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Plan, Market and Money: A Study of Circulation in Peru

ABSTRACT

This thesis reanalyses a paradigm colonial encounter, that of the Spanish conquest of Inca Peru, in the light of the theory that circulation and money are themselves class processes, which cannot be reduced to market exchange between equals.

A reading of the 16th century Spanish Visitas shows that the Andean settlement pattern of 'vertical colonies' was part of a mode of exploitation of labour based on control of the circulation of certain key goods - coca, salt, chilli, maize-alcohol. These goods, produced in the colonies, were means of payment that could be exchanged for labour in the main centres of population. Cloth, one of the main goods produced by such labour, was itself crucial in controlling the circulation of population and hence the planning of tribute under the Incas.

Three case-studies of the colonial period then examine the articulation between this Andean system, the development of the market, and attempts by the Spanish state to control circulation. It is argued that the 16th century encomienda was a mechanism for marketing the products of a planned tribute system not dissimilar to that of the Incas, and that the rapid development of the market in goods whose circulation had formerly been controlled - coca, alcohol and cloth - presented a major contradiction for the local Indian rulers. Some unpublished documentation from the archive at Huancavelica is used to analyse the conflict over the supply of forced labourers to the state's mercury mine there and, more generally, the interaction between the forces of plan and market. Finally, the legalisation of the 'Distributions of Goods' in the 18th century is seen as an attempt at state planning of the market in payment goods. The breakdown of the alliance between Spanish and Indian ruling classes in the 18th century rebellions is then reinterpreted, and some conclusions drawn on the different material ways in which circulation can be used to control labour.

E R R A T A

page	line	for	read
2	9	liverals	liberals
3	13	arguemts	arguments
7	27	joing	joint
12	10	redistirbution	redistribution
14	9	that has Polanyi has	that Polanyi has
14	24	into integrated system	into an integrated system
15	12	run	rum
17	13	Up that date	Up to that date
22	6	<u>delete line</u>	
22	7	equalities	inequalities
23	22	well" (1971:39)	well" (Frank 1971:39)
31	22	"	'
31	35	passages	passage
32	21	fetichism	fetishism
38	28	Keynsianism	Keynesianism
39	23	arrangments	arrangements
44	5	fingerprinters	fingerprints
45	27	This first condition	The first condition
47	23	proces	process
47	24	Keynes'	Keynes's
50	25	resistence	resistance
58	3	moneys	monies
58	32	analagous	analogous
60	37	envlopes	envelopes
61	29	"must have"	'must have'
61	30	"must have"	'must have'
62	36	pre-capitalis	pre-capitalist
64	2	'Marketless	"Marketless
64	3	time'	time"
64	7	simulataneously	simultaneously
66	12	still treat	still to treat
66	25	Keynsianism	Keynesianism

<i>page</i>	<i>line</i>	<i>for</i>	<i>read</i>
66	49	give use	give a use
67	23	He	She
68	7	Archmedian	Archimedian
69	18	anthropolgy	anthropology
70	3	civilisation	civilisation
77	20	asymetrical	asymmetrical
78	17	possible	possibly
82	15	form	from
82	15	<u>coca</u>	coca
96	1	Cincha	Chincha
98	29	placed	place
104	24	inca	Inca
105	20	Chucuito,	Chucuito
106	16	punsihed	punished
114	3	the the sierra	in the sierra
137	23	trying control	trying to control
141	36	wittnesses	witnesses
143	32	confliciting	conflicting
150	7	bacause	because
156	9	indicated	indicates
163	2	1937	1936
164	33	'ibid:	(ibid:
167	25	lay-brother(?)	lay-brother
174	36	clas	class
189	18	as in something	as something
194	46	<u>Relacion</u>	<u>Relación</u>
221	2	'frontiersmen to the jungle pagans'	"frontiersmen to the jungle pagans"
233	35	historial	historical
282	6	"flannel"	'flannel'
282	8	"cloth" or "clothes"	'cloth' or 'clothes'
285	3	ommission	omission
284	27	behavious	behaviour
297	4	Rebellion	Rebellion

<i>page</i>	<i>line</i>	<i>for</i>	<i>read</i>
311	13	reseach	research
324	21	knows	known
325	23	contradicitons	contradictions
326	6	as	was
335	15	Critsobal	Cristobal
336	14	<u>montana</u>	<u>montaña</u>
338	8	COMMUNIDADES	COMUNIDADES
338	17	Abrrreviations	Abbreviations
343	insert after line 29	ESTRELLA, Irene (1954) <u>Breve historia de San Pedro de Cajas.</u> Tarma, Peru.	
347	9	LANG, M.F.	LANG, M.F. (1968)
349	10	Maxime	Maxine
350	8	Asociasionist	Associationist
351	8	Insitituted	Instituted
353	2	Review	<u>Review</u>
353	18	Bureaucraft	Bureaucrat

PLAN, MARKET, AND MONEY: A STUDY OF CIRCULATION IN PERU

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy to the University of Sussex.

Barbara Bradby

September 1982

I hereby declare that this thesis
has not been submitted, either in
the same or different form, to this
or any other University for a degree.

Signature:

Pansara Bandy

dedicated to the old women of
Chucuito, who first went to the
Judge of the Province in 1567
and complained that they were
not being paid any money for
their labour of spinning

PREFACE

The field-work for this thesis was financed by a graduate student grant from the SSRC. The sources consulted in Peru are given in the notes and bibliography.

I wish to thank all those who have helped me to write this thesis by looking after my daughter, and doing other forms of domestic labour for me. My thanks are especially due to Taita Felix and Mama Rosalia Ossorio, members of the Community of Carhuapata in Huancavelica, Peru, who took us in to live with them with a generosity not often found in richer societies, and who showed me something of life outside the money economy.

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CHAPTER I

CIRCULATION AND MODES OF PRODUCTION

The past decade has seen a flurry of interest in the nature of underdevelopment and the relationship of the poor agricultural countries of the Third World to the rich, industrial countries of the First World. This interest has spanned ideological divides between those who call themselves marxists and those who do not; and it has resulted not only in the publication of numerous books and articles that try to define the nature and causes of underdevelopment, but also in the creation of new academic and political institutions to attempt to find answers to the problem. One immediate political antecedent to this resurgence of interest was the American involvement in the Vietnam War. For the first time, capitalism seemed to be on the defensive on a global scale, not just because the American-backed Saigon government ultimately lost the war, but because the attempt to uphold foreign interests by military might provoked an anti-imperialist movement in the central capitalist countries that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the bourgeois state itself.

These events provoked a recognition, among liberals and marxists alike, that the spread of capitalism and the market had produced neither the liberal vision of a world of equal commodity producers linked by the market, nor the marxist one of a mass international proletariat exploited by a single world capitalist class. While on both sides there were dissenters, the general consensus of opinion was that a condition called 'underdevelopment' could be perceived in the poor countries of the world, which of course had to be defined with respect to its opposite, 'development'.¹ Underdevelopment entailed low levels of income, of employment, of industrialisation,

and of social services such as medical care and education, while development entailed high levels of all these. It was a short step from there to the theory that in some way development and underdevelopment were structurally linked: for liberals, the problem became defined as one of structural inequality, where 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer', while for marxists it became 'the development of underdevelopment'.² The political problem in turn was redefined. For liberals, it became how to stop the national interests of the rich countries reducing the poor countries to such a degree of unemployment and poverty (coupled often with the destruction of natural resources in the poor countries) that socialist revolution would result, threatening the stability of the world order, and in particular the world market. The problem had become how to save the capitalist countries from themselves. For most marxists, the problem was simply the converse: how to utilise the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Third World for national development as a lever for the transition to socialism.

There exist excellent summaries of these debates, and it is not the intention here to produce another one.³ Rather, the rest of this chapter will attempt to show how the debate on underdevelopment has focused on the question of the relationship between market exchange and capitalism, and in so doing has neglected to look at other forms of circulation, and at their relationship to previous modes of production and to capitalism. Even under capitalism, circulation involves not just exchange-value, but also the production of certain use-values in the correct proportions to each other.⁴ As a mechanism, the market under capitalism is only partially successful in ensuring this. Historically, states have had to step in, in part simply to provide adequate use-values to ensure the reproduction of a working-class (especially in the areas of medicine, sanitation, education, etc., but also in the production of such basic

requirements as housing and heating). In the twentieth century climate of world unemployment and overpopulation, these state provisions can be dismissed as wasteful cosseting by those who argue that what is needed is a reduction in state expenditure and of real wage-levels. However, it is also clear that the market cannot on its own provide for many of the basic requirements of capitalist production itself. These include many forms of transport, energy and communications, as well as the provision of forces of discipline and control: the police, army, etc. They also include, paradoxically, the provision and control of the money supply by the state, which must be considered one of the most basic preconditions of capitalist production, and the arguments around which will be considered in Chapter II.

Subsequent chapters will reexamine a historical case that has been a paradigm in the debate on underdevelopment - the case of Peru and its integration into the world market by the Spanish Conquest of the Americas in the 16th century. They will argue that this integration was not as complete or uncomplicated as has often been assumed, but instead involved class conflicts of various kinds about the control of circulation. The question of what was to be exchanged with what, and of who was to be allowed to exchange it, become crucial ones, not just in themselves, but as a key to understanding how modes of production were organised, and how they became articulated with each other in the colonial period. In relation to the debate on underdevelopment, the thesis as a whole will attempt to demonstrate what I argued at an abstract level in the research outline to the project (Bradby 1975): namely that there is no necessary connection between the destruction of pre-capitalist methods of production and the spread of capitalist ones, and that the gap thereby opened up will not necessarily be filled by capitalist development. In addition, the research outline proposed that the effects of the import of particular use-values into a pre-capitalist mode of production was an important object

of study. Too much attention has been paid to the effects of organising export production for the world market in the colonial countries, and too little to the impact of what was imported in exchange. However, there are two important differences between the position argued in this thesis and the one argued in 1975. Firstly, the 1975 article wrongly assumed that the spread of the market, and in particular the creation of the world market by the discovery of the Americas, can be equated with the 'expansion of capitalism'. Secondly, the article proposed to study the impact of the import of particular use-values to pre-capitalist modes of production as they reacted directly on production, basically through competition. My position now would be that the historical study of Peru shows that it is necessary first to look at the intervening stage: the effect both of imports and of internal marketing of commodities on the mode of circulation prevailing in the pre-capitalist economy.

1. The Equation of Circulation with Exchange in the Debate on Modes of Production and Underdevelopment

The position of Gunder Frank with respect to the relationship between capitalism, the market, and underdevelopment is well-known and a point of reference for much subsequent writing. For Frank, contact with the world market is equivalent to contact with capitalism.⁵ Underdeveloped countries such as those of Latin America today are not suffering from vestiges of 'feudalism' or of 'traditional, subsistence' forms of economy, which could be said to be blocking the development of capitalism (1971:249-275). Rather, they have been capitalist ever since the Spanish Conquest opened them up to the market. In Frank's view, the problem of underdevelopment stems rather from the structure of the capitalist market itself, which is such as to integrate peripheral areas as 'satellites' from where surplus can be extracted through the market to the metropolitan countries (ibid: 27-36). The mechanism of surplus extraction is the market itself

and the way national and class interests become clustered around certain positions in the world market (ibid:42). To be successful, any programme to find a way out of underdevelopment must break the links of the national bourgeoisie to the international market (ibid:140-145).⁶

While Frank attempted to rewrite Latin American history in terms of this reduction of market exchange to capitalism, Wallerstein has since tried to do the same thing for the whole world, arguing that the significant moment in the development of the "modern world-system" was the formation of a "capitalist world-economy" in the 16th century (1980: 7-8). This world-economy involves a world division of labour where producers are linked through trade, and where economic boundaries transcend national and political ones. For Wallerstein, as for Frank, underdevelopment is explained by a mechanism of surplus extraction operating from periphery to core countries, but his argument depends strongly on the idea that the operation of the market reinforces whatever hierarchies of skill and of capitalisation are in existence between countries at the dawn of the world-economy (1974:350).

Three refinements of this theory of the relationship between capitalism, the market, and underdevelopment are worth mentioning, since they all try in one way or another to link it into a theory of capitalist production. One is Emmanuel's theory of "unequal exchange", (1972), which argues from a Ricardian perspective that immobility of labour between countries makes it possible for high-wage countries to extract surplus-value from low-wage countries simply by exchanging products. The argument has been well criticised by Bettelheim (1972), but its fundamental illogicality seems to be that if wage-costs are lower in the peripheral countries, then, with international mobility of capital,⁷ all capital should emigrate there and 'unequal exchange' would cease.⁸

A second refinement is that of Kay, who argued, in a phrase by now well-known, that "capital created underdevelopment, not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough" (1975:page x)⁹. What he meant by this was that for too long the underdeveloped countries had been under the sway of "merchant capital", which had by itself been incapable of making the transition to industrialisation. This domination by capital operating purely in the sphere of the market had not only impeded the development of industry, but at the same time had monetised the economy and thereby undermined traditional systems of property and the relations of production based on them. Labour was attracted to the commercial centres in the towns even when there were no jobs for them (ibid:155-156).

A third refinement of the theory that underdevelopment is created by contact with the market is closer to Frank's original position and is perhaps best seen in the work of Samir Amin (1976). Its central tenet has been neatly summed up by Kay: the integration of the colonised nations into the world economy turned them into countries "producing goods they never used and using goods they could not produce" (Kay 1975:9).¹⁰ Production and consumption are therefore dislocated in the underdeveloped countries, so that there is no possibility of what Amin calls 'autocentric' development there, such as took place in the industrialised centre. Instead the economies at the periphery are 'blocked' in the sense that they continually transfer their linkage effects to the centre countries, thereby enhancing accumulation there and blocking their own possibilities of development.¹¹

All these theories were novel in that they attempted to define underdevelopment, not as the natural state of all societies apart from those which have been lucky enough to

undergo capitalist development, but as part and parcel of the development of capitalism in the industrial countries. All of them assumed that the market was capitalist, and that contact with the market integrated a country into a part of the capitalist world. The theories were, and still are, open to obvious empirical objections. They have difficulty in accounting for core capitalist countries that are large producers of agricultural goods, such as Denmark, or the achievement of 'developed' status by former agricultural colonies, such as New Zealand; the development of the USA itself from being a mere colony on the periphery of the world market to being the dominant capitalist power is one on which the theories do not dwell overmuch.

The theories were also easy to criticise from a marxist perspective. Marx had always insisted on the primacy of production relations over those of exchange, and the equation of commodity exchange with capitalism was a fairly easy target. Parallelling the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe that had taken place between Sweezy, Dobb and others in the 1950s, Laclau (1971) argued, as Dobb had done, that the distinguishing feature of capitalism was not market exchange but wage-labour, and that the spread of commodity exchange was quite capable of reinforcing rather than undermining pre-capitalist relations of production.¹² This opened the way to many versions of the theory of "articulation of modes of production", in which capitalism and a pre-capitalist mode were conceived of as linked like two limbs by a joint, the joining in this case being the market.¹³

It is fair to say that in all the theories of articulation the market is seen as the link between the capitalist and the pre-capitalist mode. However, within this broad statement, there are two rather different ways in which this link is seen as being established.¹⁴ The first is that of Laclau already mentioned, who saw the "growing demands of the world market" for primary products as necessitating an expansion of

production in producer-areas such as Latin America, an expansion that had to take place on the basis of feudal or slave relations of production, since no others yet existed (1971:30). This theory can be traced back to much older debates, about the nature of plantation slavery in North America, about the so-called 'second serfdom' in eastern Europe, and on the development of capitalism in Russia.¹⁵ It seemed a plausible way of looking at the anomalies of slave plantations and feudal estates existing within, and producing for, the capitalist market. This variant of articulation, then, sees the pre-capitalist mode as being linked to capitalism because the products of the estate or plantation are themselves sold on the market. Rey, one of the most enthusiastic exponents of the theory of articulation of modes of production, went so far as to say that it was generally a stage in the development of capitalism in colonial countries.¹⁶

The second variant is very similar to Lewis's influential model of "economic development with unlimited supplies of labour", which earned itself the label 'dualist' in the 1960s, and against which both 'dependency theory' and theories of 'articulation' were originally reacting (Lewis 1954). It sees the link between the two modes of production as being set up through migration for wage-labour from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist sector, and migration back again when the immediate period of labour is over (Meillassoux 1972; Wolpe 1972). This migration back to the pre-capitalist area occurs because the capitalist wage given to migrant labour in underdeveloped countries does not cover the full costs of reproduction of labour-power. That is, it covers only the immediate living requirements of the labourer during the time he or she is staying in the town, mine, or plantation where the capitalist enterprise is located; it covers neither the worker's old age, nor periods of illness or unemployment (Meillassoux 1972:103).

Nor does it in general cover the cost of rearing another generation of workers, which is another cost that is met by the pre-capitalist sector.

This relationship between sectors has been formalised by Wolpe in his analysis of the functioning of apartheid as an economic system in South Africa. He argues that the introduction of apartheid, and the adoption of an ideology of 'independent development' by the South African government marks a break with the simple ideology of white racial superiority that had preceded it. The setting up of puppet governments in the 'independent' Bantustans was a logical development designed to halt the economic decline in the African Reserves. This economic decline, caused by overpopulation, soil exhaustion, overgrazing, and an incipient differentiation of the peasantry, was threatening to render the Reserves incapable of providing for the long-term reproduction of the migrant labour force in the way assumed by the level of wages being paid. Since the low wages were essential to the maintenance of the rate of profit in the capitalist sector, the state was forced to intervene to preserve the pre-capitalist sector in some form (Wolpe 1972).

In this second variant of articulation, the relationship with capitalism is still established through exchange, but rather than the exchange being that of a commodity produced for the market on the basis of pre-capitalist relations, the pre-capitalist sector provides labour-power which is exchanged with the capitalist sector in return for the wage. In both variants, the relationship with capitalism is established through the market, and market exchange is the only form of circulation considered.

These theories of articulation have been trenchantly criticised by Banaji (1977) who argues that they tend to operate at the wrong level of abstraction. Concepts such as

slave-labour, money, wage-labour are "simple abstractions" and to use them to characterise whole processes of social production is either trivial or false. Rather, Banaji urges us to look at the "laws of motion" of the system as a whole, by which he appears to mean the rules that govern the operation of the producing enterprise, what form the surplus takes, and the reproduction of the system as a whole. Banaji's main contribution to concrete analysis in this article is his characterisation of feudalism as a system that reached its most developed form in the "commodity feudalism" of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe (1977:24). Only on the basis of surplus production for the market did feudalism "crystallise" as a system in which peasant production lost all the autonomy it had had in large areas of Europe during medieval feudalism, so that peasant plots were reduced to a function of "simple reproduction" of the peasantry, all of whose surplus labour was expended on the lord's demesne (ibid:27).

Banaji clearly does not equate the market with capitalism, then, since it is equally compatible with feudalism. "Commodity feudalism" emerged sporadically on the best-managed estates of medieval Europe but "crystallised" centuries later in Eastern Europe. Similar developments took place in Latin America, and these estates again cannot simply be characterised as capitalist because they were producing for the market (ibid:27). What then were these "laws of motion" that the feudal estates producing for the market obeyed? Banaji tells us that they were

laws deriving not from the compulsion to accumulate, but from the compulsion to defend and improve social consumption levels which rapidly lost their patriarchal (non-monetary) character, if they had had such a character to begin with (ibid:27).

The lords experienced a "thirst for cash" (ibid:28) in order to finance their "habits of generosity, display and consumption" (ibid 19). The Spanish Conquest of America becomes explicable

not as the expansion of a market, that was capitalist nearly three hundred years before the Industrial Revolution, but as a "feudal colonization, a response to the crisis of feudal profitability...of the sixteenth century" (ibid:31).

Here it seems that we do have an incipient description of a mode of circulation of products that is not simply that of exchange. Although the feudal lords described by Banaji buy luxury goods on the market, their circulation within the manorial economy is different: it obeys laws of "generosity" and of "ostentatious consumption". This is a very familiar conception of feudalism as not reinvesting the surplus productively but consuming it in luxury expenditure which comes to be seen as 'irrational' from the capitalist point of view. It is similar, for instance, to Genovese's description of the patriarchal consumption habits of the slave-owning aristocracy of the North American deep south before the Civil War (1966). These descriptions are not entirely convincing, since they fail to locate feudal consumption habits as serving any material purpose in the mode of production. Ultimately one has to ask why they were not simply overtaken by the 'protestant ethic' and transformed into productive investment to increase 'relative surplus-value'.¹⁷

This overview of the debate on capitalism and underdevelopment has concentrated on writers who consider themselves marxist, but the conclusion that exchange is the only form of circulation considered would be true a fortiori of liberal writers. In concentrating on the relationship between market exchange and capitalism, even those who argued that the market was not necessarily an indication of capitalist relations failed to consider circulation as anything other than free market exchange. The next section will look at some possibilities for analysing different forms of circulation.

2. Modes of Circulation

Perhaps the one economic theorist who has seriously tried to differentiate forms of economy from each other on the basis of criteria derived from the sphere of circulation is Karl Polanyi. In "The Economy as Instituted Process" he sets out three different patterns of economic integration - reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange. Each of these patterns assumes an institutional support - symmetrical social groupings in the case of reciprocity, social centralisation in the case of redistribution, and a system of markets in the case of exchange. Polanyi's object of study is then "the manner in which the economic process is instituted at different times and places" (1968:148). This would imply that Polanyi indeed had a theory for differentiating empirical forms of economy, but in fact he makes much more limited claims for his typology, saying that it is often impossible to select one of his forms of integration as the dominant one in a society, since they often "occur side by side and on different levels...of the economy" (ibid:148). He illustrates what this means with examples: reciprocity, dominant in some primitive economies, also played a subsidiary role in archaic empires based on redistribution; redistribution is gaining ground in the modern industrial states, the Soviet Union being an extreme example, while markets recede in importance (ibid:156-157).

The difficulty with using Polanyi's typology as a theory is that since all the patterns of integration may occur in one economy, we have to bring in different criteria to decide which is the dominant one. It is quite possible to discern the three patterns within our own economy, with market exchange existing side by side with state redistribution, and with a combination of reciprocity and redistribution in the domestic sphere. If we decide that market exchange is the dominant pattern of integration, this is not because quantitatively 'more' circulation takes place through the market, which

in any case we have no way of knowing, since goods produced in the capitalist sphere are in no way commensurable with the products of domestic labour; it is rather because without the production-for-exchange of the capitalist sphere, neither of the other two spheres could exist. But our criterion is then derived from the theory of production, and not just from looking at forms of circulation. Polanyi himself has to use outside labels to identify the economies he is talking about when applying his typology. He talks of modern industrial states, of feudalism, and of tribal and archaic economies.

Polanyi's methodology has been roundly criticised by two structuralist marxists, Dupré and Rey (1974), for remaining at the 'ideal' level of exchange, and failing to look at the 'real' process of production underlying exchange.¹⁸ This is an easy criticism to make, and is a logical criticism that can be made of any exchange theory, since goods that are exchanged must first have been produced. The curious thing about Dupré and Rey's piece is that having taken up half the article in criticising Polanyi, they then go on in the second half to produce an analysis of the slave trade on the western coast of Africa which is in some respects almost identical to that in Polanyi's essay Dahomey and the Slave Trade (1966), a work which they do not refer to.

Polanyi's account of the 18th century kingdom of Dahomey is the spectacular story of how one small west African tribe grew very rapidly to dominate its neighbours, to whom up till then it had been subject, on the basis of the conquest of Whydah, which became an important port of call for the slave trade. Whydah is on the strip of coast that became known as the Slave Coast, on the Bight of Benin. Contrary to popular belief, African slaves were not obtained on the whole by European slave-raids, but were traded to the Europeans by numerous small but powerful African kingdoms, each of which controlled

a trade port. The crucial goods that the Europeans had to offer in exchange were guns. At the beginning of the 18th century, Dahomey had been in a tributary status to the inland Oyo tribe, whose territory is in present-day Nigeria. Part of this tribute was an annual consignment of 41 cases of 41 guns. Presumably by themselves making use of these guns, the people of Dahomey achieved independence, and were themselves able to organise slave-raids into the interior. According to the formalised account that has Polanyi has reproduced, the kings of Dahomey organised these wars once a year, with an army making use of elephants, and in which both men and women fought. The annual wars were preceded by a lavish period of feasting at the king's expense, during which, apart from food and drink, the king distributed rum, cowries and cloth to the people. All slaves automatically became property of the king, and the Europeans had to conduct all trade through him. Formally, the captured slaves were distributed in the ratio of one third to the royal estates, one third to the hereditary nobility, and one third for foreign trade.

Markets existed in Dahomey, but did not have the "institutional support" of an integrated market system. In other words, they were not markets as we know them, governed by supply and demand, mechanisms which link geographically dispersed markets into integrated system. Rather they were state controlled, with state officials who fixed prices and enforced the use of the state currency of cowrie-shells. Their main purpose seems to have been to provide food for state workers.

A market-system did not exist, therefore, in Dahomey, and Polanyi sets out to answer the question how, in the absence of such a system, such a vast and profitable trade in slaves could take place. Although he uses his patterns of integration, particularly those of reciprocity and redistribution, his concept of 'administered trade' is more central to the analysis.

This involved the channelling of all trade through the king, which was achieved by the strict separation of internal and external exchange, the port of Whydah being on the swampy coast, 30 miles from the royal court and centres of population. The effectiveness of the state currency, cowrie-shells, was assured by the strict control of their import through the port of Whydah. Although cowries could be found locally, the ones used as currency were brought from East Africa, clearly so that their supply could be controlled. In return for the right to trade, the Europeans had to bring gifts to the king, usually consisting of what became known as a 'sorting' of three goods - cowries, run, and cloth.

The corollary of this tight control of external trade was that all internal movement of goods had to be strictly controlled. State carriers were given little cloth passports with a secret individual identification woven into it, which had to tally with one kept at each customs post. Accounts were kept with pebbles, under a double-checking system whereby pebbles both accompanied each consignment of goods and were kept for recording at the royal court; according to the early European accounts, these pebble records were kept by the numerous women at the court, the wives of the king. Each male state official was paired with a woman of the court, who checked on all his movements and transactions.

Despite their criticism of Polanyi, Dupré and Rey's account of the operation of the slave trade further south in Congo-Brazzaville has many similarities with his. They too emphasise that the Europeans obtained slaves through trade, rather than direct raiding (1980:153); they point out that "to each trade port there corresponded a kingdom" and their analysis of how trade "could only reinforce royal power" (ibid:152) could be given as a very accurate summing-up of Polanyi's book. They also use a concept of "control of trade" (ibid:153) which is actually very similar to Polanyi's

'administered trade'. An additional factor in their analysis is the role they give to the circulation of "elite goods" in the society, which flow in a reverse direction to the flow of men and women as slaves (ibid:146). Through this concept they open the way to an understanding of how the African kings could themselves obtain slaves through trade; this seems more probable than the suggestion of annual slave-raids conducted by an army including women riding elephants, which Polanyi reproduces, relying on the accounts - doubtless exaggerated - of contemporary Europeans.¹⁹

:

Now according to Dupré and Rey these elite goods were the means for the elders in the "lineage society" to control the young men:²⁰

To control trade is to control the access of the chiefs of dependent lineages to the elite goods, that is, to control these lineage chiefs' own control of the reproduction of their dependence group and of the group's dependence (ibid:153).

We may well ask, then, what are these elite goods which, partly through their functioning as dowry goods, continually reproduce dependence on the older men. At one point, Dupré and Rey tell us that they are goods that "are not perishable and which circulate without being consumed" and give a list of examples of such goods drawn from world anthropology (ibid:146). With relation to the Congo, they mention two "elite goods": iron, and raffia loin-cloths (ibid:147). However, both these goods are quite clearly consumed. Iron is used to make such important goods as "the smith's hammer and anvil"; it is directly monopolised by the elders, although wooden tools can circulate freely (ibid). Raffia loin-cloths are described as "simple goods for consumption" (ibid), and are therefore, presumably, worn. These "elite goods", then, do not represent a meaningless exchange of goods which are never consumed; if they were it seems that it would be very easy for the young men and women to

free themselves from dependence on the elders. On the contrary, cloth is a primary necessity, and iron is the principal raw material of labour-saving tools.

One other vital element in trade between the elders is mentioned by Dupré and Rey, although they do not actually define it as an elite good, and that is salt. They explain that

The function exercised by the exchange of men in lineage societies...was to be disturbed from even before the period of trade by an asymmetry between the interior and the coast: it is in fact the coastal people who produce sea salt, by craft processes which preceded the arrival of the Portuguese and which stayed roughly the same up to the 1930s. Up that date, throughout the whole period of trade and the beginnings of the colonial period, the salt produced in this way remained an essential element of exchange 'between partners' from the coast to the interior (ibid: 152).

They state that

This asymmetry, reinforced by the arrival of European products during the trade period, turned the circulation of slaves in the direction of interior to coast (ibid).

This is particularly significant (although the authors do not integrate it into their analysis) since salt is clearly not a good that circulates without being consumed, but is a necessity for life itself, and a commodity which was generally in very short supply in tropical Africa. An article on the history of salt states that

In tropical Africa catastrophic and persistent salt scarcity reduced men to...primitive bondage...making salt even more precious than the most elementary freedom. Families in the African interior sold their kith and kin for a handful of salt, first to the desert traders who supplied the Middle East with human cattle, and later, from the 17th to the 19th century, to European traders for transport to America. A traveller in West Africa reported that he was offered a young girl for four loaves of salt as recently as 1882 (Bloch 1976:347).

Given this evidence on the importance of salt in the slave trade, it would seem to be significant that Whydah, the port wrested by the kings of Dahomey from control by their inland neighbours of Ardra in 1727, was another of these coastal sites for salt production; and that Polanyi mentions, almost as an aside, that the kings of Dahomey taxed salt, and "from the proceeds of this tax the king supplied his household, perhaps also the army" (1966:46). Considering that the king's "household" consisted of thousands of permanent 'wives' and officials, and that the feasts before the annual warring expeditions are said to have been given for 30,000 to 40,000 people, this tax must have been considerable, even allowing for exaggeration in the figures.

Several conclusions can now be drawn from this analysis of the West African slave trade. Firstly, it seems that, contrary to the prevalent assumptions of 'underconsumptionist' theorising about capitalist expansion, the 18th century merchants were not going to Africa in order to find a market for the surplus produced by the beginnings of capitalist industry.²¹ The goods required by the African kings were highly specific. The exchange set up was not simply one of abstract exchange-values; on the contrary, only the 'sorting', the offering of the right use-values, would obtain the slaves, the commodity required by the Europeans. Trade in guns, too, seems to have been of vital importance. The slave trade may well have actually stimulated the production of cloth in Europe to meet this demand, and certainly forced the traders to deal in goods like cowrie-shells, which had no possible relation to capitalist production.

Secondly, the power of the kings of Dahomey depended, as Polanyi has pointed out, on a very strict control of both internal and external circulation, and on a rigid separation of these spheres. The material basis to this control

lay probably in control of the salt supply, the centre of whose production was in the coastal swamps, and therefore relatively easy to protect from the population 30 miles away in the hills. The import of iron and guns seems to have been important to the ability of the kings to reproduce their control, and the army, which does not appear to have been a standing army, was kept loyal by payments in rum, cowries, and cloth. It is probable that the introduction of cowrie-shells as enforceable state currency was, as in many other situations, a device for paying the army.²² This was not necessarily inflationary, but removed from the state the need to actually organise the whole process of production of supplies for the army. This could be done through markets, which had, however, to be strictly controlled by the state, in order to prevent the development of private exchange.

3. The Use of Historical Examples

It is possible to see this example of 18th century Dahomey as just a museum piece - as a unique example of the strange forms of economic organisation that have prevailed in what Polanyi called 'archaic' societies. Polanyi was always tentative about drawing general conclusions from his work, but he did claim some generality for his concept of administered trade, and did see the question of how this kind of controlled trade ever became linked to a market-system as a vital one to any understanding of economic history (see below, Chapter II, section 2).

In the theories of underdevelopment that we looked at in Section 1 of this chapter, the use of historical examples raises many problems. There is a very noticeable vagueness in specifying the century they are talking about on the part of many of the authors referred to. In part, this is because the 19th century situation of colonialism and imperialism is read back into the earlier period of formation of the world market, and the whole becomes one indistinguishable sweep of the

'expansion of capitalism'. This results in particular anomalies in the case of the Spanish Conquest of South America and the colonial period that followed it. It was nonsense to describe Columbus's voyages as 'the expansion of capitalism', and yet the search for raw materials that could be exported back to the metropolis as commodities had much in common with the later developments. The case of the Conquest of Peru seemed of particular significance in this respect, since through the discovery of the gold of the Incas²³ and the silver-mines of Potosí, money poured into Spain, and through Spain into Europe and beyond, and this money was an obvious precondition of the expansion of commodity production that resulted in capitalism.²⁴ But professional historians have stuck to the line that the conquest of Peru was part of a feudal expansion.²⁵ The role of the silver imports in paying the debts of the kings of Spain is well documented, as well as the minting of money to pay the army.²⁶

In what follows, we will therefore take the historical case of Peru and look first at the indigenous mode of production, which was that of the Inca Empire when the Spaniards arrived; we will then go on to look at the articulation of modes of production that was set up in the colonial period, in which the Spanish had to rely on 'indirect rule' through the native Indian ruling class in order to gain access to labour and its products. Since the Spanish tried to control foreign trade and, it will be argued, the local Indian nobility tried to control internal trade, the resulting complex can be analysed as a series of situations in which attempts to plan production for these two circuits came up against uncontrolled market forces. In these attempts various use-values emerge as important, which bear a striking resemblance to the ones found by Polanyi in his account of Dahomey: in the beginning, salt; later on, alcohol and cloth; shells, too, were used in Inca times, though their origins and precise functions

are still a mystery; in addition, there is the very important Andean good, coca, a leaf which is chewed still today by most of the mountain population, and which is mildly addictive, being the plant from which cocaine is extracted. In the conclusion to the thesis, we shall try and give some reasons why such similar goods should emerge as important over such a vast geographical and social divide.

can lead to crisis. He elaborated a simple model of the economy as consisting of two 'departments': Department I making producer-goods, and Department II making consumer-goods (1957:514-517). This model has led to much controversy some of which was discussed in Bradby (1975). The model has also been used by a school of economists, who consider themselves marxists, but are generally known as 'neo-ricardians', in order to develop an input-output model of the capitalist economy, which is fundamentally different from Marx's in that it has no special place for money, which in their model might be any commodity (see Steedman 1981, and the criticism in Bradby 1982a).

5. This position, usually attributed to Frank, is perhaps more explicitly stated in Wallerstein (1974;1980). However, it is clearly implied in passages such as the following: "Spanish and Portuguese merchant capital...based on the Iberian Peninsula and in search of trade routes to the Indies and gold, conquered some West Indian and coastal continental outposts and converted these into their mercantile satellites through war, slave raids, pillage, the creation of slave-fed mining and plantation export enterprises, and gradually through trade relations as well" (1971:39); or in another passage: "Essentially the same relations characterize the relationship between the large industrial firm...and smaller suppliers of components for the former's productive process...; between the large merchants and financiers and the small traders and moneylenders; between the city merchants and merchant landowners ...; (ibid:41). The latter quotation is given as an explanatory example of what is meant by "metropolis-satellite" relations, and shows how, for Frank, the relation of surplus extraction is established between the industrial capitalist and smaller capitalists, not between capitalist and work-force.

6. It is a curious paradox that most theories that equate capitalism with market exchange tend to deny that such a thing as free trade ever existed. Frank's argument relies heavily on the assertion that capitalism has been based on monopolies ever since its inception (e.g. Frank 1971:41-42). In fact, because trade itself has no dynamic, Frank is forced to bring in its opposite as an explanatory factor: "The capitalist metropolis-satellite relationship between Europe and Latin America was established by force of arms. And it is by this same force as well as by the force of ever-growing economic and other ties that this relationship has been maintained to this day" (ibid:45). One may well ask: if force is a necessary condition of the maintenance of underdevelopment, why can it not also be said to be a sufficient one? The explanation in terms of the market is ultimately redundant in Frank's analysis.

7. This is an assumption of Emmanuel's model.

8. For another critique, see Kay (1975:108-119).

NOTES

1. For extreme 'liberals' such as Milton Friedman and the so-called 'Chicago boys', there is no such thing as an endemic 'underdevelopment': if the capitalist market is allowed free rein, and not opposed by nationalist interests, international equalities not opposed by nationalist interests, international equalities will be ironed out. The fact that this 'freedom' may have to be imposed by foreign bombs, and by mass tortures and executions, as happened in Chile in 1972 prior to the entry of the Chicago team, can be cynically ignored by the theorists, who abstract from all political 'distortions' to their model. On the marxist side, the most interesting and consistent dissenter from the theory that underdevelopment is caused by capitalism was Bill Warren. He has attempted to show that, contrary to popular belief, levels of income, education, health, industrialisation and the commercialisation of agriculture have all increased in the Third World since the second World War; that this is largely due to the progressive penetration of foreign investment in these countries; and that the resulting impact and devastation involved in the creation of a proletariat are very similar to those described by Marx for 19th century Britain (1980:Chapter 8). He traces both the 'liberal development' approach and the marxist 'anti-imperialist' approach to the influence of nationalism on Lenin's work on imperialism. Lenin had equivocated between the theory expressed in the title of his book, Imperialism: Highest Stage of Capitalism (the theory that capital had a historic mission to industrialise the whole world), and the theory that, by the late 19th century, capitalism had entered a stage of 'monopoly capitalism' in which national interests and the parasitism of 'finance capital' had reduced the relationship between the capitalist and non-capitalist countries to one of plundering and swindling (ibid: Chapter 3). Warren argues that both modern marxists and liberals have inherited this conception and are simply unwilling to face up to the unpleasant consequences of capitalist development, instead preferring to maintain the underdeveloped world in a state of economic backwardness that their own societies have already escaped from.

2. The phrase was used by Gunder Frank in the section headings of Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1971).

3. See for instance Agarwala and Singh (1958), Rhodes (1970), Bernstein (1973), Kay (1975), Foster-Carter (1978), Warren (1980).

4. In Volume II of Capital, Marx is concerned to show how the divergence between the circuit of capital as use-values, and the circuit of capital as exchange-value, or money-capital,

9. Kay would no doubt resent being bracketed with the other authors in this section. Nevertheless, his theory of merchant capital is in a way the centerpiece of his argument in the book, and the subsequent chapter on industrial capital is rather weak by comparison. For a general critique of the theory that capitalism developed (or underdeveloped) because of trade and merchant capital, see Brenner (1977).
10. The description was actually intended by Kay for the thinking of the whole school of 'dependency' theorists, of which Frank is one of the most important members.
11. Elson has written a useful review of Amin's work (1977:126-129).
12. The major articles from the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism have been republished, edited by Hilton (1976).
13. Foster-Carter has a brief discussion of the origins in structuralist Marxism and the ambiguity of the verb to 'articulate' in both French and English (1978:52-53).
14. The discussion presented here does not pretend to be a full discussion of theories of 'articulation'. For a comprehensive survey, see Foster-Carter (1978).
15. A brief survey of the positions on plantation slavery adopted by Marx and early 20th century marxists is given in Banaji (1977:15). For a more recent discussion, see Genovese (1966;1970). Many of the articles from the debate on the transition to capitalism, edited by Hilton (1976), discuss the 'second serfdom'. Kula's book sets out a model of the feudal economy as it prevailed in Poland between the 16th and 18th centuries (1970). Other recent discussions of the 'second serfdom' are to be found in Banaji (1977:22-29), Brenner (1977:68-73), and Wallerstein (1980:134-140). On the development of capitalism in Russia, see Lenin (1907;1964), and Kautsky (1970).
16. Rey in fact has two stages of articulation: the first is where the pre-capitalist mode is still dominant, so that contact with capitalism reinforces it (i.e. the one described in this paragraph in the text); the second stage is where capitalism 'takes root' and itself becomes the dominant partner (1976:82-87, 123,159). For discussion and criticism, see Bradby (1975) and Foster-Carter (1978).
17. The concepts of 'irrationality' and of the 'protestant ethic' derive from Max Weber (1965).
18. See also the discussion in Hindess and Hirst (1975:25-26, 261-262).

19. Colonial writers have often been accused by modern feminist writers of failing to 'see' the importance of women's role in pre-capitalist societies when they were first contacted by Europeans. On the contrary, it seems that in order to impress people in Europe with the exotic nature of primitive society, the most important thing to do was to say that in some way, women 'ruled'. It is possible that these female warriors really existed in Dahomey; but the highly formalised accounts suggest rather that they are another variant of the male myth of the 'Amazons'.

20. Molyneux (1977) has criticised the notion that control in these lineage societies was exerted primarily by older men over younger ones, and has pointed both to the way in which women were controlled in the society, and to the fact that the dowries, which were supposed to be the key element in the mechanism whereby older men extracted a surplus from younger ones, were in fact produced mainly by women's labour.

21. The classic statement of the 'underconsumptionist' position is Rosa Luxemburg (1951, 1972). The classic criticism is in Bukharin (1972). For a modern discussion of Luxemburg's theories, see Bradby (1975, section II). Modern 'underconsumptionism' is set out in Baran and Sweezy (1966).

22. Polanyi (1957) describes how in the fourth century B.C. the use of mercenaries in Greek armies raised problems of food supply during campaigns. Food markets were set up in the cities, the soldiers bought supplies there, and the money they spent could be used by those selling goods to buy booty when they returned. In 364 B.C. General Timotheus used leather tokens to buy supplies for his troops, which could later be redeemed against booty in the same way as metal money (Polanyi 1957:86). Weber writes that the Phoenician traders in ancient times did not in fact use money. Money came in along the north coast of Africa when the central Roman state paid its mercenaries with money in the campaign to conquer Carthage in the 3rd century B.C. (Weber 1961: Chapter XIX). The Persian empire is also said to have started minting money in order to pay its soldiers (ibid:179). Nearer to modern times, one of the needs of the Spanish kings and emperors in the 16th century for precious metals was in order to mint coin to pay their armies (Vilar 1976:146). This was in part because a complete change had taken place in the organisation of the army during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, at the end of the 15th century (Stewart 1969). Instead of levying regional armies together with their supplies, on a decentralised feudal basis, in the new system the army was centralised under royal control, even though troops were still raised by levy. Crucial in the reorganisation was the payment system, which was in money, and required the innovations of

accounting and of subdivisions of the army consisting of 50 and 100 men. A paymaster was appointed for each 100 men. In Seville, uniforms were brought in to distinguish commanders from their men. Stewart explains that this system of ranking by uniforms grew out of the need to keep separate pay records of payments to officers and to men (1969:283).

23. To give an indication of the impact of the discovery of gold in the Americas, Vilar writes that "all the gold available in Europe in 1500...would have measured only 2 metres each way (8 cubic metres)" (1976:19). Atahualpa's ransom and the pillaging of other Inca treasures formed a considerable part of the gold imported into Europe in the 1530s (ibid:110).

24. See Hamilton (1934).

25. See Vilar (1971).

26. Vilar (1976:144-154).

CHAPTER II

MONEY AND THE CONTROL OF CIRCULATION

This chapter will examine two theories of the role of money in circulation. The first appeals to an intuitive idea of money as the facilitator of commodity exchange; it will be argued that this 'common sense' theory of money is shared both by Simmel (1978), a leading liberal philosopher of money, and by those who in other respects have been concerned to demolish liberal illusions, Marx and his followers. The second theory has been developed by Rudi Bloch (1977), in the tradition of Knapp (1924) and Keynes (1935). It takes as its theoretical and historical starting point the creation of money in the process of taxation by a centralised state. Both Bloch and Keynes attempt some reconciliation of the 'state' theory with the theory of money as means of exchange. Bloch does so in a historical perspective, while Keynes looks at modern monetary phenomena. However, it will be seen that the two theories relate to two different modes of circulation, that are not necessarily reconcilable in the real world. This is evidenced by the current preoccupation in politics with the relationship between the state and money,¹ and has led the most radical of the monetarists to call for the "denationalisation of money" (Hayek 1978). Subsequent chapters will trace the conflict between

different modes of circulation through various periods of Peruvian history, and look at the historical role of money in attempts to control circulation.

1. The Barter Myth of the Origins of Money

The myth of the origins of money in barter has two important aspects: one is the story that money grew up to facilitate exchange between independent producers of commodities; the other is the assumption that money must once have been itself a valuable commodity, even if it no longer is today. Both of them can be found in Simmel's The Philosophy of Money (1977). He writes, for instance, that

exchange was at first necessarily exchange in kind, and exchange between direct values...One assumes that objects that were frequently exchanged and circulated because of their general desirability...were psychologically most suited to become general standards of value (Simmel 1977: 142).

According to this myth, value originates in exchange, and the object that is most frequently exchanged will become money. What is more, the object chosen as money must itself have value:

Money could not have developed as a means of exchange... unless its material substance had been experienced as immediately valuable (ibid:142-143).

A sort of teleological development of money through history can then be deduced from these premises:

Modern commerce tends more and more to eliminate money as a substantial embodiment of value (ibid:143),

and we witness

the increasing replacement of metal money by paper money and the various forms of credit (ibid.).

What is seen as necessary or valuable will vary considerably as between different societies, so that, according to Simmel, primitive people invest forms of decoration with a value that

we cannot understand. This is how Simmel explains the fact that many primitive peoples use shells as money. For him strung shells are the "lowest stage" of money, and are followed by iron bars, as people begin to place more value on metals (ibid: 144).

In other words, if we are to understand the nature of the token and credit money that we use today, we must reconstruct a vanished history in which money has developed from a commodity which itself had value and was frequently exchanged. That this history is pure myth is suggested by Simmel's use of phrases such as "one assumes that..." or "in the beginning it must have been ..." (ibid:142). His construction of a historical model which assumes the status of myth is highly reminiscent of Engels's controversial exposition of the historical development of value, in his Appendix to Volume Three of Marx's Capital. Engels too, starts his account of the development of exchange out of the natural economy of the primitive commune, and of the development of money out of exchange, with the words "We all know that..." (1959:897). His very literal reading of Marx's logic as history has not met with the approval of historians, who in general do not accept that the three or four centuries between the decline of medieval feudalism and the rise of industrial capitalism can be characterised as ones of "simple commodity production" (Sweezy 1976). On the whole, defenders of Marx have taken the point² and have argued forcefully that Marx did not intend his use of the example of pre-capitalist commodity production to be taken literally as history. Engels is accused of having vulgarised Marx, since he believed,

incorrectly, that Marx's method was 'logical-historical'; i.e. that Marx developed his concepts in logic in the same order as they present themselves in history (Weeks 1981: 98).

It has been pointed out that Marx says in the opening paragraph of Capital that his starting-point is the commodity because wealth presents itself as commodities in "those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails" (1954:43). Banaji argues that this means that "capital is presupposed" right from the beginning of Marx's analysis of the commodity (1979:29).

Similarly, Weeks argues that

Marx's treatment of value in the first chapter of Capital presupposes capitalist relations of production (1981:98),

and goes on to argue that "his discussion of money is specific to capitalist relations" (ibid).

There are considerable difficulties with this line of argument. Banaji (with fairly good authority in Marx) has to argue that the concept of capital is both the presupposition and the result of Marx's analysis of the commodity (1979:30). But even if we were prepared to accept this dialectical logic as something different from the teleological unfolding of an idea, there would still remain the concrete problem of how to analyse commodity production and money in actual pre-capitalist societies. On this point Weeks says:

money is older than capitalism, but no general theory of money applicable to all periods of its use is possible (1981:96).

He contrasts this with the view of de Brunhoff, who argues that Marx's theory of money was developed first for any occurrence of monetary circulation, and only then concretised as an analysis of money in capitalism (1976:19-23). De Brunhoff certainly seems closer to the spirit and letter of Marx's text, but the textual argument does not concern us here. Weeks has pin-pointed a difficulty in Marx: while claiming a general status for his theory of money, he also wants to say that money is the concrete form of expression of abstract social labour under capitalism.³ But while the theory that money is the form taken by value in capitalism may rule out a general theory of money as exchange-value, such as that of Simmel, it is not clear why we should therefore abandon the search for a general theory.

For the moment, let us return to the first four chapters of Capital and see exactly what is the importance of the model of simple commodity production in Marx's derivation of money from the concept of the commodity. It is true that in deriving

money as the "universal equivalent form" of value (1954:75), he does often resort to examples of independent weavers and tailors meeting in a market-place and selling their own products (e.g. 1954:57;107). The argument is slightly more complex than Simmel's, or that of the neo-classical economists who use a model of a barter economy to prove that the use of money reduces the costs of circulation (see Harris 1979:142-143). For Marx and his defenders, money emerges not simply to make barter easier, but because there is a need for a material expression of the form of value. This need only arises when goods start to be produced solely for the purpose of exchanging them, i.e. when commodity production has become fairly general. We can then ask what, for Marx, were the conditions for this generalisation of commodity exchange.

Engels was only following Marx when he said that exchange first grows up on the edge of communities, not within them (1959: 897). But Marx has a more complicated notion of the community than does Engels, since for him "a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian community, or a Peruvian Inca state" are all forms of "a primitive society based on property in common" (1954:91). Possibly Marx could have elaborated his derivation of money, using a series of 'Indian communities' or 'Inca states' as the entities bringing commodities to the market place. However, there is fairly clear evidence that he could not have done so. At one point Marx stops to consider why it was that Aristotle, having discovered the relationship of equality in the expression of the exchange of commodities, stopped short of seeing that labour was the material substance of this equality, and instead argued that in reality it was impossible for two unlike things to have a commensurable quality (1954:65). Marx argued that the reason why Aristotle could get no further was that

Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour-powers (ibid).

The continuation of this passages throws light on the relation between social equality and the form of value in Marx:

The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities (ibid:65-66).

Conversely, Marx argues in his discussion of the 'fetishism of commodities' that where, as in the European middle ages,

personal dependence forms the ground-work of society there is no necessity for labour and its products to assume a fantastic form different from their reality (ibid:81).

In view of these passages it is not possible to sustain the argument that Marx's use of independent commodity producers was merely coincidental illustration. For if exchange grows up on the edge of a society that itself contains classes in a relation of personal dependence to each other, then Marx is clearly arguing that this does not give rise to the concept of value, or the fetishism of commodities. In such a society, labour is clearly visible for what it is, the labour of people for other people, and does not appear in thought as a relation between things.

If generalised commodity exchange and the full concept of value cannot come into existence except where, at least in ideology, the participants are construed as social equals and their labours as equivalent, then it is not coincidental that Marx has continually to resort to the mental model of weavers and tailors. If we treat these simple commodity producers purely as a mental model, we can construe Marx as saying that it is only when all of society's labours are thought of as if they were the products of independent producers meeting in the market-place that the possibility of thinking of labour as value arises. The problem with completely stripping away any historical reference from Marx's account is that Marx clearly did think that forms of thought such as the 'value-form', were historically specific, and bore some relation to the material conditions of production. As quoted above, Marx claimed that it was the material conditions of slavery

that prevented Aristotle from discovering the substance behind the value-form.⁴

The difficulty about treating 'simple commodity production' as a stage of analysis, but not of history, is that there still remains the problem of the transition to capitalist production. Marx was insistent that the production of surplus value cannot be explained simply by looking at the sphere of circulation of commodities.⁵ It is quite logical, therefore, that he does not attempt to explain the development of capital at a purely abstract level. Whatever may have been the status of his first three chapters on the commodity, exchange, and money, when he reaches Part II, entitled "the transformation of money into capital", he makes it quite plain that we are entering history:

The circulation of commodities is the starting-point of capital. The production of commodities, their circulation and...commerce, these form the historical ground-work from which it rises. The modern history of capital dates from the creation in the 16th century of a world-embracing commerce and a world-embracing market...As a matter of history, capital, as opposed to landed property, invariably takes the form at first of money...(ibid:145).

Capitalism is a historically specific mode of production, and as such cannot be derived from an abstract world of commodity exchange. But when Marx attempted to account for this historical development of capitalism, he was forced to bring in elements of explanation that were logically the opposite of the developments in question. In his critique of the classical theories of 'primitive accumulation' he argued that the feudal producers became free labourers only after they had been

robbed of all their own means of production...The history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (ibid:669).

If this was how there came to be a wage labour force, violence was equally evident in the formation of the medieval fortunes "which mature in the most different economic...formations, before the era of the capitalist mode of production" (ibid:702).

The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother-country and were there turned into Capital (ibid: 705).

Unequal exchange becomes the explanation for the historical emergence of equal exchange, and violence the explanation for the emergence of bourgeois freedoms. The repetition of maxims such as "force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one" (Marx 1954:703, quoted in Weeks 1981:58), does not make it any more convincing.⁶

Marx does not here provide an explanation of the transition from one mode of production to another, but instead brings in force, and exceptional circumstances such as plunder that are outside any mode of production.⁷ Paradoxically, the mental model of pre-capitalist production as composed of weavers and tailors can be seen exerting its influence here; there is no internal dynamic in the idealised world of independent producers (even if one introduces money into the picture) that could lead to capitalist production. It is not even clear why commodity exchange should increase, why capital should arise in circulation, why the merchant capitalist should be born. Of necessity, these explanatory factors must be brought in from outside.

In short, Marx's theory of money as arising as a general equivalent in the exchanges of independent commodity producers is not very helpful in explaining the development of the capitalist mode of production, and is itself open to doubt if taken as history. It is interesting that this debate on Marx's method has all revolved around his use of the example of simple commodity producers, and whether he meant it as an abstract model of pre-capitalist society or not. It does not seem that anyone has questioned the correctness of the second aspect of the 'barter myth' of the origins of money as it appears in Marx. This is the general supposition that commodity-money is the simplest and credit-money the most advanced form of money, with token-money somewhere in between. Indeed, Marx's theory of money was designed to show that money still was, or is, a commodity, namely gold, and that "only in so far as paper money represents gold...

is it a symbol of value" (Marx 1954:129).⁸

In describing the process whereby one commodity becomes money as the expression of the values of all other commodities, Marx says that "the intermediate steps of the process vanish in the result and leave no trace behind" (ibid:95). He does not appear to mean by this that the process is therefore arbitrary, or that one of a number of historical paths could produce money as a means of exchange. His meaning seems closer to Engels's idea that, with the introduction of money, "the determination of value by labour-time was no longer visible upon the surface of commodity exchange" (1959:899). Marx is not so much casting doubt on his own history of money, as claiming for it a logical status. He is implying an answer to the critics who point out that most money is not, at any rate nowadays, a commodity incorporating the same amount of labour-time as those for which it is exchanged. Marx appears to be saying that although money does not on the surface appear to be a commodity, the role it plays in exchange shows that it must once have been; having reached its present position, it appears to us naturally as 'money', an appearance that masks its nature as a commodity (1954:129). The fact that there is no need for money to keep its commodity character when it functions as a medium of circulation presumably makes its past even more difficult to discern.

But what is the status of this 'vanished past' and how does it differ from the bourgeois myth of the barter economy, or from Simmel's assumption of a past when money "must have been" a commodity? One argument is, as we have seen, to say that it was not intended as a history at all, but is only what is logically implied in the day-to-day functioning of money as a means of exchange. But this is not the only function that money has in society. Even in Marx, money could be "merely ideal, as in its function of a measure of value" (ibid:130), or it could take the form of credit-money, which "springs directly out of the function of money as a means of payment" (ibid:139). And in an interesting passage, Marx concedes that money is also the means for non-commodity payments such as rents and taxes (ibid:139). However, his analysis of this function of money goes no further, since he

will admit of its possibility only "when the production of commodities has sufficiently extended itself" (ibid.).

We argued in Chapter I that commodity exchange is only one of several forms of circulation that can be found in the capitalist economy. One of these forms, the sphere of redistribution, is also a monetary one. In this redistributive economy of taxation and state benefits (as well as of state expenditure and state borrowing), factors which do not derive directly from commodity exchange determine how much money is available, both to individuals and to other spheres of the economy. The role of the state in controlling the money supply logically implies a different 'vanished history' of money than the one Marx gives us. But even if history does vanish in the day-to-day functioning of money, it would remain true that a whole series of modern political issues have developed around money, and governments have come and gone because of their policies on taxation, inflation, and control of the money supply. The state is involved in these monetary political questions, not just as the regulator of the sphere of exchange, but directly, because money is still, to a large degree, state money, and because the state in the redistributive sphere is an accumulator and spender of surplus, subject to the same contradictions between use-value and exchange-value as private accumulators (see Brighton, n.d.). The rest of this chapter will deal with the history and logic of money and the state sphere of circulation.

2. Money, Ancient and Modern

Polanyi, in an article called 'The Semantics of Money Uses' criticised the classical economists for deriving money from exchange. To do so was a form of rationalism which gives "the semblance of a 'parallel' between logic and history" (1968:195). Although he does not mention Marx and his followers, they would seem to be a prime target for this criticism. Polanyi's argument is that the distinctions made by the classical economists between different functions of money (means of payment, standard of account, means of exchange) are actually quite inapplicable

to modern money, since the rise of commodity money in the form of gold in the 19th century obliterated these distinctions. They are however applicable to the analysis of primitive and archaic economies, where one usually finds that different things were used for these different functions. By assuming commodity money as the universal form of money, the classical economists were able to make it appear that all these functions had been interconnected historically, and in particular that the exchange function had given rise to the other functions of money.

To show the falsity of this apparent parallel between logic and history, Polanyi uses historical arguments. "Research data reveal that the exchange-use of money cannot have given rise to the other money-uses. On the contrary, the payment, storage and accountancy uses of money had their separate origins and were institutionalized independently of one another" (ibid:185). Money for payment, for instance, developed in connection with punishment and discharge of other social obligations which had nothing to do with economic transactions. Similarly, the use of money as a store of wealth is prior to its exchange function, and is connected with hierarchical political systems involving protection of inferiors by superiors. As a standard of value, money is necessary both for exchange and for state administration of the storage of staples, but again there is no evidence to show that it is the function in exchange that gives rise to the function in state storage. On the contrary, the example of ancient Babylonia shows that although barley operated as a means of payment (for rents, wages and taxes) and silver as the standard of value, there is no documentation overmillennia of staple-goods being exchanged against one another, and no uniform means of exchange ever developed.⁹ Sale-purchase transactions were limited legally to certain goods, - land, cattle, slaves and boats. Exchange never penetrated the subsistence sphere.¹⁰

Polanyi's theoretical conclusion is clear. "Trade and money originate separately and independently of markets. They do not arise, as has been thought, from individual barter and exchange...Much of economic history consists precisely in the linking up of trade and money-uses with market elements, thus

leading to market-trade and exchange-money" (ibid:195). Since there is no evidence that internal trade evolved out of external trade, and if money as a means of exchange originated in external trade, then one can ask how it was that money ever came to be used in internal exchange. The answer, Polanyi suggests, is that "the 'money' character of commodities was more often due to the extension of government to large areas than to barter in commodities" (ibid:203).

In attacking the common-sense view that money originates in exchange, Polanyi questioned only whether history really paralleled this logic of money as exchange-money. In section 4, the history of money will be taken up again; but first we will examine an alternative logic of money. We shall look at Knapp's 'state theory of money' and try to demonstrate its relevance today by looking briefly at the problems encountered by both marxists and monetarists in analysing the state and money.

3. The State Theory of Money

a. Knapp and his liberal critics

G. F. Knapp's State Theory of Money (1924) was translated into English at the instigation of John Maynard Keynes. Its influence on Keynes's theoretical position on money is very clear in the first two chapters of A Treatise on Money (1935), but after that can at most have been indirect, since Keynes assumes, in order to simplify his argument, that all current money is bank-money (as opposed to state-money). However, in a rather bizarre way, Knapp has been blamed by latter-day utilitarians for the evils of Keynesianism, for instance by Frankel (1977:48ff.). Hayek goes so far as to blame Knapp's theory for the evils of the 1923 inflation in Germany, although his own call for the "denationalisation of money" tacitly acknowledges that money is, in fact, 'state money' (Hayek 1976:34).

In fact, poor Knapp did little more than state the obvious in his own eccentric terminology, based mainly on ancient Greek.

He pointed out that today "among civilised peoples...payments can only be made with pay-tickets or Chartal pieces" (1924:32). The word Chartal, Knapp derived from the Latin charta, in the sense of 'ticket' or 'token'. "Chartality rests on a certain relation to the laws. It is, therefore, impossible to tell from the pieces themselves whether they are Chartal or not... Chartality of the means of payment is not a question of technique" (1924:32). Even a gold sovereign is 'chartal' if it is held to be valid through proclamation, rather than through the older historical practice of weighing coins every time they were used (1924:33).

For Knapp, then, "money is a creation of law, but this is not to be interpreted in the narrower sense that it is a creation of jurisprudence, but in the larger sense that it is a creation of the legislative activity of the State, a creation of legislative policy" (1924:40). As laws only run within state boundaries, chartal money can never be international, unless states were to fuse and form a community (ibid:41). Knapp drew out the implication of his theory, that gold and silver (what he called 'hylogenic' money, from the Greek hyle=matter) are nowadays theoretically redundant, and that the possibility exists "of currency systems which insure stable exchanges without the maintenance of hylogenic arrangements" (ibid:297). But he was well aware that this would require a transformation, in that states would have to "make treaties and do away with boundaries" (ibid:296). In fact, when it came to policy recommendations, Knapp was essentially conservative. "Not everything possible or conceivable is to be recommended, and theory must point out which of the possible alternatives is the most expedient. This is not difficult. It is certainly best to keep hylogenic money while it lasts. In our group of civilised States it is best to leave gold its hyllic use...Hylogenic arrangements i.e. exchange-rates are best retained in their present form. The reasons for this are practical, and have nothing to do with the essential nature of money itself" (ibid:297).

These are hardly revolutionary policies, even in 1905.¹¹

And that money is token money nowadays, rather than commodity money, has been a standard line of attack on marxist monetary theory by neo-classical and other modern economists. What seems to arouse such strong opposition to Knapp's theory, however, is that it is state proclamation that makes something acceptable means of payment or not, and in particular the practical inference that it was in the process of state taxation that decisions as to what would count as money or not were made. "Money always signifies a chartered means of payment by proclamation... and we take as our test...that 'money' is accepted by all state offices for payment of tax, monopoly goods etc...only those chattels are money to which such character has been attributed by law, i.e. with the authority of the state" (ibid:37). Knapp was not offending in pointing out that there are many means of payment that have existed historically that are not exchange-commodities (ibid:2-3). What was offensive was the implication that even among different historical means of payment, it was only those which had a special relationship to the state that counted as 'money' in the generally accepted use of the term.

If correct, this goes right in the face of the utilitarian myth (shared by Marx) that money is simply a general equivalent that emerges for convenience in a fantasy world of independent barterers. And it goes right against the liberal philosophy (not shared by Marx) best encapsulated by George Simmel. "For him [i.e. Simmel] functional abstract money grows out of trust as social custom. Unless people had trust in one another, he wrote, society itself would fall apart...Without trust the monetary system would break down" (Frankel 1977:38). The crucial question is from where this trust derives. Knapp would derive it from the power of the state, whereas for Frankel it is "social institutions" or simply "society" which can inspire trust (ibid: 53,56). Knapp is quite blunt in stating that "it was not the gold standard per se that spread after 1871, but the English monetary system, which was the gold standard merely by accident" (1924:279). England herself needed no policy of stabilisation of foreign exchange rates, because she was "herself the dominant Power" (ibid:278).

Frankel disagrees:

It was a conception...that rested on customs of integrity: a sense of probity, adherence to a strict code of behaviour in monetary affairs and the belief that honesty or faith secures order in the industrial world (1977:53).

Frankel talks about this as an

ideology of trust which was concerned with money as a mark of the character of society...it was concerned that men should regard money as above suspicion because they realised that it could, finally, only reflect what society was (ibid:56).

Now Frankel's "society" contains no classes and no state - so long, that is, as the "ideology of trust" is still working and people believe in it. But as soon as Frankel starts to talk about distrust, which he sees as a modern phenomenon, then "society" starts to include, if not a state, at least a government with "irresponsible policies", and if not classes, at least "sectional interests" (ibid:98). He quotes Milton Friedman as support for his views on the nature of the relation between state and society: "What is significant is that he i.e. Friedman thinks of the Government of the State as something additional, apart from or outside society, whose attitude has to be tamed or counteracted" (ibid:55). In other words, he considers that the 'free monetary order' is an expression of the trust of society, while state monetary policy, coming from outside society, destroys trust and thereby the 'free monetary order'.¹² At the basis of this confusion is the simplistic idea that "Law...arose from the mind of the people" (ibid:34); and, linked to this, the interpretation of modern monetary problems as arising because money

is no longer linked to a discernible social ethic: to a body of custom and law which ensures the reliability of monetary policy and practice (ibid:93).

But unfortunately for Frankel, the people do not have 'a mind', and custom and law grow up as ways of regulating relations, not just between individuals, but also between classes. Laws, too,

do not just grow: law, like money, is nothing without the backing of the state.

However, Frankel believes that

the act of coinage, or correspondingly, the imprint on paper money symbolizes...a promise by society as a whole (ibid:32).

He also quotes Simmel's comparison of money with a bill of exchange drawn on society on which the name of the drawee has not been filled in (ibid). Here we must again ask what "society as a whole" could mean in this context, and in particular what are its boundaries. For the paper money that Frankel and Simmel are talking about extends in general no further than the boundaries of the nation-state. Knapp was at least clear that an international paper-money would require nothing less radical than the abolition of all state boundaries and the creation of an international state. It is significant that neither Hayek nor Frankel so much as mention the relation between national and international currencies. Hayek does not therefore seriously consider the possibility that his proposal for the "denationalisation of money" might well imply the imposition of its paper-money world-wide by the state of the hegemonic capitalist power.¹³

We must also ask whether this "society as a whole" consists of everyone in it, or only of the users of money. The answer to this question returns us to the barter myth, which Frankel takes from Simmel:

as soon as money had replaced barter a third party - society itself - had come into the picture: the fulcrum of erst-while relationships between the two parties to the barter agreement had been shifted. Now each was no longer dependent only on his relation to the other but also on relations to the economic circle, which, in an abstract and indefinable way, guaranteed the functioning and acceptability of the money they made use of (ibid:31-32).

For Simmel and Frankel, then, it seems clear that "society" is made up of those who exchange; it is the "economic circle" of

erstwhile barterers. It is a society that looks remarkably like the model of "simple commodity production" that has been criticised in Marx, and which presents insuperable problems in the form of women, children, and all those who do not enter into contracts of commodity exchange.¹⁴

However, the liberal argument here hits a logical stumbling block. If we accept that money constitutes society, as they argue, then the barter myth is immediately invalidated. Historically, both money and society pre-date exchange, and logically, even nowadays our monetary relations are not confined to market exchange but include taxation/redistribution. In addition, if it is argued that society is constituted simply through exchange, and made abstract in money, we are left with no theoretical basis for individuality and personality. This is paradoxical, since the liberal argument aims to show a necessary connection between the growth of monetary exchange and the growth of individual freedoms and the individual personality. But in reality exchange as a social activity can be completely impersonal. To go to the market, or nowadays the supermarket, one does not even require a name. The 'free' wage labourers of industrial capitalism barely require a name to be hired, and are often clothed in work uniforms that, while emphasising their nature as a class, render them indistinguishable as individuals. In Detroit before the First World War, Henry Ford organised his car plant on the basis of the immigrant labour force there and in such a way that the only word of English the workers needed to know was 'wage' (Kay 1975:168). He himself wrote that

a great business is really too big to be human. It grows so large as to supplant the personality of the man (Ford 1922:263).

As Marx had argued, the development of modern manufacture had rendered labour not only formally "abstract", which it had been since the beginnings of exchange, but in reality, too: labour was becoming a purely abstract moment of the total production process, subordinated to the uninterrupted flow of capital.¹⁵

Paradoxically, it is when this same mass worker becomes unemployed and joins the dole queue that he/she will need to be personally known in great detail to the dispenser of money. The differentiation of people from each other by means of complex names, addresses, passports, fingerprinters and other identificatory tags, was historically a development of statecraft. A successful taxation apparatus requires that each individual be distinguishable from all others within the boundaries of the taxing state. It often required the complete control of population movement, as in the Inca state (see Chapter III below). It is probably only within such state parameters that the widespread use of credit-money, which also requires identification of the creditor, can develop.¹⁶

The liberal concept of freedom, based as it is on market relations, is therefore intrinsically bound up with impersonality and anonymity. Simmel and Frankel are, in fact, aware that the process of abstraction involved in the use of money is a contradictory one. Frankel argues that while the mathematical, objective reasoning that money allows also facilitates the growth of an abstract concept of individual freedom, monetary relations also have a tendency to quantify and objectify relations between people.¹⁷ The money abstraction is a double-edged sword - the giver of freedom that at the same time always threatens to kill it - but to abolish money would be to abolish society itself. This exposes another problem with the 'barter myth' we looked at in section 1 above. In the liberal version, it uses the supposed former personal relations between individuals to explain the subsequent impersonality of money relations. Liberal theory has advanced far enough to see that abstraction is a social process, but it can see it only as evolving in a teleological growth of personality and civilisation, since its concept of society is that of classless relations between individuals. A marxist theorist, Sohn-Rethel, has in a similar way made the real social abstraction of the exchange process his starting-point, but his theory is crucially different: for him, the historical emergence of the exchange abstraction marked the formalisation in thought of the separation of intellectual from manual labour. This separation is the basis of class exploitation, which reaches its

highest development in the capitalist appropriation of science itself as part of the means of production (1978).


However, Sohn-Rethel's solution must here be rejected too, since it makes the relationship between money and exchange an even tighter one than does the barter myth: money becomes the necessary form taken by exchange-value. Once again, this leaves us without a theory of money that can account for the non-commodity sphere of taxation/redistribution, and for the fact that in practice most known moneys are state-issued and state-guaranteed. The state theory of money, attacked by the liberal theorists, has the advantage of bringing inequality into the picture from the start of any theorisation of what money is, or has been. At a stroke, it removes the necessity to postulate that money 'must once have been' a commodity, as well as the need to employ a model of simple commodity exchange.

b. Keynes on state money and bank money

This brings us back to Keynes, and his development of Knapp's state theory of money. Keynes's exposition in Chapter 1 of A Treatise on Money is of interest, because while accepting the state theory of the nature of money, he attempts to analyse the relationship between state money and bank money. This would seem to be of obvious contemporary relevance to the attempts by states to control their national money supplies.¹⁸ Keynes's basic starting-point is that even if a means of exchange can hold general purchasing power, that is, even if it is also a store of value, it does not thereby count as money. This description is compatible with barter. This first condition of money is that there should be a generally adopted 'money-of-account' in which debts and prices are expressed. This marks the historical break between the Age of Barter and the Age of Money (1935:4-5). But a monetary system also requires that some material thing shall answer to the money-of-account, and this thing may well change. It is when the state claims the right to declare what thing shall answer to the money-of-account, the right, as Keynes puts it, "not only to enforce the dictionary but also to write the dictionary" (ibid:5), that the "Age of Chartalist or State Money" has been reached. Keynes is clear that "today all civilised

money is, beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist" (ibid), and that it has been so for "some four thousand years at least" (ibid:4). Like Knapp, though, Keynes argues that chartalism does not necessarily imply that money is token money. On the contrary a commodity standard may be designated, and indeed was for hundreds of years.

The next important historical step is to what Keynes calls 'Representative Money' which "begins when money is no longer composed of its objective standard" (ibid:11). Representative money is state money which has its antecedents in bank-money; that is, it is a debt accepted in lieu of payment, but in this case it is a state debt. It gives rise to the further categories of Fiat Money (where the objective standard is abandoned altogether) and Managed Money, which is a hybrid form, where the issue is managed by the state but has a value in terms of an objective standard into which it is legally convertible. All these are forms of state-money, as opposed to bank-money, which for Keynes is not money-proper. Their interrelationships are shown in the following schema from Keynes:



Source: Keynes (1935:9).

The schema shows how managed money is the only form that is related in some way to all others (ibid:15-16). It also illustrates Keynes's method of derivation which is actually very

similar to Marx's - it is a logical account of interrelationships that claims to coincide with the actual course of history.

What is vital here is not Keynes' historical argument, which we will look at again in the next section, but the fact that when he brings in Managed Money (which he argues is "the most generalised form of money) he shows clearly how the state appropriates a surplus through the money form. He says that the Gold Standard was reintroduced in England in 1819, not as pure commodity money, but rather as a "mixed managed system" (ibid:16). The Reason he gives for this development is that during the preceding period of Fiat Money "the uses of Representative Money had become so familiar and acceptable to the public, and so profitable to the Treasury and the Bank of England" (ibid, my emphasis).

Keynes is not here guilty of the cynicism that he has been accused of (e.g. Frankel 1977:44), but is analysing the nature of money and the social relations it involves. Keynes argues that in the era of managed money the old mechanism of debasement of the coinage - applicable only to the operation of commodity moneys - had been elevated to a new level. Because managed money implied a relationship between a commodity and its symbol, the state could vary this relationship at will, without going through the complex material process of altering the silver content of coinage. In denying Keynes' analysis, Frankel behaves like the classical economists, whom in another connection Keynes accused of

ignoring the problem as a consequence of introducing into their premises conditions which involved its non-existence; with the result of creating a cleavage between the conclusions of economic theory and those of common sense (Keynes 1961:350).

One of Keynes's purposes is to show that state representative money is logically similar in form to bank money in that it creates money out of the transference of debts. This is anathema to Frankel, who states emphatically that "a debt can only be discharged by paying it" and a promise is not kept by promising to keep it at a later date (Frankel 1977:46). But Keynes has

shown that this kind of debt is similar to that involved in bank money, which is

simply an acknowledgement of a private debt, expressed in the money-of-account, which is used by passing from one hand to another, alternatively with Money-Propor, to settle a transaction (Keynes 1935:6).

Banking practice obviously involves trust. The trust involved in accepting money from the state is similar, and allows the extension of banking practice far beyond what would be possible if money were really based on the trust and consent of individuals. Keynes seems perfectly realistic in following Knapp, who

accepts as "Money" - rightly, I think - anything which the State undertakes to accept at its pay-offices, whether or not it is declared legal-tender between citizens (ibid: 7 n.1).

However, there is one point that does not seem to have been understood by Keynes' critics, which is that for Keynes state money was originally commodity money. The evolution to 'representative' or token money came through the state adopting the form of bank money (ibid:7). The logic of the modern 'mixed managed' system of money (i.e. with commodity and token money alongside each other) is not therefore to be understood as a state symbol representing real commodity money. Rather, Keynes's analysis would see the modern commodity backing for state paper money as equally state money; the commodity form was in fact the older one historically for Keynes. The origins of paper money, on the other hand, cannot be traced back simply through the history of state money, but will take us back to early banking. We will return to this point in section 4. Before that we will pick up the threads of the discussion of the marxist theory of money begun in Section 1, and see how the prevalence of the 'barter myth' has prevented marxism from coming to grips with the analysis of money and of monetarism.

c. The failure of marxist theory to account for state money

Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production deliberately abstracted from every outside influence on the process of capital accumulation, including the role of the capitalist state. His method is to concede as much as possible to the liberals of his day, and to argue that even if the world were composed of free, independent individuals confronting one another in the market-place, the fact that some of them have only a very peculiar commodity to sell - namely their labour-power - would lead to capitalist accumulation in the way he describes.

In recent years there has been an attempt to make marxism into a more complete account of capitalist society by developing a theory of the state, which analyses the way in which the state can provide for the continued reproduction of the conditions for capital accumulation, and yet at the same time make this process appear fair and legitimate. As a generalisation it can be said that the main point of debate has been the question whether the modern capitalist state merely reflects the interests of capital, or whether it has some relative autonomy from them.²⁰ As a second generalisation, which is negative and may therefore be disproved, it can also be said that nowhere in this debate is there any serious discussion of the state theory of money and its implications for the marxist analysis.²¹ This is not surprising, since most marxists have taken Marx's method, outlined above, as meaning that the capitalist economy is coterminous with the sphere of exchange, and that money is ultimately commodity money. It could be argued, however, that this is an incorrect interpretation and an illegitimate extension of a simplifying assumption, made by Marx for the purposes of argument, to the conditions of the real world. The result has been that marxists are as much guilty of equating the economy with the market as they have accused both Keynesians and anti-Keynesians of being. They, just as much as their 'bourgeois' opponents, have to see

the growing role of government in the economy as simply another intrusion of the 'political' into the 'economic' (Gamble and Walton 1976:76).

The few exceptions to this generalisation are to be found not among those preoccupied with analysing the role of the state, nor on the whole among the exponents of Marx's theory of money.²² It is significant that the most striking exception to the rule should be Paul Mattick, whose project has been to work out the implications of marxism and keynesian theory for each other, and whose book Marx and Keynes first appeared in 1945. However, Keynes is better known for his dictum that 'money doesn't matter', and for his advocacy of fiscal rather than monetary policy, than for his belief in the state theory of money. Mattick's aim, therefore, has been to show that

inflationary monetary policies were adopted not out of conviction but in deference to necessity,

and that this necessity lies

in the drive...to secure capital's continued profitability despite growing public spending (1980:70).

Recently Ben Fine, after thirty pages on the subject of "World Economic Crisis and Inflation", at the end of which he admits that his theory "leaves inexplicable the coexistence of increasing unemployment and inflation", has appended a page and a half on "the state and inflation" (1979:205). He has already argued that inflation is caused by the over-expansion of credit as different capitals compete for the funds to restructure and expand their industries, together with an assumption of working-class resistance to restructuring, so that "the expansion of credit as capital has to exceed the expansion of capital in production" (ibid:204). This inflationary expansion should, in theory, be followed by a deflationary period in the recession, when the value of money rises as the prices of goods and of paper assets fall (ibid:205). However, Fine brings in the state's role in credit formation to explain the continuation of inflation in the recession. This he says is due to the fact that

for the state, the financial asset concerned predominantly in the formation of credit is money (ibid:205).

It is not clear, however, why this credit should have to take the form of an increased supply of money.

O'Connor does provide one possible explanation of this phenomenon, in the brief eight pages of his long book, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, which mention the subject of money (1973:188-196). He suggests that the state is caught in a vicious circle whereby in order to finance its increasing budgetary expenditure, it must increase the national debt; but, because of inflation, investors are increasingly unwilling to hold long-term bonds; it must therefore shorten the length of the debt more and more; the debt then becomes so short that it is equivalent to money (ibid:191).

In general, the marxist theories of inflation that ascribe it to some function of the process of capital accumulation ignore the role of the state, and have difficulty in explaining why inflation should be a problem of the 20th but not of the 19th century.²³ Those which do take the state into account could be described as marxism's attempt to catch up with keynesianism.²⁴ Given this, it is not surprising that the response of marxism to the backlash of anti-keynesian monetarism has so far been almost non-existent. What there is can be qualified as a relapse into support for keynesianism. This can mean either, at a political level, calling for more government expenditure to reduce unemployment;²⁵ or, at a theoretical level, a restatement of Keynes's position on the quantity equation, which is quite similar to Marx's.²⁶

This failure to analyse money as state money has meant that marxism has not spotted the central contradiction of monetarism: to 'control the money supply' means more state intervention, not less. In arguing that the money supply should be limited in order to limit state spending, the monetarists have forgotten that it is only the state that can limit the money supply. Only Hayek seems aware of this contradiction, and it is perhaps partly why he refuses to call himself a monetarist.²⁷ His basic disagreement with Milton Friedman is that he believes that if the state limits its own supply of money, this will not thereby limit the

quantity of money in circulation, since other forms of money will be found by users. There is therefore "no such thing as the quantity of money" for Hayek (1978:76). The implication, which Hayek does not, of course, spell out, is that controlling the money supply would mean a very much higher level of restriction by the state, and is therefore not compatible with the claims of monetarism to be a liberal, 'free market' theory.

By contrast with the orthodox marxist position, this thesis will argue that 'controlling the money supply' is the revival of one of the oldest forms of class control, namely, the control of circulation. The following chapters should elucidate what is meant by this, and the different forms that money can take in such a process of control. But the state theory as developed by Knapp and Keynes is still unsatisfactory, in that although it provides an alternative logic to that which analyses money as growing out of the exchange of independent commodity producers, it still tends to postulate that money "must once have been" a commodity, even if this commodity was chartered by the state. The next section presents a theory that proposes to reconcile commodity and state theories of money in a radically different way.

4. Bloch's Theory of the Dual Origins of Money

a. The theory

The starting point of Rudi Bloch's work on money is the contradiction between the Aristotelian theory of money and that of Knapp and Keynes, that is, between the barter and the state theories. Aristotle was the founding father of the 'barter myth' we have already criticised; in a famous passage he explains:

Not all the things that we naturally need are easily carried; and so for exchange purposes men entered into an agreement to give to each other and accept from each other some commodity, itself useful for the business of living and also easily handled, such as iron, silver, and the like. The amounts were at first determined by size and weight, but eventually the pieces of metal were stamped. This did away with the necessity of weighing and measuring, since

the stamp was put on as an indication of the amount (1962:42).

Bloch admits that much evidence on the early trading of metals and of salt appears to support Aristotle's theory. He quotes examples of the use of standardised pieces of salt for means of payment from Ethiopia, the Cameroons, imperial China, ancient Rome, and pre-hispanic America (ibid:2-3). There is also a close historical connection between the making of salt and the minting of money, many towns doing both, from ancient Greece down through medieval Europe. But Bloch is clear that this evidence does not mean "that either salt or metal was ever used as money in the sense now generally accepted" (ibid:3). This sense Bloch takes to be that of Knapp's definition. In other words, standardised commodities may be 'means of payment' but are not yet money in the sense of being defined by the state as acceptable in payment of taxes.²⁸

Bloch then sets himself the task of "reconciling both Aristotle's and Knapp's ideas, that is the barter and state theories of money" (ibid:4). This he does by introducing

the history of the so-called tally, tessera or talea in Latin, kerbholz - 'notched wood' - in German, taomin - 'twins' - in Hebrew, symbolon in Greek and chih-chi in Chinese - both meaning 'put together' - as an essential element in the evolvment of currency" (ibid:4).

The significance of the duality involved in the etymology of the concept is that the tally is a technique for registering receipt of payment whereby an object, typically wood, ceramic or paper, was torn or broken in half, one half staying with the deposited good, (stock) and the other half going to the payer (foil). The randomness of each tear or break meant that it was possible to register individual acts of payment, as only the two appropriate halves would fit back together again, and this made forgery virtually impossible (ibid:5). Bloch argues that the next step in the development of the tally system was when goods deposited became standardised. Tallies could then be deposited in an office separate from where the goods were stored,

and, rather than representing the precise individual good deposited, could stand for any equivalent good. Records of services could also be made in this way:

the number of acres ploughed, sacks of salt transported and so on. Work of this kind would be 'notched up', the record stored and some work-equivalent object retrieved when the 'foil' was presented (ibid:6)²⁹

Bloch then goes on to explain how, where tallies were needed for large numbers of small deposits, individual hand-made tallies were replaced by mass-produced tallies. One master stamp of a hard material could be used to make any number of tallies in a softer material. At first, clay or wax was used; but it was the invention of sideros by the Greeks in the 7th century B.C., a form of steel made by plunging red-hot iron into cold water, that first enabled them to stamp soft metals, such as gold and silver, for coinage. Mass production obviously meant that the problem of counterfeiting had to be overcome in different ways, now that each tally was not by its very nature unique. One way of doing this was to use a random break for the master seal; for instance, the Greeks used a broken-off nail to produce a mark that was difficult to imitate (ibid:7). Later on, the design might be made very complex (as in watermarks), and either the technique of production or the material on which the stamp was printed might be monopolised by the issuing authority. Paper-making, for instance, was invented by the Chinese before 200 A.D. and later used for printing money with copper plates. It is clear from Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta that the paper used was made from mulberry bark (ibid:9). Paper had replaced the earlier material of silk for printing money; both were made from the mulberry tree, which, significantly, was a state monopoly in China. Paper money was cheaper for the state to produce than metal money for large denominations, but it has high replacement costs for wear and tear, and so has never replaced low denomination metal coins (ibid:8-9). Bloch points out that shells were the cheapest objects ever to be chartered for use as money by states, but that their use depended on the state being able to control and monopolise their circulation. This was usually achieved by importing shells from outside the area, as in the

case of Dahomey (Polanyi 1966). Shells circulated alongside paper and metal moneys in China in the 13th century A.D. (Bloch 1975:9), and the British were still using them in foreign trade in the 19th century (Polanyi 1966).

Bloch's theory of the role of the tally in the history of coinage, then, allows him to achieve the theoretical reconciliation of the two opposed theories of money set out by Aristotle and Knapp. It is the standardisation of goods by official marking that allows the mass production of token coinage. This theory is exemplified by looking at the connection between the production of salt and the minting of money. Salt can only be produced in limited geographical areas, and is not only essential to human existence, but also vital in early methods of storing protein, and thus in the creation of a surplus for future consumption (Bloch 1976:336-337). It was because the geographical limitation of its production made salt easy to monopolise, while at the same time every household needed it in order to survive, that most states prior to the industrial revolution obtained a large part of their income from the taxation of salt. This might be at the level of an empire-state, as in the case of China, where the salt tax brought in up to 80% of state revenue in the 12th century A.D. (Bloch 1975:14); or it might be at the level of a medieval town, such as Schwäbisch Hall in Germany, which owned salt springs and factories and which issued 'Coins of Hall' or Heller in return for goods and services, which could then be used to purchase salt or pay tolls and taxes.³⁰ In each case it is the taxation authority which legislates on the standardisation of goods to be received in payment of tax, and on the token money issued against the monopoly good.

The connection between salt and money, then, is not the one predicted by Aristotle: salt does not become money simply by being the most traded commodity in most early societies. Salt was important, rather, because it played such an important role in state finances. Because of this, the supply of salt could be an important factor in early money management. In China, where salt was the main backing for the issue of a token currency,

Bloch claims that the critical inflation at the beginning of the 14th century was due, not to fraudulence or mismanagement of the issue of paper currency, but to a rise in the ocean level, which severely contracted the supply of salt from salt-marshes.³¹ At this time, there was a 25-fold increase in prices, with no corresponding increase in the money supply (ibid:15). At times, the monopoly good was used by states as means of payment, as when Roman soldiers were paid in salt (whence comes our word 'salary'), but payment in salt does not thereby become payment in money. Money enters the picture when the soldiers are paid with a token which can be redeemed against salt or other goods. In Bloch's theory, money is from the start a relationship between two things - a state commodity and a state token.

b. Some implications

We have seen that Keynes accepted the state theory of money for analysis of the modern monetary system, but still felt the necessity to give token money a pseudo-historical derivation from commodity money: token moneys only evolved after a long period when states chartered commodities as money. Bloch, on the other hand, assigns a different role to the state commodity in his analysis. According to him the roles of state commodities and state tokens are not interchangeable, neither does one evolve into the other: they are from the start a duality. Money is a means both for circulating the state monopoly good, and also for fixing a sales tax on it. This sales tax can be seen, conversely, as a levy on general production.

The first important implication of this is that Bloch finally gets us beyond the liberal theory of money as growing up in exchange between free individuals. Bloch's theory of money as the mass-produced state tally implies that it grows up in the context of the production of a surplus and its extraction from a producing class by a non-producing one. Money, rather than being the symbol of the free contract between individuals, becomes the symbolic expression of the power of one class over another. This power is not purely ideal, as in the unconvincing theory of the

'asiatic mode of production', but has a material basis in the control of the circulation of a monopoly good.

In another context, Bloch has shown how major technological advances of general import were made in salt production.^{32A} A second implication is therefore that increasing productivity of labour may have been linked to specific needs to increase production of a state monopoly good, rather than to unexplained general advances, or ones brought about by competition between individuals, on a false analogy with capitalist development.

Thirdly, Bloch's theory implies that money, far from being the facilitator of exchange, is actually in origin a way to control private exchange. It limits sales of the state monopoly good to those who have paid their taxes and are therefore in possession of the token; and it ensures the more efficient circulation of the state monopoly good, thereby lessening the incentive to smuggle. This explains how pre-capitalist kingdoms and empires with developed money systems, such as Dahomey in the 18th century or imperial China, could also be ones where private trade was strictly controlled.

Finally, we should note that Bloch's theory implies a very different history to the commodity than the one we are used to thinking of. In fact, many people would probably argue that the 'state commodity' would be outside the marxist definition of a commodity, which depends on a notion of private property being exchanged. And yet this state commodity has many features in common with the private commodity we are more familiar with. It has both use-value and exchange-value, since the state organises its production only in order to exchange it in return for tax from the classes of direct producers. And just as Sohn-Rethel (1976) links the origins of abstract reasoning and of modern mathematics to the complete abstraction from use-value involved in commodity exchange as it emerged in ancient Greece, we can link certain forms of abstraction to the development of the state commodity and to the money that represented it. It is true that the abstraction is not as complete: systems of weight

and measurement, such as were evolved for the circulation of state commodities, are not a way of measuring goods as abstract exchange-value but rather as use-values; and early token moneys may be tied to the purchase of specific goods, and not be the representation of pure, non-specific exchange-value that modern money is. But nevertheless, state methods of storage and stock-keeping, which need at least some form of counting and of writing, themselves give rise to the contradictory possibility that the token may become exchangeable for any commodity, rather than only the state commodity, and so prepare the path to commodity exchange, a path that most centralised states were very careful to cut off.

c. Towards an alternative theory of money

With notable exceptions, the theories we have looked at tend to collapse money into either a pure token or a pure commodity. Only Keynes and Bloch have tried to elaborate theories that show money as a duality. In some ways their theories are reminiscent of Marx's insistence on the dual nature of the commodity, its existence as both use-value and exchange-value. In the Grundrisse Marx argued that money and what it represented could not be collapsed into one:

To compare money with language is...erroneous. Ideas do not exist apart from language...as prices exist alongside goods. Ideas which have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to circulate, in order to be exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy; but the analogy there lies not in language, but in the foreignness of language (1972:162-163).

At another point, Marx thought that writing offered a better analogy with money: in talking of the history of the different forms taken by money, he says that "the symbols for words, for example the alphabet, etc., have an analagous history" (ibid:71).

It is worth taking this analogy literally and looking at what is known about the history of writing. What is particularly interesting here is that archaeological work on the origins of writing has been beset by the idea that writing "must once have

been" pictographic, and that ideographic (i.e. abstract) writing must have evolved out of picture writing. This seems exactly analogous to the way theories of money have continually had to invent a pseudo-history of commodity money, out of which abstract, token money could have evolved. But recent work by an expert on the archaeology of writing, Denise Schmandt-Besserat (1978) appears to have exploded this myth. The first known written texts come from Uruk in Mesopotamia and date from the end of the 4th millennium B.C. They were discovered in 1929 and contain about 1,500 abstract ideographs that are largely undeciphered today. Even though these clay tablets bear the earliest known writing, it is generally supposed that they must have evolved from earlier pictographs, and the fact that none have ever been discovered is explained by the hypothesis that they were recorded on some perishable material.

Schmandt-Besserat has uncovered a different set of antecedents for these early texts. She takes their material form as her starting point, namely, that they are written on clay, and that although they are known as 'tablets' the clay on which they are written is in fact convex in shape. The characters themselves were of two kinds, numerical signs impressed into the clay with the blunt end of a stylus, and other signs incised with the pointed end (1978:38). Her research on the early use of clay shows that long before the invention of pottery, a system of clay tokens was in use which had a geographical distribution stretching from the Nile to the Indus rivers (ibid:43). They consist of geometrical shapes - spheres, disks, cones, tetrahedrons, etc., and are to be found in many of the world's museums, usually described as "objects of unknown use", "children's playthings", or "amulets" (ibid:42). They were fired, and had usually been found in storage areas of early settlements, in clusters of 15 or more. She realised that these tokens, some of which dated back to the 8th and 9th millennium B.C., were of the same kind as had been discovered in 1964 by Amiet in Susa, a site dating from about 3,000 B.C. Amiet's tokens had been found inside spherical clay containers known as bullae, which were very similar to an egg-shaped container found six years earlier on a later site at Nuzi. This egg-shaped,

hollow envelope had an inscription on its surface representing 48 animals; when opened up, it was found to contain 48 tokens. Nuzi texts spoke of tokens being used for accounting purposes, being "deposited" and "transferred" (ibid:40).

The token system is shown to have been in use continuously from the ninth to the second millennium B.C. (ibid:42). It can be classified into 15 major classes and around 200 subclasses distinguished by size, marking or fractional variation. Some of their meanings become clear when taken in conjunction with the earliest writing of the Uruk tablets, which are roughly contemporaneous with the first spherical bullae found at Nuzi. Many of the complex token shapes and markings are reproduced in two dimensions on the Uruk tablets, and Schmandt-Besserat gives a table matching token shapes and ideographs (ibid:42). Markings on tokens also appear first about 3,100 B.C. when of 660 tokens collected from six sites 363 have incised markings, usually of parallel lines, and another 26 show impressions apparently made by punching the clay with the blunt end of a stylus (ibid:46). In this way the form of the earliest clay texts is shown to derive from the spherical, clay envelope that accompanied a consignment of goods. These envelopes or bullae contained tokens representing the goods being delivered, but since the envelope had to arrive unbroken at its destination, a system had to be devised of knowing what was inside as the goods went on their journey. Representations of the tokens inside were therefore impressed on the outside of the clay envelope. In the case of some bullae, this was done by impressing the tokens themselves into the clay of the envelope before they were sealed inside it. But on most bullae two-dimensional representations of the enclosed tokens were made on the exterior with a thumb or the blunt end of a stylus (ibid:47).

What then happened was virtually inevitable, and the substitution of two-dimensional portrayals of the tokens for the tokens themselves would seem to have been the crucial link between the archaic recording system and writing (ibid).

The seals on the outside of the envelopes would presumably

have been those of the sender of the goods and the carrier, which in itself tells us nothing about whether these goods were being sent between private traders, as is generally assumed (ibid:47), or were being delivered to centralised deposits. A further feature, not very well explained by Schmandt-Besserat, is that from at least the period of the Uruk tablets, each token shape appears in two forms - perforated and unperforated. This suggests that the perforated ones were to be strung on strings (ibid:46). According to Bloch, any centralised storage system requires a tally system for accounting. The tax-payer needs to take one half of a tally from the state deposit, the other half of which corresponds to the goods deposited there in payment of tax.³³ The existence of all the sub-types of tokens in both perforated and unperforated forms does suggest that the perforated ones were kept on strings in a central deposit, and the unperforated ones were kept by the tax-payers as receipts for tax paid, presumably exchangeable against other goods in the state deposit.

The possibility, of course, arises that both the tokens themselves and the delivery bills inscribed on the clay envelopes could have been transferable. Knowing so little about the social systems within which these goods circulated, we cannot say whether this happened or not; but since the possibility was there, either it must have happened, or there must have been centralised ways of controlling trade so as to stop it happening.

This theory about the origins of writing is, like any other theory, open to disproof. However, it is clearly not based on a speculative 'search for origins' such as the one that assumes that patriarchy "must have" evolved out of matriarchy,³⁴ or equally the one that assumes token money "must have" evolved out of commodity money. Schmandt-Besserat's theory is based on material evidence and not on assumed pre-histories of mankind. If correct, her theory tells us more than simply something about the origins of writing. It shows us that the process of abstraction involved in writing developed as part and parcel of the money abstraction. The first abstract representations were three-dimensional ones of circulating goods; writing developed as a two-dimensional

representation of the three-dimensional one. From the start, they both have to do, not with things as such, but with relations between people that are mediated by things - between the sender and carrier of goods, or between the state official and the tax-payer who brings goods to the state deposit. In any class system, whether based on state property or on private property, such a relationship will imply control of other classes by the class of non-producers.

The civilisations studied by Schmandt-Besserat are the ancestors of Hammurabi's Babylon studied by Polanyi (see section 2 above). Polanyi shows that exchange in ancient Babylonia was legally limited to certain goods and that

Clearing, book-transfer and non-transferable checks were first developed, not as expedients in a money economy, but on the contrary, as administrative devices designed to make barter more effective and therefore the developing of market methods unnecessary (1968:188).

We can now go further than Polanyi and put money on the side of administered state trade, designed to prevent rather than further private exchange. We can also go further than he does when he writes of economic history as the "linking-up" of trade with markets, and of money with exchange. We can hypothesize that this linking-up was not a peaceful joining of hands, but a battle fought out between different and contradictory systems of the socialisation of labour - between that in which one class extracted and redistributed the labour of another class directly, through centralised organisation and planning, and its opposite, the indirect, decentralised socialisation of labour through commodity exchange, which ultimately demands the formal freedom and equality of those who participate in it.

The following chapters of this thesis will try to illustrate this proposition with respect to various case studies taken from the history of Peru, both before and after the Spanish conquest, and will then draw some conclusions about the relationship between different forms of money and the control of circulation, and about the importance of the control of circulation in pre-capitalist modes of production.

NOTES

1. See Gamble (1982) for a recent assessment of the impact of monetarism on British economic policies and on the Conservative Party.
2. Exceptions are Meek (1973) and Murray (1977).
3. "Commodities can only be generally exchanged for this universal equivalent [i.e. money],...because there is already something universal which is inherent in commodities produced under capitalism; it is the universal, abstract (non-specific) labour which goes into producing them. Since the non-specific nature of labour is what distinguishes capitalism from pre-capitalist systems, the full development of money as such can only be understood in its relation to capital" (Harris 1979:145).
4. Sohn-Rethel (1976) argued that there was a material reason why Aristotle could discover the form of value (though not the substance of value), and this was the invention of coinage and its spread to Greece around the 6th century B.C. Aristotle's discovery of the "exchange abstraction" before there was any possibility of "equivalence" of different labours, shows that money is the concrete expression of the value-form, rather than an expression of value in its relation to production (1976:5-8). In this way, Sohn-Rethel solves the problem of the relation between simple commodity production and commodity exchange as it arises in Marx; for him, the crucial point about commodity exchange is that it must abstract totally from use (production). On the other hand, Sohn-Rethel makes the link between money and commodity exchange even tighter than in Marx, since for him money is the necessary concrete expression of the very form of value. See also Banaji (1977), Kay (1977), Elson (1977) for the idea that money is the concrete expression of the form of exchangeability. Some criticism of this point of view can be found in Bradby (1982a).
5. "We have shown that surplus-value cannot be created by circulation, and, therefore, that in its formation, something must take place in the background, which is not apparent in the circulation itself" (Marx 1954:162). Again, "it is therefore impossible for capital to be produced by circulation" (ibid:163).
6. See Bradby (1975,1976) for a rejection of the view that the expansion of the capitalist mode of production necessarily requires violence. See also Foster-Carter (1978) for a criticism of Bradby.
7. Hindess and Hirst have argued strongly that "colonial and tributary relations, however frequent and important they have been in history, do not and cannot amount to the social relations of a mode of production" (1975:199-200).
8. Weeks has recently defended the view that "Marx's theory of money provides a critique of [the bourgeois] analysis by demon-

strating that money must be a commodity" (1981:120).

9. See also Polanyi's article on 'Marketless trading in Hammurabi's time' (1957).

10. Godelier writes in a footnote: "The non-existence of a universal currency in primitive societies is explained therefore, both by the absence of developed market production and, simulataneously, by the necessity to control access to women and power. This would lead to choosing 'rare' goods corresponding to the limited number of women and roles of authority and to separating their circulation from that of other goods, placing them under the control of individuals who represent the community's interests. This control is both an attribute of their function and a symbol of their status" (1977:231 n.29).

11. Even Hayek believes that "so long as the management of money is in the hands of government, the gold standard with all its imperfections is the only tolerable system" (1976:126). He thus concurs with Knapp in his short-term policy recommendation (though Hayek shows no evidence of having read Knapp's book).

12. The utopianism of the monetarists reveals itself quite clearly here as the wish for a society without the state. It is no accident that the pursuit of this vision led them to attack the institution of money as we know it. However, the vision is a highly cynical one - Hayek's proposal is essentially to turn the banks into the state, so as to secure international mobility of labour, and on that basis a drastic lowering of wages worldwide (1976:111).

13. It is ironic that Hayek should accuse Knapp of reviving a "medieval doctrine...of the valor impositus" (Hayek 1976:26). His own recommendations look on the face of it like an attempt to put the clock back to a decentralised feudalism of independent merchant and banking states. He claims that "the early foundations of banks at Amsterdam and elsewhere arose from attempts by merchants to secure for themselves a stable money, but rising absolutism soon suppressed all such efforts to create a non-governmental currency" (ibid:31). It is not clear how this is consistent with his view "that the thousands of minor princelings and cities who, during the later part of the Middle Ages, had acquired the minting privilege, sometimes abused it even more than the richer princes of large territories" (ibid:25). The monetarists may get away with arguing that the state is something outside, and interfering with "society" /i.e. capital/ nowadays; it is a less tenable position with regard to the early merchant states, such as Venice or Genoa.

14. See Bradby (1977:1982a) for a further development of this argument.

15. For the concepts of "fordism" and the "mass worker", see Gramsci (1977). See also Kay (1975:167-171) and Brighton (1977).

16. See Weber (1961), Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson (1957), and also Polanyi's articles edited by Dalton (1968).

17. "Money acts, as it were, in a double role: on the one hand it negates the subjective, the unique and the qualitative factors, on the other it allows the individual to realise his personal ends by impersonal means" (Frankel 1977:25).

18. Keynes's analysis of "Current Money" as made up both of state-money and bank-money is relevant to modern monetary policy (1935:9-11). In spite of all the monetarists' rhetoric, the money supply is not solely the responsibility of the state, since banks also have the power to create money through debt-creation. This is what Keynes called bank-money, and what has caused the proliferation of devices for trying to capture all the numerous means of debt creation in a statistical measure of the money supply in recent years.

19. In Keynes's historical account, chartal money is commodity money, by and large, until the French revolution. Coinage was not for him a very significant advance, as it is only a very preliminary step towards representative money (1935:11). Even when, during the second Punic War, the Roman state first debased the coinage to its own advantage, this did not make that money 'representative'. For Keynes, if a coin had value above its metal content, this was due to the "prestige of the coin, or the value of the stamp on it, or to its aesthetic qualities, or to the seigniorage charged for minting", but not to its being merely token (ibid:13-14). For some reason, Keynes discounts the "paper moneys, which are alleged to have been anciently current in China, and also those of John Law and other precursors" (ibid:14-15). The connecting link to representative money is given rather by the use of a commodity as money "which is limited by absolute scarcity...and the demand for which is wholly dependent upon the fact that it has been selected by law or convention as the material of money and not upon its intrinsic value in other uses" (ibid:14). Keynes opposes this to what he sees as the earlier, purer form of commodity money, which must be a non-monopolised commodity, and one whose supply is governed by costs of production and scarcity, like any other commodity (ibid:7). Despite Keynes's advances towards accepting the state theory of money, he still writes of an Age of Barter preceding the Age of Money, and tends just to put the barter myth into pre-history rather than history: "Money, like certain other essential elements in civilisation, is a far more ancient institution than we were taught to believe some few years ago. Its origins are lost in the mists when the ice was melting, and may well stretch back into the paradisaic intervals in human history of the interglacial periods, when the weather was delightful and the mind free to be fertile of new ideas - in the Islands of the Hesperides or Atlantis or some Eden of Central Asia" (ibid:13). For Keynes, money seems to mark the transition to civilisation, in a rather similar way to that in which patriarchy did for Engels (1962).

20. A collection of articles from this debate can be found in Holloway and Picciotto (1978).

21. As a literal statement about 'the state theory of money' this is undoubtedly true of the participants in the debate on the capitalist state. As a wider one, it is also true that this

debate is not about the relationship between the state and money. Some exceptions drawn from other debates will be considered below in the text.

22. Some marxist writing on money which does not mention the state: Ergas and Fishman (1975); de Brunhoff (1976); Harris (1979). Weeks mentions the state as an aside in his very orthodox chapter on the "theory of money", to say that it cannot be analysed until after the analysis of credit, but he does not then, apparently, return to the subject (1981:116).

23. It is still possible for a marxist to write a long article on money which does not attempt any analysis on inflation (Harris 1979). The orthodox marxist position is still treat inflation as "only the indicator of the real crisis" (Gamble and Walton 1976:24). Weeks considers that "a period of inflation is not empirical evidence of the intrinsically valueless nature of money, but exactly the opposite: it demonstrates the consequence of attempts by the state to repeal the basic law that money must be a commodity" (1981:107). This statement is capable of different interpretations; here it appears merely to assert that inflation can have no effect on the real world of commodities. See also Aglietta for a sophisticated restatement of the 'demand-pull' theory of inflation in marxist terminology (1979:368-369).

24. A good example is Itoh (1978). Italian writers have been more preoccupied with the critique of keynsianism in its relation to the state and money, than have English-language writers: see Negri (1979) and other articles in the collection by Red Notes (1979).

25. See the current proposals for an 'alternative economic strategy'. A defence of this strategy, with references to further reading, can be found in London CSE Group (1980).

26. "Keynes had argued that the velocity of circulation of money was not a constant and that the money supply and therefore the price level rose or fell in responses to the behaviour of real forces, the interaction of the plans of government, capitalists and consumers. The price level was determined by these real factors not by the money supply" (Gamble and Walton 1976:60). Compare this with Marx (1954:123-124), or with Weeks (1981:104-108).

27. Hayek (1976:75-81).

28. "There are means of payment which are not yet money; then those which are money; later still those which have ceased to be money" (Knapp 1924:2).

29. The article on the word symbolon in Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon gives many references to its meaning a token, ticket, cheque or counter, as well as to its use for one of "the halves or corresponding pieces of a bone or coin, which two contracting parties broke between them, each party keeping one piece" (1883:1458). They also give use, equivalent

to the Latin tessera frumentaria, meaning "a ticket, entitling the holder to a donation of corn or money". It is also significant, in the light of Bloch's theory, that they mention its use in the plural (symbola) to mean the "standard weights of the city" (ibid).

30. For more information on salt taxes, see Bloch (1976:347-348). They include the famous French gabelle and the large-scale monopoly guarded by the North-West Frontier in India, which was taken over by the British and finally abolished after Mahatma Gandhi's famous salt march; one colonial expert interpreted the Great Wall of China as a similar salt frontier; the temple in Jerusalem had its own salt chamber, as did the temple at Ephesus, and Bloch links this to the role of the temples as abattoirs for the slaughter of animals, as well as to their roles in banking, money-lending and minting (ibid:348). Wallerstein quotes details of how the Russian gosti were at once fiscal and commercial agents of the Tsar: the most important family of gosti, the Stroganovs, rose to power on the basis of their dealings in the salt monopoly (1974:323-324 and notes 100,101,106). Hufton has an interesting chapter on the practice of salt smuggling in France, from provinces where the gabelle was heavy to those where it was lighter, in the years leading up to the Revolution (1974:284-296). He calculates that at least a million people were engaged in salt smuggling, and that 23,000 men and 146 pieces of legislation were employed by the state monopoly to try and combat it. The British tended to pride themselves on not having oppressive taxes such as the gabelle. But in fact a salt tax was introduced by Parliament in the Civil War. It was repealed by the Commonwealth but the Restoration saw it reimposed to finance the war against the French. Walpole abolished it in 1730, but reimposed it in 1732. During the War of American Independence, North raised it to 5 shillings a bushel, and Pitt raised it to 10 shillings to pay for the war with France in 1798. In 1803 the yield of the salt tax in England and Scotland was nearly £1 million, only slightly less than the yield from the tax on brandy at the time. By 1816, the yield was £1,600,000; the tax was eventually repealed in 1825 (Sabine 1980:100-102). There is an interesting book by Adshead (1970) on the administration of the Chinese salt monopoly by the British in the years before 1907, under the concept known as synarchy, or joint rule. This form of indirect rule found that the key to the Chinese fiscal system was still the salt monopoly, that had been established first over 2,000 years before.

31. Professor Rudi Bloch is a remarkable polymath, but by profession was a physicist. Among other things, he has published work on historical changes in the ocean level (1966). He claims that the rise in the ocean level mentioned here started somewhere before 1300 A.D. and had world-wide repercussions as production was forced inland to the salt mines and away from coastal salt pans. In Europe towns such as Venice, Yarmouth, Noirmoutier, and the Carmargue and Crimean delta regions lost their importance as salt producers, which they had held since the ocean level had last receded between about 700 and 1,000 A.D. (Bloch 1976:345).

32. "Saltmaking by evaporation, which includes separate harvesting of salts having different solubilities, is indeed a skilled art. Further, it gave rise in very early times to important concepts and technical innovations, the most outstanding being the measurement of density and pumping by screw, both ascribed to Archimedes. The first use of a propeller and sail-type windmills was to operate an Archmedian Screw and the chain pumps for transporting water and brine" (Bloch 1976:341). The transport of brine seems to have led to some of the earliest use of pipelines, the Chinese using bamboo and the inhabitants of the Alps near Salzburg having to use hollowed out tree-trunks from which pipelines more than 100 km. long were constructed (ibid:338). Pease mentions the terraces found at Lluta, in southern Peru, as having been used by pre-incaic civilisations for salt-making (1978:154,160).

33. More information on the history of the tally, down to modern electronic devices used in banking, is contained in Bloch (1975:4-8). One use of tallies, similar to the early writing described by Schmandt-Besserat, was in Crete, where knots used for recording items could be impressed on clay or wax; the swastika is one such representation of a knot (Professor Bloch, personal communication).

34. The classic statement of the pseudo-historical evolution of patriarchy from matriarchy is in Engels (1962). For a good demolition of the theory in relation to the early peoples of Ireland see Thurneysen (1937). See also Reiter (1977).

CHAPTER III

CIRCULATION WITHOUT THE MARKET: THE CASE OF THE INCA PLAN

Ever since the Spanish Conquest, the Inca empire has fascinated Europeans as being an example of an economy in which, although there was a widespread social division of labour, there was no place for the market and money.¹ In recent years, however, there has been somewhat of a theoretical revolt against attempts to fit analysis of Inca society into categories drawn from European history. The leader of this revolt, John Murra, wrote in 1958 that he would refuse to enter into debates on whether the Incas should be classified as

'feudal', 'socialist' or 'totalitarian', labels which originate in the economic and social history of Europe (1975:25).²

Instead, he announces his purpose as to "understand the economic and political organisation of one civilisation only, the Andean one" (ibid:22). As a method, he proposes the use of

the advances made by anthropology in recent decades, on the basis of field-work in stratified pre-capitalist societies, particularly in Africa and the Pacific' (ibid:25).

One may well ask here why concepts drawn from Africa and

the Pacific should be any more or less relevant than ones drawn from Europe. Over the years, Murra has indeed elaborated a cogent theory of an economic concept specific to Andean civilisation, which in his article setting it out he called "the vertical control of a maximum number of ecological levels" (1975:59-116).³ But it will be argued in this chapter that he himself has fitted this analysis into theories of "reciprocity" and "institutionalised generosity" (1975:175-176), which derive ultimately from the frameworks through which classical anthropologists, such as Boas (1897), Malinowski (1920) and Mauss (1923), saw the societies they studied, which were none of them very close to the Incas either in time or place.

The search to define 'Andean society' has been enthusiastically undertaken by Peruvian economic anthropologists. Murra has proposed that his model of vertical control is a "pan-Andean" one (1975:66) and states that

the archaeologists are researching the existence of 'verticality' in previous epochs...Its survival today and the modifications it has undergone since 1560...are being established by ethnologists in their field-work (ibid:61).

However, his followers have taken the search for evidence of the survival of Andean society beyond what Murra expresses here. Far more important to them than Murra's really original concept of 'verticality', has been that of 'reciprocity', for which he claimed no originality. A marxist flavour has been added by showing how enduring local ideals of reciprocity could be manipulated by exploitative powers. Godelier, for instance, in his illuminating essay on Murra's work, can argue that with the extension of the Inca state

older forms of economic reciprocity corresponding to the traditional forms of ideology and ritual, were used in the functioning of direct relations of economic exploitation and servitude (1977:64).

The theory of the survival of Andean society is best set out in an essay by Alberti and Mayer. In it they write:

It is really surprising to observe how, despite the passage of four centuries, many of the forms of symmetrical reciprocity which existed in Inca times and even before, as well as many of the mechanisms of manipulation that converted reciprocity into an ideological tool for establishing systems of domination, continue to operate at present within a totally different socio-political context (1974:21).

They go on to list four

threads which unite the Andean society of the past with that of the present...

1. Symmetrical reciprocity in relations of production and distribution with the community.
2. The importance of the kinship system in determining reciprocity.
3. The relation between vertical control of the ecology and reciprocal exchange.
4. The manipulation of normative aspects of reciprocity to set up systems of domination (ibid:21).

In this theoretical framework, 'vertical control' becomes just one aspect of 'reciprocity'. The 'control' aspect is interpreted strictly to mean control over natural resources and is never taken as implying social control. The study of present-day Andean communities is understood as the study of 'traditional Andean society' itself, so that, as in the above quotation from Godelier, it seems that present-day reciprocity can be simply read off as a survival of pre-Incaic social structure. In a curious way the Incas themselves, from whom the analysis of 'Andean society' took off, are themselves pushed outside it - they become mere intruders onto the Andean scene, manipulators of ancient structures and ideologies which survived their demise. As this seems unsatisfactory, this chapter will therefore first take a critical look at the concept of reciprocity as applied in the Andean context, before going on to re-examine the theory of vertical control, and to look at the Inca state in terms of the concepts developed in the first two chapters of this thesis.

1. The Basic Concepts of 'Andean Society'

a. Reciprocity

In his thesis, entitled The Economic Organisation of the Inca State, Murra analyses the Inca economy in terms of Polanyi's three categories of reciprocity, redistribution and exchange.⁴ In Chapter 7, he argues that "the study of Inca exchange is only another way of looking at the development and expansion of the state" (1978:198). Redistribution is the principal form of exchange of goods, and private exchange plays only a subsidiary role in the economy. The main distinction, therefore, is left as between reciprocity and redistribution. It is the separation of these concepts where they have been blurred by the chroniclers⁵ that forms the basis of Murra's argument against the idea that the Inca state could be called a 'welfare state' and that the state was directly responsible for the well-being of widows, orphans, the sick, etc.⁶ The origins of this idea are in the writings of the 16th and 17th century apologists of the Inca empire, Blas Valera and Garcilaso de la Vega (1960), who were concerned to highlight the sufferings of the Indian population under the Spanish, and who consequently glorified the Inca state into a harmonious system of state planning for the well-being of its subjects.

These two authors introduce a distinction not made by any of the other chroniclers, between two different kinds of Inca state deposits, - the qollqa, for the use of the state alone, and the sapsi, for the use of the local community and the maintenance of 'widows and orphans'. But, as Murra puts it,

a procedure which makes local welfare dependent on state 'generosity' is contrary to the fundamental logic of Andean social organisation. The latter makes the local community or kinship group responsible for its own subsistence and welfare, by means of reciprocity (1978:181).

There is slightly more evidence to suggest that state deposits could be used to help out at times of crop failure. But Murra argues that the maintenance of those unable to work was clearly

a traditional local responsibility, which would include working the lands of the sick and old, and possibly administering provisions from store-houses of the local community. It is the attribution of this local responsibility to the state that enables Blas and Garcilaso to convey the image of the benevolent statecraft of the Incas (ibid:196).

This image is helped on by another confusion, as to the nature of the redistributive economy. Murra argues that while the attribution to the Inca state of a 'socialist' or 'welfare' nature assumes that redistribution was for welfare ends, in fact, apart from the scant references to possible use of the state deposits in times of crop failure from drought or frost, these deposits are usually referred to as being for "military, ecclesiastical, court and administrative purposes" (ibid:196). As in other redistributive economies, gift-giving gave power, in the absence of any other way of using accumulated goods (ibid: 197).

For Murra, then, welfare was a function of local reciprocity, and was in no way to be confused with redistribution, or the 'institutionalised generosity' of the Incas towards warriors, kuraka, etc.; this local reciprocity and responsibility for welfare are fundamental aspects of the definition of Andean society. However, it is not clear how the local class structure of kings and kuraka can be accommodated within this model. Other authors, taking their cue from Murra, have argued that the class structure was created at a local level through the manipulation of the ideology of reciprocity.⁷ However, there are big problems with this approach. Firstly, if we take the four criteria of the Andean economy laid down by Alberti and Mayer (see above), this definition includes both a fundamental reciprocity and the manipulation of that reciprocity to produce systems of domination. What conditions, then, determine which acts of reciprocity are genuine, and which manipulative? Why should not all such acts become manipulative ones? In other words, the explanation in terms solely of reciprocity and its manipulation is not sufficient. Additional factors will have to be brought in to explain the differences between acts which are all justified in the ideology

as reciprocal. This is hardly surprising, since from the materialist point of view the ideology of exchange has been an important factor also in the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, while in no way providing a complete explanation of how surplus is accumulated.⁸

Secondly, once the basis of Andean society is defined as both reciprocity and its manipulation, the distinction between reciprocity and redistribution itself breaks down. This is illustrated in the work of Wachtel, who starts from a position very close to Murra:

reciprocity was not simply operative between individuals of equal status (ayllu members), it also worked within a hierarchy (gifts from the mighty Inca, duty in return from the ayllus). In the Inca state, the principle of reciprocity does not make sense except in conjunction with the concept of redistribution, as the system of tribute shows (1977:70).⁹

He goes on to draw conclusions that would probably not be acceptable to Murra, in view of the latter's critique of the idea of the Inca state as fulfilling a 'welfare' function:

the Inca's generosity provided for the welfare of those who were old or sick and unable to work. In times of famine, he distributed to the communities the reserve stocks from his granaries. The peasants felt therefore that they shared in the consumption of the produce they delivered as tribute (ibid:72).

For Wachtel, then, "tribute was an integral part of the system of reciprocity and it amounted to a dual system of gifts and counter-gifts" (ibid:72). This position sees redistribution as just an extension of the principle of reciprocity, whereas for Murra, redistribution was a mechanism of accumulation of power, to be sharply distinguished from reciprocity between members of the same kinship group at local level.

However, Wachtel's discussion does show up the weakness in Murra's analysis. Despite the assertion quoted above that ayllu members are individuals of equal status, it is an important part of Wachtel's analysis that "the peasants owed tribute not only to

the Inca, but also to the whole hierarchy of the curacas" (ibid: 70),¹⁰ so that

in fact, duties to the Inca seem to have been an extension of duties to the curaca, as though the Empire had established itself by modelling its institutions on those already in existence (ibid:72).

If this is the case, then it is slightly absurd to talk of the ayllu as a "communal system" (ibid:73), unless it is seriously being proposed that the Inca state, too, was a communist utopia. A more sensible way out for Wachtel would be to say that the method of surplus accumulation by the kurakas at a local level, involving both an ideology of reciprocity and a material use of redistribution to convey prestige and ensure loyalty, was repeated by the Incas on a more extensive scale. But in this case, the distinction made by Murra between reciprocity and redistribution, corresponding to different ways of organising production and circulation at local and state levels, disappears. The existence of a class structure within the ayllu does invalidate the claims made for a local communal system based on reciprocity.

At this stage, it is worth examining in more detail what features have given rise to the analysis of the local economy as based on reciprocity. Some of these, such as the periodic redistribution of land between households, or the working of the lands of the old and sick by other members of the community, are more properly analysed as mechanisms of redistribution within the community. Others, such as the mutual aid in agriculture or the building of a house for a newly married couple mentioned by Blas Valera under his 'law of brotherhood', may more properly be described as reciprocal obligations.¹¹ But more controversial is the characterisation of relations between the kuraka and ordinary members of the ayllu as based on reciprocity. For instance, Murra states that

the norms of reciprocity and of labour given in return for the 'generosity' of the local lord certainly come from centuries before Pachacuti (1978:137).

The main example of this 'generosity' given is the custom of the kuraka holding feasts for their relatives and subjects. Murra (1978:141) quotes various sources on this subject, some of which say that food and drink was given to everyone, but most of which say that it went to those who worked the fields of the kuraka and tended his flocks. Much has been made of the fact that the Incas carried over this custom to state level. When the villagers worked the state lands, they were given food and chicha (maize-beer), and there was sometimes music and dancing. For Murra, this is

an indication of the care which was given to the observation of the principle that rotating labour services were reciprocal obligations (ibid:147).

For Wachtel:

ayllu members went off together to the Inca's land to tend it communally. Their work was done to the rhythm of songs and dances of a religious character and the occasion had its place in a total integrated view of the world (1977:71).

Similarly, the mitayos, those who did periodic personal service, "were both fed and rewarded by Inca or curaca" (ibid). And for Godelier:

the Inca State provided food and drink in the same way as during the traditional ayllu system when the beneficiary of the community's cooperative work had fed those who helped him. The State provided tools and seed and forced the people to come to work in their holiday clothes and with music and song (1977:64).

These modern commentators all emphasise the impression of social consensus given by the references to songs and dancing. There is good authority for this interpretation. Polo de Ondegardo is quoted by Murra as saying that it is fair that the kuraka have his lands worked by other people, seeing that he provides food and drink for them; for this reason, Polo states, "there is general order among them" (Murra, 1978:142). For Guaman Poma, too, communal meals with music and dancing were one of the features that marked the transition to civilisation from a state

of barbarism in his history of the Andean peoples (Dilke 1978: 26).

However, there is good reason to doubt such an interpretation. The contemporary survival of these work parties, known as minga or minka, has also frequently been given an interpretation which emphasises their role of linking different strata of the peasantry (Mayer 1974a; Fonseca, 1974). Although Mayer and Fonseca show how the various forms of minka allow rich peasants to exploit poor ones (and Fonseca explicitly links this to the role of the kuraka in pre- and post-conquest society) (1974:91), they also emphasise how at the same time minka forces the redistribution of some of the surplus of the richer peasants to the community as a whole (ibid:108; Mayer 1974a:53). The whole is firmly based in the context of reciprocity (ibid:54; Fonseca 1974:106). Yet, of the explicit ethnographic references to the use of the word minka in Fonseca's article, one makes it interchangeable with peón, which means 'labourer' (1974:97), while another tells us that

the minkas are those 'invited' to work for the boss in return for their 'rights', since in this asymmetrical relationship one does not expect the exact equivalent of the service performed to be returned (ibid:92).

All the other references are to practices with far more specific names in Quechua, and indeed the diagram on page 93 of the same article does not mention the word minka.

Fonseca, then, is arguing that a series of specific work relationships are united under the generic name of minka. The question is what is the characteristic that unites them. The evidence presented here is quite consistent with a meaning such as 'labour for which a wage is paid in kind', the crucial variable being that the labour given is not returned by equivalent labour, but is rewarded in goods. There does not seem to be any great justification for putting this under the more general heading of 'reciprocity'. Indeed, Fonseca tends to avoid this characterisation in favour of 'redistribution', keeping 'reciprocity' for the relation of waje-waje, where the labour is

returned by equivalent labour among equals. Mayer argues that an important feature of relations governed by 'reciprocity' is the fact that once a person is asked to participate, he or she cannot refuse (1974a:55); but the example he himself gives of how a returned migrant from Lima looked in vain for workers to help him roof a house would seem to indicate that there are ways of refusing the traditional gift 'inviting' one to work (ibid:52).

In a different area of the Andes - the Community of Carhuapata, near Lircay in Huancavelica - the word mingado or minga is used today for a person employed to keep flocks of sheep and llamas in the high pastures (puna), while the owners of the herds lived at a lower level. In a case observed in 1976, a woman travelled up to the puna in order to look for a mingado but failed to find one. The reward being offered was a money payment, in sharp contrast to the ethnographic evidence presented in the articles by Mayer and Fonseca, which comes from the Huánuco region. The difference is possible due to the importance of the Huancavelica mercury mine in the economy of the region around it during colonial times. From early on, the word mingado acquired the meaning of wage-labourer hired by the mine-owner on the free market as a substitute for a compulsory mita labourer. It was possible for an Indian to buy himself off mita labour by paying over a sum equivalent to the difference between the cost of paying a mita labourer for two months, and the cost of hiring a wage-labourer. The case observed in Carhuapata conformed exactly to this pattern. The family wanted to hire a mingado to relieve them of the onerous duty of shepherding, which they did by turns in a house in the puna. One particular couple, the brother-in-law of the woman of the house with his wife, used to stay and mind the flocks in the higher level house in return for participation in the harvest of the lower levels, as they had little property of their own. But this latter couple were not in a relationship of minga to the owners of the animals. Just as in the colonial mita, the mingado is one who does for pay work that others would do out of necessity for their keep.

Documents from Huancavelica of the colonial period abound with references to the use of mingados or, in Spanish, alquilas

in the mines, and some of the conflicts that arose around this practice will be discussed in Chapter V. But already at the end of the 16th century, there is a reference in Relaciones Geográficas de Indias to "those who hire themselves out of their own free will, known as mingas" (Jimenez de la Espada 1965:BAE vol. 183, page 377). We can be sceptical about the precise meaning of 'freedom' to work for a wage. The point that emerges clearly is that from early days of the colonial period, and in some surviving usages today, minga refers to a relationship where the worker is paid, whether in kind or in money. This would contrast with unpaid labour that takes place within a household, and with labour that is exchanged for equivalent labour at a later date. The latter may be classed as 'reciprocal', but one should be extremely wary of applying such a label to unpaid labour of widely different kinds that is exchanged, across the sexual divide in particular, within households.¹²

Given that this meaning of minga as a free wage labourer emerged so early on in the colonial period and has survived to the present day in at least one area of the Andes, the emphasis so often put on the reciprocity involved in present day labour relations classified as minga would seem analogous to analysing the wage under capitalism as a form of reciprocity between capitalist and worker. The straining of the concept of reciprocity is particularly evident when an ethnographer such as Fonseca (1974) is at pains to point out how easily minga relations allow exploitation of poor peasants by rich ones, and of Indians by mestizos. If, during the colonial period, Indians were compelled to do labour for the Spanish and give up the product in the form of tribute, receiving no payment for it themselves, or if their caciques pocketed the payment, it is predictable that struggles against this forced labour would use the argument that under the Inca regime a reward was received in kind for tributary labour. It does not justify us in analysing this form of state redistribution as reciprocity. In other words, where surplus is being accumulated through redistribution of some of the product in some form, we cannot logically analyse this surplus accumulation as another form of reciprocity. This argument applies at the level

of the Inca state, and equally at the level of the local kuraka, or at that of present day survivals. If Wachtel is correct in asserting that the "duties to the Inca were just an extension of duties to the curaca" (1977:72), then one cannot argue that the local economy was based on reciprocity, while the state economy exploited through redistributive practices.

Similar considerations apply to the other practice under the Incas which has been interpreted as an instance of Inca reciprocity. This is the fact that the Incas and kuraka always provided the raw materials to be worked, - the land, seed and tools in the case of agriculture, the wool or cotton for weaving (Murra 1978:147; Godelier 1977:64; Wachtel 1977:72). This is not at all an unusual feature of a mode of production. Both capitalist and slave modes of production operate on a similar basis. Again, it is predictable that with the breakdown of the organisation of supplies of raw materials under the Spanish, the Indians should resent having to work their own lands and weave their own wool for compulsory tribute.¹³ The fact that political struggle against the tribute system used this argument during the colonial period does not justify us in describing the supply of raw materials to workers as an act of reciprocity.

In this section, it has been argued that the theory that underlying all forms of surplus accumulation in the Andes there has been an economy of reciprocity does not stand up to examination. On logical grounds, it seems dubious to use a concept of reciprocity that includes its own negation, or 'manipulation'. Empirically, the theory has difficulty in accounting for surplus accumulation at local level and in distinguishing genuine acts of reciprocity from manipulative ones. The analysis of present-day survivals of minga as a form of reciprocity capable of manipulation involves ignoring the usage of the word to mean free wage labour, a usage that became established early in the colony and has survived to the present day in some areas of the Andes. The next section goes on to examine the other concept which it has been argued is characteristic of the 'Andean economy and society' from pre-incaic times to the present day - that of verticality.

b. Verticality

Baudin first talked of the origins of exchange in the Andes as being along the vertical axis between agricultural and pastoral areas (1961:163). However, it is Murra who has developed the modern theory of verticality, which he set out in his article on vertical control; published in 1972, it drew on new data from the Visitas - enquiry visits made by Spanish officials to certain localities in the 16th century. (Murra 1975:59-115). In this article, Murra argues the existence of an "Andean ideal" whereby populations situated on one ecological level send groups of colonisers out to the other ecological levels in order to have direct access to the products of different climates and altitudes (ibid: 60). Goods can then circulate within the ethnic group along kinship lines and the group as a whole can be self-sufficient. Access to a wide range of goods can be maintained without having recourse to trade or barter. Murra shows first how this model operated on a fairly small scale in the region of Chaupiwara, near Huánuco, inhabited by the chupaychu. Here a group of about 3,000 families had its centre of population at about 3,000 metres above sea level, while at three days walk away in the high puna it had pastures for its herds and access to salt, while four days walk away in the upper jungle region it had coca fields. A little above the coca fields were fields for cotton and chilli. These colonies were inhabited permanently by members of the chupaychu, who would be in charge of keeping the herds, or making the salt, etc. They were islands in the sense that none of the intervening territory was held by the group. This feature has led Murra to call the system that of 'vertical archipelagos'. All the colonies were themselves multi-ethnic, that is, colonists from different ethnic groups lived and worked alongside each other in areas often quite far distant from the home where they would be registered as resident (ibid:62-71).

Secondly, Murra shows how in a large kingdom, that of the lupaga on the shores of lake Titcaca, the same model was operated on a more extensive scale. The lupaga were one of several pre-incaic kingdoms in this area who were conquered by the Incas,

and consisted of about 100,000 people. Their centre of population and power was at 4,000 metres, mainly pasture land, but where potatoes and other root crops can be grown. They had colonies in the oases of the Pacific coast, at ten or fifteen days' walk away, where they could grow maize and cotton and gather guano for fertiliser. Similarly they had coca fields many days away on the eastern slopes of the Andes. It appears that, as in the previous case, the colonies were multi-ethnic, but that they could be much larger, involving hundreds of households (ibid:71-80).

Murra's third and fourth cases give evidence that the phenomenon of 'vertical control' was not limited to mountain peoples. The third case is of a long lawsuit which took place in the 16th century between two ethnic groups from the sierra, and one from the coast, over the control of some coca fields on the western slopes of the Andes. All parties were in agreement that "before the Incas came" these fields had been under the control of a coastal group from Collique, but it appears that the Incas had forced them to share the coca fields with several other ethnic groups, all of whom, again, belonged to their communities of origin, producing a situation which was extremely difficult for the Europeans to comprehend. The fourth case documents the existence of links between the coastal kingdom of Chimú and the sierra region of Cajamarca. Two isolated pieces of evidence indicate that there may have been Chimú colonies in the sierra. Firstly, the existence of yunga speaking inhabitants of some villages in Cajamarca in 1644, said to have been captives brought there by the Incas, but very likely of earlier origin; secondly, a 17th century report that there were 6,000 Indians in the sierra paying tribute to the Chimú in gold, silver, copper and other products. As there is no evidence that the Chimú ever conquered peoples of the sierra, it is more likely that the relation was one of vertical control of Chimú colonists (ibid: 80-101).

Murra's fifth case is different, in that a group of serranos found producing coca in Songo, in the jungle region of what is now Bolivia, denied very early on in the colonial period that

they had any ties with sierra communities. But in the course of the questioning by the Spanish in 1568, and in the context of Spanish pressure to produce more coca, which was becoming an important market commodity, it emerged that in Inca times the colony had been larger and had produced great quantities of coca, which were delivered to Cuzco, the Inca capital. Murra, then, interprets this case as one of the use by the state of the model of 'vertical archipelagos'. Here, the importance of geographical verticality gives way to a vertical integration with the state structure. The link back to Cuzco as base, being dependent on the Inca state structure, was forgotten in the years after the conquest, with the destruction of that state (ibid:101-109).

Murra then poses the question of whether there is historical continuity between the pre-incaic system of vertical control and the many transfers of population effected by the Incas with the aim of controlling newly conquered territories. Both the latter, as well as people transferred to perform duties for the state, such as working the coca fields of the Inca, were known under the generic name of mitimaes to the Spanish. Murra argues that this is not a semantic confusion, but that the connecting link was that all such mitmaqkuna, as they were called in Quechua, maintained links with their communities of origin. The system of military colonists used in the expansion of the Inca state can therefore be seen as an extension of the pre-incaic system of vertical archipelagos. That the system did reach very complex proportions under the Incas is shown by details such as that the mitimaes from the lupaga were sent by the Incas as far north as Quito and as far south as Chile, and were still enumerated with the lupaga in the nucleus on lake Titicaca. However, Murra also argues at the end of this article that in the Inca state

the earlier concept of the ecological archipelago was in complete contradiction with the way it was being used and extended for military purposes in the different circumstances that went with the change in scale (ibid:114-5).

The question of a pan-Andean model and its survival is here raised in an interesting way. Once again it is suggested that the Inca state created contradictions where there had been none before. This is in line with Murra's general postulate of a basic non-exploitative system of reciprocity upon which the Incas superimposed a system of state exploitation. But in the absence of more information about how the product was circulated between the islands and the nucleus of a pre-incaic archipelago we cannot assume a basis of non-exploitative reciprocity. Murra did call his system one of vertical control. Yet subsequent uses of the theory have concentrated more on the vertical aspect than the control aspect of the theory. The model must, however, involve a system of social control of the colonies by the nucleus in order to prevent the colonists either spreading horizontally to produce their own subsistence locally, or appropriating their own specialised product and developing relations of exchange with other ecological levels. It is known that the Incas organised such a system of social control on a vast scale. We cannot assume, even in small-scale cases of verticality, that no control was exercised over the colonies by the nucleus, let alone in the case of large kingdoms such as the lupaga or that of Chimú. Murra tries to find a continuity in technical organisation, but a discontinuity in social organisation, between an original Andean model of verticality for self-sufficiency of the ethnic group, and the way the Inca state used colonists for expansion and accumulation.

The argument of this chapter has been that one cannot strip away archaeological layers, or layers of social organisation, and get back to the original reciprocal society. The existence of surplus accumulation at a local level in pre-incaic times and also, to some extent, within the Inca state, creates difficulties for Murra's sharp distinction between reciprocity and redistribution. In the same way, we cannot assume an original vertical control system geared to self-sufficiency, whose purpose is contradicted by the use made of it by the Incas in surplus accumulation and military expansion. Because Murra clings to reciprocity as the basis of the pan-Andean

model, he stops short of ever suggesting that there may have been any continuity in methods of surplus accumulation and social control.

The theory of vertical control has as its corollary the elimination of exchange. Murra is at times quite clear about this (1975:99-101). He states that he is trying to get behind the ethnocentric assumption of some archaeologists that where cultural links are found between different geographical areas, this must be an indication of trade. On the contrary, the commonest way for goods to move in a pre-capitalist society is along lines of "reciprocity, redistribution, or of tribute" (ibid:100).¹⁴ There are several references in Murra's data to tribute payment in pre-incaic vertical systems. This means that vertical control, as direct control, implies an internal hierarchy, where relations of equality do not develop between subjects of the group, but only between rulers of different groups. Trade is always external trade, and becomes the monopoly of the ruling class in a by now familiar pattern (Polanyi: 1957).

There are various discussions of the extent of internal trade that was allowed under the Incas, but the evidence is very confused, due in part to the fact that the Spanish very quickly developed a market economy in Peru after the conquest, so that it is hard to tell from the chroniclers which markets were old, which new; also, the Spanish words used to describe indigenous transactions tend to be very general ones, such as rescate, which admit of many interpretations (Mayer 1974:35). In these circumstances, arguments for and against the existence of barter and markets in Inca times tend to be logical rather than empirical. Baudin, for instance, argued that with equal amounts of land being distributed to each household, variations in family size and crop yield would lead to surpluses and shortages which could be resolved through exchange (1961:168). Mayer argues that it is possible for markets to grow up very quickly when political conditions change, and that the markets observed by some chroniclers may have been of recent establishment (1974b:30). Markets probably diminished in importance

under the Incas from pre-incaic times, and may have had to do with the supply of provisions, and the cooking of food, for specialist artisan populations in centres such as Cuzco (ibid: 30).¹⁵

Murra argues that state redistribution was the principal form of circulation of goods. The state made use of and extended forms of vertical economy by developments such as mitimaes and also by the pairing of communities, often one on the coast and one in the sierra (1978:206). He argues that there is ample archeological evidence of trading between coast, jungle and sierra going back at least 2,000 years. The Incas managed to take trading out of the hands of the local lords and channel it through the state (ibid:206-7). Murra also argues frequently that it was state policy to preserve the self-sufficiency of the local ethnic groups, and that such policies as the allocation of lands to be held in direct vertical control were part of this.

However, these two arguments together mean that there was a dual process at work here. At the same time as preserving and extending the self-sufficiency of the ethnic group, in the sense of independence from the necessity to engage in trade with outside groups, the state was also creating self-sufficiency in a second sense - that of production for subsistence as opposed to surplus. Rather than seeing self-sufficiency as the Andean model underlying superimposed forms of exploitation, we can then see it as being created in the very process of setting up surplus production.

From this point of view, vertical control of different ecological levels in pre-incaic times does not have to be conceived as a symptom of an Andean model of self-sufficiency, but can well be integrated into a scenario of structured societies producing surplus in the form of tribute for different kings and lords. The centralisation of surplus appropriation by the Incas tended then to reduce vertical control to a function of providing subsistence for those on remote ecological levels engaged in producing surplus for the Inca, as well as for the

mass of the population who worked the state lands and wove the state wool.

2. An Andean Mode of Production?

So far, we have tried to show that the concept of vertical control, which is very specific to the Andes, has been fitted into a mould of 'reciprocity', which is entirely non-specific. If it were correct that 'Andean society' has reciprocity as its basis, this would immediately take away the specificity of the label 'Andean', since 'reciprocity' has been found by anthropologists all over the world. Now in recent years, theories of society based on reciprocity or exchange have been subjected to fairly devastating criticism by a school of marxist economic anthropology, growing out of French work on African societies.¹⁶ It would therefore seem relevant to see whether the theories of 'mode of production' and of 'social formation' developed by French marxists provide a better general framework for situating the specific institutions of Andean economy and society.¹⁷

A well known article by Godelier has attempted a marxist re-working of the analysis of the economic organisation of the Inca state presented by Murra in his doctoral thesis (Godelier 1977). Murra's thesis was written many years before his elaboration of the concept of verticality, and he later thanked Godelier for helping him to see the implications of what he had written in his thesis more clearly (Murra 1975:22). What Murra's thesis had done was to show very clearly how the great technological achievements of the Incas were all related to the state's need to produce a storable surplus. He showed how the achievements of terracing, irrigation, and the transport of fertiliser from the islands off the coast, all had to do with the production of maize, which was primarily a state crop, for feeding the army and for making chicha for state workers (1978:Chapter 1). The invention of the technique of freeze-drying potatoes seems also to have been for storage in the state deposits, found at regular intervals along the incredible Inca roads which traversed thousands of miles of some of the most mountainous territory in the world. Murra also showed how the development of groups of

specialised producers were also to do with state surplus production. These were groups such as the aqllakuna ('chosen ones') who were celibate women who lived in special houses, spinning, weaving and making chicha for the Inca state; or the cumbicamayoc, who were male weavers, specialised in making very fine cloth for state consumption and redistribution; or the yanakuna, who seem to have been a further social development, in that they were herdsmen of the state flocks whose status had become hereditary.¹⁸ These kinds of development have led some to classify the Inca empire as a "slave mode of production" raised to new levels by the imperialism of the Incas (Choy 1978).

Godelier, however, takes a different approach. He analyses the Inca state as a 'social formation' composed of three main modes of production. At the base of the structure was the ayllu, in which

ownership of land was communal [and] work also had a communal form, based on mutual cooperation between villagers (1977:63-4).

The Inca conquest imposed "a regime of forced labour" (ibid:64) and by making use of traditional reciprocal forms was able to create "a new form of the mode of production, similar or derived from an 'Asiatic mode of production'" (ibid:64). The third development was that of the yana, "a type of slavery" (ibid:65), where people were completely uprooted from their communities and given in personal service to an aristocratic family. Within the social formation, however, it is the second form, the 'Asiatic', that is dominant (ibid:65), although it makes use of the old kinship relations in order to reproduce itself (ibid:68).

This once again raises the question of whether the Incas are part of the 'pan-Andean model' proposed by Murra, or whether they are a development external to the model. Although Murra does not ask or answer this question directly, it has been argued in this chapter that it is an implication of the way he poses the dichotomy between reciprocity and redistribution that the Incas will appear as an external imposition on the Andean model.

Godelier puts this position quite clearly:

One can therefore say that the succession, one after the other, of these two economic and social formations is not the result of an internal evolution within the Indian society of the Andes. The Inca conquest had already upset the internal evolution of the Andean tribes and communities. Later, the Spanish conquest was to modify, for a second time, the new developments resulting from the Inca conquest (ibid:66).

He does qualify this statement with a rider on the pre-incaic empires, but reaffirms that for the majority of tribes, which had not reached this stage of development, their incorporation into the Inca empire "resulted in an upheaval imposed from outside" (ibid:66).

If this kind of separation was already implicit in Marx's formulation of the Asiatic mode of production, it becomes even more marked when instead of the totality being defined as the mode of production, it becomes, in the structuralist version of marxism, a 'social formation' composed of several modes of production.¹⁹ The paradox is, of course, that the Incas, - the only pre-hispanic Andean civilisation of which we have any first-hand account, become defined as something external to Andean development. This cannot be regarded as a tenable position; the more so because the residual category that is left after subtracting the Incas from 'Andean society', namely, the self-sufficient reciprocal community, has in itself no dynamic, no potential for development. If the social formation is analysed as being composed of the Asiatic and slave modes of production superimposed on a traditional primitive communism, then it cannot be argued that the traditional development of Andean society was interrupted by the arrival of the Asiatic mode. No development has been defined that could be interrupted.²⁰

In a sense, this problem is very similar to that encountered in Chapter II above in relation to the 'barter myth' of the origins of money. In each case, a problematic gap is opened up between the original reciprocal society and the system of class exploitation that grows up on top of it. Both theories

must bring in outside factors to bridge this gap: for Marx, the violence of 'primitive accumulation', and for Godelier, the Inca conquest.

Since Godelier's contribution, the major development of Murra's theory of verticality has taken place. At the same time, the digestion of the documentary evidence of the Visitas of the 1560s has forced a recognition that the dichotomy between state and village community has somehow to incorporate the existence of a considerable local elite of kings and lords. It is paradoxical that Godelier's article, which might have pointed in a different direction, has actually enabled this local ruling class to be analysed as manipulating local norms of reciprocity, in the same way as he had analysed the Inca state as doing. As already suggested, the problem with this analysis is not exactly that it is false. Every mode of production can be said to legitimate itself in terms of an ideology of exchange: the slave exchanged labour for the master's protection; feudalism contained many forms of contract between lord and vassal; in capitalism, labour power is exchanged for its value in the wage. The problem is rather that the theory cannot explain the material basis of surplus accumulation. In effect, the theory of the 'manipulation of reciprocity' must involve the assumption that the peasantry were stupid and could not see that they were being manipulated. All the more so if we consider that the peasantry were not actually separated from the means of production in the Andean economy; on the contrary, the theories urge us to see them as very self-sufficient. This contrasts strongly with the analysis of capitalism, where the fact that the wage-labourers do not own their means of production clearly facilitates the reproduction of wage labour. However conscious the capitalist labourers may be that they are producing surplus for a dominant class, there is no alternative to wage-labour. The peasantry in the Andean social formation, as set out by Godelier, do have an alternative: they can simply produce for their own subsistence.

In what follows, we shall attempt to reinterpret the theory of a specifically Andean form of vertical control of resources,

in the light of the theory of circulation set out in Chapters I and II. In this way, we shall try and see what was the relevance of the vertical colonies to the ability of the Inca state to mobilise such apparently vast amounts of surplus labour.

3. Vertical Control and Inca Circulation

Murra (1978) has shown that the redistributive state sphere took the place of the market in the Inca economy, and authors such as Baudin (1961) have demonstrated how this circulation of goods under the Incas required a form of state planning that is in many ways very similar to socialist planning of the economy.²¹ However, these and other authors have recognised that Inca planning did not extend to the whole of society's production, but was confined to a state sphere of goods. The subsistence of the peasants was their own affair; the state did not interfere, nor did it require them to make tribute goods from their own raw materials and resources.

If we then look at how this material surplus was produced under the Incas, we will find that there were two very different ways in which labour could be exploited by the state. On the one hand, we have the normal labour obligations of each married couple, to work the lands and wool of the state and of the kuraka, to perform military and other public services on a rotating basis; on the other hand we have the full-time employment in specialist surplus production of groups such as the yana and aqlla, some of whom, at any rate, must have obtained their subsistence directly from the state or from the private lands of the royal dynasty and their military followers. As long as we stay at this level of relations of exploitation, we have no way of deciding which of these relations was the principal one, or how the two were interconnected.

It is only at the level of circulation that we can see how the Incas controlled the integration of these different forms of production. The cloth and chicha produced by the aqlla were used as payment in kind for military and agricultural state

labour. Maize produced on the state lands filled the store houses, which were mainly used to feed the army. The yana who minded the state llamas produced the wool given out to each household to make the state cloth, as well as transport for the army. The mitimaes²² sent to far away ecological levels to produce coca or salt were also producing important items in the redistributive system, since coca was present in most rituals, while salt is vital in the preservation and preparing of food. In order to control how goods circulated from one sphere of the economy to another, the Incas developed a sophisticated system of accounting and planning. This system involved the development of a social class who controlled circulation - the quipucamayog, who kept accounts and records of labour obligations on knotted cords, and the tocricog, who appear to have been government planners who visited the villages and reassigned obligations. It is clear from Guaman Poma that the administration worked by incorporating members of local nobilities into its lower ranks (Dilke 1978:99).

Now we could say, very generally, that the Inca state, having created a division of labour in society, had also created interdependencies. In particular, those in full-time specialist crafts, or in the army or other state service, would be dependent on the stocks in the state storehouses for their subsistence. There are many Spanish accounts of the incredible amounts of cloth, maize and other goods that were to be found in these storehouses after the Conquest (Murra 1978:Chapter 1). By creating interdependency and then controlling the circulation of products between sectors, the Incas could thereby control production. In controlling the way in which labour was made social through the plan, they could be said to be occupying a similar position of power as that occupied by the bureaucratic class in many socialist societies today.²³

However, this explanation is not quite sufficient, since it does not tell us how it was possible to get local labour, over a vast area of territory, to work the maize and coca lands of the Inca and spin and weave the state wool into cloth, all of which had to be transported long distances to state storehouses. It might be argued, as Murra tends to, that the State secured

a system of 'indirect rule' by redistributing gifts of fine cloth and objects of gold and silver to the local lords, thereby securing their allegiance and the labour of their subjects (1967:391; 1978:167). But this still does not tell us how the local kuraka were able to extract surplus labour from their subjects in order to enter into a tributary relationship with the Inca state. It might be argued that the fine cloth redistributed by the Inca to the kuraka was then redistributed by the kuraka to his subjects. But clearly not all the surplus can have been redistributed in this way, or the vast accumulation of labour in the form of fortresses, roads, gold objects, and the ostentatious consumption of cloth at the Inca court, would not have been possible.²⁴

We shall return to the question of the local extraction of surplus in Chapter IV. Here we can say that the process of creation of a sphere of planned state production involves the centralisation of the surplus formerly appropriated and exchanged between local lords. This process has its own dynamic, since, in effect, the state sphere becomes a monopoly sphere, but a state monopoly cannot function if there is independent production and exchange on its borders; outside kingdoms must be internalised in order for luxury trade to be eliminated. For the Incas this process of centralisation was clearly an ongoing military one. However, the army had to be paid in state cloth and fed on state maize, etc. As the military presence of the Incas increased, production of these state goods had to increase too. We have seen how technological change as well as changes in the relations of production occurred in precisely this area of state production. But the costs of control did not end with the army. They extended to the class of bureaucrats in charge of planning, checking and administering the regular production of surplus for the storehouses, as well as to the institutionalised generosity that was the price of enlisting the local lords in this process. We can then talk of a 'law of motion' of the Inca mode of production in terms of an ongoing process of centralisation, extending the area of monopolisation of state goods, which involved increasing costs of control, both military and bureaucratic. These costs of control had to be borne by intensi-

fied production of state goods. The extension of the area of monopolisation therefore involves the intensification of monopoly production.

If the feature of vertical control of different ecological levels seems to have been lost at this level of generality, it can be reintegrated by pursuing the theory of monopoly goods further. Clearly, one principal aim of an administration based on state monopoly goods is to prevent any other power building up similar monopolies. This may well be the reason why a complex criss-crossing of ownership is found, particularly in coca and salt producing areas, and is so often said to date from the time of the Inca. For instance, in the third case analysed in Murra's article on vertical control, the coca lands in dispute were acknowledged to have been the property of the lords of Collique on the coast "before the time of the Incas" or "before the Incas entered these lands" (1975:84-93). Under the Incas, access was granted to the other ethnic groups in the area, thereby greatly diminishing the coca that had formerly been received in tribute from their colony at Quivi by the lords of Collique.

Maria Rostworowski has recently published two early Visitas of the Canta region. When the Indians of Quivi were asked by the Spanish in 1553 if there were any "lands of the Inca" in their district, they replied that there were "two small coca fields"; the village was still described as belonging "to all the different divisions, for they are there to cultivate the coca" (Rostworowski 1978:59-60). In Huánuco in 1562, on the other hand, some coca fields that had originally belonged to the chupachu and which the Incas had made them share with their own colonists sent from Cuzco, had been reclaimed by the original owners (see below, Chapter IV, section 3b).

Murra's fifth case of vertical control quite clearly shows the Incas themselves establishing their own exclusive coca

colony on a larger scale. Songo, in present-day Bolivia, was a colony of 200 households sent down from the mountains to produce coca and send it back to Cuzco. In an appendix to this thesis, evidence is presented that seems to show that the fortified tomb of Guanacaure in the jungle slopes below Huánuco had been an Inca coca colony from the time of Tupac Yupanqui. The same Inca is associated with the conquest of the "small" coca fields at Quivi, over which there was so much dispute in the period after the fall of the Incas. Now although Murra has argued against the idea that coca was a state monopoly good under the Incas,²⁵ there is much evidence that it was. The chroniclers, according to Wachtel, say that it was kept for the use of the Inca, the priests and the kuraka (Wachtel 1977:145); and he quotes Acosta as saying:

in the time of the Inca kings it was not lawful for the plebeians to use coca without licence from the Inca or their Governor (ibid:257 n.33; Acosta 1954:BK.IV,Ch.22).

The reference to the possibility of obtaining 'licence' to use coca is entirely consistent with the running of a state monopoly.²⁶ It should probably be taken as meaning licence for the kuraka to cultivate and harvest their own coca fields, such as the lords of the lupaga appear to have possessed in 1567 (see below, Chapter IV).

Whether or not coca was formally a state monopoly, much of its production went to the state, and there is some association between coca fields and Inca conquest and fortifications. The much vaunted concern of the Incas for the self-sufficiency of their subject communities is here given a new twist. Giving each community access to some coca lands ensures that no one ethnic group will be able to dominate another through a monopoly on coca production and circulation. Baudin mentions the same process in connection with the Inca conquest of the peoples on the Pacific coast who had formerly controlled the guano islands:

The Cincha Islands, where these valuable deposits of bird droppings were to be found, were parceled out among the different provinces of the empire, so that no one province could establish a monopoly for its own benefit (1961:74).

And yet we know from Murra that the main use of guano was as fertiliser on the state maize lands (1978:61).

Apart from coca, the other area where we find frequent references to multi-ethnic settlements placed by the Inca to exploit a particular product is that of salt. For instance, Murra's first case is of salt production in a place called Yanacachi (which means 'black salt' in Quechua), where salt-makers from various ethnic groups were stationed (1975:66-7). The questionnaire that formed the basis of the Relaciones Geográficas de Indias contained a question about salt. The answers show in general that salt production and distribution was highly localised. Guamanga and Cuzco, for instance, were the sources of salt supply for very large areas. But where we find references to places where salt is produced, they are of the following type:

A league and a half from the village of Caquingora there are some salt-works called Yaribaya, in which settlement the Inca had placed Indian salt-makers from all the surrounding villages, and it is solidified by the cold... (Jimenez de la Espada 1965:BAE vol. 183, page 340).

Similar references to multi-ethnic settlements making salt are found in the province of Otavalo, and another, perhaps referring to the same place, 18 leagues from Quito (ibid:BAE vol. 184, pages 239-240, 263).

In the salt-works near Guamanga, two kinds of salt were produced. Rock salt was excavated from an underground chamber that was also a lake and had to be reached by boat. But according to the description,

this is only for the crystal salt, of which only a little is obtained, while for the white salt which they make in loaves and other shapes, they distil salt water which runs from the hill in a little stream, and this water is shared out amongst themselves in wells by the inhabitants of that hill, who are many and who have a village founded for this purpose from the time of the Incas, so that there are Indians there from all over this province...and these inhabitants share out this water by days and by weeks, according to the possession and distribution which they have agreed amongst themselves from of old (ibid: BAE vol. 183, page 194).

Again, we find the same apparent preoccupation with the self-sufficiency of the different ethnic groups, which at the same time has the effect of preventing any one group gaining a monopoly over the source of supply. According to Garcilaso de la Vega, quoting Blas Valera,

the Inca ordered that the salt that was made, both from salt springs and from sea water, and the fish of the rivers, streams and lakes, and the fruit of self-sown trees, the cotton and the cane, should all be the communal property of the natives of the province where they were, and that no private person should appropriate them for himself, but rather that everyone should take what they needed and no more (Garcilaso 1960:167-168).

If this passage is usually interpreted as showing the concern of the Incas for the self-sufficiency of the communities, it is equally open to interpretation as showing how they organised the economy so as to prevent local monopolies growing up.

One of the reasons why the importance of salt has not hitherto been fully realised in studies of the Andean civilisations is that, precisely because its production was so localised, it does not appear on many Spanish tribute-lists of the 16th century, which are the usual source of information about Inca tribute. Even in the late 18th century, Cosmé Bueno reports only nine salt-works in the whole of Peru (1951). The Incas must have needed to appropriate a large surplus of salt, not only for food storage and consumption in the royal city, but also for metal refining. There would therefore be good reason for the state to try and reduce to a minimum the consumption of salt by the mass of the population.

There is good evidence that salt was in short supply under the Incas. Methods of drying meat using very little salt were in use, while fish was sometimes frozen in ice to avoid salting it (Cobo 1956:113). Very long distances were travelled by some groups to obtain salt. Rostworowski, for instance, notes a close relationship between the Indians of Canta and "those of the region of Huánuco Pampa, Chinchaycocha, Yaros and Bombon" (1978:179). The yaros were the ethnic group in whose territory the salt-works were near the lake of Chinchaycocha, and where the people of the Huánuco region also went for salt. One of the oldest informants in the Huánuco Visit mentions salt as one of the items they used to give to the Inca in tribute, and says that

they used to deposit the salt in Bombon and Huánuco Pampa for the Indians who passed along the royal road from Cuzco to Quito... (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1967:239).

Also, according to Guaman Poma, ritual fasting always involved abstention from salt, which was associated with abstention from sexual relations (Dilke 1978:52,61,75,78,81,82). This is confirmed by Cobo, who cites it as evidence that the Indians were great lovers of salt (1956:113). Bloch states that severe salt-deficiency does cause a reduced sexual drive, which explains why there is an association between salt and sexuality in practices such as the Greek worship of Aphrodite, pictured as rising from the waves as goddess both of love and of salt (1976:347).

There is evidence to suggest that the pre-Incaic coastal kingdoms operated salt monopolies. Von Hagen describes the extensive salt-making centre of the Chimú, at a place called Gallinazo in the Santa valley (1976:177). An Inca tampu or wayside station was built on the site. Von Hagen puts the date of these stone-built salt pans as "very early on". After being dried in the stone basins,

the salt was then piled in high white pyramids (which are still a feature of the landscape here, as the salt-pans are still in use) before being loaded for distribution (ibid:177).

Pyramids are still a feature of the northern landscape in another sense: various monumental pyramids, apparently of religious significance, were built at different times and places along this coast. In ancient Egypt, too, salt was stored in pyramids and the pyramid shape signified salt in early pottery markings (Bloch 1976:Fig. 9). Also of significance is the fact that a 'great wall of Peru' was discovered just beyond this site in 1931 (Shippee, 1932). Salt monopolies often require fortified cordons to prevent smuggling. The discovery of this long, fortified wall close to the major salt administration centre of the major coastal kingdom is suggestive of a salt monopoly.

It seems that the Gallinazo described by von Hagen cannot be the same site as gave its name to the Gallinazo culture of the neighbouring Virú Valley, which flourished between 300 B.C. and 500 A.D. But the association with salt is unmistakable in the name of the Salinar culture, which flourished prior to the Gallinazo in the valley of Chicama slightly further north (Alden Mason 1968:64-65). An even earlier culture, the Guañape, also takes its name from an area very rich in salt. In Relaciones Geográficas we find the following entry under "Santa y Guañuape":

La Guara, where there are some salt fields, the largest in the world, and the most valuable to be found in the Indies, from where most of the kingdom of Peru is provided (Jimenez de la Espada 1965:BAE vol.183, page 255).

Guañape was also the site of an Inca tampu (von Hagen, 1974:181), which was built near the site of the earliest known agricultural culture in Peru, that of Cerro Prieto, where maize seems first to have been domesticated about 1400 B.C. (Alden Mason 1968:39-43). This is significant, as the beginnings of grain agriculture are associated everywhere with the beginnings of human salt production, since pure hunters and fishers can survive without additional salt, but grain-eaters cannot (Bloch 1976:337).

The Incas themselves had salt-works just outside the capital city of Cuzco, at a place called Cachi-mayu (salt-river). Renamed

Las Salinas by the Spanish, this was the site, in 1538, of a crucial battle in the Spanish civil wars that followed the conquest. Where the salt marshes converged with a rocky outcrop to form a narrow passage there was a large settlement and tampu, while further on down the valley lay the largest known storage area of the Incas, Piquillacta ('flea-town'). Associated with Piquillacta is another great wall across the valley and a vast fortified gateway, Rumi Colca (von Hagen 1974:109).²⁷ Murra discusses the toll-gates, the descriptions of which in the chroniclers might provide evidence that private trading was in fact permitted within the Inca empire, but he concludes that their function was to check on the movement of state goods (1978:213-214).

Again, as in the case of coca, whether or not the Incas had a formal state monopoly of salt the geographical proximity of salt-works and storehouses is striking, as is the evidence of fortifications. The multi-ethnic character of the settlements making salt would clearly make it more difficult for the salt-makers to set up their own monopoly. Not only one of the oldest informants in the Huánuco Visit, but also Francisco Vilcacutipa, described as "the oldest Indian in the province" of Chucuito in 1567, remembered that salt had been given in tribute to the Inca (Diez de San Miguel 1964:106).²⁸

In the mountain regions of the Andes, salt and coca were both products of the vertical colonies. The main centres of population in an area such as Huánuco were several days journey from each of them. Now if the villages were equi-distant from either extreme of the vertical spectrum, this can be interpreted in one of two ways. The usual way would be to say that this is to ensure self-sufficiency by access to all the ecological levels. But if these goods were effectively monopolised by the state, or by the local rulers who were in favour with Cuzco, then a very different interpretation is necessary. The distance of the settlements from the vital colonies producing salt and coca ensures not ease but difficulty of access. In short, the further away the colonies were from the villages, the easier it would be to monopolise their product and prevent smuggling.

This theory is borne out by the fact that even in the relatively low-altitude area around Huánuco, the villages were still situated at some distance from the Inca maize-lands near the main river, which runs down the valley. The Spanish clearly could not understand why the best lands were deserted, and founded the city of Huánuco right in the old, irrigated, Inca maize-lands.²⁹ That the lupaga, whose centre of population on the shores of Lake Titicaca was at over 4,000 metres, should have to go very far to grow maize, is not surprising. The striking thing is that even in the Huánuco region the kuraka lived in villages some distance from the maize lands.

The trio of salt, coca and maize were the most important products of vertical colonies cited in Murra's article on the Visits, in which he sets out the theory of verticality. All these were also important items in the sphere of state redistribution, or the state monopoly sphere as we have preferred to call it here. It is rather striking that in Murra's analysis of what he calls the "ethnocategories" of an Inca quipu, that is, the system according to which different goods were grouped together for recording with knots, this trio of salt, coca and maize emerges again. Maize was clearly a good that needed to be controlled, because it was the raw material for making the alcohol known as chicha. In this quipu from the Inca storehouse at Xauxa, which was translated for the Spanish court in 1561, salt is grouped together with chicha, with fish (i.e. salted fish) and with a category described as 'every fruit' (Murra 1975:252-253). Murra interprets 'every fruit' as standing for chilli and coca, which do not appear anywhere else in the list. Chilli is grown usually in quite close proximity to coca in the upper jungle region. Murra offers us no explanation as to why these goods should be grouped together, except that they are all "dry and preservable" (ibid:253).

A possible interpretation is that the three very dissimilar goods were grouped together because they were state monopoly goods. However, in a sense the whole of the state economy could be described as a state monopoly sphere, and there would be better candidates for real state monopolies, such as gold

and silver, or cloth woven from gold thread, which clearly no-one could own or wear except the Inca caste. It seems more important to see what role was played within the state sphere by these goods. Here it will merely be suggested that the importance of these goods was that they were the necessary means of payment for obtaining labour to do work such as spinning, weaving and agricultural labour. It was the product of this first tier of labour that could then be used to 'finance' the enormous state expenditure in building and maintaining the army. This hypothesis will be elaborated in relation to the structure of the local economy of the kuraka in Chapter IV. But before we leave the Incas we must turn to consider the role of cloth in the control of circulation.

4. Cloth and the Control of Circulation

Murra has continually emphasised the importance of cloth in the Andean economy, as something that was not completely understood by the Europeans. He describes the massive deposits of cloth, as well as of wool and of cotton, found in the Inca storehouses, as the aspect of storage that was "most typically Andean, and therefore strange, to the European observer" (1975:157). In his thesis, based on a reading of the chroniclers, Murra had made a simple distinction between cloth that was woven for the Inca state in tribute, and cloth woven for personal use by the peasantry. But in his later piece on "The Role of Cloth", which makes use of the Huánuco Visit, this distinction is broken down, since it is evident that in Huánuco the local kuraka had automatic access to the wool and cotton of the community, and received special privileges in the form of cloth woven by servants and women (Murra 1975:145-170). The attempts by the Spanish to abolish the practice of polygyny had clearly reduced this automatic access of the kuraka to female labour for spinning and weaving (ibid). We might add that the sexual dimension of this exploitation was carried over to the state level, where the houses full of aglla, women 'chosen' for the Inca, span, wove, and made chicha for the state.³⁰

The aspect of the redistribution of cloth that particularly

interested Murra was the 'compulsory' nature of cloth gifts and of gifts of wool. The Europeans were curious about the Inca custom of bestowing large quantities of gifts, especially cloth, on conquered kings and peoples. By some, such as Garcilaso, this was interpreted as proof of the peaceful nature of Inca expansion and evidence of the care of the Inca state for the welfare of its people. Murra picks up the hint that these gifts were compulsory ones, and prefers to explain them as the opening move in a game of reciprocity; acceptance of the gift of cloth would signify acceptance of the future obligation to give tribute to the Inca state. Rather than having a 'welfare' function, then,

the 'gift' of cloth would be more appropriately seen as the issuing of a certificate of Inca citizenship, the bond of the new servitude (ibid:167).

The sense of gift-giving used here by Murra stems from Mauss's famous essay on the gift (1923), in which he argued that gift-giving was a social practice with established rules, an effect of which was to make it appear that the gift itself contains a 'spirit' that compels the recipient to give something in return. However, Mauss's theory has recently been very convincingly criticised by Sahlins (1974), on the basis of a re-reading of the original Maori text on which it was based. The old Maori informant who gave Mauss his cue in fact brought in gift-giving as an analogy by which to explain why some birds should be sacrificed to the priests after a bird-hunt in the forest. In Maori society, the priests were understood as giving a 'spirit of increase' to the forest. The forest converts this increase into birds which are then caught by the hunters. The hunters are then under an obligation to give some of their catch back, symbolically to the forest, and literally to the priests, who had given the gift of increase to the forest in the first place. The analogy of gift-giving used to explain this involves three people (an aspect that was not explained by Mauss, who took it as referring to only two). One person (A) gives a gift to another (B) who later passes it on to a third (C). After some time, B receives something else back from C, in exchange for the gift. The text states quite clearly that

the 'obligation' referred to is that of B to pass this second gift back to A. In other words, Sahlins shows that the famous passage on gift-giving was saying that one should not make capital out of another person's gift; or, if one does, the original donor should be recompensed. This rule was considered self-evident by the Maori informant, and was not the mysterious spiritual force that Mauss made it into; it was used to explain that one should not make capital out of the priests' gift of growth to the hunters/forest.

Applying this reinterpretation of the theory of the gift to the Andean context, we can say that the obligation put on the conquered king or noble by the gift of cloth from the Inca was not simply to reciprocate; the significance of cloth was that it could be 'given' in turn to third parties in exchange for labour, and so produced an increase. This increase, or surplus, would then be owed back to the Inca state, as original donor. Now we know from other contexts that cloth was the principal means of payment both for service in the army and for other state service, such as transporting goods to Cuzco (Murra 1975:164-165). A significant detail is that a revolt is said once to have occurred in the army because the Incas had neglected the organisation of the weaving tribute, with the result that the soldiers had not received their statutory two pieces of cloth that year. The Inca reimposed the tribute and order was restored (Murra 1978:155-156). Clearly, then, if cloth was the means of payment for state labour, the distribution of quantities of cloth to conquered lords was simply giving them what was necessary for organising and rewarding labour given to the state by their subjects. This adds a new dimension, for instance, to the gift of cloth sent by Atahualpa to Huascar (the two brothers who were fighting for the throne when the Spanish arrived), a gift that was refused and burnt by Huascar, presumably to show that he was not conquered yet and was not going to organise Inca tribute (Murra 1975:166).

This interpretation helps to illuminate another problem raised by Murra. There is a passage in Polo de Ondegardo which

suggests that state officials handed out wool to the peasants for them to make their own clothes, and then came round later to inspect and punish those who had not. This goes together with the insistence that this wool was handed out to everyone, regardless of whether they had their own herds or not (Murra 1975:168). Murra rejects Polo's explanation of this very strict control as being in order to ensure that everybody wore clothes. This, he suggests, was simply a reflection of European conceptions of 'savages' as going nude; whereas in fact all Andean peoples wore clothes, if only on account of the cold. It is possible that Polo was simply confusing the purpose of state hand-outs of wool, and that the wool in question was meant for weaving for state tribute. But discounting this possibility Murra suggests that these compulsory distributions of wool to the peasant in order to make their own clothes was

a mechanism of government, a coercive and, at the same time, symbolic, reminder of the duties of the peasant towards the State, of his status as a conquered person (ibid:169).

However, it is clear from the Visits to Huánuco and Chucuito, that a major ingredient of the payment given for spinning and weaving labour was cotton or wool for the labourer to make his or her own clothes with (see Chapter IV below, tables 4.1 and 4.2, and text). The receipt of wool from the state for personal consumption was the means of payment for spinning and weaving wool for the state. Once again, the compulsory nature of the 'gift' can be explained by the fact that it was in effect an advance payment for labour.

There is a further aspect to the distribution of cloth by the Inca state, which is barely considered by Murra. This was that the patterns woven into the cloth, for which Peruvian textiles are so famous, served to differentiate the people of one ethnic group, or ayllu, from those of another. Murra rejects the idea that the Incas had imposed these differences, and thinks it more probable that they dated from pre-Incaic times (1978:110). This may be true, but not if it is taken to mean

that the weaving patterns were simply individuating marks that had grown up spontaneously; for pre-Incaic societies were already stratified, and their rulers would have had similar needs to the Incas to impose identifying dress on their subjects. Gosta Montell, an expert on Peruvian forms of dress, quotes Acosta as saying that the Incas had an inviolable law, that no man might change the fashion of the garments of his province, even though he went to live in another (Montell 1929: 202-203). He also quotes Montesinos, who ascribed the law to Capac Yupanqui, an early Inca:

This king made a law which was kept inviolably, and even today it may still be seen. It was that the people of each province, as well men as women, should go about with some token by which they were distinguished. This law was observed with so much rigour that if any man or woman went about without the said token, he was punished, because by its means the king knew on seeing them from what province they came (Montesinos 1920:31).

Similarly, Guaman Poma wrote that 100 strokes of the lash were meted out to any member of an ayllu caught wearing the cloth of another ayllu (Dilke 1978:53).

Now for a token of identification to be immediately visible to the authorities it must have been displayed on an outer garment. It is very striking that still today the Andean people recognise what village someone is from by the carrying-cloth, which is always worn on the back whether full or empty. These carrying-cloths are made of very finely woven, strong woollen cloth, with a band of extremely elaborate symbols in different colours woven down their centre, where the two halves of the material are joined. Montell mentions the belts of pattern woven across the long shirts worn by the Inca, and the elaborate wide belts worn by women around the waist (1929). Clearly the Inca emperor and nobility were not depicted carrying burdens on their backs. However, for the mass of the population to be carrying goods is still today, and must have been then, their normal appearance. It is possible that the belt on actual clothing and the band of pattern on the carrying-cloth had to correspond for identification.

Clearly a planned system which depended on the kuraka of each ethnic group being able to provide a certain number of Indians for specific tasks required by the state would have to have some system of controlling population movement. The quotations above from the chroniclers show that cloth did provide such an identificatory system: cloth was in effect the passport of the Inca empire, which every subject had to display everywhere he or she went. This is borne out by the fact that in the colonial period a primary worry of the kuraka was the ease with which their subjects could 'flee' from their place of residence and so escape contributing to the Spanish tribute. Although local cloth went on being woven and worn, the removal of the control of the Inca state, which may well have included the monopoly of knowledge of how to read the symbols woven into the cloth, meant that cloth no longer served the same purpose.³¹

If the compulsory 'gift' of cloth by the Inca was also the handing out of a complete identification system for tribute-payers, this helps to explain another reference mentioned as puzzling to the Europeans by Murra. This is a passage in Garcilaso, where he is quoting Blas Valera and says that sometimes, after a military campaign ending in victory, the Inca himself

paraded in front of the conquered people, wearing in each village the costume worn by its residents, a thing of great pleasure for them... (Garcilaso 1960:163, quoted in Murra 1978:125).

Once again, we can be sceptical about these chroniclers' interpretation of Inca customs as to do with the welfare of their subjects. Rather, according to the theory being proposed here, the Inca would have been demonstrating the new pattern of cloth to be worn by the conquered peoples. Presumably the identification system would have made use of existing differences in patterns of dress, while systematising them across the empire. The reference to the Inca parading "in each village" is interesting, since it shows that the identification system was vastly more complex than is suggested by both chroniclers and modern writers, who tend to pick out head-dresses and hats as disting-

uishing different regions. Guaman Poma tells us that the four 'quarters' of the Inca empire could be told apart by their head-dress, but it is significant that the example he gives is of the knitted woollen hats worn by the golla, the people of the southern area (Dilke 1978:34). These are still worn today, and themselves have symbolic patterns knitted into them. It is also possible that the feathers that had to be collected from jungle birds as part of the Inca tribute in both the Chucuito and Huánuco areas played a part in the identificatory system, since the Incas in Guaman Poma's pictures are often shown wearing head-bands with feathers in them.

Further evidence for this interpretation of the role of cloth is provided by the etymology of some of the Quechua words indicating divisions and sub-divisions of the population. Most significant is the fact that the basic word ayllu, which is variously translated as 'tribe', 'clan', 'ethnic group', 'kinship unit', or 'village', comes from a Quechua verb aylluy, which not only means "to bring together or join together", but also "to clothe or provide with clothing" (Chouvenc and Perroud 1970). According to the interpretation proposed here, the parading of the Inca in each conquered "village" and his provision of cloth to his conquered subjects would be the definition of the ayllu as a unit distinguished by its cloth. In grouping the people into tribute-paying units, probably using the decimal system, the Inca was simultaneously clothing them, by providing them with their identificatory cloth.

Having established this, we might then go on to note that the word suyu, used to describe one of the four provinces of the Inca Empire, also means a stripe on a piece of clothing. Similarly, seje, the word used for the ten divisions found in the city of Cuzco and analysed by Zuidema (1973), also has the meaning of a stripe on cloth, though one that is narrower than a suyu. It is not very important to the argument here whether the meanings of these words in relation to cloth are chronologically earlier or later than their use to delimit subdivisions of the population. The sequence could have been either way; the important point is the convergence of meanings in the Quechua

that has come down to us today.

Various other word-uses now fit into place. Chincha, the word used to describe the northern region of the Empire, means "of many colours" in Quechua. Chinchasuyu, the full name of the region, means the "stripe of many colours" possibly indicating that it was a region where many colonists were being sent by the Cuzco conquerors. Chinchaycocha - the lake near which salt was produced in the Huánuco region - could have been named "lake of many colours" because of some natural feature of the water. Alternatively, it might be so called because of the colonists "of different colours" who were placed there to make salt in the multi-ethnic settlement, all wearing the cloth of their original place of residence to identify them. In the Huánuco visit it is noticeable that many workers in the coca fields in 1563 bore the name Tacori.³² The Quechua word taku means both "mixed up", as in the expression for a meal of leftovers, taku taku, and also "a brownish colour", such as would be obtained by mixing many colours (ibid). In the earlier 1549 Visit to the region, the two coca colonies, Pichomachay and Chinchao are both described as a "village of Taquiri", and were inhabited by colonists from all the different divisions of the ethnic groups. Since there is no personage in the Visit called Taquiri, it seems that this is the name, meaning "mixed", applied to those who lived there. Chinchao itself of course comes from the word chincha meaning "many-coloured" described above. This indicates that names suggesting the 'mixing of colours' are found in both of the multi-ethnic colonies in the visited region of Huánuco, that is the coca and salt colonies at either end of the vertical spectrum. This is entirely consistent with Acosta's assertion, cited above, that the Inca law applying to clothing applied also to those moved from one province to another. Guaman Poma also mentions that the Chanca, a tribe that had been fairly recently conquered by the Incas when the Spanish arrived, could be recognised even when dispersed to the opposite end of the country by their distinctive dress (Dilke 1978:34).³³

To sum up, cloth was not simply important in the Inca economy for its role in reciprocal gift-giving, even if that is

taken to include a tribute obligation sealed by the gift of cloth from the Inca. It was also vitally important as the means of payment for state labour, and as the means of controlling population movement without which the system could not have worked. As a final word, we might note the similarity between many of the very abstract symbols woven into Andean carrying cloths today, and the knots used for recording in the ancient quipu system. It is also interesting that a form of very complex weaving still exists today, which is intermediate between the quipu and true weaving. This is the finger-weaving used to make slings (huaracas) for shepherds. One in my possession is woven from 36 threads of 4 different colours, which form a succession of knot-like symbols all the way down the cord which is the sling.³⁴ These symbols are the same as ones which occur on the carrying-cloths of the community from which it came, Carhuapata in Angaraes.

5. Direct and Indirect Control Under the Incas

We have seen that the Incas did not on the whole try to control production directly, and yet were able to accumulate large amounts of surplus labour over a wide area. Contrary to popular belief, their organisation was based not on a vast bureaucracy, but on a system of indirect control through local rulers. It has been argued in this chapter that the control of the Incas was exerted primarily over circulation, which they were able to do by pursuing a double strategy of breaking up existing monopolies over key resources, and establishing their own more centralised ones. The concept of 'vertical control', so important in theories of the survival of typically Andean forms, hides these two different processes. The multi-ethnic groups found in areas of salt and coca production assure the prevention of local monopolies of these goods, while the state itself can appropriate the surplus. Some of these islands, especially the coca ones, seem to have been formed as exclusive new state colonies, to supply the royal city with coca.

The Inca policy was not, therefore, concerned with self-sufficiency of the local ethnic groups. Everywhere, we find

that the mass of the population was kept out of the strategic areas where these key products were produced. We find the main settlements neither in the saltworks, nor in the coca fields, nor even in the temperate climate of the maize lands. Instead, the population lived as far away as was possible from all of these resources. At times, the coca lands, as well as being remote from these centres of population, were guarded with Inca garrisons. This peculiar pattern of settlement was to have drastic consequences for the indigenous population after the Spanish Conquest, since it was very easy for the invaders to take over these key resources.

To have a means of controlling population movement was crucial to the Inca system of planning labour and the circulation of goods in the state sphere. Cloth patterns appear to have formed a complex passport system, possibly also recording the tribute obligations of their wearers, in the complex weaving found on Andean cloth, which persists to the present day. The ideology that the distribution of cloth was a 'gift' from the Inca can be shown up as such, in a rather more material way than in the usual interpretation of this compulsory gift-giving.

Our re-analysis of the Inca mode of production and circulation has the advantage of locating the Incas themselves within the internal development of Andean society. The process of breaking up and creating new monopolies was only acting on an already existing structure in which salt and coca were probably monopolised by the tribes in whose territory they lay. The complex patterns woven on Peruvian cloth have their origins in civilisations well before the Incas and in particular the very rich religious burial sites of the coastal kingdoms. But these, too, were stratified societies with a centralised appropriation of surplus which was, in some cases at least, associated with a salt monopoly. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that the system of using cloth for identification was taken over from preceding civilisations by the Incas.

NOTES

1. Marx, for instance, wrote "It may be said, on the other hand, that there are very developed but nevertheless historically less mature forms of society, in which the highest forms of economy, e.g. cooperation, a developed division of labour, etc., are found, even though there is no kind of money, e.g. Peru" (1972:102).

2. These and other quotations from Murra are my own translations from work published by him in Spanish. Some of these works exist in unpublished English versions. There may therefore be unavoidable discrepancies with Murra's original English versions.

3. Throughout this chapter I shall refer to Murra's articles as collected in the volume published by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos which he himself edited in 1975.

4. Murra's thesis was presented in 1956, but only published, in a Spanish translation, in 1978.

5. The chroniclers were mainly Spaniards who wrote 'chronicles', that is histories, of the Inca empire and the Spanish Conquest in the first century or so after the Conquest. It is very much due to Murra's work that these chronicles are now treated less as if they were the culmination of centuries of documentary history, and more as the compilations of oral tradition that they were (Pease 1975).

6. Baudin (1961) is probably the modern writer most responsible for the continuation of this tradition. His work entitled The Socialist Empire of the Incas was first published in French in 1928.

7. See Godelier (1977) and Wachtel (1977) for a general use of this argument. For more detailed present-day analysis see Mayer (1971), Burchard (1974), Fonseca (1974), Orlove (1974).

8. See Bradby (1975) for some discussion of this argument.

9. The ayllu is the basic kinship unit of Andean society (see Rowe 1946). Its exact meaning in different areas of the Andes has not been particularly well clarified in the literature, and a different meaning will be suggested in this chapter, which relates the word ayllu to the two meanings of the verb aylluy which means both "to bring together, or unite" and "to provide with clothing" (Chouvenc and Perroud 1970).

10. In my text I have used the spelling of Quechua employed by Murra in his 1975 publication. Quotations using other spellings have been left as in the original.

11. Blas Valera is quoted by Garcilaso as having written of the "law of brotherhood" prevailing in the Andean villages, whose inhabitants "would help each other to plough, sow and harvest, without taking any pay" (Garcilaso 1960:162). For a discussion, see Murra (1978:137).

12. Harris (1982) states that minka is labour where "the worker is repaid in the product to which he or she has contributed". This is to be contrasted with ayni, where labour is repaid with labour. However, against the common conception, Harris argues that in ayni, the labour repaid is generally different labour from that given in the first place. Most commonly this reciprocity takes the form of men and women without appropriate relatives of the opposite sex exchanging 'male' work for 'female' work. In the area of North Potosí, where Harris studied the laymi people, this may take the form of a woman exchanging spinning for a man's weaving, or of a widow offering to sow one day for an unmarried man, in return for his ploughing her field for her. This use of ayni to obtain complementary labour appears to make more sense than the usual analysis in terms of exchange of exactly the same labour at different dates.

13. See below, Chapter IV, section 3b and note 36 for further discussion of whether this was in fact the case.

14. It must be said that Murra does not, in general, accept that the concept of 'tribute' is applicable to Andean societies. See Murra (1967:403 n.1), where he states categorically that there was no tribute in the Inca economy, and that the use of the word in colonial documents is a Spanish misinterpretation. See also his discussion of the case of the Collique coca lands, where he suggests that "the 'tribute' in cotton and coca that the people of Quivi paid to the lords of Collique was nothing but the normal exchange between the separated segments of what 'had been all one'..." (1975:92). The reluctance to use the concept of 'tribute' here brings Murra back to exchange theory.

15. Maria Rostworowski has documented the existence of much trade between the coastal peoples of Peru (1970, 1975). This goes together with an apparently greater specialisation in certain crafts than was the case in the mountain regions. However, it has not really been clarified how far the different scenarios described by Murra and by Rostworowski for the sierra and the coast respectively correspond to real differences, or how far they merely reflect different presuppositions. For instance, Rostworowski (1975), having found that on the coast saltmaking was a highly specialised full-time craft, concludes that this represents a distinctive feature of the coastal social organisation. She says this because Murra has pointed out that workers in the 'vertical

colonies' in the sierra were still registered in their village of origin. However, there is every indication that saltmaking was a permanent, specialist occupation the the sierra too, although the circulation of its product may have been more strictly controlled than on the coast. There may be some confusion here because colonists sent to the coca fields did not like to stay for very long because of the danger of malaria and other diseases. There is a clear distinction in the Huánuco Visit between workers who go to the coca lands for the harvest on a rotating basis, and those who stay permanently as cultivators (see Chapter IV, table 4.5). But even the permanent workers did not stay longer than "two, three, or four years" because they fell ill, according to Xulca Condor (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1967:40).

16. Meillassoux's book on the Gouro of the Ivory Coast was important and influential here (1970). See also Terray (1972), Molyneux (1977), and Dupré and Rey (1980).

17. See especially Balibar (1970) and Rey (1976). For English language work in the same 'marxist structuralist' framework, see Hindess and Hirst (1975) and the same authors' auto-critique in 1977.

18. See Murra (1975:225-242); Pease (1978:115-140).

19. See above, note 17, for works which expound this concept of the 'social formation'.

20. For a recent defence of the application of the concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' (AMP) to pre-hispanic Mexico and Peru, see Olivera and Nahmad (1978). The concept itself has come in for much valid criticism among marxists of different persuasions in recent years. Anderson has defended Asia against Marx's assessment that it had no history (Marx 1972:81) by writing a history of China, India, and the Ottoman Empire which shows that these societies experienced class struggle like those in the west. He also demonstrates the falsity of many of Marx's assumptions, such as that there was no private property in typical 'Asian' societies, that production was always organised in communal villages, and that changes in government came about merely through the replacing of one despotic lineage by another one, leaving the economic structure of society unchanged. Instead, like others, Anderson has derived Marx's view of 'the East' from other European thought going back to Montesquieu (Anderson 1974). Hindess and Hirst have criticised the concept of the Asiatic mode on conceptual grounds, arguing that it does not fulfil the criteria Marx himself laid down for the development of any coherent concept of mode of production. In particular,

they argue that the AMP includes an arbitrariness in its own definition, since the relation of tax/rent that prevails between the state as landlord and the taxpayer could involve either communal village production and tax payment, or individual tax payment (1975:193-200). They attribute the concept to a residual Hegelian idealism in Marx's thought (ibid:201-206). An excellent discussion of the issues raised, both on the question of Marx's relationship to 'orientalism' in western thought, and on that of the contemporary analysis of middle eastern societies, is to be found in Turner (1978). His argument is that 'orientalism' (probably including the AMP) is a set of absurd questions thrown up by the false assumption that capitalism has to develop 'spontaneously' in other countries, as it did in western Europe. Turner argues, on the contrary "that once the global centres of capitalism had been established, the conditions for development on the periphery were fundamentally changed" (1978:81). He also tries to show that Marxism is itself capable of "demolishing the whole enterprise of orientalist speculation" (ibid:82). For a recent contribution to the debate, which assesses Godelier's work on the Inca social formation as one that has "gone to great lengths to sort out the 'dead parts' of Marx's theory, notably the notions of 'Oriental despotism' and 'stagnation'", see Bailey (1981:92). Golte (1978) discusses the difficulties in applying the concept of AMP to the Inca state, but seems reluctant to abandon it altogether.

21. For a recent discussion of the question "Was the Inca empire socialist or communist?" see Arze (1978).

22. Mitimaes is a colonial corruption of the Quechua mitmaq, made plural by adding the Spanish 's'. For more discussion of the words used to describe colonists, and of their exact meanings, see Espinoza (1978:300-328).

23. See Murray (1979) for this argument.

24. For the ritual destruction of cloth, and the specially fine textiles made for the Inca, see Murra (1975:161-163).

25. The argument that coca was not a state monopoly can be found in Murra (1967:386). This is discussed again below in Chapter IV.

26. Guaman Poma states that the pouch for carrying coca was the symbol of the Inca policeman (kachaco) (Dilke 1978:98).

27. It seems that the tampu and storage area were burned to ruins prior to the final battle of the civil war. Cieza de Leon in his book on the battle mentions only that those that fled "hid among some ruined walls that were near by" (n.d.:325).

28. Vilcacutipa, who was said to be 100 years old, put salt right at the end of his recital of the tribute that used to be given to the Inca. He grouped it together with feathers, in the phrase "and everything else that he asked of them they gave him, even salt and feathers" (Diez de San Miguel 1964:106). Feathers would obviously be very difficult to get for the lupaqa, who lived a long way from the jungle where the birds were. We must assume that salt was also hard for them to get, and was an exceptional demand placed on them by the Inca. No salt-works are mentioned in the Chucuito Visit, and it is possible the lupaqa obtained their salt from the neighbouring Pacajes, or maybe from nearer the coast, where they went to get maize.

29. See below, Chapter IV.

30. The evidence on the status of these women is unclear. As so often there is a sharp divergence between the accounts of the chroniclers, who compare these women to the celibate Vestal Virgins or Catholic nuns, and the evidence that can be gathered from the Visits. In the Huánuco Visit, for instance, the chupachu stated that they had given women to the Inca, "daughters of caciques for mamaconas, and others to serve in the house of the sun" (Ortiz de Zúñiga:I 47). The word mama in Quechua (plural mamakuna) means, as in other languages, 'mother' and has no connotations of celibacy. The lower status servant women of the temple would probably have been secondary wives of the priests, just as servant women of the kuraka were also his secondary wives. The discussion of Inca women in Silverblatt (n.d.) appears to say everything and nothing. Her model of an original Andean parallel descent system, where women had some autonomy with regard to both property and production, which was drastically transformed into a sexually hierarchical society by the fact of the Inca expansion and conquest, is open to the same kind of criticisms as we have applied in this chapter to Godelier's formulation of the relation between state and community. Seen from the perspective of the overall social structure, the removal of a number of women from their communities to be 'guarded' in special houses for the Inca would presumably leave numbers of unmarried men free to serve in the army, build fortresses etc. The more concrete information that can be extracted from the Visitas on the circulation of women will be discussed below (Chapter IV, section 4).

31. Silverblatt argues that interpretations of symbols woven into cloth by present-day Andean women "point to an occupation exercised by women during the Inca Empire that is never mentioned in the chronicles: women, through their weavings, served as historians for their villages and for the State" (n.d.:7-8). She suggests that although the responsibility for recording history has always been attributed to the male quipucamayoc, the keepers and interpreters of knotted cords, women "were also scribes of Andean history...who recorded events from a distinctly female perspective" (ibid). Although it is possible that women of the Cuzco elite did do the fine weavings that Silverblatt, following the chroniclers, suggests they did, there is absolutely no evidence from the Visits to Huánuco and Chucuito of women weaving fine cloth at the local level. In

Chucuito, one of the major cloth-producing areas of the Empire, several informants mention a sexual division of labour whereby men wove fine cloth, and women everyday cloth (see below, Chapter IV).

32. For people in the coca fields with the name Tacori, see Ortiz de Zúñiga (1967:223,249,264). The connection is not systematic, however.

33. A group of mitmaq known as Chancas from Cajamarca were settled by the Incas in the valley villages between Lircay and Julcamarca in Angaraes, a department of Huancavelica. In the colonial documents they appear as ayllu mitmas chancas de caxamarca, or with some abbreviation of these words. They seem to have had a greater presence in the villages of the reducciones than did the native angaras, who may have kept more to the hills. My suspicion, which I cannot confirm, is that the different weaving patterns worn by the people of the valley and of the highlands correspond to these Inca divisions.

34. These slings are woven by hanging all the threads from the fingers of one hand and plaiting them with the other. They can be woven with many more colours than the one mentioned in the text.

CHAPTER IV

MARKETING THE PLAN: THE EFFECTS OF THE ENCOMIENDA ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY, 1549-1570

In two crucial respects, the system of European feudalism¹ brought to Peru by the Spanish invaders was the logical antithesis of the Inca mode of production. It was a market system, although what was to be produced for the market was still planned, whereas under the Incas trade had not been allowed to develop; and it was a system where ownership of resources was established usually quite literally by living on top of them, in sharp contrast to the Andean system of remote control taken up by the Incas. This chapter will examine the effects that invasion of their vertical colonies and the marketing of their tribute had on the position of the kurakas, the local lords who had been the ambiguous instruments of Inca domination. The arguments of Chapter III lead us to expect that the effective removal of the theocratic state and the army of the Incas would not simply leave a layer of Andean communities, based on reciprocity and verticality as underlying ideals of self-sufficiency in the mountain

environment. Since it has been argued that there also existed a system of local surplus extraction it remains to be seen how this was affected by the changes.

Both this and the next two chapters will look at the interaction between this Andean mode of production and the various forms of economic systems and institutions introduced by the Spanish. Central to all three will be the relationship that evolved between planning and the market economy, which at times shaped both class struggle and colonial debate. The present chapter takes as its starting point the testimony of a local kuraka in Huánuco in 1562, who said that in the early years, before they had been given a proper tribute assessment, or tasa, the Spanish used to take tribute by force "telling them that they were rich and that since they used to give it to the Inca they could give it to them too, without taking thought to treat them like the Incas used to" (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1972:59). In other words, the Spanish attempted simply to take the place of the Incas as recipients of tribute, but somehow were not able to do what was necessary to reproduce the system and give their exactions a semblance of legitimacy.

In general, this failure of the Spanish to treat the Indians as the Incas had done in questions of tribute has been explained as due to the misunderstanding by the Spanish of the way the Inca tribute system had worked. Numerous colonial sources agree that under the Inca empire the peasant population did not give any tribute in kind from their own land, or manufacture from their own resources². All that was required by the state was that the local peasant community should give up a certain proportion of its labour-time to working the resources of the state: maize for the Inca deposits was produced on special Inca lands, cloth for the Inca was made from wool from the state flocks, and so on. The community was allowed its own lands, flocks and vertical colonies apart

from those of the state. The state observed the principles both of the rotation of state labour service and of reciprocity in providing food and chicha for the workers during their period of service (Murra 1975:30-31). The Spanish system of tribute in kind broke all these rules. Most basically, it planned certain quantities of goods to be produced, as opposed to the Inca planning of labour allocation only. The community was now expected to provide these from its own lands and resources; the Spaniards took on permanent servants and labourers, despite the decree of 1549 that forbade the use of the Indians' 'personal service' in tribute³; and the Spanish state did not provide food and drink for the Indians during the time they were doing labour for the tribute. In addition, it is argued that the Spanish destroyed the self-sufficiency of the Indian communities by preventing them from owning lands at a distance, thereby breaking up the network of vertical colonies that pervaded the Andes and the surrounding lowlands⁴.

There exist in the literature two radically opposed scenarios of the outcome of this imposition of the Spanish tribute system on the local economy (Rivera 1978:7-8). One of them shows the local rulers, who became known as caciques, turning to a despotic exploitation of their subjects in order to meet Spanish exactions, and for personal enrichment (Wachtel 1973)⁵. The other scenario is described by Godelier, who maintains that

the Indians had no choice but to survive by eliminating all social inequalities which appeared among them and which threatened the solidarity of their community (1977:69).

Rivera has attempted to steer a middle course between these two positions. Her study of the will of a rich merchant cacique who died in 1673 shows that he had accumulated impressive quantities of land and cattle, and an extensive network of monetary debts, often for coca and wine advanced

on credit (1978:9-16)⁶. While clearly not implying a situation of community egalitarianism, then, Rivera rejects the charge of a "'despotic' power which turns completely against the interests of the community" in the colonial period (ibid:17). On the contrary, she argues that much of this surplus was invested in communal works, such as the church, hospital and school in the will in question, or the specific bequest of money to the community for buying land from which the tribute could be paid. In this way, the cacique used his personal accumulation to prevent the complete collapse of the community structure and the selling of community lands to the Spanish, as happened in some areas, while managing to fulfill the tribute obligations on behalf of the community, unlike a neighbouring cacique who was imprisoned for failing to do so (ibid:18). For Rivera, then, the economic accumulation of the merchant cacique was itself the only possible strategy of survival for the Indian community.

This chapter aims to throw some light on these debates by asking not whether the caciques were good or bad to their subjects, but what they needed in order to reproduce their control over their subjects' labour. Rather than starting from a position which analyses the Spanish as having misunderstood the 'reciprocity' on which Inca state power was based, we will take the words of another cacique in Huánuco, who complained that the caciques were no longer being given 'what was necessary for their rule' as they had been under the Incas (see Section 2). An obvious starting point is to look at how labour was paid. This takes us into an analysis of what was happening to the vertical colonies after the conquest, and the effect that the marketing of the tribute by the Spanish had on the local economy of the caciques. We will also attempt to answer the question of whether the massive investment of the surplus accumulated by the caciques in church-building was "simply an act of Christian charity" as Rivera suggests (ibid:17), by looking at what the caciques needed in order to maintain the population under their control in the communities and

stop them fleeing to the towns and estates.

The analysis is of the period pre-1570, when the encomenderos, the Spanish holders of feudal grants of labour, did literally attempt to take over the goods formerly delivered to the Inca state deposits as tribute, and market them in the towns and mining centres, which had grown up rapidly after the Conquest. In recent literature there have been some attempts to capture the complexity of this period. Assadourian has used the suggestive phrase "'economic programming' for the short and long term" to characterise the 16th century encomienda, but he then goes on to ascribe its decline in a straightforward manner to

the spread of the internal market/which pushed on inexorably towards the replacement of the rent of the encomienda as the dominant form of agrarian surplus production (1979:284).

But Platt (1978) has shown that tribute produce was being marketed in Potosí in order to pay the tribute in money form as early as the 1550s, so that it is not clear why or how the market should be so contradictory to the encomienda. Platt in turn attempts to characterise the period as one in which a tax-rent was paid to a "mercantile state" through the "administered conversion of kind into money" (1978:42). Platt's case was one of a province that was placed directly under the Crown in 1553 (ibid:38); but most of the rest of the vice-royalty remained in private encomiendas. His special case leads him to exaggerate the power of the Spanish state over the holders of encomiendas in this period. In fact, the argument of this chapter will be that the Spanish state was only beginning to consolidate its centralised control over the feudal encomenderos, and that the framework of economic planning they operated in was, although deformed, still essentially based on Inca planning. The contradictory action of the market has to be looked for, not in its effects on the

encomienda as a feudal grant of labour, but rather in its effects on the local Andean economy, especially as it affected the position of the caciques.

The evidence to be examined dates from the period of the 1560s when the Spanish state sent 'Visitors' to various regions of the Andes, usually at the request of the Indians to have their tribute assessment, or tasa, lowered. As Murra has observed, this was a period in which the Spanish officials and politicians were relatively pro-Andean, and therefore concerned to find out about local traditions (1964:422 n.5). These Visitas are therefore an invaluable ethnographic source; but despite the fact that two of them were published ten and twenty years ago respectively, very little systematic use has been made of them.

1. Verticality and the means of payment after the Conquest

The visit to the lupaqa of 1567 contains much detailed information about the access to labour of the ethnic authorities, and in particular of the two overlords in the system of dual authority, Martín Cari and Martín Cusi (Diez de San Miguel, 1964). This information has been quantified by Murra, who classifies the labour into three categories: the agricultural labour of the community on the lord's lands, the rotating service of the mit'ani involved in pasturing, domestic work, and work in the distant vertical colonies, and thirdly, some hereditary herdsmen, or yana. In addition, each lord received cloth as tribute (Murra 1974: 212, Cuadro II). But it is also possible to classify the forms of labour according to the form of payment by which they are rewarded, since both leaders give a lot of detail on this point, partly, no doubt, in order to impress upon the Spanish that, although they did not pay money wages, they certainly did not receive tributary labour 'for nothing'. Cusi's list, in particular, devotes almost as much space to explaining how he pays 'his' Indians, as to saying what they do for him (Diez de San Miguel 1964:32-33). Table 4.1 shows how the various forms of labour were rewarded.

TABLE 4.1

Forms of Payment of Labour by the Overlords of Chucuito

	Martín Cari	Martín Cusi
	Local	Vertical
	Local	Vertical
Categories of labour, based on Murra (1975:212)		
1. agricultural work, paid by the day	meat, potatoes, chuño, quinoa	maize, coca, chicha
2. annually rotating work:		
a. transport to and from vertical colonies	chuño, dried meat, quinoa, wool to exchange	meat, chuño
b. pasturing herds, guarding fields, domestic service, fetching firewood		maize, coca
c. guarding fields in other villages	once a year	
d. agricultural work in maize colonies	'food' alpacas, coca	dried meat, wool, alpacas
e. full-time coca-workers in colonies		'food' ('like the others')
3. permanent, hereditary herdsmen (<u>yana</u>)		coca (half the harvest)

Source: Diez de San Miguel (1964:20-22, 32-33).

If it is borne in mind that the generic category used by Cusi - 'food' - would almost certainly include coca, then it can be seen, first of all, that all labour payments involved coca. The lupaga obtained their coca from colonies two or three hundred miles away in what is now Bolivia. In addition, in order to obtain labour for the food surplus that was in turn necessary for maintaining any specialist labour, it was necessary to dispose of maize, and chicha (alcohol made from maize). Maize was obtained from some fields in the same area of Bolivia as the coca-fields, and also from larger colonies in the coastal oases of Moquegua and Sama. The food surplus, along with the 'vertical' products, could be used to employ permanent herdsmen, and so build up the vast herds of llamas, for which the lupaga were famous. These llamas and alpacas (or their meat and wool) could in turn be used to reward the workers in the vertical colonies, and to transport goods to and from these colonies. But clearly this was a structure in which the disposal of the 'vertical' products was basic to the accumulation of other forms of surplus labour.

In 1567 cloth was the commodity produced in the area which interested the Spanish Visitor most, since not only was a large tribute in cloth being collected, but private contracts were being signed with the caciques, who collected wages of 2 pesos per piece of cloth on behalf of their subjects⁷. This practice was denounced by almost all the Spaniards interviewed, but the caciques who admitted to it claimed that they had spent all the money on church ornamentation or else on making up the silver tribute of those who had gone to Potosí and not been able to pay it all (ibid: 41,98,109,113)⁸. The Spanish Provincial Judge shows both that conflicts were developing around this practice of the caciques, and also that their subjects did not spin and weave for nothing, but were being paid in the traditional goods:

some old Indian women had come to complain to him, as Judge of the province, that they were being ordered to

spin wool for cloth and being paid nothing for it; the witness objected about this to their kurakas and principals, and was told that they were given food; and since then he has taken trouble to find out and is sure that they were not giving them any money, but were giving them some food to eat during the time it took them to do the spinning and weaving they had been ordered to do... (ibid:62).

Once again, it turns out that 'food' must include coca, as the caciques of the lower division of Juli make clear when they explain that they would not willingly make cloth for 2 pesos, even if they received the money:

those who cannot make their own cloth give for the over-garment alone, without the shirt, - that is, the half of what they make for 2 pesos - two fleeces of wool, which are worth 2 pesos, to the person who makes it, and in addition they give them food and coca... (ibid:121).

Some other Indians from the same village mention the payment of a llama or alpaca as well as 'food' for weaving an over-garment (manta) (ibid: 118).

The same practice was current in hiring out Indians for transporting goods to Cuzco and Potosí - journeys that could take up to five months. The caciques collected the wages, and paid the Indians in "some food and the odd llama" (ibid: 62). The fabulous churches of these lakeside villages bear witness today to the use to which this surplus was put. In 1567 there was already talk of pulling one of them down to build a bigger one (ibid: 233). How the caciques were able to control such a vast amount of labour for apparently so little reward is a question that has puzzled investigators from Garci Diez down to Karen Spalding⁹. Only when the theory of verticality is realised for what it is - a process whereby the ruling class were able to control goods that were crucially necessary and could be used as wage-goods - does the apparently meaningless 'reciprocity' make sense as a form of exploitation.

Turning to the Huánuco Visit, there is less detail available of forms of payment for labour other than domestic labour, but the prominence of the products of the vertical economy in this latter category is very striking (Ortiz de Zúñiga, Vol.I 1967; Vol.II 1972). The following table collates explicit references to goods used for payment by the caciques of the various ethnic groups in the area.

TABLE 4.2

Forms of Payment used by the Caciques in Huánuco Province, 1562

Cacique	Ethnic group	Form of labour	Payment
Diego Masca	chupachu	Building a house	Food, drink, chilli and salt
Nina Paucar	chupachu	One male servant, one female servant	Cotton, chilli, salt and coca
Francisco Guacayas	chupachu	One female servant House-building and ag. work	Cotton and food Food, meat coca and cotton
Martín Capari	chupachu	One female servant	Cotton
Felipe Masco	chupachu	Three female servants	Cotton
Baltazar Guacache	chupachu	One female servant	Cotton, salt and chilli, and food
Gonzalo Cochache	chupachu	Two female servants	Wool
Francisco Conapariaguana	Cuzco mitmaq	One female servant	Cloth, salt and chilli

Andrés Auquilluco	Cuzco mitmaq	One female servant	Cotton and wool
Juan Chuchuyauri	yacha	Four male servants Three female servants	Cloth and meat
Antonio Guaynacapcha	yacha	Two female servants Four male servants	Wool, cotton, salt, chilli and meat
Gonzalo Tapia	yacha	Married couple making cloth	Coca

Source: Ortiz de Zúñiga (I :69,75,80,84,87,90,94; II :32,39,61,65,146).

Now apart from the vague references to 'food', it is notable that all these payment goods are the products of vertical colonies. The Visit contains many references to how these colonies were assigned to the different ethnic groups in the area by the Incas. The distances involved are a number of days' journey rather than weeks' as with the lupaqa, but the basic social organisation is similar. It is the caciques who organise the labour in the colonies, and they who receive and redistribute the products. As in Chucuito, we find that in order to employ labour, whether in the production of an agricultural surplus, or in specialist activities such as spinning, weaving, and herding, the caciques had to dispose of the vertical products. The surplus produced by these specialists could then be used to employ a further tier of labour, such as the instance of agricultural labour being paid with pots, (Ortiz de Zúñiga :I 114).

If this theory is correct, we would expect to find a high degree of centralisation in access to the vertical colonies and their products. The next section will look at the evidence as to whether the caciques did have a monopoly on these products, not as against members of other ethnic groups, but as against the members of their own ethnic group - their subjects¹⁰.

2. The Caciques' Tribute in Vertical Products

One of the most telling comments on the position of the caciques after the Conquest is given by Diego Masca of Chupa, one of the chupachu caciques in Huánuco:

In Inca times, the caciques and principals¹¹ were given what was necessary for their rule; and now they are not given it, because these caciques and principals pay tribute as well as the Indians, something they used not to do in Inca times, apart from being in charge of ruling the Indians, collecting the tributes and seeing that orders sent by the Inca were carried out. (ibid: I 67).

We must now ask what it was that was necessary for the rule of the caciques over their subjects, and who it was that gave it them. Since the Spanish Visitors were extremely keen to find out the exact answers to these questions too, in order to put an end to exploitation of the Indians by their caciques, and transfer the economic surplus to the Spanish state, there are several statements on the subject.

The two overlords of Chucuito both insist that "no tribute was given to the caciques" in Inca times. Instead, everything was stored in the Inca deposits, and the caciques were allocated large amounts of cloth, maize, chuño, coca, salted fish and llamas from these stores (Diez de San Miguel, 1964: 22,34). In addition, the Inca distributed servants, including the women who became secondary wives of the caciques (see section 4, below). What this amounts to saying is that the overlords of the lupaga had played an important role in stocking and administering the Inca deposits in the area. Considering that Martín Cari's grandfather had been "a great lord, like second-in-command to the Inca", this is not surprising (ibid: 107). But if the tribute paid by the lupaga had all been thought of as Inca tribute in those times, this had left their overlords with a formidable list of labour owed to them in 1567, both in the lakeside villages and in the colonies. We have already summarised this in Table 4.1 and pointed out the importance of the products of the vertical colonies as basic to the structure of accumulation.

Turning to the relation of the caciques to the vertical colonies, there is much evidence to show that they did have a monopoly on these products, especially in the case of coca. Pedro Cutinba, ex-overlord of the province and a very authoritative witness, in arguing that none of the coca harvested in Chicanoma¹² was being sold on the market, tells us that "it is only for the caciques and a few Indians to eat" (ibid: 39). And of the caciques

of the seven villages who gave evidence, only Martín Cusi, one of the two overlords, claims to have permanent workers stationed in Chicanoma (ibid: 33). The Visitor was suspicious that the caciques were using the coca tribute from Chicanoma for personal gain, rather than to help pay the silver tribute owed to the King (by selling it on the market), and this was clearly a source of contention. In defence, the caciques claim that

They distribute [the coca of Chicanoma] to those who go to Potosí to earn [money] for the tribute...and they also distribute it to some of the principals of the ayllus and to those who work on the building of the churches...(ibid: 197).

However, in his final Parecer, the Visitor insisted that the caciques did receive a tribute in coca, and that they "spend and distribute it as they think fit" (ibid: 244). He recommended that a royal tribute in money be assessed for the residents of Chicanoma, which would mean that they would pay much less than they do at present in coca; meanwhile the coca was to be auctioned to the highest bidder, and the proceeds were to be put in the 'chest of the three keys' - a social fund for the payment of tributes and the relief of the poor (ibid: 224; 273-276).¹³

The maize colonies of the lupaqa, while under less centralised control than the coca-fields, were certainly thought of as possessions of the caciques, who received 'tribute' from them:

they spend the wheat and maize given in tribute by the Indians of Moquegua, Sulcave, Vilcacopio and Larecacha on giving the Church Fathers their allowance, although sometimes there is not enough, and they pay it together with the other Indians of the province; the servants that the caciques have in the areas where maize grows give these caciques maize for making chicha since these fields belong to the caciques (Diez de San Miguel, 1964: 197).

There is also considerable evidence that, of the caciques, it was the two overlords who had privileged access to the

maize colonies. Firstly, a small but significant detail is that only Cari and Cusi list maize as an item of food given to their agricultural workers. The caciques of all the other villages report giving their workers potatoes, chuño, meat and quinoa - the food products of the region - as well as coca and chicha (ibid: 94,100,107,111,117). Obviously this meant having access to maize, since chicha is maize-beer, but the maize grown for eating as food is a different variety, usually thought of as a higher quality. Secondly, Cari and Cusi are the only caciques who state that they have workers employed in the maize colonies of Sama and Moquegua, claiming 25 and 15 respectively (ibid: 21,33). Thirdly, Cari is the only cacique who claims to have transport workers bringing him maize from the colonies on a regular basis. He has "forty or fifty Indians a year" making these journeys (ibid: 21). Only one other cacique mentions any journeys being made to the coast on his behalf, and talks of his Indians arriving from the lowlands, in an ambiguous passage which could mean that he has permanent workers living there (ibid: 111).

It is quite possible that the other caciques were hiding connections with the maize colonies, especially as the Corregidor of the province affirms that "all the head-villages of this province have lands there", when describing the maize lands on the coast (ibid: 50). But it is curious that all the other caciques and principals talk only of their subjects going to the coast to exchange for maize. They take llamas and wool (ibid: 91), sometimes cloth (ibid: 98), silver (ibid: 112), dried meat (ibid: 116), or simply their labour for the harvest, if they have nothing else to exchange (ibid: 29). There is even talk of prices varying with good and bad harvests (ibid: 120). It is likely that the declarations of tribute owed them given by Cari and Cusi were lists handed down from former overlords, parts of which bore little relation to reality in 1567. For instance, it was mentioned above that, alone among the caciques, they claim to give their workers maize to eat;

but when other Indians from Chucuito are interviewed, they make no mention of maize in the list of goods they receive for working their lords' lands (ibid: 82,86). But this is precisely why the declarations of Cari and Cusi may be taken as a reasonable indication of the extent of tribute received by their ancestors, which is what we are primarily interested in here. The changes occurring by 1567 will be considered below.

In contrast to the overlords of the lupaga the caciques in Huánuco seem quite happy to talk of a local 'tribute' which had been owed to their ancestors in Inca times by their subjects (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 28,38). Diego Masca's statement, quoted at the beginning of this section, provides a possible reconciliation of this discrepancy.¹⁴ If in Inca times the Kurakas had been given 'what was necessary for their rule', he argues that the reason they do not get what is necessary under Spanish rule is that they themselves have to pay tribute. Now this claim is not credible if one takes it at face-value as meaning that the cacique and his household had to give their share of the tribute assigned to the ethnic group, since this consisted merely of one 'piece' of cloth, with other minor items such as a chicken or two, and, in groups which did not pay salt tribute, a ducat in money. It may have been hard for poor or small households to pay this tribute, but it cannot have been a great burden to that of a cacique. It is therefore not clear why such responsibilities should be used to justify the claim that the caciques were not being given the necessaries for their rule. It is far more likely that Diego Masca had in mind those items of the tribute which were not divided out among the houses, but which were left as 'communal' responsibilities and fell to the cacique to organise. Prominent among these items were salt (a traditional tribute product) and beeswax (a new one), and, among the yacha, wood.

It is no coincidence that these were the three goods that the caciques were so anxious to be relieved of in

1562 (see Section 3.b). For they were all products of vertical colonies. It was these items that the caciques resented having to give up in tribute, because they were left without their means of payment. The picture becomes clearer when we look at the composition of the local tribute said to have been paid to the ancestors of these caciques under the Incas. Once again, we find the same prominence given to the vertical products, and the same structural relation to other forms of labour as was found when we focussed on the means of payment for labour used by the caciques (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The oldest and most authoritative informants remember the trio of coca, salt and chilli as actual products that were given to the kurakas: all the other components of the local tribute are described as forms of labour. This is most clear in Xulca Condor's recollection:

in Inca times the Indians subject to a cacique used to make him his shirts and capes of fine cloth, and ordinary cloth, shoes, headbands and bags, they worked his fields and built his houses, and they gave him salt, chilli and coca, and Indians to watch his herds, and when it was necessary, Indians were given him for carrying goods... (ibid: I 38).

Diego Xagua lists an almost identical local tribute in weaving, herding, building, and agricultural labour, and then states:

if they had coca-fields, they gave him Indians to work them, and they gave him tribute of chilli and salt... (ibid: I 28).

Both of these 'principal caciques' explain that in 1562 "they give them none of these tributes" (ibid) apart from a bit of agricultural labour. Diego Xagua explains that his servant women still spin for him, but he must 'request' men to weave for him,¹⁵

and if he needs salt or chilli, or other small things, he must beg the Indians to give them him, since he has nothing fixed that they must give him as an obligation... (ibid: I 28)¹⁶

For Xulca Condor, this decline of the local tribute means not only that the caciques must work harder than in Inca times, but also that "they do not have the status /señorio/ and authority that they used to have" (ibid: I 38).

Now the caciques may well have exaggerated the downfall in their 'status and authority' for the benefit of the Spanish, but the fact remains that they see this status as dependent on two factors: access to labour, that could produce a local surplus of food, llamas, and cloth; and access to salt, chilli and coca - the products of the vertical colonies. From the point of view of the cacique, as Xulca Condor shows particularly clearly in the above passage the two kinds of tribute were of a different order. Salt, chilli and coca were things given to the cacique, whereas the rest of the tribute was labour done. Diego Xagua's juxtaposition of coca with salt and chilli is the same, although only salt and chilli are called 'tribute given'. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 have shown how the customary 'payment' of surplus-producing activities, such as spinning, weaving, and herding, in 1562 involved coca, salt, and chilli.¹⁷

There is actually no reason to suppose that these payments had changed very much from Inca times. Francisco Nina Paucar of Auqimarca, another chupachu cacique, says that when "his subjects" do building or agricultural work for him "he gives them nothing except food and coca and chilli and a bit of meat during the time they are working, and this is the payment he gives them, and this is a very old custom among them"... (ibid: I 75). If Diego Xagua and Xulca Condor had implied to the Spanish that in Inca times the kurakas had received such labour as tribute, this does not mean that it was not paid in the traditional ways. Rather, they seem to have been trying to convey two things: firstly, that their status, in terms of the labour they could command, had declined since Inca days; and secondly, that whereas in the past, a certain amount of labour had been offered automatically to the kurakas, nowadays they

had to 'request' the labour each time. The basis of this local control of labour had been the tribute in salt, chilli and coca, which was used to pay the labour in other surplus occupations. Again, this does not necessarily mean that the labour of salt-makers, etc. was unpaid, but rather that the bulk of their produce - that is, of that part not already destined for the Inca deposits - went to the kuraka on whom the specialists were dependent for their subsistence, especially as regards the products of the other end of the vertical spectrum.

It follows that if the caciques were complaining in 1562 that they no longer had 'what was necessary' for their rule, then we must go on to look at what was happening to their access to the products of the vertical colonies, without which their whole mode of surplus accumulation would collapse.

3. The Market in the Vertical Products

Given the theory put forward here, we would expect the arrival of a market economy to produce differing, but not necessarily contradictory effects on the traditional economy. From the consumption side, we would expect to find the vertical products becoming available to people other than caciques, and the caciques trying to control this access; while from the supply side, we would expect the caciques, either in competition or in collaboration with settled Spaniards, to try and utilise their vertical colonies for production for specific markets.

a. Decentralisation and consolidation in Chucuito

Even by looking at table 4.1 it is possible to see that by 1567 certain changes were taking place in the ability of the overlords of Chucuito to control labour. Specifically, their ability to call on annually rotating

labour, the traditional system of mita, was breaking down. This is shown by the fact that Martín Cari brackets what should have been mit'ani, or rotating workers (according to Cusi's statement), together with his permanent yana, when describing how he pays them. Furthermore he distinguishes all these workers quite clearly from his transport workers, who "once they have returned, are not used again for that journey, but others go" (Diez de San Miguel 1964: 21). This replacement of rotating annual labour by permanent service is well borne out by the fact that most of the 'principals' of the lesser villages deny that they give labour on an annual basis to the overlords, although some say that they had done so in the past (ibid: 111; Pease 1978: 133-134). Instead, in one case, Martín Cari is said to be working his lands in another village with his own yanaconas (Murra 1975: 221).

If the centralisation of command in the two overlords was slipping, parallel with the decline in rotating labour, the corollary was the growth of permanent service. This was of great concern to the Visitor, who issued a decree setting free the 'perpetual servants' of the caciques (Diez de San Miguel 1964: 200-201). In explaining his action to the Audiencia, he says that "not only were they /the caciques/ served by these Indians all their life, but also by their sons and descendants as if they were slaves"; even Indians who were not caciques sometimes had over a hundred of these servants. Showing true sensitivity to local tradition, the Visitor provided enough Indians for the caciques "to serve them each year by turns /m̄itas/, so that they should not have those perpetual servants" (ibid: 221).¹⁸

Now if the theory being put forward in this chapter is correct, then one would expect such a decentralisation and consolidation of control over labour to be based on a similar decentralisation of access to the 'vertical' products. This is the case to quite a spectacular degree when we start

to look at the growth of the market by 1567 since the main goods being sold in the province were coca and alcohol. According to the Spanish Corregidor, the lupaqa were selling off at least 5,000 head of llamas each year (worth between 20,000 and 40,000 pesos) in exchange for coca and wine (ibid: 49). The practice of selling coca and wine on credit to the caciques and other rich Indians was condemned by all the Spaniards interviewed except the Corregidor, who was obviously involved in the trade (ibid: 241).¹⁹ These sales on credit made for great hardship at debt-collection time, when llamas and cloth would be seized, and debtors taken prisoners (ibid: 215-216). But we hear also that when

those who owe these debts are caciques and principals, even if they have the means to pay and have more than enough silver, they give Indians as hired labourers to pay their debts owed to the Spanish... (ibid: 59).

This reference to goods being handed out on credit in return for labour is particularly significant in view of the 18th century development of the planned marketing of goods, to be considered in Chapter VI. Here the meaning of the later development is plain: the goods being marketed in Chucuito were wage-goods which could be used to gain access to labour.

As in the 18th century distributions, cloth and foreign cloth were also being sold on credit at this time, but the items most frequently mentioned are coca and wine. The Visitor added a separate article in his final Parecer "on the coca that is bought in the province" in which he singled out the "great disorder" resulting from the high prices, in terms of their own animals, that the Indians were prepared to give for coca. He recommended that the merchants should not be allowed to stay more than two or three days at a time in each of the principal villages, nor should they be allowed into the interior (ibid: 251). The main markets in coca were in Cuzco (an area of production) and in Potosí (the site of consumption), and it is significant that one

of the principal forms of wage-labour that the Indians were sent to do by their caciques was transporting coca from Cuzco to Potosí (ibid: 218).

Of these two goods, coca was a traditional vertical product, while wine took the place of chicha, the indigenous alcohol made from maize. Wine was at first imported through the port of Ilo, quite near the coastal colonies of the lupaga, so that while the Spanish seem to have been the main merchants of the commodity, they were dependent on the caciques to give them labour and llamas to transport it on the long journey to the mountains, where were the main consumers. But the process of import-substitution for Spanish wine (a category that very likely included fortified wines and grape brandies) began remarkably early.²⁰ A Spanish encomendero had already left the Indians of Sama a vineyard in his will some time before 1559 (ibid: 247-248). In 1567 it had produced "over sixty flagons of wine" (ibid: 128). The Visitor recommended its expansion (ibid: 249). A similar vineyard existed in Moquegua (ibid: 248).²¹

There are two major implications of this rapid growth of the market in coca and alcohol, the vertical products. The first is that ordinary Indians with a modicum of property or money from wage-labour were no longer so dependent on their caciques for access to these goods. The second is that a much wider stratum of 'caciques and principals' were able to buy in these goods and use the labour of their subjects to pay them off. It has been suggested by Murra that Cari and Cusi were young and inexperienced leaders, set up as overlords by older caciques from the other villages, who consolidated their power behind this respectable front (1975: 223). This theory is confirmed by the fact that it is a cacique of Pomata, one of the subordinate lakeside villages, who appears fifty years later selling substantial quantities of chilli and of wine from his lands in the coastal colonies through an agent in Potosí (Murra 1979:87-90). We could now

add two things to Murra's theory. The first is that the strategy of the older caciques was to leave Cari and Cusi to organise the tribute, and in particular the despatching of the five hundred mitayos each year to Potosí. The mitayos had to be provided with food and animals for their long journey, but also with coca (in part to exchange for food on the way), which seems to have absorbed a good deal of the personal coca tribute that the overlords received from Chicanoma. Secondly, it seems that it was the influx of the market in coca that enabled the caciques of the subordinate villages to free themselves from their tributary status to the overlords of Chucuito. Whereas in former years they had been dependent on the overlords for their share of the coca from the sole source in Chicanoma, and had in return sent fine cloth and provided agricultural labourers for the overlords, these caciques could now buy coca easily from Spanish merchants and use it to accumulate their own surplus.²²

b. The Dispute over the Tribute in Huánuco

While the lupaga were a large and wealthy group, unusual in that they were placed directly under the Spanish Crown for tribute purposes,²³ the groups visited in Huánuco were far smaller and had been assigned in encomienda to two Spaniards.²⁴ Between these encomenderos and the caciques of the ethnic groups which they held in grant there developed lengthy legal disputes over the payment of tribute, as in other areas. The usual interpretation of such disputes is simply that the Indians were being oppressed and exploited by the Spanish both in the quantity of goods they had to pay compared with Inca times, and in the fact that some of these tribute-goods had to come from their own lands, as opposed to the special Inca tribute lands (Murra 1967: 399,403; Platt 1978: 34). However, while for reasons that will become clearer below, many caciques did tend to complain of the severity of the tribute in Huánuco in 1562, the testimony of one of the oldest witnesses, Francisco Pitoananga should put us on our

guard against simplistic interpretations:

in Inca times the Indians were harder worked than at present, because at that time they were very hard-worked in giving tribute of many things; nowadays, although they give tribute and have to work, it is not so much, because they stay at home, whereas at that time they used to go to Cuzco and to Quito and never stayed still, and they used to serve in war and in many things which they do not do now, and they were frequently punished - and with rigour - which they are not nowadays (Ortiz de Zúñiga : II 86).

It will be argued here that the dispute over the tribute cannot be understood unless we take account of the fact that the tribute was marketed tribute, and unless we look at the role of the vertical colonies in the organisation of this tribute.

For one of the groups visited in Huánuco, the Cuzco mitmaq, we are fortunate in possessing three separate tribute assessments, those of 1549, 1559, and 1563. We also possess those for 1549 and for 1553 of the yacha, who together with the mitmaq made up the encomienda of Juan Sánchez Falcón. After representations by the Indian caciques in Lima, the reassessments of 1553 and 1559 had lowered their tribute burden, but Sánchez Falcón insisted on continuing to levy the tribute on the basis of the first assessment, having argued in the Royal Tribunal that "he could not maintain himself and was suffering hardship" after the reassessments (ibid: II 299). Since the difference between the tribute list of 1549 and the reassessments was the ostensible reason for the 1562 Visit, it is worth looking in detail at the differences between these two assessments. Table 4.3 summarises the assessments for the yacha and the mitmaq, giving monetary values, mainly from those which appear in the text of the Visit. From the subtotal at A, it can be seen that the reassessments had lowered the amount of the major tribute goods owed by about 20%, but at a value of slightly over 100 pesos for each of the ethnic groups, it is scarcely possible that this difference would be the source

of so much expensive litigation.

Moreover, the total amount of these goods owed - the cloth, maize, money - is not actually a source of complaint in the caciques' opening declarations, although there are some money commutations that they wished to reverse (ibid: II 56). Instead, the only tribute goods that these caciques actually ask to be relieved of are the relatively insignificant items of the wood, in the case of the yacha, and the salt in the case of the mitmaq. On the other hand, the major differences in value between the 1549 assessment and the later reassessments are due to the removal of the 'personal service' clauses, which involved both growing crops on lands of the encomendero and providing a variety of artisans, domestic servants, and herdsmen. This personal service appears to have absorbed at least 39 full-time workers, or about 10% of the married male population,²⁵ and in addition the seasonal labour of the whole community. Perhaps crucially, it had meant the appropriation of all the caciques' artisans, as Andrés Auquilluco explains:

they have no artisans other than those they give to their encomendero, that is, three agricultural workers, two cowmen, two goatherds, one shepherd, one man to look after the mares, two carpenters, one potter, one fisherman, and eight Indians to fetch grass and firewood; and this is from the first assessment, for in the second assessment they are not ordered to give any servants... (ibid: II 38).

Now whether or not this labour was being paid was a burning question in 1562, owing to the prohibitions on the use of the Indians for personal service, issued in 1549, which the Spanish Crown was trying to enforce. The evidence is conflicting and ambiguous. The Visitor, for instance, who was clearly opposed to this private accumulation of the encomenderos (and recommended the abolition of the personal service whichever tribute assessment was finally decided on) listed the personal service being given in 1562 and stated that "the Indians complained that they are not paid" (ibid: II 253). This statement contains an ambiguity, possibly deliberate,

since, in general, it is not the Indian workers but their caciques who complain about non-payment. For instance, Andrés Auquilluco, in continuation of the passage quoted above, says that "they are not paid for these servants", clearly meaning that the caciques are not paid. As in Chucuito, the caciques would expect to receive payment for their subjects' labour, and Spalding has found that many such private contracts for the sale of Indian labour were signed between caciques and Spaniards in Huánuco at this time (1974: 40).

On the other hand, there is much clear evidence that the encomendero was paying this personal labour. Full-time artisan labour seems to have been paid a direct wage, while rotating labour was paid by the 'discounting' of certain tribute goods. For instance, Diego Masca states that the chupachu

give four carpenters and four potters to make tiles and bricks, and the encomendero pays the carpenters and potters a wage /jornal/ for their work... (Ortiz de Zúñiga : I 66).

In the yacha village of Guacor, the principal, Domingo Pomachagua states:

sometimes two, sometimes three Indians go to serve in the house of the encomendero in Huánuco for one month, and their encomendero makes an agreement with them to give each Indian one peso for this period, and it is not paid to the Indian himself, but later at the payment of tribute at the end of the year, it is discounted from the silver they have to give (ibid: II 116).

Other accounts show that the artisans, although 'paid', were also being given to the encomendero against the value of tribute goods - usually ones that the artisan would manufacture. For instance, among the mitmaq registered in the village of Quilcay, we find one Miguel Collana, who is

cutting wood for the house of the encomendero; he does not owe tribute, but he is paid for his work by the encomendero, and what this amounts to is discounted from the tribute... (ibid: II 195).

However, the hiring of wage-labour had already gone further than what was demanded by the tribute. Some of this was by agreement of the caciques and wages were set against items of tribute. Among the chupachu, for instance,

those who work have, for the last three years, worked on the construction of the monastery of San Francisco in this town; the wage that should have been given to them is taken from them and discounted from the maize they owed in tribute; they give fifty Indians all the year round and Gómez Arias [the encomendero] hires another fifty whom he brings on day-wages which are discounted from the cloth-tribute at the rate of two and a half pieces for each Indian each year... (ibid: I 51).

But while the caciques could still derive some benefit from the wages of these rotating day-labourers, others, who had gone into permanent service, had made private agreements with the encomendero which were beyond the control the caciques. In Allauca Rumar, where eight out of sixteen married couples were absent from their home village, the principal tells us that

he does not know whether the Indian who stays permanently in the fields of the encomendero is paid or not and in the same way he does not know if the miller is paid by the encomendero - the latter Indian went there of his own free will, and they did not give him to the encomendero, and they would like to bring him back to his homeland... (ibid: II 149).

And one month after the house inspection of the mitmaq and yacha had finished, the caciques of these ethnic groups were in Huánuco again, declaring Indians whom they had 'forgotten' in the Visit. Some of these Indians had approached the caciques wanting to be registered in their home villages, but all of them did not pay tribute, (ibid: II 244-247). Of these, thirteen men and twenty-three women appear as in the service of the encomendero.

Now clearly the encomendero would not have been able to employ all this labour if he had not, through the tribute, been effectively appropriating the means of payment on a large scale. Some wages may actually have been paid in money, since the wage-goods could be bought on the market in Huánuco, which was mainly supplied through the tribute. But given the well-known shortage of silver at this time, it is just as likely that wages were in fact paid in kind. We hear, for instance, of the encomendero paying a shepherd in wool from the sheep he minds (ibid: 126). The city of Huánuco had been sited right in what had been the Inca maize colonies of the area, which had apparently fallen into disuse after the Conquest.²⁶ In an explicit Spanish adoption of the 'vertical' principle, the yacha were ordered to put twenty permanent married mitimaes, or colonists, in Huánuco to work these lands and provide domestic service for the encomendero. In payment, the encomendero was to give these mitimaes

lands where they may sow maize and allow them half the harvest for themselves... (ibid: II 287),

a share-cropping arrangement that recalls the one Martín Cusi had with his coca-growers in Chicanoma. It is also quite safe to assume that the building labourers mentioned above would not have worked without at least the provision of coca and alcohol, and probably food as well.

It could be argued that this surplus labour was probably rather less than what had been given up in Inca times, particularly if we look at the statements of two of the oldest leaders, Pitoananga and Arcay (ibid: I 238-240; II 86-87). But it is here that we must recall the complaints of the caciques that they no longer receive their own personal tribute, and that they are not given 'what is necessary for their rule' (see above, section 2). And we must remember that the reason why Diego Masca complained that they no longer received what was necessary for their rule was, he

said, because the caciques had to pay tribute. In other words, the caciques were being put in an impossible position because the Spanish tribute was absorbing the means of payment that they had formerly received - directly from their subjects, and indirectly from the Inca state - in order to fulfil their role as local organisers of surplus labour. The continuation of present trends would mean that they simply would not be able to mobilise the labour to produce the tribute; and without this surplus of the necessary goods, the encomendero would not be able to 'sustain himself', that is, to pay all his labourers. We must therefore take a closer look at the forms taken by the caciques' payment of tribute.

Francisco Conapariaguana shows that the tribute paid by the caciques was not just the normal individual's share:

/the caciques in Inca times/ did not pay tribute, nor did they use to work, except in supervising the Indians; but nowadays they pay tribute with the other Indians, and in greater quantities of all the tribute goods; this they do of their own free will because the Indians are so few in number and so poor, while the tribute is heavy, and in order to stop the Indians from fleeing... (ibid: II 29).

The cacique was caught in a vicious circle, since in order to stop his Indians fleeing he had to pay various items on behalf of the community, but this eroded his personal tribute, which was necessary to his rule and, again, to stop the Indians from fleeing. But he only got into this vicious circle in order to avoid another one: this was that, owing to the infrequency of reassessments, when people 'fled' permanently, or were just temporarily absent doing wage-labour, those left behind in the village had to take on their tribute duties, making the attraction of 'fleeing' correspondingly greater. This form of labour had also to cover the normal tribute of those specialists sent by the cacique to the vertical colonies for tribute purposes - the coca-growers, salt-makers, woodcutters, and those who

collected wild honey and beeswax.²⁷ It was known as the yupanaco, from the Quechua yupanakuy, meaning to count, or keep accounts, reciprocally, between two parties.²⁸ And so, for instance, we find a fourteen-year-old girl in Yacán, who has to spin ten ounces of cotton each year "for the cloth which the agricultural workers, the goatherd and the potters were supposed to make" (ibid: II 94). Again, in Atax there is one old man who explains that he "helps to weave the cloth which those who are away from this village doing wage-labour for the tribute were supposed to give" (ibid: I 135). In neighbouring Rumar, the principal, Lazaro Marcaxari, explains that

in the same way, each of the absent Indians owes one and a half pieces of cloth, and since they are absent, he distributes cotton-spinning by spindles among the old men, old women, and widows, which they give in spun, to make the pieces of cloth for the tribute... (ibid: I 149).

Baltazar Cochache, a chupachu cacique, who gave evidence in Huánuco claimed that this extra labour meant that the original one and a half pieces of cloth per married couple had now grown to three and a half in the year. Each couple makes one piece every four months and "the extra half piece is made out of spindle-fuls of cotton spun by old men and women and boys and girls" (ibid: I 89). It is fairly clear that the spinning was the stage in the total process of cloth production that proved to be a bottleneck for Spanish attempts to increase the production of cloth for the market.

Now this extra labour, particularly the spinning undertaken by the old women, as well as some old men, was not unrewarded, but depended on the caciques being able to supply them with the customary means of payment. Once again, we find references to the products of the vertical colonies here. Cristobal Contochi, principal of Curamarca, one of the mitmaq villages, says that they work communal fields for the tribute in food crops, "and sometimes they sell what is left over for coca, salt and chilli to give to the old women" (ibid: II 178), while in the chupachu Cayan the surplus from the communal fields was bartered for cotton, part of which went to the 'poor',

a category composed mainly of the old, especially old women (ibid: I 255).²⁹

But this brings us back both to the dispute over the tribute in the vertical products, and to the role of the caciques in paying these 'communal' items of the tribute which were not distributed to individuals. For in the neighbouring village to Curamarca, we hear similarly that there is a surplus from the communal tribute fields, but that it is used to buy the salt for the tribute (ibid: II 189).³⁰ And we know too, that the salt was the one item of tribute that the mitmaq were determined to get rid of in 1562: all four caciques make this request in their opening declarations, and since the Visitor did not concede it, they pursued the case further in Lima in 1563, when they finally obtained an assessment that relieved them of the salt (see Table 4.3). But in 1562 the salt tribute was seen by the mitmaq caciques as the major drain on the surplus labour of their communities. Andrés Auquilluco, arguing in favour of the 1559 reassessment, says:

the reassessment is fair, and they can well pay it, with the exception of the salt, which they buy and exchange for coca, chilli, maize and potatoes (ibid: II 38).

Alongside this traditional barter, there was already the possibility of buying salt on the market:³¹ Condor Guauya complains both about the tribute in sandals, which had officially been abolished in the 1559 reassessment, and about the salt, and asks

that they be relieved of the salt, which they also buy with money, for all that they earn in hired labour has to be spent on these two things (ibid: II 42).

Even if it was bought on the market the salt tribute would be a drain on the community's surplus labour, which could therefore not be realised in the form of 'what was necessary for the rule' of the caciques. Among the yacha, the tribute in wood, a product of the jungle region, played a similar role in forcing the Indians into wage-labour for the encomendero

Juan Chuchuyaure, in asking for the removal of the wood tribute, explains:

there are two carpenters for the wooden items, but as they cannot make them all, this is commuted into labour of working fields and doing other things that their lord ordered them; and in this they were wrongly treated because they do not have jungle-lands to fetch wood, and they must go far to find it... (ibid: II 56).

It seems that the encomendero was using the difficulty that the yacha had in obtaining wood in order to legitimate personal service far beyond what would be warranted by their shortfalls in this one item.

Now for both the mitmaq and the yacha, their difficulties in obtaining the vertical products arose from the fact that the Spanish state was no longer guaranteeing the multi-ethnic character of the settlement and use of the resources of the vertical colonies that had been ensured by the Inca state (Murra 1972:434). The yacha had to cut wood a long way away "in the land of the chupachos" (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 57). The problem that the mitmaq had with the salt arose from the fact that their saltmaker had defected to the yaros, in whose territory the salt-works lay. Since this incident is mentioned only by the principal cacique, Conapariaguana, we can presume that the saltmaker was responsible to him. And although in the context of a rather veiled request to be relieved of the salt tribute, his statement shows a much greater preoccupation with the restoration of the salt supply, and an awareness that commutation of the salt tribute into money would not really solve their problem. It is therefore worth quoting in full:

In answer to the tenth question he said that all the things they give in tribute are grown or reared in their own lands apart from the salt, which they go three days' journey for, to the salt-works of Yanacachi [black salt]; they take coca, chilli, maize and potatoes to exchange for it; but they are poor and possess no gold or silver and for this reason do not know what to say in this matter of the commutations; on the contrary, they feel

weighed down by the tributes and would like to be unburdened of them; and they have a man employed in making the salt, which is in the territory of the yaros, and because it is in their territory they have made off with him, when these people had put him there for the salt they extract; and they wished that those yaros Indians would not make off with him and would give him back and leave him there for the purpose for which he was put there (ibid: II 29).

Like other statements about exchange for salt, this one shows that a wide range of goods had to be offered in exchange, and that the list had to include coca and chilli, the products of the lower vertical colonies. But just as they were being squeezed out of their niche in the salt-colony by the yaros, the mitmaq were losing their coca-fields to the chupachu (ibid: II 179, 195, 241). This was not very surprising, since these colonists had been brought from Cuzco by the Inca Tupac Yupanqui and given lands which had formerly belonged to the chupachu (ibid: II 177, 187, 197). The lands had been in two areas: on the lower slopes going down into the jungle, known as the andes, where there were several 'fortresses'; and in the main food-producing area higher up, where were the villages visited in 1562.³²

When the Inca fell, the fortresses were abandoned by the bulk of their inhabitants, who came to live in the temperate, food-producing region around Huánuco (ibid: II 197). But there are enough references to the few colonists who remained there in 1562 to show that these Inca fortresses had been placed in lands producing coca and chilli, although by that time, the mitmaq had converted what lands they had left in the fortress area to producing cotton for the cloth tribute. The loss of their direct access to coca would have been critical for any group, but especially for one, like the mitmaq, who were seen as alien 'supervisors' (mayordomos) in the area by the local groups, (ibid: I 51). Not only was coca an essential means of payment of virtually all forms of labour, but it was also essential in obtaining the salt, without which they could not subsist.³³

The chupachu had no such problem with their salt supply. Murra has pointed out that they had a reciprocal arrangement with the yaros, who owned the salt-works; the yaros had twelve coca camayos, or resident coca growers, in the chupachu coca lands, according to the 1549 Visit, while we know from the 1562 Visit that the chupachu had ten or twelve salt-makers in the yaros territory. (Murra 1967: 386; Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 29). For the chupachu, the abandonment of the Inca fortresses in their coca fields meant the reestablishment of their monopoly over the coca, which was only relaxed in return for reciprocal rights elsewhere. It is therefore not surprising that they are the only ethnic group owing coca tribute both in 1549 and 1562. It is also significant that their principal cacique, Diego Xagua, is quite happy with the salt tribute, and explicitly rejects the idea of commuting it into money, since "they need it themselves as well" (ibid: I 29). As with the mitmaq, the principal cacique shows a greater attachment to and 'need' for the salt supply than do his lesser caciques, one of whom does mention it as an item he would like to see commuted into money (ibid: I 72). And once again, it is the principal cacique who appears to control the group's salt-makers. Despite the fact that he has complained that the caciques no longer receive a personal tribute in salt as they did under the Incas, Diego Xagua still says that "they do not give anything in exchange for it, but just have placed there..ten salt-makers" (ibid: I 29). The other chupachu caciques, on the other hand, tend to talk of giving "cotton, maize, coca and chilli" in exchange for salt (ibid: I 52, 58, 63, 68, 73). This suggests that the principal caciques still had centralised control over and privileged access to the salt-making process.³⁴

It might be asked, if the chupachu still controlled their coca and salt colonies effectively, what were they complaining about in the tribute, and why were they losing labour to the wage-labour sector? Since the Visit to the chupachu is incomplete, there is not as much information to go on as in the visit to the mitmaq and yacha. The ostensible reason

for the Visit was the same however - a request from the chupachu leaders that they be charged according to a reassessment made in 1552, rather than by the original 1549 assessment that their encomendero went on charging (ibid: I 5,6). But where it is possible to make comparisons, it seems that the chupachu were paying by the 1552 reassessment; for instance, they were paying 70 baskets of coca three times a year, as specified in the 1552 list, not the 80 baskets of 1549 (ibid: I 33-34, 307, 314). When we look at the opening declarations of the caciques, there are two main complaints: the quantity of cloth, and the fact that it now has to be handed in three times a year, owing to the necessity to make the cloth owed by all the artisans and other 'absent' tribute-payers; and secondly, the tribute in honey and beeswax (ibid: I 82-83, 86). This second complaint seems to be similar to that of the yacha about the wood tribute, or the mitmaq about the salt. In each case, it concerned a vertical product that was laborious to obtain, and responsibility for which fell on the caciques. The complaint about the cloth is in part a complaint about the fact that the artisans and absent Indians are allocated a share of the ordinary tribute at all, since in Inca times, the artisans "did not pay tribute in anything other than the things of their craft" (ibid: I 40). But it is also a complaint about the extent to which labour was being syphoned away by the Spanish and the burden this was leaving for those who stayed in the villages.

This brings us to the second question posed above - why the chupachu should be losing labour in this way when they still maintained control over the vertical colonies. Here it must be remembered that the coca harvested by the chupachu was going primarily to the encomendero as tribute. We do not know how much the caciques received themselves. But if it was only through this alliance with the encomendero that the chupachu caciques were able to regain and keep control of the coca fields, this also meant that a large part of the coca harvest was thrown onto the market in

Huánuco. The caciques were quite familiar with a money price for coca in 1562: in asking for a commutation, one of the caciques tells us that "one basket of coca, of those that go to the encomendero, is worth four and a half pesos" (ibid: I 93). And we have already seen that the mitmaq were able to buy the salt. There was also a market in raw cotton in Huánuco (ibid: II.102). Diego Xagua even tells us very explicitly that

they usually fall short of the tribute cloth they have to give, so they buy it in the shops of this city for money... (ibid: I 29).

We do not know whether this refers to individuals buying their tribute-cloth with wages they have earned, or to some commercial dealing of the cacique.

What must be emphasised from the preceding discussion is that it is misleading to say that 'the chupachu', as an ethnic group, had kept control of the coca-fields. Similarly, Murra's assessment that the defection of the mitmaq's salt-maker was a sign of inter-ethnic tension, is not the whole truth (Murra 1967: 385). For it was the caciques who kept or lost control over labour in these colonies, and even among the caciques there are signs of a hierarchy of access. In this situation, lesser caciques as well as individuals would buy the controlled goods on the market if it offered them a better rate.

It would be wrong to conclude that the caciques were caught in an irreversible process of loss of control to the Spanish. There are several signs of resilience, not the least of which is that, insofar as it is possible to place any reliance at all on the census figures, the population was rising.³⁵

Although the caciques complained a lot about Indians 'fleeing', this was a two-way process. Not only are there instances of caciques in the Huánuco Visit

registering advenizos, or 'newcomers' from other areas, to whom they have given shelter in their villages; there is also one instance of a man who had 'fled' from the encomendero's employ to the tutelage of an Indian cacique (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 207). The process of specialisation for the market, which was enforced through the Spanish tribute, must have brought economic benefits. We have already looked at the way the chupachu had regained a monopoly over the coca-fields and were specialising in its production. Though most of the benefits went to the encomendero, we can speculate that some were appropriated by the caciques. Table 4.4 illustrates the extent to which the ethnic groups were starting to grow their own cotton for the tribute-market. Cotton was being grown in two areas: in the old Inca fortress of Guanacaure, which must have been on the lower slopes towards the jungle, since there had been coca there in Inca times (ibid: I 30); and in the area around Huánuco which had been Inca maize lands, and where the encomendero, too, was growing cotton. The table shows that the lands in Guanacaure were still mainly the preserve of the mitmaq, although there were representatives of the chupachu and quero there, but in 1562 the mitmaq were being encouraged to convert land in the maize colonies around Huánuco to cotton production. We cannot tell whether this was an expansion, or whether it was substituting for production in the distant jungle-colony. What is clear is that in general the changeover to providing their own cotton had been used by the caciques to negotiate a reduction in the amount of cloth owed, which had made the tribute more manageable.³⁶

In short, the institutionalised market of the tribute was forcing the different ethnic groups to specialise in production of certain commodities and, since they themselves controlled the labour process, to demand a share in the benefits. Those that were outrun in the competitive race to produce certain products found that a lot of their communal surplus, appropriated by the caciques, was spent on obtaining vertical products from distant colonies over which they no longer had any control. Hence the case pursued by the caciques over the tribute was in

part their attempt to make the institutional tribute-lists adapt to the real operation of the market in bringing about a division of labour and regional specialisation. This control over the communal surplus was essential to the caciques if they were to reassert their control over labour which the Spanish were whittling away. The abolition of the tribute in kind ten years later, and the failure of the Spanish settlers to have their encomiendas converted to hereditary perpetuity by the Spanish Crown indicated the partial success of the strategy of the Indian nobility during the second quarter of the 16th century.

4. The Church, the Market and the Control of Women

The most striking specialisation of all was that which transformed the Huánuco region into one producing quantities of cotton cloth for distant markets in what Assadourian terms the "colonial space" (1982). We have seen that the worst bottleneck in the cloth production process was in the spinning of the cotton, and that this was done mainly by women. We have also seen that the majority of the caciques' permanent servants were women. This section examines what the Visits can tell us about the way women were controlled in the traditional Andean society, and at the possible connections between this control and the growth of cotton spinning after the conquest. It then goes on to look at the signs that, in crucial respects, the traditional control of women was foundering in the 1560s, and to see whether this can help us to understand the attitude of the caciques to the Spanish Church, which seems, paradoxically, to have been a welcoming one.

a. The distribution of women and of tribute duties

One of the most striking things about the Huánuco Visit is the high proportion of 'old women' and 'widows' among the population. Also, since there were many polygynous households, and the Spanish only counted one woman as 'married' (as did the Indians apparently), there are also many 'spinsters' in the final counts of population. The Visitor to Chucuito

was also aware of this, and suspected that it meant that men were being hidden from the census:

because of this, I always took with me a few children, so that in their innocence they could say who was a widow and who was married. It seems that the reason why there are so many widows and spinsters is that the majority of the unconverted Indians have two wives, and three if they are principals, while both the married and single Christians keep concubines, and when these men die, the wives and concubines they leave behind are called widows or spinsters... (Diez de San Miguel, 1964: 207).

But while the practice of polygyny together with late marriage for men would produce this effect, the widows and spinsters should in a normal population be counteracted by a high proportion of bachelors. However, this is not the case in any of the Visits, there being more women than men in all the ethnic groups visited, the imbalance being particularly pronounced in the older age groups. Two explanations are possible: either that the women were effectively hiding men of working age; or that the old women were 'war widows', the male population having suffered disproportionately during the Conquest, and probably the preceding period of civil wars. Both are suggested by Hadden in his article on the subject (1967: 378).

However, the practice of polygyny does not seem to have depended on a supply of women artificially increased by the death of men in war. Many old women in the Huánuco Visit are recorded as living in houses on their own, so that assimilation into another household was not automatic. Polygyny was an elite practice under the Incas, and seems to have worked along the same redistributive model as did other things. The lupaga, for instance, used to give the Inca "women to have as concubines - daughters of the richest and high-ranking Indians and not of the common men." (Diez de San Miguel 1964: 81). The lupaga overlords insisted that in Inca times they were not paid tribute directly by their subjects, but were allocated things from the Inca deposits.

In the same way, they explain that "the Inca gave them male and female servants for themselves, and to give hospitality to travellers" (ibid: 34). In Huánuco five years earlier, Diego Xagua remembered

that...they used to give the Inca...women for the sun, whom they used to take to Cuzco, and others who were placed in Huánuco as royal women /mamaconas/; these women used to have to be beautiful, and from them the Inca used to give wives to those who it seemed to him did not have them... (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 26).

And again:

noone was married except by order of the Inca, who distributed women as he thought fit; and their custom was to give everyone one wife, and after that, if they accumulated more women, it was in return for deeds and services rendered to the Inca (ibid: I 31).

Now Diego Xagua's account is that of one who had lived in Cuzco with the planners, and as such, appears rather idealised. But there is evidence in the Huánuco Visit that women were in fact 'redistributed' among the ruling class in this way, and that the kurakas and lesser caciques could also redistribute women lower down the social scale. For instance, Juan Xulca, cacique of Aucimarca, says that the "four (servant) women he has were given him by Yllatopa and the woman to whom he is married which makes five" (ibid: I 54). Yllatopa had been described in 1551 as "an Inca who was in rebellion" living among the chupachu, apparently as one of their two kurakas (ibid: I 312). Xulca Condor, on the other hand, had not received his women from an 'Inca' but from the recently deceased principal cacique of the chupachu, 'Don Gómez' Nina Paucar, who "had given him some servant women, of whom four have died, and another four are left, including the woman to whom he is married" (ibid: I 44). Similarly, among the mitmaq, two caciques explain that their servant women were given them by the deceased cacique Canagoa and by the present one, Conapariaguana, respectively. (ibid: II 39,45).

There is also evidence of a much more local redistribution of women. Of a total of 102 polygynous households in the whole Visit, 29 were those of the caciques and principals, leaving 73 that were not. Of the latter, 14 were houses either of servants of the caciques, or of those employed by the caciques in specialist occupations for the tribute. Another 11 are listed in houses adjacent to those of the caciques. Over one third of the polygynous households of commoners, then, appear in some very close relation to the caciques. For the others, while the pre-hispanic naming system remains a mystery, we have no information. But the evidence seems clear that the caciques were able to distribute women at a local level.

The scope of the caciques' responsibility in this matter was limited by the Inca state: several witnesses explain that legal marriages could only be performed by the Inca 'governor of ten thousand' who came once a year to celebrate a joint ceremony in the village square. Juan Xulca emphasises that "the cacique could not and did not perform this, and the same ceremony was performed for the caciques and principals" (ibid: I 53). All the witnesses concur in saying that it was the sons of the legitimate wife who were the heirs to their father's position and property (ibid: I 32, 43, 53). The inspection of houses confirms that there was a clear differentiation between the one legitimate wife and the other secondary wives, although the legitimate wife was not necessarily the woman whom the man in question had married first. In theory, at least, secondary wives were allowed to leave for a legitimate marriage. For instance, another of the chupachu caciques, to whom don Gómez had given women, explains that "if they should want to marry, he will not forbid them to" (ibid: I 65).

There was a difference in status, then, between secondary marriages, which could be arranged by the local nobility, and legitimate marriages, which had to be confirmed by the Inca state. The ambiguity of the role of the local kuraka in this redistributive process is similar to that encountered

in trying to analyse whether there had been a local tribute, separate from that paid to the Inca deposits. For the kuraka must have acted as a local representative of the Inca state if there were to be couples waiting to be 'married' in the right place at the right time for the Inca governor's annual visit; and yet his responsibility was clearly seen as separate and subordinate to that of the Inca state. Again, the power to distribute secondary wives to various kinds of servants and kin, seems to have been one that was, in principle, independent of the Inca state. But as with other sources of local power, the Incas, rather than directly curtailing it, seem to have rather raised the principle on which it was based to a new level. The 'tribute in women' delivered to the Inca storage centres and religious sites was countered by some redistribution of women to loyal kurakas, but must have made it effectively more difficult for the local rulers to establish their own monopoly.

One economic effect of the marriage and inheritance practices described would be to reproduce a propertyless class dependent on the cacique. This dependence would be only with regard to the products of the other ecological levels, since ordinary food lands were excluded from the inheritance law described, presumably because they were not 'property' (ibid: I 32). These practices explain how it was possible for the Chucuito caciques to accumulate the large number of personal servants that were 'set free' by Garci Diez.

The house-to-house inspection of the Huánuco Visit makes it possible to see how the cloth tribute was distributed as between polygynous and monogamous households. In general the amount of spinning and weaving to be done varied directly with the number of working adults in the household. This can be seen very clearly in the yacha village of Coquín, where the encomendero provided the cotton, so that all the tribute seems to have been in weaving (ibid: II 133-147). There is some evidence of a sexual division of labour in the

very traditionally organised village of old Martín Arcay, with women spinning and men weaving (ibid: I 241-244); but the division does not seem to have been strict, since there is clear evidence that men spin in the village of Curamarca (ibid: II 179-186), and that women weave in that of Coquín. We can conclude that, at any rate by 1562, having a large household did not lighten the tribute load, regardless of whether the extra household members were in the relation of secondary wives to a male head of household, or as other relatives of a male or female head. In fact, there is some evidence that polygyny was by then an expensive practice. For instance, Miguel Uxi in the chupachu village of Quinoas, who has two wives, complains that "he finds the [tribute in] cloth and everything else very hard work because he has many children and he does not have time to work to maintain them" (ibid: I 120); two doors further on, another man with two wives makes a similar complaint (ibid: I 121).

This information sheds some light on the frequent complaints about the way the Spanish had distributed the tribute. For instance, Juan Chuchuyaure, principal cacique of the yacha, says that

each Indian has to make and pay more than in the time of the Inca because at that time the very old people used not to work, and these tributes at present are not distributed among them with respect to the houses they have, but rather to the number of Indians there are... (ibid: II 56).

In fact, these complaints have two facets, both of which have to do with women's economic role. One complaint is that the old people and unmarried men owe tribute, and the other is that women must do tribute work. The connection between marriage and tribute-paying under the Incas is very clear in a statement made by Condor Guauya, a mitmaq cacique:

the old men and the unmarried men are objecting because they make them do tribute work without having women to make their food and mind their houses... (ibid: II 43).

'Making food' involved agricultural work, as Conapariaguana makes clear:

the old and the unmarried men are aggrieved because they do not have women to work their fields for the time they are busy with the tribute... (ibid: II 30).

But it turns out that married men might well be aggrieved for the same reason:

in the time of the Inca they used to have less work because neither the women nor the old people used to work, and they worked the fields for those who were employed working in the tribute, and nowadays every one works... (ibid: II 35).

The Inca system, as remembered here, must have encouraged both polygyny and late marriage for men, two things which would tend to be complementary. One of the great contradictions with the Spanish system, perhaps especially in the 16th century, when the tribute was clearly a real material burden, was that it tended to make women flee the villages (Cook 1965). This was a different problem from that of the hiding of men at census time. Part of the usually accepted rapid decline in the Indian population in the first two centuries after the Conquest was accounted for by a rapid growth of the mestizo population, caused by Indian women marrying Spanish men (ibid).

What this meant for the caciques was not only the difficulty of controlling women in the elite redistributive system, but the breakdown of the whole basis of the traditional 'reciprocity' whereby women were given to men in return for undertaking the obligation of paying tribute. Guaman Poma's concern about women fleeing to the towns is usually produced as evidence of indigenous racism, as he deplored the rapid mixing

of the races, and urged the King of Spain to keep them separate (1937: 533). But it clearly has many other aspects, not the least of them the fact that the demands made on their male subjects for tribute were in part legitimated by their ability to provide these men with women. Martín Capari, one of the chupachu principals who gave evidence in Huánuco shows that when the caciques could no longer do this, the process of legitimation broke down:

don Gómez [Nina Paucar] distributed the tribute well as regards what corresponded to the married people, but he wronged the unmarried men who do not have wives in that he imposed as much on them as on the married men, saying that he would give them wives and then did not give them them... (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 83).

This suggests that when the caciques complained that under the Spanish they were no longer given 'what was necessary for their rule', one of the things they were missing was an effective tribute in women, which the Inca state had legitimated and, within limits, allowed them to control. Given that the Catholic Church was trying to stamp out polygyny at the time in Peru, one would expect to find a great deal of opposition to the incursions of the Church on the part of the Indian nobility. We must now go on to consider whether or not this was the case.

b. The Indian caciques and the Church

The paradox of the colonial Church is that while it was dedicated to stamping out 'idolatry' (i.e. the beliefs, religious practices, and systems of kinship, naming and marriage) among the indigenous inhabitants, it was at the same time their main protector against economic exploitation by secular Spaniards. This leads to conflicting interpretations: while some would stress the utopian experiments of some of the early pioneering bishops, the role of the Church as provider of hospitals and schools, and as defender of the property and rights of the Indians, others would point to the

Church's own parasitic economic power, and see them only as rivals to the private sector in trying to gain access to the labour of the Indians (Haring 1947: 179-208). From very early on, the Church and religious orders started to acquire land, through bequests and later especially through mortgages - the monasteries being effectively the only lending banks until the 18th century; and from just as early, the Crown tried to legislate to limit the acquisition of property by the Church (ibid: 190-192).

The 16th Century Spanish Visitas could be used to shed a lot of light on the early colonial Church. What concerns us here is to look at the relationship between the Indian caciques and this early Church. The Visitor to Chucuito was obviously staggered at the power and property already acquired by the sixteen clergy in the area, who seem to have been all Dominican friars who seldom left their monastic houses. Although his original instructions contained only one brief clause inquiring as to whether the Indians were receiving "enough religious teaching to unburden the conscience of His Majesty" (Diez de San Miguel 1964: 9), Garci Diez devoted a full third of his final Opinion to fulminating against the flagrant abuses of the Church in the area (ibid: 225-239). He found that the clergy already owned more than 6,500 head of sheep and goats, the progeny of those donated them by the Indians to provide their meat rations: lands for pasture as well as for food crops had also been donated, and the Indians were giving free labour to pasture the cattle, work the lands and provide domestic service for the clergy (ibid: 227-230). Apparently while Garci Diez was already in the area, the clergy had acquired a legal title in the form of the 'Donation' of these lands and cattle to the Dominican Order, as well as of the seven vast churches with their sumptuous decoration, ornaments and vestments (ibid: 182-193). Garci Diez obtained a legal 'Revocation' of the donations in 1568, in which the value of the lands and cattle was estimated at 200,000 pesos and that of the churches and

ornaments at another 200,000 (ibid: 278-287). But the donations went on, and Garci Diez was powerless to stop them:

in the village of Chucuito they bought a vestment for 500 or 600 pesos and waited until I had left the province to charge the Indians for it, and in this way they made them pay for it (ibid: 234).

In spite of all this, Garci Diez claimed that most of the young children were not baptised, that couples were not legally married, that the more distant villages had never seen a priest, that the clergy imposed monetary fines on the Indians, and that they kept them prisoner for 'witchcraft' and made them make cloth. They did not stay long enough in the area to learn the native language, and many of them had relatives trading in the area, or themselves traded with the Indians (ibid: 226,227, 234-236).

However, when it came to the test, the clergy were prepared to stand up and defend the Indians. During the Visit, the two lupaga overlords presented their own 'questionnaire' to be answered by their own witnesses in the presence of the Visitor. This questionnaire is a delightful parody of the form taken by the questioning of the Spanish Visitor: that is, each question begins with the words 'whether they know that...' and continues with the information required in the answer. The subjects covered range from the 'sterility' of the province, its weather, the diseases of the llamas and how often they can be shorn, right through to wages and the price of flour. The principal witnesses brought to confirm or deny the 'questions' are three Dominican friars and two other Spaniards. The friars' defence of the Indians, in fact went further than the caciques might have liked, for all three of them allege that the caciques exploit their subjects by levying 'excessive' tributes (ibid: 156,159,162). This seems particularly disloyal when the caciques repeatedly affirm that the major part of what they earn in hiring out their subjects' labour was spent in

church-building - with some justification, apparently, since these magnificent churches are still standing today.

But was this defence, which was not especially enthusiastic, the sole motive for such a massive investment of resources in church-building by the caciques? A further factor is that the church-building was competitive as between the different lakeside villages. That of Chucuito had presumably been built first, and as it was now, in 1567, ten or twelve years old, the Indians wanted to demolish it and build a bigger one, more suited to the capital of the province (ibid: 233). Possibly a major reason for this competitive, prestigious church-building on the part of the caciques, was in order to stop their subjects from 'fleeing'. In part this would be through the social control exerted by the Church, both through the keeping of parish records and as guardians of morality and justice. But there were also presumably certain attractions of large and beautiful churches, which could already boast of fine choirs and musicians, to a population whose temples had formerly been the domain of a privileged elite. The lavish expenditure on processions and entertainment during the festivals of the Christian calendar that still persists today in the Andes seems already to have been under way, since wax for Holy Week figures as the only regular "community expenditure" in the area (ibid: 234). As in Huánuco, the 'fleeing' of Indians from Chucuito, especially those who stayed in Potosí after doing their mita, was already of major concern to the caciques, who complained "that the labour and expense of going to collect tribute from them is worth more than the tribute itself" (ibid:147). We should remember that although there was obviously a tendency to hide Indians at census time, since the Visitor was mainly concerned with assessing the Indians' ability to pay tribute to the Crown, the caciques also needed to maximise the labour they could call on themselves, and had to avoid their subjects registering themselves anywhere else at census-time. For instance, in one of the yacha villages, two young unmarried men had been sent to Huánuco

to call the married people who were there so that they could be counted in this Visit and to serve in their stead while the Visit was being conducted... (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 112).

This evidence of concern on the part of a cacique to maximise the number of tribute-payers registered as under his control could well have been the kind of need that would have led to the competitive church-building in Chucuito.

In Huánuco the missionary process was far less developed, and the church or monastery of San Francisco was still being built in 1562. The Visitor's instructions included one to ask the Indians whether their encomendero had provided them with sufficient doctrina, an expression covering both instruction in the Christian religion and the regular services of a priest. Without exception the caciques who gave evidence in Huánuco before the start of the inspection of houses all complain that the encomendero has not provided them with sufficient or regular enough doctrina, and there are other complaints made in the villages. Francisco Conapariaguana, on behalf of the mitmaq stated

that after they were granted in encomienda to Juan Sánchez they were without the services of a priest or friar for three years, without having anyone to say services to them at the beginning, and after that another year, and then one Peralta, a lay-brother(?) instructed them one year, but since then they have been without the services of priest or friar except for the caretaker of San Francisco; and now they wanted the instructor of the chupachos to instruct them as well and that their lord should pay him; and the caretaker used to come for five or six days a year and no more and as soon as he had baptised and married them he went back... (ibid: II 29).

Íñigo Ortiz recorded this complaint in his final Opinion (ibid: II 259), and made a radical proposal that was not taken up either in 1562 or ten years later when Toledo reorganised and monetised the tribute. This was that the tribute should be distributed "per head, rather than in common" (ibid: II 261). With the existing method any decrease in population meant that those left behind had to

pay more tribute. And Inigo Ortiz adds that his proposal

would mean also that the encomendero would, in his own interest, contrive to join them together and marry them, and keep better account of them than he does... (ibid: II 261).

Garci Diez, whose opinion on the Huánuco Visit was also solicited, recommended that the Indians pay by the less burdensome tribute list plus one hundred pesos in silver, and that they should

put 500 pesos each year in a Chest of three keys for the benefit of the Indians, with the proviso that Juan Sánchez Falcón be compelled to provide doctrina for these, his Indians... (ibid: II 268).

It is not unreasonable to conclude that the Spanish saw the provision of priests as a way of checking a falling population. The Visits do not, however, provide any evidence that the population was falling, so that Inigo Ortiz' remarks are slightly puzzling. In fact, since the first tribute-census of 1549, the figures for the mitmaq and yacha in 1562 show that the tribute-paying population had doubled (ibid: II 267). Instead, when the caciques complain of a falling population what they tend to mean is that many Indians have 'fled' from their control and are no longer paying tribute, so that their contribution has to be covered by those left behind.

What is important here is that this kind of fall in the population of tribute-payers would also be likely to be remedied by a more permanent presence of the Church. In other words, the caciques competed to attract clergy to their own area, because they desperately needed this outside ideological force to help them control their subjects, prevent them from 'fleeing' and encourage them to marry and settle down. The study of population movements in this period maintains that women were more likely to flee than men (Cook 1965). Catholic ideology, with its emphasis on the control of female sexuality, as well as the more practical role of the church in providing women

with the stability of a legal marriage in which their children would have inheritance rights, would go some way to answering this social problem for the caciques.

Under the Incas, there had apparently been no separation of church and state. Diego Xagua states that they worked the lands "of the Inca and of the sun, which were all one..." (ibid: I 29). The annual visit of the Inca 'governor of ten thousand' had been the occasion both for the solemnisation of marriages, and for a general auditing of the caciques' fulfilment of duties, both in performing sacrifices and in collecting tributes (ibid: I 46). It is interesting that the caciques' memory of the years during which they have had or not had doctrina is very accurate, and one of them says that although he cannot work out from memory the exact time they have been without a priest, "he will give it by quipu when he is visited" in his village. (ibid: I 62). Since it seems unlikely that the caciques would have been keeping a separate knotted account of priests' visits, this must mean that this information could be read off from the quipus that must still have been in use to record population statistics. The collection of tribute under the Spanish at this time depended in an obvious way on some stability of population in the villages. It also seems to have depended on the regular counting of different categories of the population - for example, old women did not have the same tribute duties as did unmarried young men. For the caciques, the absence of priests was another, crucial instance of the Spanish state's failure to provide them with 'what was necessary for their rule'.

c. Women, verticality and the market

Up to now we have really been looking at the caciques' need to be able to redistribute women in a stable marriage system in order to be able to call on their subjects to pay tribute. But women were not only valuable as pawns in the marriage system: their labour was also a vital component of the tribute

and there are signs that its importance was increasing. Both Huánuco and Chucuito had quickly risen to prominence as areas producing cloth for the rapidly expanding market in the mines:³⁷ in both areas, this expansion of production, which was partly through the tribute, and partly through private contracts, involved increasing female labour. In Huánuco, where spinning the cotton by hand was the most time-consuming process, this involved the labour of old women and teenage girls; and we have seen how the caciques had to be able to pay not only their secondary wives, but also a general category of 'old women', with coca, salt and chilli. But in Chucuito as well, where the cloth produced was made from wool, which is much quicker to spin, the expansion still involved an increased female input. Garci Diez explains this in language reminiscent of many modern debates:

Recently, a custom has arisen in this province which consists in compelling the Indians to make ordinary woven cloth against their will; this is doing them great harm, since this cloth is only made by the women, although some men help to spin... (Diez de San Miguel 1964:216).

Martín Cusi is among many who mention a traditional sexual division of labour in making cloth, but he also shows how women's share is increasing:

the fine cloth is made by men and the ordinary cloth by women; when the wool is distributed it is given to the married women and the other women help them, and they also distribute wool for making this cloth to the widows and spinsters... (ibid: 75).

According to Garci Diez, this extra cloth was apart from that which had to be made for the tribute (ibid: 217), but it is also quite likely that the 1,000 pieces of cloth owed in tribute - which had originally been specified as to be half of cumbi (fine cloth) and half of avasca (ordinary cloth) - was increasingly being made up of avasca. This would be one possible explanation of the sharp fall in the price obtained for the 1,000 pieces on the Potosí market, which had

been 6,000 pesos in 1564, and was only 4,000 in 1566 (ibid: 177-179; 208). This is effectively acknowledged in the reassessment of tribute that was given to the lupaqa as a result of the Visit, where the cloth tribute is raised to 1,000 pieces of ordinary cloth, and 600 of cumbi (ibid: 272).

Now women did not spin and weave for nothing, but had to be supplied with the vertical products, including wool or cotton for their own clothing. The traditional form of payment had caused a protest by 'old women' in Chucuito, who appear to have been demanding money payment (ibid: 62). But by and large, old women appear to have been the most vulnerable and dependent section of the community, and we do not ever hear of them earning money wages. Married women, too, were more dependent on the caciques than married men. While some women probably went to Potosí from Chucuito "to make chicha" (ibid: 19), mining, then as now, was primarily for migrant male labour. This at any rate, is one explanation for the high number of widows in the Visit given by Garci Diez:

others stay there [in Potosí] with concubines, or remarry, leaving the children and wives they have in this province abandoned - a fact which can be clearly seen in the Visit... (ibid: 210).

In order to keep a large dependent population of old women and widows, it was necessary also to have institutionalised late marriage for men, preferably - though not necessarily - combined with polygyny. Wage-labour in Potosí involved unmarried as well as married men, and no one over sixty years of age (ibid: 196). It could therefore work well for the caciques as a means of delaying the marriage of younger men, but, as the above quotation shows, might mean that these men never came back at all. This could, in turn, have increased the population of dependent women, as Garci Diez claims, but would start to be counter-productive if it meant that women started to migrate to the mine-centres too in search of husbands.

It could be argued that the population profile in the 1560s was exceptional, in that there were many unmarried or widowed older women, as a result of the wars of the preceding decades. It is possible in this case that the expansion of spinning and weaving for the market on the basis of female labour was allowed by this historical accident. Whether or not this is correct, the system went on to reproduce itself, and cloth factories developed in both areas from the 17th century on.³⁸ Although exact figures are not available, it is known that these factories did employ female labour, and as conditions were bad and wages far lower than in the mines, we can assume that the proportion of female (as well as child) labour was fairly high.³⁹ By this time the caciques who still controlled vertical colonies were using them to produce for the market. Control over their subjects' labour depended on controlling their access to the market in coca, wine and cloth, which they did either by themselves becoming long-distance traders, or by forming an alliance with the corregidores, who had better links with the national and international market.

5. Marketing the Plan

What this chapter has attempted to show is not whether the caciques were good or bad to their subjects in collaborating in the market economy introduced by the Spanish, but how they were in a position to extract and accumulate surplus labour from their subjects, and what they felt they needed in order to reproduce that economic power. The persistence of this indigenous ruling class can only be explained if one accepts that they had been an essential part, too, of the Inca mode of production, although some of them had had their economic power curtailed by the Incas and stood to gain from the destruction of the Inca state. This ruling class based itself not on the 'manipulation' of some natural law of kinship and reciprocity - any school history book would show that blood kin can be the worst of enemies in any fight to retain economic power - but in a quite specific

control of the products of the vertical colonies, which could be used to obtain labour. The labour obtained could then be used to produce a surplus of other important means of payment such as cloth. It has also been suggested that control of the vertical products was an essential part of ruling class control over women, whose labour was important not only directly, but also indirectly, as the seal on the contract between a cacique and his male subject as tribute-payer.

The early Spanish marketing activities of the encomenderos were based mainly on the sale of the surplus of this Andean mode of production, which came to them as tribute according to a plan which had its roots in Inca planning. The availability of this surplus of formerly controlled wage-goods on the market in the mines and smaller towns, quickly attracted a labour force which could be used both by Spanish miners and by encomenderos for the production of cloth and an agricultural surplus. But the growth of this private Spanish sector was still dependent on the transfer of wage-goods produced in the Andean mode of production, which the market itself was threatening to destroy. This period was not really a transitional one, in that its development was cut short by Toledo's reorganisation and the effective abolition of the encomiendas.⁴⁰ Its curtailment was in part brought about by the struggle of the Indian caciques, who argued forcefully that their relationship with the encomenderos was not providing them with the necessary means to reproduce their control and keep the population stable. They were losing their former 'tribute' in the means of payment, and found that the separation of church and state powers under the Spanish meant that the state did not provide its own legitimation of the extraction of tribute; instead the caciques were in effect having to pay a separate tribute to the Church in order even to acquire outside legitimation for practices as basic to the reproduction of their communities as that of marriage.

The Spanish Crown and peninsular interests were equally opposed to the growth of private interests in the colonies

through the encomienda system, and particularly to the attempt to make these grants hereditary and permanent. But their strategy of opposition to them had to be based on an alliance with the Indian caciques, or at least on a willingness to grant some of their demands. While often thought of as the greatest colonial imposition on the Indian population, Toledo's institution of the mita, or rotating labour service with wages paid by the state, can be seen as a concession to the caciques, since it was designed to keep the population under their control. Similarly, his drastic policy of reducciones, the concentration of the population in villages which were also parishes, is thought of simply as the colonial attempt to abolish indigenous religious practices and subject the population to the kind of continuous census control made possible through parish records. But both the massive investment of their surplus resources in church-building by the caciques in Chucuito, and the continual complaints about the lack of priests in the Huánuco area, show that the caciques actively encouraged a closer control of the population by the Church.⁴¹

To say that the Spanish system of colonial exploitation had to preserve the productive base of the Indian communities is at best a half-truth.⁴² If it means that the Spanish preserved 'kinship and reciprocity' in the communities it must be false, since they did a lot to stamp out the indigenous kinship, marriage, inheritance, and naming systems, and reciprocity was no more significant among the Indians of the communities than it was among Spanish townspeople. What had to be preserved was a class structure among the Indian population which corresponded to a specific mode of extraction of surplus labour which was neither that of market capitalism nor that of landed feudalism. The market economy was only able to expand on the basis of this Andean mode of production; but the Andean mode was only able to reproduce itself through a control of the market, turning it to its own advantage. The next chapter will look at the way this class structure interacted with state taxation policy around what was the linchpin of Toledo's reorganisation - the Huancavelica mercury mine.

TABLE 4.3

Value in pesos^a of the Tribute owed by the mitmaq and yacha Ethnic Groups
in the Encomienda of Juan Sánchez Falcón

	1549 (La Gasca)		1559 (Marqués Cañete)		1563
Tribute goods ^b	mitmaq	yacha total	mitmaq	yacha total	mitmaq
Silver or gold	100	100			100
Cloth	100	30	100	150	200
Maize	150	200	300	100	100
Wheat	150		50	50	100
Potatoes	150	100		150	50
Beans	8				
Sheep		90		36	36
Pigs	12	15	12	8	2
Hens	22p2t	22p2t 44p4t	22p2t	20	42p2t 11p1t
Eggs	8p4t	8p4t 16p8t	7p2t	12p8t	20 15p4t
Sandals	6p6t	44p4t 51p1t		11p1t	11p1t
Salt ^c	72	72	72	72	72
A. SUB-TOTAL	679p3t	610p1t 1,289p4t	563p4t	488p 1,051p3t	578p5t

Other sisal ^c	20p8t	12	32p8t	48p6t	48p6t
Wood ^c	21p5t	10p6t	32p2t		
Fruit ^c	8p6t		8p6t		

Personal service

a. Crops	96	120	216	
b. Other ^d	144	96	240	16
				16

B. TOTAL 970p4t 848p7t 1,819p2t 563p4t 552p6t 1,116p1t 578p5t

Source: Ortiz de Zúñiga (1972: 280;287, 290-291, 295-296, 302-303).

- a. Values expressed in pesos ensayados and tomines (9 tomines = 1 peso).
- b. Prices taken from Ortiz de Zúñiga (1972): 1 piece of cloth = 1 peso, 1 fanega of maize, wheat, potatoes or beans = 1 peso, 1 pig = 1 peso, 1 sheep = 3 pesos, 1 pair sandals = 2 tomines. The value of crops grown with 'personal service' appears to have been 216 pesos. (See Ortiz de Zúñiga (1972:265) where the value of La Gasca's original tasa is given as 1,819 pesos, and after subtracting personal service on lands of the encomendero it is given as 1,600 pesos. Since 18 fanegas of crops were being sown, 216 pesos would be the value of a yield of 12 times the grain sown). Price for hens (1 male + 1 female = 2 tomines) and eggs (20 eggs = 1 tomin) are taken from a price-list for the period quoted in Lohmann (1946:98).

- c. The value quoted is only approximate. Salt has been priced at $\frac{1}{2}$ peso a loaf, on the grounds that it occupies the same place in the tribute duties of each mitmaq tribute-payer as does the $\frac{1}{2}$ peso in money owed by each yacha tribute-payer. A total of 107 loaves of salt are listed in the mitmaq villages, and the total salt owed was given by the Visitor as $4\frac{1}{2}$ fanegas (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1972:253). Assuming that the 107 should be 108, this means that 1 fanega of salt would be equivalent to 24 loaves. According to tribute planned in the tasa, the mitmaq were meant to be paying 6 fanegas of salt, or 144 loaves. The reduction in practice to $4\frac{1}{2}$ fanegas is accounted for by the fact that salt could not be made in the winter months, as is clear in the 1549 tasa for the chupachu:
- they give forty loaves of salt in summer and in winter twenty...
(Ortiz de Zúñiga 1967:307).
- d. 'Other' personal service has been included, as without this it is hard to see how the total of 1,819 pesos for La Gasca's tasa could have been arrived at. Only those servants that had to be sent to Huánuco have been included, that is, for the mitmaq, 8 domestic servants, 2 potters and 8 gardeners and herdsmen, and for the yacha 4 herdsmen and 8 domestic servants. Wages have been calculated at 8 pesos a year (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1972:148).

TABLE 4.4

Summary of References to Cotton-growing in the Huánuco Visit

ETHNIC GROUP Village	Tribute cotton	Cotton lands near village	Sown/not sown	Exchange	Colonists in jungle cotton lands
<u>CHUPACHU</u>	own				
Llolllo		Available	Sown (I.114)		
Atax		(work encomendero's cotton lands I.132)			
Rumar		Available	Sown (I.141)		
Allauca Rumar		Guacar	Sown (I.150)		
Oxpa		Cayra (I.218)	Not sown:cattle I.218		
Uchec		Available	Not sown (I.239)	With pucaraes (I.239)	Family in Muchque (I.243)
					Old woman in pucaraes (I.244)
Cayan				From communal food surplus (I.255)	Woman & family in Guanacaure 'fortress' (I.249)
Colpacocho		Available	A little (I.258)	I.258	

Mantacochocha		Mantacochocha	
		& Quilcay	Sown (I.261)
<u>QUERO</u>	own		
Chaullla		Cayra	Not sown (I.159) I.162
Rondo			From communal food surplus (I.172)
Pecta		Available	Not: no time to irrigate and cultivate (I.182) I.182
Atcor		Cayra (I.193)	Not: will sow I.193
Guaoya		Cayra	Not sown (I.210) Woman away (I.211)
Auchi		Cayra	Not sown (I.214) Old woman & sons in Guanacaure (I.216)
Guacas		Available	Not sown: cattle I.228 (I.228)
<u>MITMAQ</u>	own		
Yacan		None (II.87) Communal field (II.94)	With pucaraes (II.87) Man away (II.96)
Curamarca			Not sown: too little land (II.178) II.179

Quilcay				Cacique's brother-in-law in Guanacaure (II.189)
Guarapa	Cascay	Sown(II.198) Family in cotton field (II.200)	Supplementary (II.198)	
Cochamarca	Cascay (II.209-10)	Will sow to replace exchange		
Xigual	Cascay	Sown(II.218)		2 families in Guanacaure(II.225-6)
Pachacoto	Available	Not sown(II.238)	II.238	Family in Guanacaure (II.237)
Ananpillao	Possible	Not sown:used for food(II.244)		Family in Guanacaure (II.243)
<u>YACHA</u>				
Guapia			II.102 (for cacique)	
Paucar			II.105,107,108 (for own clothes)	
Chacapampa			II.124 (own)	
Coquín			II.135 (own)	
Caure	None (II.160)			
Chuchuco	None (II.147)			
Xacxa	None (II.172)			

Source: Ortiz de Zúñiga (1967, 1972).

TABLE 4.5
References to Coca-workers in the Huánuco Visit

1. Village	2. Ethnic group	3. Coca tribute	4. Coca mita	5. Permanent workers	6. Rotating workers
Nauca (Oxpa)	chupachú	-	One Indian each five months		1
Cochatama (Quinoas)	chupachú	-	-		Married couple in the coca fields
Llocillo (Rumar)	chupachú	-	-		Married man in the coca
Quinoas		2½ + 7 baskets One coca-worker	-		Unmarried wo- man in coca Wife of married couple from Cochatama (3 men)
Atax	chupachú	1 + 4 baskets	Two men & two women every 3 months	Married couple(?)	(2 men)
Rumar	chupachú	6 + 1 baskets	2 Indians each harvest	One man + two wives + 2 children & man's mother (returned because ill, but has lands for food	(5 men)

in coca area, wives
have stayed there,
he wants to go back
when well)

Allauca Rumar (Yanaconas)	chupachu	5 + 1 baskets	2 Indians each 3 months	Married couple and child(?)	Widow gone to coca lands to exchange (6 men)
Guancayo	queros	-	-	-	One man in the coca
Rondo	queros	1 basket One coca-worker	-	Married couple in the coca + 2 children	
Pecta	queros	2 baskets (6 from this hundred' = Guan- cayo, Rondo, Pecta, Chaula, Achinga)		Married couple with house and fields in the coca + 2 children	(8 men)
Achinga	queros	1 basket			(2 men)
Atcor	queros	3 baskets	1 Indian each harvest	Married couple + child living in Pichomachay	(2 men)
Queros	queros	?	1 Indian each harvest	-	(3 men)

Guayan Queros	queros	?	1 Indian each harvest	-	-
Guaoya	queros	1 + 2 baskets One coca-worker	1 Indian each harvest	-	(1 man)
Auchi	queros	1 basket (shared with Guaoya and Guacas)	1 Indian each harvest	-	-
Oxpa (Rumar)	chupachu	4 baskets	-	Married couple + 2 children living in coca	One old woman + one young man (1 man)
Guacas (Guaoya)	queros	The value of one pig in coca	1 Indian for harvest	1 widower	(1 man)
Marcaguasi	chupachu	3 baskets + one llama's worth	-	1 widower + his brother & sister	-
Uhec (Marcaguasi)	chupachu	4 + 1 baskets	2 Indians each harvest	Married couple & child	(2 men)
Cayan (Marcaguasi)	chupachu	1 basket	1 Indian three times a year	Married couple & child	(2 men)
Marac (Cayan)	chupachu	2 baskets	1 Indian three times a year to Pichomachay	-	-
Cayan (mitimaes from Rampas) (Marcaguasi)	chupachu	1 basket	1 Indian twice a year	-	Married couple & child (2 men)
Colpacocho (mitimaes) (Marcaguasi)	chupachu	2 baskets	1 Indian three times a year to Pichomachay	-	-

Mantacocha etc. (Marcaguasi)	chupachu	6 sacks	2 or 3 Indians three times a year	1 widower	(One woman)
Coquín	Yacha	None	None	1 married couple in new field (had been 2 but one came home)	
Pachacoto	Cuzco mitmaq	None	None	One 'very old woman' in the coca	
Ananpillao	Mitimaes from Canta etc.	None	None	One woman with three children in the coca in Chinchao	

Notes

1. The first column gives the name of the settlement as recorded in the Visit, and underneath it, in brackets, the name of the settlement of the cacique to whom the lesser 'principal' is subject, where relevant and available.
2. Columns 3 and 4 both refer only to the declarations of the amount of tribute owed to the Spanish by the 'principal' of each village. Some of these declarations include statements on labour arrangements for the coca tribute.
3. Column 5 includes only workers identifiable as living permanently in the coca-producing area by some specific reference in the text, such as to having 'house and lands for growing food' there, or to owing no other tribute apart from work in the coca-fields.
4. The unbracketed references in Column 6 are to workers said to be away in the coca-lands at the time of the house-to-house Visit, but who do not appear to be living there permanently, usually because they are listed as owing tribute in other goods, which permanent coca-workers are not. The bracketed figures in Column 6 are the sum of the number of heads of households who specifically mention that they 'go to the coca' as part of their tribute

duties. The number is likely to be a considerable underestimate, since many people answer simply that they 'work in everything that the others do' as regards the tribute obligations spread among the community. It is also an underestimate because it seems that generally married couples went together to the coca-fields, so that when a man answered that he goes to the coca once a year, this meant that two people went.

NOTES

1. The characterisation of the impetus of the Spanish conquest of the Americas put forward here follows Vilar (1971), who "described Spanish imperialism as the highest stage of feudalism" (Banaji 1977:31). The system implanted in the 16th century in Peru has often been thought to be predominantly of large landed estates producing for the market, and there has been a debate about whether these estates are to be characterised as 'feudal' (ibid:26; Laclau 1971) or 'capitalist' (Frank 1971; Wallerstein 1974:92). However, the encomiendas were clearly not landed estates (Haring 1947:44), and this is not the sense in which 'feudalism' is used here. Rather it is used to signify a decentralised system of economic power, based on control of labour rather than of land, and depending, as in medieval Europe, on control of long-distance trade in arms and luxuries to reproduce itself. The difference in Peru lay not in the relationship to the market, but in the fact that the Spaniards did not on the whole control labour directly, but only through the Indian caciques. The conflict between the Spanish settlers and the government in Spain over whether these feudal grants were to be hereditary had already led to the civil war in the 1540s and the death of the first Viceroy sent from Spain (Haring 1947:57).
2. Murra (1975:30-31) quotes some of the colonial authorities.
3. Haring (1947:57); Platt (1978:37).
4. See Murra (1975:83) for the view that the Spanish could not understand why the Andean ethnic groups valued their vertical colonies so highly. However, the same article hypothesises that the decline of the structure of the Inca empire was hastened by the fact that "the Europeans were so greedy to take over the resources that had belonged to 'the Sun or the Inca'" (1975:109). It is significant that modern commentators, even when dealing with a case such as that of the legal struggle of the inhabitants of Chucuito to keep control of their maize colony on the coast in Sama in the late 16th century, see it only as part of a struggle to maintain access to subsistence products outside the markets in the mining centres with their high prices (Pease 1978:140).
5. See also the discussion of Guaman Poma in Chapter V of this thesis.
6. A similar will from much earlier (1588) is quoted in Pease (1978:135-136).
7. The corregidor of the province stated that the ordinary cloth of Chucuito was "the best in all the Kingdom since it is worth one peso more per piece than that which is made in other parts, and since he has been in this province he has seen the Indians earn more than 10,000 pesos for making it" (Diez de San Miguel 1964:49).

8. In 1567 the lupaga had to send 500 Indians a year to Potosí "and from the wages that these five hundred Indians earn, the /tribute of/ eighteen thousand pesos is paid to the royal officials in Potosí" (ibid:19). But "through going to Potosí many Indians are lost, since they remain there, and the tribute that these men should have paid is levied on those living here" (ibid:19). Similarly, in answer to a question on the uses to which the "community cattle" are put, Martín Cusi replies that "if there is some tribute left to pay over and above what those who go to work in Potosí give, it is made up with the community cattle" (ibid:30).

9. Some interpretations of the Visitas of the 1560s can only be described as arbitrary and selective. Spalding, for instance, considers that the numerous references to 'payment' of workers in certain goods is simply an error of translation or an ideological gloss of the Spaniards who compiled the Visit (1974:44). She seems to derive her interpretation from the fact that the caciques often use the words 'nothing apart from' coca, chilli, etc. in describing their forms of payment (ibid.). A more likely interpretation of this phrase is that the caciques were explaining to the Spanish that they did not pay money for labour. One would not then have to resort to theories so unlikely as that the Indians willingly worked for their rulers in return for the favour of being ruled 'in the long term' (ibid:44-45).

10. The emphasis in the literature on the way the vertical colonies were shared among different ethnic groups, either through reciprocal arrangements to have colonies in each others' territories, or because 'they had been put there by the Inca', has tended to obscure this aspect of the distribution of their products.

11. The exact numerical distribution of caciques and principals in the 1560s is still a matter for research, although Murra gave the outlines of what could be gleaned from the Huánuco Visit in his essay accompanying its publication (1967:393-398). Diego Xagua is described as 'principal cacique' of the chupachu, and in addition Francisco Nina Paucar is also a cacique. The heads of the other 41 chupachu villages presented by quipu in Huánuco are all described as 'principals' (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 22-24). Prior to delivering the quipu Diego Xagua had said that it contained "thirty-nine caciques and principals" (ibid: I 22), presumably meaning that with himself there were forty. The extra three no doubt appeared because the list of principals and villages "was given by other principals together with don Diego Xagua from their quipus and memories" (ibid: I 24). Clearly, then, a principal was formally the head of one pachaca or 'hundred', forty of which made up the four 'thousands' or waranga, which were said to have made up the chupachu in Inca times. This said, there was clearly a network of principals of villages subject to more important principals, and when interviewed in their villages (or at any rate in the Spanish translation of the interviews) the principal sometimes referred to the head of one 'thousand' as the 'cacique principal'. For instance, in the village of Auchi, which was part of "the hundred of Guauyan Queros", the principal, Anton Xulcacapcha, said that

he was "subject to the principal Juan Bautista Caxachagua of this hundred of the queros and they recognise Don Cristóbal Xulca Condor as principal cacique" (ibid: I 213-214); while in Marac the elderly principal Martín Carcay "said that this village is subject to Don Felipe Masco as principal cacique... and they are all subject to Don Diego Xagua who is principal cacique now that Don Gomez is dead" (ibid: I 237). This structure of four heads of 'thousands', with two living on the 'left' bank and two on the 'right' bank of the Pilcomayo river that ran through the chupachu territory, is illustrated in Murra's tables appended to the 1967 volume. However, as it happens, the account given by Diego Xagua with help from the other caciques and principals does fit rather well with the quipu recited in 1549 of the tribute that the chupachu had given to the Inca, which is appended to the 1562 Visit (ibid: I 306-307). Here the responsibilities are apportioned out among a total of either 3,948 or 3,958 or 3,968 Indians, depending on which of the figures for salt-makers one takes. Unlike all the other figures given, there are three given for salt-makers: "and for making salt they used to give sometimes sixty Indians and at others forty or fifty" (ibid: I 306). (This presumably indicates that this was a good whose production had to be expanded at times). Now although the total of 4,000 Indians was clearly a formal accounting measure used by the Inca state, it seems likely that the level of tribute exemptions would be fairly accurate, given that the caciques were so adamant that they had not paid tribute in Inca times. If we take the middle figure of 3,958 as the total for chupachu tribute-payers in Inca times, this leaves 42 for kurakas and other authorities who would not have paid tribute under the Incas. This is extremely close to Diego Xagua's figure of 43 caciques and principals presented in 1562. If this is correct, what it must have meant was that there were 40 heads of 'hundreds' and over them two overall authorities, just as in the quipu presented in 1562 there are only two authorities entitled 'cacique'. For some reason Murra accepts and quotes Helmer's figure of 4,099 for the total chupachu population according to the 1549 Inca tribute quipu (1967:405). It is not clear how this figure was arrived at, but it must surely be wrong.

12. This was one of the distant vertical colonies of the lupaga, lying on the eastern slopes of the Andes in present-day Bolivia.

13. Given this monopoly, which still existed in 1567, despite the presence of Spanish merchants in the vicinity of Chicanoma, and given the way in which the overlords equated the tribute paid to their ancestors with the tribute paid to the Inca deposits, it is not surprising that coca has been thought of as an Inca state monopoly. Murra has reacted violently to this claim, and insisted, on the basis of the Huánuco Visit, that there were "peasant coca-fields...separate from the state plantations" (Murra 1967:386). On the basis of my reading of the Visits I would prefer the following interpretation. Under the Incas, the local kurakas were supplied with 'what was necessary for their rule' from fields, which, after the Spanish Conquest, were remembered as fields 'of the Inca': they were, however, worked by their own subjects, and the caciques had to organise both temporary and

permanent labour to do this. There is no evidence that there were separate coca-fields for the Inca tribute either in Huánuco or in Chucuito. Rather, the kurakas were given an allowance out of the coca sent to the state deposit. The illusion that the coca-fields were 'peasant' ones arises from the fact that the cacique did not, of course, consume all the coca-leaf himself, but 'distributed' it to his subjects. But if the theory put forward here is correct, this was not some inexplicable act of 'generosity', but was tied quite specifically to certain forms of labour performed for him by his dependent subjects.

14. It is also possible that there were real differences between the way the two groups saw their relationship to the Inca state. The ethnic groups in Huánuco had only relatively recently been subjugated by the Incas, which was why there was a group of mitmaq from Cuzco living among them to stop them from rebelling. The caciques of the chupachu may therefore have seen their local tribute as in something very distinct from state tribute, which was eroding it. The lupaga, on the other hand, had apparently allied with the Incas in conquering the other kingdoms around Lake Titicaca, and may therefore have felt some unity of economic interest with that of the Inca state (Pease 1978:89).

15. The process of formally 'requesting' labour seems very widespread in Andean society (Murra 1975:216). It probably serves some economic function as an advance payment, or at least an indication of ability to provide the necessary payment goods.

16. Spalding has conveniently omitted the "salt or chilli , and other small things" from her use of this quotation, stating merely that when the cacique needs "help" he must "beg the Indians to give it/ him" (1974:37). She also misses the point that Diego Xagua is here contrasting the present situation with the past (real or supposed). He is complaining to the Spanish authorities that his Indians are no longer under any automatic obligation to give him tribute goods, as they had been in the past; whereas Spalding interprets the passage out of context to mean that in general in 'Andean society' no ruler was any different from the other members of the community in having to obtain labour by means of 'reciprocity' (ibid).

17. At the same time, labour paid in this way is very often described as receiving 'no other pay' except these things. For instance, Diego Masca had recently had a house built by "his Indians...while they were working on it he gave them food and drink and chilli and salt and no other pay" (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 69). Juan Xulca, in answer to the same question, says that "the cacique does not give them or pay them anything, except that when they are working on it he gives them food and drink" (ibid: I 54). Clearly, the Spanish were interested in whether the Indians were earning money wages from their caciques, out of which they could pay money tribute, so that the caciques were concerned to show that this was not the case. But they also had to steer a difficult course between giving this impression, and giving the opposite one, that they were receiving unpaid labour, since the Spanish were just as much opposed to anything approaching slavery where the Indian caciques were concerned,

as they were in the case of the 'personal service' given to Spaniards (see note 18).

18. Anything approaching enslavement of the native Indian population of the Americas had been forbidden in the controversial New Laws of 1542-3 (Haring 1947:56). This did not, of course, apply to the use of African slaves. The commitment of Garci Diez to the Andean principal of rotating labour is interesting in the light of the subsequent conflicts over the mita (see Chapter V).

19. Interestingly, these practices are also deplored by the two overlords and the ex-overlord of the province, who must have themselves been engaged in them (Diez de San Miguel 1964: 25-26, 36, 43). Martín Cari complains about thirty Spanish merchants resident in the town of Chucuito, engaged in selling coca and wine, as well as maize and chunõ to the Indians, on credit at exorbitant prices (ibid:26). Principals of the other villages tend to complain less about the presence of the merchants and more about the prices being charged (ibid:83,87). This could be interpreted as meaning that the overlords saw the merchants as competitors whom they would like removed, while the lesser 'principals' were keen to buy from them, thereby avoiding the centralised control of the overlords.

20. See Lohmann Villena (1966).

21. Assadourian has an interesting discussion on the production and marketing of wine in the colonial period (1982:154-163). He describes the vineyards as "the most important form of commercial cultivation in the Peruvian area, as much for the quantity of wine drunk as for being a product for the market, where almost 100% of production is destined for sale" (ibid:154). He notes the attempts to restrict Indian consumption of wine, evident in both ecclesiastical and municipal dispositions, but he is also aware that these controls were frequently evaded (ibid:161). He quotes information on the competition that aguardiente made from sugar-cane posed to grape products in the 18th century (ibid: 162). However, the same information also makes it clear that the competition was felt strongly by the vineyards as producers of aguardiente made from grapes (ibid:162-163). A drink known as pisco, from its origins in the coastal valleys of Ica, Pisco and Nasca, is nowadays considered the Peruvian national drink. It is described as aguardiente de uva, which means, literally, 'burnt water of grapes', and is therefore equivalent to brandy. The word 'brandy', first appeared in English only in 1657. Originally 'brandewine', it was adopted from the Dutch brandewijn, which means, literally, 'burnt' (i.e. distilled) wine (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, 1936). Since wine itself forms absolutely no part of the alcoholic consumption of the Andean Indians today (although some cheap fortified wines under the brand name 'Vermouth' do), it would be interesting to know whether the Spanish term vino, so often heard about in the marketing activities of Spaniards from the 16th century on, in fact covered aguardiente in the form of brandy. Aguardiente made from sugar, i.e. rum, has been a favourite drink of the mountain Indians since at least the early 18th century and still is today. In 1714 its production on the sugar-estates was

prohibited, thereby increasing the consumption of brandy from the vineyards, whose price was sixteen times that of the rum (Assadourian 1982:162-163). From the same period, we hear of the "unlicensed sugar-farms" in the mountain areas, which had been recently replanted "to the great detriment of the Indians" (BN C 1209, see text). Since spirits are much less bulky to transport than wine, and since transport from the coast to the main centres of consumption in the mountain mining centres was the most material problem of the marketing process throughout the colonial period, it would seem highly likely that the category of 'wine' would from quite early on have included both wine for the Spaniards and brandy for the Indian population.

22. See Murra (1975:214-223) for a discussion of the decline in agricultural labour given to the overlords by the other villages after the conquest. A decline in the cloth tribute can also be seen in the text of the Chucuito Visit. Like the caciques in Huánuco, Cari and Cusi make a clear distinction between labour that has to be 'begged', and labour that is automatic. Confusion arises because in Huánuco this automatic labour is described in Spanish as tributo, or labour given 'by way of obligation'; whereas in Chucuito, the lords describe it as given by the villages "of their own free will" (Diez de San Miguel 1964:20). In fact, the two distinctions are the same. Martín Cari, for instance, distinguishes between the "five pieces of cloth" made in his own village of Chucuito for him every year, for which "he gives the wool", and the "one, two, six or seven pieces" given him by the other six villages "of their own free will, for which cloth...he does not give the wool, because, as he has already said, they give this cloth of their own free will without being obliged to" (ibid:20). But Cari also adds that nowadays "if he has need of some garment of fine cloth he begs the caciques of the other villages to have it made for him and they make it" (ibid:21). This must inevitably contrast with his declaration "of the tribute given to his ancestors in Inca times" where they are said to have received "one hundred pieces of cloth" automatically from the Inca deposit (ibid:34). Cari's distinction is therefore very similar to that of the caciques in Huánuco, who claim that their ancestors received an automatic tribute of coca, salt and chilli in Inca times, but nowadays they must 'beg' the Indians if they need these things (see text, section 2). It is clear that 'begging' - in Spanish the verb rogar is used - involved an advance payment to indicate that the labour would be paid in the customary way. Rogar is in fact a translation of the Quechua mañay, which means to ask for in the sense of to borrow. Mañana runa means a man of good credit (Chouvenc and Perroud 1970) and the passive manuy means to lend. The noun manu can mean either a debt or a credit. The process of 'begging' labour was therefore one in which an advance payment was 'lent' which had to be returned with labour or its product, or alternatively the labour was 'borrowed' and repaid in the customary payment goods. In the 1560s it is clear that more labour was having to be 'begged', that is paid, and less was being given automatically as tribute.

23. The other two ethnic groups given in direct encomienda to the Crown were the inhabitants of the island of Puná, in the

gulf of Guayaquil, and the people of the Chincha valley. In his article on the trade in shells (mullu) between Chincha and the Gulf of Guayaquil, Murra asks if it is mere coincidence that these three areas were the only ones to be given to the Crown (1975:265). Despite the fact that he read his paper at a conference at a place in Ecuador called Salinas ('salt-pans'), Murra has failed to notice that the island of Puná was an important salt producing area. For instance, Vasquez de Espinosa, writing in 1628, tells us that the salt in Callao, the port for Lima, came from Guayaquil. And in the Relaciones Geograficas de Indias we are told that not only the island of Puná belonged to the Crown, but also a port 20 leagues further north known as Desembarcadero, which was the nearest port to Quito, 40 leagues inland. The merchants in this port paid 240 pesos rent to the Crown each year "because they have rights over the reed-boats /balsas/ that put in there to sell, and they have a building in which they lock the merchandise they own, and they have the contract /trato/ to ship salt there from the island of Puná, which is the port of Guayaquil, and from there they provide the salt for this city /i.e. Quito/ and province and the other districts". (Jimenez de la Espada 1965:BAE vol. 184, page 176). Francisco Pizarro made the island his first base in Peru, from which he launched his expedition to the interior. The importance of salt provisioning in military expeditions is well brought out in Stefano Varese's book La Sal de los Cerros (1968). The refusal of the jungle tribes to vacate this 'hill of salt' rendered them unconquerable by the many military and missionary expeditions that attempted to subdue them, while in the mid-18th century Juan Santos Antahualpa, a messianic leader, set up his independent 'Inca' kingdom on this hill, and held out against Spanish attempts to dislodge him for forty years (ibid).

24. There were actually four or five encomenderos among whom these ethnic groups were distributed. The parts of the Visit we possess, however, are of the encomiendas of Gomez Arias (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I) and that of Juan Sánchez Falcón (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II). Even they are incomplete, since they cover only the 'left' bank of the River Huallaga; that of the villages on the 'right' bank still remains to be found (see Murra's preliminary note to the publication of the Visit, 1967).

25. The way the information is recorded in the Visit does not make it possible to say exactly which of these 'Indians' working for the encomendero was a single person and which a married couple. The figure of 39 was arrived at by adding the 21 'artisans' listed for the mitmaq in the declaration of Andrés Auquilluco (see text) together with the 18 that the yacha were supposed to give according to the 1549 assessment (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 287). This seems more reliable than the figures given by the Visitor in his final summary, which total 47, not including unspecified "herdsmen and carpenters", since he seems to have included all of those sent to live in Huánuco, only some of whom were meant, at any one time, to serve in the house of the encomendero (ibid: II 252-253). However, it is possible that in practice all of them were involved full-time in his service.

26. On this point, Xulca Condor stated in Huánuco that "the lands which they possess and cultivate at present are not so good as those they used to have because the good ones were taken by the Spaniards when this town was founded" (ibid: I 42). Francisco Nina Paucar complained that since that time various Spaniards had invaded more lands, and they had gone various times to Lima to reclaim them without success; "and now they would like to be paid for them, since they are poor and in need, and if they are not paid for them, they would like the lands returned" (ibid: I 75-75). The order of priorities is significant here, preferring the money to the lands, and provoked the Visitor to ask "if they need these lands to sow and cultivate, or if they can do without them"; and Nina Paucar replied "that they have many other lands for working and harvesting but they would like these ones since they are theirs and the people who are occupying them are rich and they should pay them as is just" (ibid: I 76). Felipe Masco, who was principal cacique of another of the 'thousands', complained that one Martín de Guzman had taken some of their lands "saying that they were of the Inca, when they themselves had already sown wheat in them and cut the irrigation canal to water them" (ibid: I 231). We can deduce from these fragmentary pieces of evidence that the Spaniards claimed any unused lands as theirs by right, and that often the unused lands were those that had been 'of the Inca'. The Indians in turn had to prove that they really needed the land by cultivating it, in order to convince the Spaniards they had a right to it.

27. The quipu of the former Inca tribute given by the chupachu caciques in 1549 included "sixty Indians to get honey", so that the chupachu must have had access to jungle lands where the wild bees were to be found (ibid: I 306). It is not clear whether the responsibility of finding honey for the Incas included also getting beeswax, or whether this was an extra task added by the Spanish.

28. The word yupanaco has been listed by the editors of the Huánuco Visit under the heading of 'reciprocity in labour', in their "ethnological index" (ibid:321). However, the meaning used here is confirmed by Fonseca, who has studied some present-day survivals of the yupanakuy (1972:325-326, and n.12). In the village of Yacán today, there are still certain chacras yupanakuy, which are communal fields among the private parcels. The sowing of maize and the preparation of the land for potatoes are both accompanied by a fiesta of the yupanakuy which is sponsored by the village authorities. These fields must therefore be survivals of ones which were set aside by the caciques in colonial times to be worked by the community in order to pay the tribute of those absent as craftsmen or labourers. In the colonial context of the Huánuco Visit, yupanakuy is used for labour which had to be done by the community, but where each individual's share is counted exactly. This is contrasted with labour done communally but where accounts are not kept of contributions: for instance, in the village of Xigual, the principal Juan Condor Guauya said that "they make the blankets, tent covering, and tablecloths all in common since they do not keep account of this because each person gives what he is able" (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 218). Similarly, the chupachu principal of Oxpá,

Andrés Yacolca, says that "they buy rescatan the beeswax among them all in common and there is no account kept of what is given towards it" (ibid: I 219). I would suggest, then, that the distinction is between different ways of discharging a communal responsibility: one "keeping accounts", and the other "not keeping accounts"; and that the latter was probably the responsibility of the cacique to organise each year, whereas the former had been apportioned out in the general distribution of tasks.

29. Many informants state simply that the surplus of food from the lands worked to pay the tribute is given to "the old women and the poor who do not have enough to eat for their subsistence" (ibid: I 238), or to "the old women and old men who do not have enough to eat" (ibid: II 217). In Yacán, "if anything is left over from the tribute maize, they distribute it among the poor who have no fields or are not able to work them", and with the potatoes for the tribute "they do the same with what is left over, that is, they distribute it among the old men and widows who have nothing to sow" (ibid: II 85).

30. Although the salt tribute was allocated by loaves according to the population in each village of the mitmaq and chupachu (the two groups that owed salt tribute), only in two villages are the loaves distributed among the different households. In general the salt tribute seems to have been the responsibility of the cacique or principal. It appears only in his list of the tribute owed by the whole village, which was normally given by the cacique or principal before showing the Visitor round the households in his village. There is frequently an explanation that the salt is bought, or exchanged for, by all in common, probably indicating that this was the responsibility of the cacique (ibid: I 116, 130, 140, 148, 258, 261; II 66, 178, 180, 184, 188, 189, 210, 217, 228, 229, 240).

31. How the market for salt developed in the 16th century is not entirely clear. In 1585 Capoche wrote that at Potosí 5 cwt. of salt were necessary to process 50 cwt. of ground silver ore; 70 Indian mitayos were assigned to work in some salt-mines 6 leagues away from Potosí, where there were 10 or 12 Spaniards producing about 60,000 cwt. of salt per year "with yanaconas that they have" (1959:142). These yanaconas were presumably skilled Indian salt-makers, like the yanaconas who made silver in Potosí. But Assadourian notes that a source of 1603 (by which time production at Potosí had declined slightly) estimates the annual consumption of salt in Potosí at 330,000 cwt., while in 1640 it had risen to 1,500 cwt. a day (1982:220 and n.116). So that Yocalla, the salt mine near by, cannot have produced enough salt for Potosí. A Relacion of 1582 for the province of Otavalo in present-day Ecuador tells us that in the village of Tumbabiro "they make much salt and...do an enormous trade with it, for they go to sell it in all the villages of this district" (Jimenez de la Espada 1965: BAE vol.184, pages 238-240). This is presumably the present-day Cotacachi, a place name meaning 'ground salt' in Quechua (kutacachi). Salt was also being traded between the island of Puna and Cuenca in Ecuador (ibid: BAE vol. 184, page 263) and also between there and Lima (see note 23).

It is unlikely that salt would have been traded from so far north to Potosí. There were some salt works in the province of Pacajes near Lake Titicaca, which was another old vertical colony, "where the Inca had Indian salt-makers placed from all the surrounding peoples" (ibid: BAE vol.183, page 341). There were also salt-mines in the province of Collaguas at Lluta, which was not too far from the trade route to Potosí that went through Arequipa (ibid: BAE vol. 183, page 332). Vasquez de Espinosa wrote that everywhere below ground in the southern coastal vallies of Sama, Locumba and Arica there were salt mines (1948:482-483), which fits with the evidence given by a Spaniard in Sama who said that fruit trees could not be grown there because the water was saline (Diez de San Miguel 1964:124). However the lupaga do not mention making salt in this coastal colony. The Corregidor of Chucuito says that they engage in exchanges (rescates) of "fish, salt and pots", but although the meaning seems to be that the lupaga exchanged their own salt, it is not clear where they got it from. The "oldest Indian in the province" was the only one to remember that salt had been given in tribute by the lupaga to the Incas (ibid:106). The salt works of San Pedro de Cajas in Tarma province were another Inca colony with mitimaes from different provinces, and the inhabitants were granted exemption from tribute and mita duties (Estrella 1954). The Spanish Crown tried to monopolise the salt supply by a decree of 1603, which took over the salt works at Guaura, north of Lima, and others (Escalona y Agüero 1775:219-220). But this attempt was abandoned in 1607 because the supply dried up, to the detriment of the Indians, "for when the salt was monopolised, they could not afford it" (ibid). So the King freed the salt again, according to the Gazophilacium written in 1647, which was "a great mercy for...the large consumption of it...especially in the silver mines" (ibid). However, in 1611, Vasquez de Espinosa visited Castrovirreyna and said that 15,000 cwt. a year was consumed in the silver mines there, and that a production tax of ½ real a cwt. was still being paid to the Crown on it.

32. Murra has expressed his doubts that "these were 'fortresses' in the European sense of the word" or that they were really to do with keeping down the chupachu (1967:400). Instead, he has suggested that they were 'magico-religious' sites, and were more to do with guarding the area from jungle tribes (ibid:402 n.1). (See Appendix).

33. See Appendix.

34. This centralised control of salt is borne out by the fact that not one salt maker turns up in the house inspection of the chupachu villages. Three are mentioned in the inspection of the village of Rondo, which was, however, a quero village, under Xulca Condor (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 174,178,180). The quero had been joined with the chupachu by the Incas, apparently to make up the numbers of one of the 'thousands' (ibid: I 41). Diego Xagua, principal cacique of the chupachu, claims that as a group, they have "ten salt-makers...and among them the two old men" living in the salt-works of Yanacachi. The only two other caciques who claim to know the exact number of salt-makers are

Diego Masca of Chupa and Juan Bautista Yupachauí of Collagoa who both put the number at twelve. All these three lived on the 'right' bank of the Huallaga, and their villages are therefore not covered in the part of the Visit we possess. But since it was normal for the salt-makers from different ethnic groups, who all lived in and 'shared' the salt-works, to be registered in villages of their own ethnic groups, we would expect the twelve chupachu salt-makers to appear somewhere in the Visit. Since three appeared among the quero, we would expect to find another nine in the lost part of the Visit, that covers the 'right' bank. The Villages of Chupa and Collagoa, together with Chaglla where Diego Xagua lived, were all concentrated in a small area on this 'right' bank (see map appended to the Huánuco Visit).

35. Summing up the Visit of the mitmaq and yacha ethnic groups, Garci Diez de San Miguel commented that in 1549 the tribute had been calculated "for only two hundred and forty-one tribute-payers, while this visit has found four hundred and two married men, seventeen widowers, and one hundred and thirty-nine unmarried men, which, in my opinion, makes five hundred and fifty-eight tribute-paying Indians" (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 267). The chupachu and quero population had also increased (Hadden 1967). These figures may of course be doubted for many reasons.

36. Francisco Pitoananga, principal of Yacan, states that his people can do the tribute work "with ease, because now that they themselves provide the cotton they have less pieces to make, but formerly, when their encomendero provided the cotton, more was distributed to them than they were able to make up" (Ortiz de Zúñiga: II 85-86). This must cast doubt on the frequent assumption that the Spanish misunderstood, or did not wish to abide by, the local custom, which was that the state or lord commissioning any piece of work had to provide the raw materials. Assadourian, for instance, states that, by comparison with the Inca system "the encomienda added the obligation to include the raw material in the cloth-tribute" (1982:192, n.74). The statement of Pitoananga quoted here shows quite clearly that providing their own raw materials was a strategy of the caciques to lower the cloth-tribute. They were, of course, only able to do this because they were organising cotton production on the old Inca coca and maize lands.

37. The anonymous Relación of 1603 states that worsted cloth (bayeta) was coming from Huánuco to Potosí at that time (Jimenez de la Espada 1965: BAE vol.183, page 382). For the cloth from Chucuito being marketed in Potosí, see text.

38. Various informants in Huánuco stated that a major difference from Inca times was that the cloth tribute then had been in fine cloth made from wool (cumbi) whereas in 1562 it was in cotton (see, for instance, Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 48). Considering the expansion in cotton cultivation that was evidently taking place in the area in the 1560s, it is surprising that from the 17th century on, (as in other areas of South America) there was a changeover to production of woollen cloth. Assadourian dates the change to around 1620 (1982:200), and attributes it to the rise of the obraje factory system, the decline of population on

the coast (where cotton had been produced under the Incas), and to the abundance of wool in the highlands (ibid:199-200).

39. See Golte (1980:63-64).

40. This reorganisation probably had rather less than the desired effect. Spalding says that in the 17th century between 40% and 60% of the tribute collected from the Indians still went to encomenderos (n.d:15). A document from 1684 shows an application by the Superintendent of the Huancavelica mercury mine for the grant of an encomienda for his pension when he retired. He pointed out that there were two vacant encomiendas in the province of Angaraes, together worth 4,938 pesos de a ocho. He was granted 2,000 ducats a year "for two lives" and the surplus of 321 pesos was to go to the Royal Chest in Huancavelica (BN B 1522). This does show that the encomiendas still existed as an individual claim on the tribute of a province, but since one of the encomiendas that the Superintendent was pursuing had been vacant since the death of Amador de Cabrera about 80 years previously, they cannot have been a very well maintained institution.

41. There is another side to the policy of reducciones implemented by Toledo, which can be gathered from the Huánuco Visit. The population was often moved down into, or at any rate nearer to, the maize lands. Since these lands had formerly belonged to the Inca or the kuraka, and were good quality, irrigated lands, there was no reason why there should have been any conflict between the Spanish state and the Indians over this policy. This would be one reason why there are so few records of how the reducciones were carried out in practice. That they were carried out, however, is confirmed by the lay-out of many of the existing villages in the Peruvian sierra. See also Ortiz de Zúñiga (I 114-115).

42. See Spalding (n.d).

CHAPTER V

PLAN VERSUS MARKET: STATE MONOPOLY CAPITALISM IN THE HUANCAVELICA MERCURY MINE, 1570-1793

From the middle of the 16th century to the end of the 18th, the question of the Huancavelica mercury mine and its supply of labour were frequently commented on by Viceroy's and high-standing officials as not only the most important but also the most intractable of all Spain's problems in the colony.¹ It is therefore remarkable that so little attention has been paid by historians in recent years to the subject.² What is more, although the existence of two reputable monographs published around forty years ago³ does make Huancavelica relatively well-researched in terms of Peruvian mining history, these works have been very little used as secondary sources. The resurgence of liberal sympathy for the Indian population of the colony has meant at times a relatively uncritical acceptance of the ideas that work in the mercury mine was lethal, that the population declined as a direct result of it, and that the main form of recruitment was by the forced labour draft, or mita (Spalding n.d.:18). Eminent historians have looked at colonial mining through the problematic of why forced labour persisted in the Peruvian mines, when it disappeared early in Mexico (Brading and Cross 1972). This oversimplified schema relies on the false supposition that the mita at Huancavelica was an "identical arrangement" to that at Potosí (ibid: 558), while the characterisation of the Potosí regime as simply one of forced labour has itself been disputed (Assadourian 1979: 236-7; Tandeter 1972).

At one level, Huancavelica owed its unique importance to the simple fact that throughout over two hundred years of production at Potosí it took 2 cwt. of mercury to make 1 cwt. of silver,⁴ Huancavelica being one of three mercury mines in the world at the time,⁵ and the only one in the New World. But as well as being, as Means described it, "the prime source of both Royal and private wealth in Peru" (1932:189), Huancavelica was also the prime source of the leyenda negra, the 'black legend' of Spanish exploitation of the native population. It will be argued in this chapter that far from being simply a propaganda device by Spain's European enemies and colonial adversaries,⁶ the black legend had its origins in an internal struggle. This struggle grew out of the articulation of modes of production already analysed, and while in a sense it was a struggle between old and new ruling classes over the labour supply, it cannot be fully understood without an analysis of the labour process in the mercury mine, the relationship between free and forced labour there, and the considerable strength of the working class in the mine.

Furthermore, the two hundred year long struggle over the mita was not just one between different modes of production, or different would-be exploiters of Indian labour: it was also the focus of two separate but articulated struggles over circulation. Firstly, Huancavelica was crucial in the Spanish state's taxation policy. Silver-miners were taxed not on their final product of silver, but on the amount of mercury allotted to them out of the state deposits, given that the ratio of mercury consumption to silver produced was very stable. But this made the control of mercury circulation even more central.

The supply of mitayos, or forced labourers, was intended to play a similar role at Huancavelica to that of the supply of mercury at Potosí: that is, mercury miners⁷ were expected to hand over an amount of mercury corresponding to the amount of labourers they had been assigned by the state, multiplied by a fixed coefficient of production. In the protracted and rather half-hearted attempts by the colonial state to eliminate mercury smuggling,⁸ the mercury miners continually argued that if the

state would fulfil its side of the contract by providing forced labourers and paying their wages on time, then the problem of smuggling would cease. Secondly, the provision of the mitayos depended only indirectly on state edicts, and directly on the Indian caciques; as we have seen, the control of the caciques over their population was itself principally threatened by the presence of markets and of various forms of wage-labour, not least of which was that in the mine at Huancavelica itself. The state's struggle with the miners to control the circulation of mercury, and so of silver, therefore articulated with the struggle of the caciques with the miners to control access to the market, and so control their subject population.

If the reforms of Toledo had been primarily designed to curb the growing decentralised feudal power of the encomenderos by making taxes payable to the state in centrally minted state money,⁹ we cannot therefore see them as an endorsement of market capitalism. As has been argued for European feudalism,¹⁰ that of the encomiendas pre-1570 was not incompatible with the market; on the contrary, the marketing of the tribute-in-kind was probably the principal form of marketing at the time. After 1570, it will become apparent that Spanish state control was most concentrated precisely where the market was most developed, and that this was true not only of Spanish external policy, but also internally to the colony. This curbing of the power of independent market feudalism brought the Spanish state into a de facto alliance with the Indian caciques, whose interests were very directly threatened by the encomiendas. This confirmed an articulation of modes of production in which the Spanish state was dependent on the Indian caciques to collect the Indian tribute and to deliver the mitayos to enterprises that the state could tax. Toledo's attempt to turn the caciques into mere salaried tax-collectors could be only partially successful. They often devolved tax-collecting duties onto subordinates,¹¹ and despite Spanish attempts to exploit such divisions, many of them retained economic power and maintained an impenetrable wall between their communities and the Spanish census-takers throughout the colonial period.

One of the difficulties confronting research on Peruvian mining history is that available figures tend to be state planning figures, which often bear little relation to reality. The main planning figures of the Huancavelica asientos are summarised in Table 5.1. This chapter will try to examine the reality behind the figures for forced labourers at Huancavelica, and why for so long the mita was a focus of debate and protest between state, miners and Indian caciques. The colonial problem that emerges is very far from both the traditional marxist and the liberal development problematic of the 'non-separation of the direct producers from their means of production'. The double squeeze of Spanish state obligations and the Indian caciques produced a free wage-labouring class at Huancavelica extraordinarily early, probably before the end of the 16th century. What failed to emerge over the following two hundred years was an independent capitalist class. The Miners' Guild, though at times enormously powerful and wealthy, failed ever to shake off state control of credit, sales, and of the mine itself. The Bourbon Reforms, which brought a cautious liberalising of external trade to Peru, gradually tightened the noose around the neck of the Guild in the 18th century, ending in complete government takeover and operation of the mine from 1782 to 1795, an experiment first mooted two hundred years earlier, and which proved disastrous.¹²

1. The Contradiction in the 'Black Legend'

The 'black legend' of Huancavelica is full of picturesque detail. In 1630, Domingo de Luna, Protector of the Indians, who was a fervent opponent of the mita, wrote to the king that the mitayos were collected up and chained together in gangs of fifty or one hundred. The women wailed and tore their hair when the men went off to the mita; houses were shuttered up; while others pawned the clothes off their backs, or hired wives and daughters out as prostitutes in order to raise money required for commutation (Lohmann 1949:274-275). A hundred years later an important report commissioned by the King's chief minister, which recommended direct government administration from Spain of the Huancavelica mine, still dwelt on the horrors of work in the mine, and wrote that mothers used to break the bones of their babies, so that

they would be unfit to go to work there.¹³ Mercury poisoning, the poor ventilation and noxious gases of the mine, as well as pneumonia caused by coming out into the cold mountain air from the suffocating heat of underground work, led to Huancavelica being named 'the graveyard of the Indians'.¹⁴

There is a tendency on the part of historians of the 18th century to accept that the 'black legend' had been true in preceding years, but was by then a thing of the past. As so often occurs, different theories are used to explain 18th century situations than those assumed to have applied in the 16th and 17th. There are two aspects to this tendency. The first is that the stories of high illness and death-rates in the mine are thought to have been true in earlier years, but it is assumed that conditions had improved by the 18th century. The second is the idea that the mine had effectively been run on forced labour in previous centuries. The two are of course linked, since the argument about the horrific conditions in the mine is considerably strengthened by the idea that this labour was against the will of the Indians, and was correspondingly weakened if the existence of free wage-labour could be adduced. Whitaker, for instance, attributes one positive outcome to Antonio de Ulloa's otherwise disastrous attempt to confront and reform the encrusted corruption of the mercury mine in the 1760s, which was to establish that mercury poisoning and other evils were a thing of the past, and thereby eliminate the argument about the sufferings of the mitayos from future discussions about what to do with the mine (1941:49). Similarly, many authorities accept that by the 18th century the mita, rather than actual work, meant a monetary levy on the population of the areas surrounding the mine, which subsidised the employment of wage-labour there.¹⁵ And this goes hand in hand with the assumption that in the preceding centuries the mine had actually been operated on forced labour.

In fact, the first official prohibition of free wage-labour at Huancavelica occurs in the 1598 asiento (a contract between government and Miners' Guild for the renewed lease of the Royal Mine) of the Viceroy Velasco (Lohmann 1949:167). In 1613 we hear of a rough figure of 1,500 wage-labourers at Huancavelica; and in 1645 official permission was given to hire the many

forasteros (i.e. migrants who had left the province where they were registered for mita and tribute duties), with whom, apparently, the city was teeming (ibid:238,333). The original allocation of over 3,000 mitayos to Huancavelica by Toledo had been cut to 1,500 in 1595 (ibid:156), but in 1645 a survey of the numbers working in the mine revealed only 95 mitayos (ibid:330). This makes the numerical decline of the forced labour in comparison to free labour very similar to that described by Brading and Cross for Mexico.¹⁶ While the exact roles in the labour-process of these free and forced labourers will be examined in the next section, it is clear from these and many other references that to describe the mercury mine as running on forced labour during the 17th century would be a great over-simplification.

The contradiction at the heart of the 'black legend' lay in the fact that it was not the mitayos (who were officially supposed to change over every two months) who were liable to the occupational hazards, but the permanent wage-labourers. The Governor Sola, known as the 'Restorer of the Mine'¹⁷ wrote in 1748 that mercury poisoning was now virtually unknown; while in the past, "no hewer could withstand three or four years in the work without coughing blood and contracting mercury poisoning" (quoted in Whitaker 1941:111,n.68). It was because there was a long-term labour force that the dangers of the mine had become so evident. The Council of the Indies was even more opposed, therefore, to free wage-labour than it was to forced labour; indeed, the reform of the mita to make it work as intended was often advocated as the only thing that would put an end to wage-labour. The contrary position of total opposition to the mita, such as that of Domingo de Luna, who made a serious offer on behalf of the Indians to pay the total cost of importing the deficit in mercury if the mita were abolished, was also justified on the grounds that it would end the evil of the wage-labourers (Lohmann 1949:272). He was able to argue this because wage-labourers were often hired directly or indirectly by the mitayo who thus bought his commutation. The wage-labour force was also clearly fed by mitayos who stayed on after their two months of forced labour in order to do the more lucrative free-market jobs.

As regards actual death and illness in the mines there is considerable evidence that the accounts were exaggerated by those, both Spanish and Indian, and including members of the clergy, who saw the mita as taking away labour that was theirs by right.¹⁸ The worst years would appear to have been in the first half of the 17th century, after initial open-cast mining had given way to a rather ad hoc gallery system, and before the completion of a ventilation shaft that took forty years to build. But in 1608 the Viceroy Montesclaros actually visited Huancavelica. He appears to have made a thorough job of it, spending six hours down the mine, visiting the town's hospital,¹⁹ and finding to his own satisfaction that there were no cases of mercury poisoning and that in general the conditions of work were no worse than in other underground mines (ibid:210-213). Even before this visit, the Viceroy Velasco had in 1598 prohibited night-work in the mine (against much opposition from the Indians), as well as ordering that the different jobs should be rotated, so as to avoid possible ill effects. In 1604 the deeper shafts had been blocked off, while the 1609 asiento contained provisions relating to safety in handling the refining of the mercury, and regulating the distance to be maintained between the different furnaces (ibid: 167,176,225).

While the study of what was forbidden at Huancavelica is often the best guide to what was happening there, the mine was by no means backward in the 17th century. A process for 'distilling' the mercury, involving furnaces known as 'dragones', was invented there in 1645 and only later implemented at the Fugger concession at Almadén in Spain. This saved both labour and fuel in the refining process, and allowed the government productivity quotient to be increased from 3 cwt. to 11 cwt. per worker per year (ibid:330). It has not been realised by some that the famous 'ventilation shaft' took so long to build precisely because it was a tunnel, and not a mere shaft. It was designed in 1605 with the express intention of allowing trucks and llamas to travel backwards and forwards to the faces, and in order to install a winching device. This would save the labour of the 'apires', who brought the ore up in carrying cloths on their backs (ibid: 185). Lohmann Villena writes that this tunnel was described by

a contemporary as "as broad as any room at the Palace", and that together with the stone staircases that led off it to a large area of the mine, it was a cause for admiration in all who came to visit Huancavelica from other mines, including Potosí (ibid: 412).

While clearly not a very healthy or safe place to work, then, the mercury mine was not backward or unchanging in the 17th century, and high wages there attracted a labour-force of varying degrees of permanency. The legend that the Huancavelica mita was decimating the Indian population lived on, however, precisely because, from the point of view of the Indian caciques, the mita did threaten them with population decline. Mitayos often did not return, because they stayed on in Huancavelica, employed in the mine or in essential services in the town, or else because they found somewhere else to settle as forasteros, or 'outsiders', thereby evading tribute and mita obligations in their community of origin. The contradiction in the 'black legend' is nowhere more graphically displayed than in the work of Guaman Poma. In a sense, the indictment of the Huancavelica mita is the heart of his remarkable book, written about 1613 addressed as a letter to the King of Spain (Poma de Ayala 1936). As a dispossessed cacique from Lucanas, a province that was subject to the mita, it is likely that his bitter comments are written from experience. But after pages cataloguing the horrors of death, illness and exploitation at Huancavelica, Guaman Poma has to ask the king that at the end of their period of service there, the Indians should be escorted half a league outside the town on their road home, "as well as those helping them - children, wife or brother" (ibid:533). Now Guaman Poma rests the bulk of his case on the argument that the Indians were being kept in Huancavelica against their will by Spaniards, the men either as miners or as weavers, muleteers and traders (rescatadores), and the women as mistresses and 'cooks' (ibid:526). However, if it was difficult for the caciques themselves to seek out missing Indians, it would have been impossible for the Spanish; it is hard to imagine how a Spaniard would have had the resources to seek out Indians if they fled his/her employ into the surrounding mountains. So, if the Indians were being kept against their will, why did the caciques need the government

to put them on their road home?

In fact Guaman Poma's text provides an answer to this question, since he reserves much of his wrath for the alquila system, which at that time required the community that could not send its full quota of mitayos to hire free labourers as substitutes. He complains that they are often made to provide hired substitutes for Indians who have obtained an exemption on grounds of illness, such as mercury poisoning. Similarly:

they should not hire substitutes for absent Indians, but rather the caciques or their subordinates should seek them out, even though they be in monasteries (ibid:528).

Under Inca rule, which Guaman Poma held up as the example of 'good government' proclaimed in the title of his book, this uncontrolled movement of population could not, of course, have happened, or would have been made infinitely more difficult by the cloth passport system (See Chapter III). Quite clearly, Guaman Poma saw the alquila system of wage labour as taking the Indians away from their rightful owners, the caciques. The Indian 'captains' and 'mayors' (alcaldes) of the mine (who were responsible for the mitayos in Huancavelica itself) "on the pretext of hiring them, rob Indians from him who is hiring them out" (ibid:532).

What is more, Guaman Poma saw the system of payment for labour in the mine as another kind of robbery from the cacique. He claims that the Indian workers:

are forced to take maize, meat, chicha, bread, or cheese on their account, which is discounted from their work, so that at the end they come out very poor, with large debts and no money to pay their tribute with (ibid:527).

The centralisation and monetisation of the tribute by the Viceroy Toledo had been intended to encourage Indians to go and work in the mines and thereby earn the money for the tribute. But because the situation was still one of articulation of different modes of production, the Spanish state could not collect tribute directly from individual Indians, but only through the caciques. For this reason, Guaman Poma insists several times:

that wages should not be accounted in chicha, but rather they should bring money for their tribute (ibid:527).

The abuse was even worse when the community hired substitute wage labourers (alquilas). The captains of the mine received the commutation money to exempt an Indian from the mita, but did not pass it on to the hired substitute. The latter, instead of getting paid with this money:

drinks it all up in wine and chicha and the mine-captain takes it from him saying that he hired himself for these things (ibid:532).

But once again, this is seen as a wrong done to the cacique who provided the hired substitute:

in this way, he makes the poor Indians pay, and makes a bill to charge it without the Indian who provided the substitute seeing it, and he charges him against his will with this bill, and the captain deceives him every time that he brings him Indians (ibid:532).

The passage is obscure, but appears to mean that the cacique would himself expect to receive the extra wage earned by an alquila, or 'free' labourer, who had perhaps stayed on after the end of his period of forced service, but that the system of individual payment 'discounted' in food and drink meant that the community received nothing to help with the tribute payment.

Guaman Poma is at pains to point out the contradictory position in which the caciques were placed, being expected to provide forced labourers without any state control of population movement, and being expected to provide tribute from wages paid directly to their subjects, and in kind. Two outcomes are described in the text. One is the famous picture of the cacique being punished by being hung by his feet, "on the pretext that a few Indians are missing from the mita"; similarly, the caciques would have their property and cattle seized by judges sent by the miners (ibid:530). The other is the description of the cacique forced to turn to exploitation of his subjects, as is shown in the following passage, which also suggests a remedy:

that the Indians of this kingdom should not be hired in the mines and town-squares, nor should the captain be able to hire them, for these Indians lose and spend what they do not have, and with all that they go missing and the hired labourers desert their villages; and apart from this, on this pretext the poor Indians are dispossessed and robbed by the

principal caciques, subordinates, mayors, and captains; and if they themselves go in person to fulfil the mita of the mines and town-squares and other obligations and mitas, then these poor Indians will not be oppressed, and the principal caciques will cease from dispossessing them and will have no cause to rob in this kingdom...(ibid:533).

For Guaman Poma, then, the central problem is the free wage labour system: if the forced labour system were run in an orderly manner, under the control of the caciques, then the abuses and exploitation would cease.

Just like the caciques in Huánuco fifty years earlier, Guaman Poma was concerned about the lack of church teaching, and relates this closely to controlling the movement of the population. A sentence that begins with the complaint that mass is not said often enough ends with the recommendation that a census of everyone in the mines and other Spanish enterprises should be made once a year (ibid:530). And it is also very clear that Guaman Poma saw the movement of women to the towns and estates, as wives or mistresses of Spaniards, as a crucial factor in population decline. Possibly in order to convince the King of Spain, he emphasises the mixing of races that was resulting, which was against royal orders. Once again we find that the cacique appears to need the active presence of the Church in order to keep the population stable, both through the keeping of records, and by establishing standards of morality and exercising an authority that would provide legitimation for his own.

In short, wage-labour was the contradiction at the heart of the 'black legend'. The existence of a large free labour force at Huancavelica from at least the turn of the 16th century meant that those who defended the Indians against exploitation in the mine were always vulnerable to the charge that they simply wanted to use the Indians in their own service. Guaman Poma's vision is slightly more complex than this. He sees a clear division between the 'poor Indians' and those who exploit them, who are both the Spanish and the Indian caciques and foremen at the mine. His fear is that the whole social order is breaking down, as the caciques turn to robbing their subjects' land and cattle. It is interesting that many of his recommendations were things that had already been legislated for in asientos with the Miners' Guild.

This is true, for instance, of his call for a rotation of the more dangerous jobs at the mine, or the demand that the Indians be paid in money rather than in kind, and that they be put well outside the town after their period of work was up. These orders were clearly never obeyed, since they recur in all the 17th century asientos. But these contracts also contain clauses, and at times quite specific mechanisms, in order for the workers to be paid directly and individually,²⁰ precisely so as to avoid what Guaman Poma would have liked, that is, for the cacique to receive the wages earned by his subjects.

The crucial question that arises, then, is why, given that wage-labour was available, did the Miners' Guild make such a continual issue with the government over the question of the delivery of the mita, and why was it for so long a principal focus of Indian opposition to Spanish rule? The next section goes on to examine some possible answers to these questions.

2. Wage-Labour and the Debate Over the Mita

The biggest obstacle to giving a decisive answer to these questions is the fact that the large colonial archive at Huancavelica is, to date, uncatalogued.²¹ This section does, however, make use of some documents examined there in 1975-6, as well as some from the national archives in Lima. It also uses some data summarised in Lohmann Villena's book (1949), although the interpretation placed on them is my own.

a. The mita as a subsidy to wage-labour

A crucial factor that does not seem ever to have been appreciated in analyses of Spanish colonial mining policy is that the mita was not simply forced labour; it was also labour whose wages were fixed and paid by the state. As a state monopoly, the government undertook to buy at a fixed price all the mercury produced, and a part of the money consigned for this purpose was set aside for payment of wages to the state mitayos. This arrangement caused continual problems, principally because of delays in the arrival of money. At first, the money was simply derived from the sale

of mercury in Potosí, and the consortium of merchants who had obtained the contract from the government for transporting the mercury there were supposed to bring back the cash to pay the miners, out of which the mitayos would be paid (Lohmann 1949: 107-9). This, of course, left the miners in a position where they were extremely vulnerable to the merchants, since the latter did not deposit the money in the Caja Real, or royal strong-box, at Huancavelica, as intended, but instead used it to force the miners to sell mercury to them at a black market price which was usually lower than the official one. As for the mitayos, they often had, of necessity, to leave before the cash for their wages arrived (ibid:108-9). This problem was already a scandal by 1581, and in 1590 the Viceroy agreed to remit 40,000 pesos from the public Treasury every two months, in order to pay the wages of the mitayos (ibid:145). In 1598 the Viceroy Velasco arranged for the whole cash supply to be drawn on the Caja Real of Lima (ibid:165).²² However, the problem did not end there, and by the middle of the 17th century there were continual complaints about the state being late with its remittances, and the refusal of new Viceroys to cancel debts incurred with the miners by their predecessors. In 1660 the state debt amounted to 425,000 pesos de a ocho²³ (ibid:360), and in 1667, when the debt had reached 600,000 pesos, the Viceroy Ibarra recommended the raising of public loans to enable prompt payment of the miners (ibid:374-5). But the problems persisted, and towards the end of the 17th century there are increasing references to the aviadores at Huancavelica - merchants who were able to advance credit to the miners, often against their production of mercury (ibid:383). In 1690, a Memorial from the Miners' Guild to the Viceroy asked for the cash remittances to be drawn on Potosí again, directly from the mercury sales, to avoid the long delays of the Lima officials (ibid:426).

By the 18th century the tables appear to have turned, and Cornejo's report of 1734 accuses the miners of being twelve years behind with their repayments of the annual advances they were receiving from the royal treasury (Whitaker 1941:23). Regardless, then, of whether or not the money was actually being used to pay forced labourers, or whether it was simply a subsidy for paying

free labourers, the miners do appear to have continued depending very much on the state as a source of credit, and to have preferred efficiently run state credit to that of the local private merchants. This was therefore one good reason why the miners would continue to argue in favour of the mita.

However, the role of the mita as monetary subsidy did not end there. As already indicated, the alquila system of wage-labour originated in a process whereby the forced labourer, or his cacique, paid a free labourer to take his place for his period of mita duty.²⁴ Different authorities in the mine vied with each other to take advantage of this money: the mine-owner, his foreman, and the Inspectors, who were the highest, and often the most corrupt, Spanish officials at the mine (Lohmann 1949:224, 240). But a document from the early 18th century also shows the Procurator of the Mine²⁵ accusing the caciques and corregidores,²⁶ who were responsible for collecting this commutation money,²⁷ of keeping a large part of it for themselves:

for his mita payment, they charge the Indian Mitayo seventy pesos, and in some provinces seventy or eighty pesos, but they only want to hand over thirty-two pesos, four reals, justifying this on the erroneous accounting from times past that said that with these thirty-two pesos, four reals together with the seventeen pesos, four reals that the Miner had to give the Indian, he could hire another... (BN C 1209).

Now it is possible that this accusation refers simply to the practice the caciques had of using certain rich Indians to pay the commutation money on behalf of the community, a practice that has been well documented for Potosí.²⁸ While commutation was common from at least the beginning of the 17th century, it had frequently been forbidden, until it was finally allowed at the above price of 32 pesos, 4 reals, in 1693 (Lohmann, 1949:424). Even then it was only officially allowed for one eighth of the mitayos, and the fixing of a price must have been intended to stop exorbitant sums being charged.

In 1713, in the same document, the Governor complains that of the 620 mitayos who were supposed to come to the mine, 243 had been exempted by further recounts obtained by the Indians, and only 72 were actually coming in person. What is more, the

miners were not actually receiving money from these commutations, because, the Procurator alleges,

the Corregidores have reduced their mita payments to poor quality, expensive Peruvian cloth, gunpowder, muskets, and other drugs for which they can find no market in their provinces; and if these are not accepted, they take them away again, so that the Miners are left without one thing or the other... (BN C 1209).²⁹

While there are frequent prohibitions on the evidently common practice of paying mitayos their wages in cloth at Huancavelica in the 17th century,³⁰ this reference is unusual in showing how other parts of the circulation process imposed by the Spanish state could take the form of cloth. The Procurator was convinced that this payment in kind was not due to a real shortage of money:

the Corregidores collect the Money from the Indians and then request to pay the Guild in the goods mentioned, at exorbitant prices... (ibid).

It would seem altogether more likely, however, that the Indians were themselves paying the mita commutation in cloth that they produced, since one of the demands of the Governor's Memorial, is for the "extinction of the unlicensed cloth workshops and sugar farms".³¹ He claims that:

the fall in numbers has not been for lack of Indians, but because of the workshops for making local cloth; the number of them has grown so much that it is difficult to find any village, farm, or country estate in the provinces subject to the mita, that does not have ordinary looms for making this cloth, or where at least the Indians are burdened with spinning wool, or working the cane-fields that have been planted again to make sugar, which everyone knows is against the interests of the Indians; but as all the citizens of these provinces make profits from them, they hide them in the censuses... (ibid).

With all this, "all the provinces are owing one or two years of mita"; when the Governor went personally to Vilcashuaman to collect the mita, he was beaten up and had to return empty-handed, while the offenders went unpunished (ibid).

The officials of the mine, then, saw the Corregidores, and the caciques who were in league with them, as the main beneficiaries of the present system of mita:

It follows that far from any burden that the delivery of the mita might have meant to the Corregidores, their cunning has devised the modes and forms described so that not only is it no burden to them, but rather they manage to make substantial profits from it... (ibid).

Claiming that production in the mine was very low for lack of labourers, the solution proposed by the frustrated Governor was for judges to be sent to the mita provinces, presumably to do a new recount of the Indians. The Lieutenant and Procurators of the Mine were asking for the Governor "to be ordered to compel the Corregidores... to deliver the Indians they are supposed to in person, not in money" (ibid: title of document BN C 1209).

Clearly, the system of subsidising wage-labour through commutation money paid by Indians subject to the mita was not working as intended. However, the Miners claim to be experiencing an actual labour shortage, not just a shortage of cash, and their demand, as so often, is for the state to provide them with cheap, forced labour. We will now look at how the colonial census, rather than furnishing evidence in this debate, merely reflected the form taken by debate over population in the colonial period.

b. Colonial censuses and conflicts over labour

In an article on censuses, Mayer has noted that Toledo's Ordinances contained a contradiction: while requiring the corregidores to keep up-to-date lists of the Indians in their provinces, official inspections were forbidden except by direct command of the Viceroy. This was because inspections tended to prove counter-productive, as large numbers of Indians were hidden. Toledo's solution was to order the corregidor to keep a secret up-to-date list of the Indians who owed tribute (Mayer, 1972:353-354). As Mayer points out, a secret census of a traditionally suspicious population would be an impossibility for the corregidor. But in any case, the corregidores were often accused of keeping double lists, one with a lower number of Indians for collecting royal tributes, and another for their own uses (ibid: 533).

In practice, it seems that the corregidores were completely

dependent on Indian caciques and tribute-collectors for the maintenance of any lists of population, and it was often caciques who were accused of keeping double lists and thereby defrauding both the corregidor and the treasury (Golte 1980:157). An informant in Potosí in 1690 went so far as to say that the corregidores were mere tools in the hands of the Indian governors of villages (Sánchez-Albornoz 1978:89). This dual alliance of caciques and corregidores proved almost impregnable to the demands of the Huancavelica Miners' Guild. Just as Toledo had indicated in the 16th century, throughout the 17th and 18th centuries it proved extremely easy for individual provinces to obtain recounts that lowered the number of their population subject to the mita. This practice had one paradoxical effect, which was that whenever a general census was taken, the purpose was always to prove that the population was greater than appeared in the recounts.³² This purpose was generally accomplished fairly easily. Taken together, these two tendencies to under- and over-exaggeration make colonial population figures eternally ambiguous.

It is within this general perspective that a recount of the population subject to the Huancavelica mita, found in a bound volume entitled Provisiones sobre mita, 1636-1746 in the archive of the Municipality of Huancavelica (hereafter 'PSM'), must be interpreted.³³ The recount is in the form of an Index compiled in 1736, the first year of Gerónimo de Sola's administration as Governor of Huancavelica, the man known as the 'Restorer of the mine', and the first person to be appointed directly from the Council of the Indies, in the 18th century attempt to wrest the mine from the corrupt vice-regal administration.³⁴ Although they are all copied out in the same hand and listed according to the same formula, the counts of the individual provinces date mainly from 1723 and 1724. This makes it plausible to assume that they were first commissioned as a result of requests from the Indians to have the number of mitayos lowered because the population had been hit by a plague that had spread up from the River Plate in 1719 (Sánchez-Albornoz 1978:164). The 'decrease of the population due to the plague' was still being used as an argument by the caciques of Angaraes in 1730 (PSM 1736:21). Because of these requests and all the other difficulties surrounding the mine,

the Viceroy Prince of Santo Buono had in fact made an attempt to close the operation of the mine altogether, but when that failed the king had issued a provision banning the mita in 1720. This had been reversed in 1722 (PSM:1733).

Table 5.2 summarises the provisions for mitayos from each province laid down in this 1736 Index. The background to the recounts is the general census of the viceroyalty undertaken by the Viceroy Duque de la Palata in 1683-1689.³⁵ This was undoubtedly the most thorough census undertaken during the colonial period, and aroused immediate opposition from the interested parties, since it found the population to be very much larger than would have been expected on the basis of existing lists. Lohmann Villena reports that the population of one province, Lucanas, was ten times what it had been reported as previously (1949:414). On the basis of this recount, the Duque de la Palata had issued an Auto decreeing that the obligation to send 620 mitayos to the mine at Huancavelica should remain the same, but instead of this representing one seventh of the population as formerly,³⁶ it would now represent a twenty-first part only. This would mean that instead of the rotation coming round every sixteen months, (allowing for the two 'small mitas' of the winter months, when only half the normal quota was sent) the turn of each mitayo would arise only once every 3½ years (PSM 1736:51).

It is significant that, formally speaking, the census of 1687-8 did not increase the mita service to Huancavelica, but rather decreased it by three times. This was the opposite of the Duke's solution at Potosí, which was to shorten the period of rest enjoyed by the mitayos there to one week in every two, from the previous arrangement of one in three (Sánchez-Albornoz 1978:77-78). Nor did the category of forasteros ('outsiders') occupy such an important place in the Huancavelica catchment area as they did in that of Potosí, where the census put them at nearly half the population.³⁷ It was the Duke's attempt to rule that this group should do mita, having previously been exempt, that was a main source of resistance to his census in the Potosí area (ibid:76-77).

In contrast, the resistance to the 1687 census in Huancavelica seems, at first sight, paradoxical. Evidence of it exists, however, in the Governor's Memorial analysed above, which states that of the 620 mitayos provided in the 1683 asiento, even on paper there only remained 377 in 1713, owing to new recounts and lowerings obtained by the different provinces (BN C 1209). By 1736 the total formally owed according to the same 1687 census had decreased to 309 mitayos. (See Table 5.2). This figure fits well with the complaint from the Huancavelica Miners made to the Duke in 1682, the year before he commissioned the census, where they state that only 309 mitayos remain of the 620 provided in the previous asiento, that made with the Marques de Mancera in 1645 (PSM 1736:51). The effect of protests at Huancavelica, then, was to lower the mita, once again, to the status quo ante 1683, with the difference that, in theory at any rate, the rest-period between periods of mita service had been lengthened by three times.

An analysis of the recounts made into an 'Index' in 1736 can reveal much about the form taken by resistance to Palata's census, his attempt to make the paper figures of the Huancavelica mita into concrete reality, and about the Miners' attempts to overcome this resistance. All the entries for the different administrative districts of the 13 provinces take the same arithmetical form, which is illustrated in this extract summarising the entries for two districts in the province of Chumbivilcas:

1. Livitaca

Population (1728): 7 mandones ('commanders'), 255 native tribute-paying Indians, 55 outsiders

22 exemptions (1724):

- 1 cacique
- 1 governor
- 1 second-in-command
- 2 mayors
- 2 regidores ('councillors')
- 1 alguacil mayor ('chief constable')
- 1 public scribe
- 4 singers
- 1 master of the chapel
- 1 preceptor
- 1 blacksmith
- 1 tailor
- 1 shoemaker
- 1 carpenter
- 1 dyer
- 1 barber
- 1 sacristan

This leaves 233 tribute-payers, of which the seventh part /those formally liable to mita at any one time under Toledo's ordinances/ is 33.

The Duque de la Palata in 1687 assigned $8\frac{1}{7}$ Indians to each mita period of two months, so that in 7 mitas, it would be the turn of $56\frac{1}{7}$ Indians to serve, and for the 21 mitas, 173 Indians would be necessary. This leaves a surplus from the full total of 233, of 60 Indians for the other ordinary mitas, whose seventh part is $8\frac{1}{7}$ Indians who shall be delivered according to the orders of this high government.

2. Belille

Population: 4 mandones, 116 native tribute-paying Indians,
1 outsider

17 exemptions (1724): 4 singers
2 masters of the chapel and school
1 preceptor
1 regidor
1 alguacil mayor
1 scribe
1 fiscal ('attorney')
1 barber
1 blacksmith
1 tailor
1 shoemaker
1 carpenter
1 dyer

Leaving 99 Indians of which the seventh part is 14.

In 1687, $3\frac{1}{2}$ Indians were assigned to each two month period of mita, which makes $24\frac{1}{2}$ in 7 mitas, and 68 in 21 mitas. This leaves a surplus of 23 for the other, ordinary mitas of which the seventh part is $3\frac{1}{4}$. (PSM 1736: 1.2).

This arithmetical formula is followed for all the other districts of the 13 provinces. Its ostensible object is to prove that even if each community complied strictly with the 1687 provision to send only 1 in 21 of the tribute-paying population to the mine, after the deduction of the number of exemptions allowable under the law, there would still be enough Indians to serve the so-called 'ordinary mitas' on a rotating one-in-seven basis. The exactitude of the arithmetic that always finds the same number of Indians to serve the 'ordinary mitas' on the one-in-seven basis, as that number assigned to Huancavelica on a one-in-twenty-one basis, means that the numbers for total population must be fictitious.³⁸ But this could mean either of two things: either that the Spanish mine officials were cynically manipulating the figures to suit their wishes; or that the purpose of

the recount is actually to estimate the total number of tribute-payers that would be necessary to fulfill the various mita obligations, the implicit assumption being that the totals are low enough to make it difficult for anyone to reasonably deny them.

However, while my own inclination is to the latter view, it is not intended here to reopen the colonial debate on population.³⁹ Rather, the documents are valuable for the insight they give into what was included under the generic term 'ordinary mitas'.⁴⁰ This seems to have meant different things in different provinces. For instance, in the silver-mining provinces of Lucanas and Castrovirreyna, the local authorities clearly wanted mitayos for the silver-mines. In Castrovirreyna it was argued that in 1687 they had been exempted from the mita to Huancavelica; but in 1730 they were still arguing that they could not send 28 mitayos to Huancavelica as well as the 25 they had to send to the silver-mines of Lucanas. Instead, they argued, there were surpluses of population in the provinces of Tarma and of Cotabambas, which could well provide these mitayos to Huancavelica (PSM 1736:19). Entries 32, 33 and 34 in the 1736 Index, on the other hand, are designed to show that the three districts of the province of Lucanas can provide the $19\frac{1}{4}$ mitayos they are supposed to for Huancavelica, and still have available $19\frac{7}{8}$ mitayos on the one-in-seven basis for work in the silver-mines of that province (PSM 1736:32-34). However, a miner from Lucanas tried to appeal against this decision, arguing that the $19\frac{1}{4}$ mitayos owed to Huancavelica could well come from the surplus population of Castrovirreyna (PSM 1736:35). Entry 36 repeats the exemption of Castrovirreyna from the Huancavelica mita (PSM 1736:36), and entry 37 is a memorial from the governor of Chinchaycocha, in the province of Tarma, arguing that they should not have to give more mitayos, as those of Castrovirreyna were alleging (PSM 1736:37).

In the province of Vilcasguaman, the 'other mitas' are described as "estates and cloth-factories" (haciendas y obrajes) in six of the districts counted, and in the other four the wayside hostels and postal service are included (tambos y chasquis)

(PSM 1736:22-31). The district of Parinacochas, in the province of the same name, was counted as having 287 native tribute-payers, of which 153 had to be deducted before calculation of the mita. Seven were caciques and tax-collectors, 90 for the local authorities of church and state, as listed in the above extract from the Index, representing 18 for each of 5 parishes in the district, 21 who had died since the last recount, and then:

29 yanaconas who live on the highland farms estancias of Pausa...whose Indians serve as herdsmen for the cattle of the convent of San Cristobal de Pausa of the Preachers Order, as is recorded in the certificates of the recount; and...the mita of this province is $7\frac{1}{4}$ Indians, $5\frac{1}{4}$ of them for the Royal Mine and 2 for the callana? of the Royal Chest there, apart from other mitas that they gave to Don Alvaro de Monroy and other people; 3 Indians from the parish of Pallo who serve as postal runners and 3 noble Indians...who showed their title as descendants of the Governor Cacique Don Pedro Quispe Guaman, which leaves 134 to be counted for the mita... (PSM 1736:15)⁴¹

For all four districts of Parinacochas, the mita is first calculated as one seventh of the available Indians (i.e. in this case, 19) and then it is stipulated that only one quarter of this (here, $4\frac{3}{4}$) is to be assigned to Huancavelica.

In the province of Xauxa, where of 3,641 tribute-payers in the three provinces, a staggering 2,499 were exempted under a series of provisions going back as far as 1596,⁴² the list of exemptions again includes both assignments for cloth-factories and estates, along with ones which would be better described as 'infrastructural'. For instance, 273 Indians were assigned to five hostels in the area; 12 to working ferries over two rivers; 164 to obrajes and 116 to a sheep-farm. Many other exemptions were listed on a wide variety of grounds, ranging from being lame or without land, to being a 'noble Indian of the ayllu Paguichaquillanqui', or 'for being married to a mestiza woman' (PSM 1736:51). The Miners of Huancavelica were particularly annoyed by this list of exemptions, and argued in 1736 that it was quite unrealistic and out of date. For instance, they claimed there were no longer any ayllus of silversmiths or potters, only descendants with that name; the 'outsiders'

were not landless, but all owned land; and there were no Indians acting as 'frontiersmen to the jungle pagans', a ground on which 431 exemptions had been granted. The Miners eventually agreed to concede the exemptions, however, provided it did not mean a diminution of the number of mitayos owed before the last recount (PSM 1736:51).

Even in the 'other ordinary mitas', then, we find the same division and conflict between 'productive' labour service, where profits could accrue to individuals, and 'unproductive' forms of labour. This means that it is an over-simplification to think of the debate over the mita as simply a struggle between state and private appropriation of labour. In actual fact, this bifurcation is not confined to the 'other ordinary mitas' but is also present within the mining mita itself. From the early 17th century, that is, from the time when mining started to get dangerous as the unplanned galleries rambled further underground, there had been conflict between the Miners' Guild and the state about who was responsible for the repair and maintenance of the mine. It would appear that in general large-scale projects such as the ventilation tunnel did not get carried out without substantial state finance and provision of labour by the state. For instance, in 1624 it seems that the state spent 1 million pesos in putting the direction of the tunnel back on course, due to an error in a previous plan (Lohmann 1949:267-8). But a continual problem was that the mitayos provided by the state for such works as these would be diverted and used for private gain. In 1615, the Veedores, the state mine inspectors, were accused of using 640 mitayos provided for repair work themselves. As they held the key to the mine, which was locked at weekends, they were said to go back secretly and mine veins they had marked and left during the week, or mine the pillars holding up the roof of the mine. For this reason, the work of maintenance seems to have been regarded as the most lucrative by the Indians, and Lohmann Villena reports a phrase in common use at the time: "to get the Indians to come and serve in the correct and proper manner, you have only to put them on repair work" (ibid:239-240).

It is possible then, that this repair and maintenance work, which came to be known as la roza at Huancavelica, provides a parallel with the kajcheo at Potosí (Tandeter 1980:38). The latter was a right of access to the silver-mines at weekends for free wage-labourers, to appropriate any ore they could for their own use. But it is also likely that much repair work at Huancavelica was itself highly paid, since it involved emergency clearance work without which the mine could not function. For instance, in 1693 underground water caused collapses, which were cleared in four months, but with an expenditure of ½ million pesos, and the use of 500 workers. (Lohmann 1949:422). Even if only half of this money went on wages, at around 4 pesos per working day, the implied wage-rate is 8 times that provided for the mitayos at the time.

As well as being lucrative to the workers, this system of state-organised repair and maintenance work was also lucrative to the individual miners, and so to the state itself. Lohmann Villena mentions the systematisation of la roza as a contributory factor in the raising of the productivity quotient from 3 to 11 cwt. a year in 1645 (ibid:396). At any rate, by the early 18th century the question of whether the Indians of Angaraes (the province in which Huancavelica was situated) were to serve in la roza, or in ordinary work at the mine, had developed into one of the longest legal disputes in the history of the mita. A copy of it is contained in the 1736 Index found in the Huancavelica archive (PSM 1736:21), and another copy is in the National Library in Lima, showing the Viceroy taking the case to Spain in 1730 (BN C 1619).

In line with the general tendency, the caciques of Angaraes had quickly succeeded in having the mita assignation made in the time of the Duque de la Palata lowered.⁴³ His asiento of 1683 and the census of 1687 had in fact merely confirmed the 1645 number of 25 mitayos owed every two months, while lengthening the rest period for each mitayo. But in 1690, the Angaraes had had this lowered to 8 Indians every two months, under the Duke's successor, the Conde de la Monclova, who conceded many lowerings, on the basis of "fictitious little lists" (Lohmann 1949:423). The

distribution of these 8 mitayos among the different villages and ayllus of Angaraes does not appear to have borne any great relation to reality at the end of the 17th century,⁴⁴ and the form in which they were to be delivered, too, gives the list a very traditional ring:

1½ Indians from the Chancas division of Guayllay

2 from the Guaros of Acobamba

4 from the Quiguar of Espiritu Santo de Caxa

½ from Callanmarca

The 3½ from the Chancas of Guayllay and the Guaros of Acobamba to be delivered in silver.

The 4 from Espiritu Santo de Caxa in coal.

The ½ from Callanmarca in person.

(PSM 1736:21; BN C 1619).

The implication is that these were arrangements in existence since before the attempt by the Duque de la Palata to reform the mita. On the basis of this information, which was taken from a 'Book of mitas for Potosí, Carabaya and Guancavelica of 1690', the mitmas division of Andabamba was granted exemption from la roza in 1718, by decree of the Viceroy Prince of Santo Buono, on condition that they delivered "the two Indians every two months" for the ordinary mita. These are presumably the two specified for the Guaros of Acobamba in 1690, which can be traced back to 1643, when Don Diego Guaynasuma, cacique of the Guaros of Acobamba, had succeeded in getting the mita lowered from 5 to 2 mitayos every two months, "from Acobamba and Andabamba" (PSM 1643).⁴⁵

In 1730, then, the caciques of other communities in Angaraes sent a petition to the Superintendent of the Mine, arguing that "all the other villages should enjoy the same privilege as do the people of Andabamba". The 1718 provision for Andabamba has in any case not been kept, according to the caciques, so that since they are being made to send 20 Indians to la roza, they should at least be let off the 8 Indians of the mita. They also asked to be paid a compensatory fine of 1,000 pesos, for breach of the 1718 agreement. The Conde de los Torres, Governor

Superintendent of the Mine recommended that they be let off these 8 mitayos and keep on with the thirty (sic) all the year round for la roza, as well as being obliged to send people whenever there is an accident that needs repairing. Under this rubric, the Governor mentions 40 Indians at present engaged in repair work in a pit named San Xavier. This recommendation was backed up by the Protector General at the Royal Court in Lima, and the decision granted by the Viceroy Marqués de Castelfuerte in 1730 (PSM 1736:21; BN C 1619).

The significance of this suit in the present context lies in the way in which the repair and maintenance work - la roza - was conceived of as another form of forced labour by the caciques, alternative to and conflicting with mining labour - la mita. In Angaraes, the position of la roza in the debate is therefore similar to the 'ordinary mitas' in other provinces. They are both forms of draft labour which conflict with the obligation to send mitayos to the mercury mine in the usual way. In fact this interpretation is more directly borne out by a phrase in the document which brackets what would count as 'ordinary mitas' together with the repair work to the mine:

the mita of wayside hostels, of continuous operations for the discovery of /new/ mine-workings, and repairs to the Royal Mine... (ibid.)

This suggests that la roza had originally been justified as coming out of the quota of Indians who would be assigned to the 'other ordinary mitas'. What is very clear is that the provision of an infrastructural service within mining itself was a collective necessity for the Miners for which they depended on the state, but it also conflicted with their individual needs for assignments of labourers. As with the 'ordinary mitas' in other provinces, the caciques, probably with the backing of the corregidores, played these two forms of mita off against each other, arguing that they could not do one, because the other was taking up all their resources. We must conclude that the recount of 1736 analysed in this section represents not simply the conflict between miners and corregidores over the labour supply, but also the struggle of the caciques to avoid their Indians doing either of these. Furthermore the conflict between

the state-backed Miners' Guild, and the corregidores and caciques on the other hand, cannot simply be seen as one between state and private sectors. Within both mining and the 'other, ordinary' uses to which labour was put, we must take into account a conflict between state and private interests.

c. The prices of free and forced labour

One obvious reason why the Miners of Huancavelica continued to demand a supply of forced labour from the state for so long was that, as is shown in Table 5.3, the wages of free labour were always much higher. This meant that the money allowed for wages in the state price of mercury would not cover the miner's wage bill as planned. The payment of commutation money was therefore formally conceived of as making up this difference between the wage of the mitayo, which the miner would receive from the state, and the wage of the free labourer.

The wages of mitayos at Huancavelica were already high; those of free labourers were astronomical. It is true that proximity to the source of money production brought inflation and that prices of goods in the mining towns were very high. But this does not really account for why there should be such large differentials between different wage-rates. A free labourer at Huancavelica could apparently earn four times as much as a mitayo and seven times the amount that a muleteer transporting goods for the corregidores could, at the end of the 17th century, (See Table 5.3). There are two indications that these high wage-rates were not simply accounted for by the high cost of subsistence in Huancavelica, and do in fact reflect the strength of the free working class there. The first is the rather extraordinary fact that the free wage-labourers demanded a substantial portion of their wages in advance. This we know because a memorial of 1684 from the Miners asks to be allowed to take prisoner any free labourer who takes the advance and then absconds, or does not complete the labour required (Lohmann 1949: 411). It does not therefore sound as if this advance was simply the discounting of food and drink from the final wage payment that we hear about in the case of the mitayos and other labourers.

The second indication that high wages reflected the strength of the working class is the level of alcohol consumption reported at Huancavelica. We have already seen how Guaman Poma denounced the way the Indians spent all their wages on drink in the early 17th century. One of the most fascinating encounters between Spanish government and the Peruvian colony was the period spent by Antonio de Ulloa as Governor of Huancavelica in the 1760 s. Whitaker made his attempts at reform central to his excellent monograph on Huancavelica in the 18th century, but confined his study mainly to the corruption and intransigence of the colonial authorities, who were able to ensure that Ulloa did not get the necessary backing from the Viceroy for his project.⁴⁶ However, Ulloa also came up against the intransigence of the Indian population during his stay at Huancavelica. Having come from Spain with every intention of reforming the lot of the miserable mitayos, he was deeply shocked by what he saw as the laziness and alcoholism of the Indians. With the same heavy-handed good intentions that made him arrest the two top Spanish officials at the mine and put them on trial for corruption, Ulloa attacked the problem of alcoholism and non-payment of tribute by the Indians.

In a reassessment of tribute for the Indians of Angaraes dating from 1765, Antonio de Ulloa explicitly links these two problems (BN C 2236). The Indians were many years in arrears with their tribute payments and complaining that old men and widows had to pay, for lack of young tribute-payers. Ulloa took a census which proved that the population included 431 tribute-payers, more than double the 162 that had been said to exist in 1728. What is more:

the province of Angaraes should be the one with the very least problem in paying the tribute, since in the Mine it possesses a subsidy to the community; apart from the fact that they are there paid double the wage that is customary in all other employment, they are also paid in money... (BN C 2236)

However, the problem was that:

whatever they earn in the week, their wage of 4 reals a day is instantly consumed in aguardiente, between Sunday and Monday... (ibid.)

If the Indian tax-collectors took the wages of the Indians in order to pay the tribute, they too would spend it all on drink, fiestas and bull-fights, where quantities of expensive aguardiente and chicha flowed for all the villagers. Ulloa did not stand idle: not only did he arrest a number of mayors and tax-collectors, those from Julcamarca being kept in prison for more than a year; he also tried banning the sale of aguardiente on Sundays and holidays. Needless to say, this proved totally counter-productive; secret sales continued, but the Indians used the prohibition as an excuse to get drunk on Mondays and a good day's work in the mine was lost.⁴⁷ Although Ulloa took over from the Lieutenant direct responsibility for tax-collection, his attempts to organise mitayos to work in the mine in order to pay off the tribute debt, (apart from the usual remittance of Indians to do la roza, which was apparently still customary in Angaraes at this time) met with total failure. The imprisoned Indians appealed for leave to sell their property in order to obtain release, which Ulloa refused to grant them, on the grounds that it was forbidden and anyway undesirable for Indian property to pass into Spanish hands (BN C 2236).⁴⁸

Now Antonio de Ulloa was no fool, but one of the brightest young men of the Spanish Enlightenment, and author, twenty years earlier, of one of the most famous 18th century accounts of colonial Peru.⁴⁹ His attempts to discipline the workforce, at Huancavelica were as fruitless as his attempts to discipline the Spanish Inspectors. The picture that emerges of the workforce, however, is hardly one of docile and oppressed forced labourers. Even the mitayos were highly paid and clearly had customs and rights which they were prepared to defend. The free labourers appear to have been very hard to come by for the miners, to have demanded extremely high wages and a substantial advance payment. It would be wrong to assume that these were developments specific to the 18th century. There is every indication that they go right back to the early years of the mine.

One obvious explanation of the large wage differentials at

Huancavelica would be that the different workers had different levels of skill and were doing different jobs. The evidence on this will be considered in the next section. It is possible that the miners were deliberately obscuring such a situation when they continually asked the government to provide cheap mitayos instead of the expensive free labourers. However, there is also evidence that at least some of the mitayos were doing similar work to free labourers, but that they were on different systems of payment, which gave rise to the differentials. The evidence comes from the 1712 Memorial from the Governor and Procurator of Huancavelica, analysed above. In it the Procurator General argued that the present commutation sum of 32½ pesos was quite inadequate for making up the difference between the mitayo's wage and the price of a free labourer. He went on to explain that this was because of

...the erroneous and outdated accounting which said that with this 32 pesos, 4 reals, together with the 17 pesos, 4 reals, that the Miner had to give the Indian, another one could be hired, who would work for the two month period, in which there were only fifty working days; but in fact, the hired Indian is not paid by the day, but by the load, or puricha /walk/ which is the term used in the mine, so that the sixty pesos that used to be given to the mine for each Indian not delivered in person, together with what had to be paid him, are just not sufficient; because there are days when the hired Indian earns 20 reals /2½ pesos/... (BN C 1209).⁵⁰

In other words, at any rate by the 18th century, the free labourers were on piece-rates, whereas the mitayos were still on time-rates. The clear implication of the above argument is that the miners got better value for money out of the mitayos, or day-labourers: the Procurator goes on to argue that the high free wages described have put up the costs of production of a cwt. of mercury so much that the Crown should raise the official buying price, which was 58 pesos at the time (ibid).

This argument is, in fact, confusing, since the evidence from the 17th century suggests that the mitayos were much less productive than the free labourers, in part because of the payment system. At least as early as 1598, the two-month period of service was calculated as including forty days. (Lohmann

1949:162). And as early as 1581 the miners were complaining that owing to the difficulty of finding fuel for the furnaces, the Indians were only able to hand in one 'load' per day (ibid: 106). At some time the day-wage, or punchao (Quechua for 'day') became linked to the accomplishment of a specific amount of work, known as one 'load'. The forty days' work, therefore, came to mean not literally attendance at the mine for forty days, but the accomplishment of forty 'loads'. As so often, we hear about this because of complaints about how the system encouraged smuggling. In 1688 it was said that the mitayos who came to Huancavelica unaccompanied by their wives used to smuggle pieces of mercury ore up from the mine with which they bought food and drink from the guarmichacras ('supply-women')⁵¹ at the mouth of the mine. This practice meant that the mitayos could take up to three or four months to complete their forty 'loads'. On the other hand, a mitayo who came with his wife could finish the task in three or four weeks. He then received a certificate of completion, which he presented to the Corregidor in order to receive his wages (ibid:413).

We may speculate that the mitayo who brought his wife to Huancavelica was able to complete the work more quickly because the wife helped with the labour, either directly, or by selling food and drink at the mouth of the mine in return for mercury ore. What is important here is that piece-rates would be an obvious way for the miners to eliminate such smuggling, provided that the rate was set above what the women (and ultimately the merchants to whom they would pass on the mercury in return for goods) could offer as a price. While the only evidence on the piece-rate system operated for the free labourers comes from the 1712 document already quoted, the free labourers were already earning very high wages in relation to the mitayos in the early 17th century. It seems likely that given the obvious incentive to smuggle inherent in a system of fixed day-tasks, piece-rates are the explanation of the high wages of free labourers from the early years.

However, unless the payment system for mitayos had changed between 1688 and 1712, it is strange for the Procurator in 1712

to be arguing that costs of production were lower using mitayos than they were with free labourers, since the free labourers' higher wages seem to have corresponded to higher productivity. It is also possible that the Procurator did not really know what he was talking about, since there were so few mitayos working in the mine at the time - he mentions only 72 engaged in the "extraction and refining of metals" (BN C 1209). His mention of fifty days' work in the two months is out of line not only with all the other evidence, which talks of forty days, but also with his own quotation for the basic wage of a mitayo. At 17½ pesos, this represents forty day-wages of 3½ reals each, the official wage-rate that had prevailed since 1630 and been reconfirmed in 1683 (Lohmann 1949:286,397).

Finally, it is interesting that at the end of the 17th century the Council of the Indies saw the wage differential between free labourers and mitayos as the root cause of the succession of petitions from the Miners that the mita be delivered them by the state. In a delightful demonstration of Spanish utopianism, a Royal Cedula was issued in 1697 which ordered that the wages of mitayos and of free labourers were to be equalised at 7 reals the day. It was hoped that in this way the embarrassment of the official continuation of forced labour would simply disappear (ibid:427). It was also stipulated in this decree that the levelling of wages should not imply any lengthening of the working day, possibly indicating that the mitayos were effectively on a time-rate by this stage, rather than on a set amount of work for the day. This would, of course, make the Procurator's wish to employ mitayos rather than free piece-workers more intelligible. There is no evidence that anyone ever tried to implement such an equalisation of wages in later years. The Cedula must be remembered as an instance of the remoteness of Spanish government from an understanding of the realities of life in the colony.

d. The means of payment of free and forced labour

The wage differentials between mitayos and free labourers at Huancavelica also had another aspect. Evidence will be examined

in this section that suggests that the free labourers demanded payment in money, whereas, at any rate until the mid-18th century, the mitayos had to be content with payment in kind.

We have already looked at Guaman Poma's denunciation of the way the mitayos had their wages 'discounted' in alcohol and food in the early years at Huancavelica, coming home to their communities without any money to pay their tribute.⁵² Later on, the emphasis of complaints shifts to the practice of payment in cloth, probably meaning that if there was a balance left over after the discounting of advances for subsistence and alcohol given to the mitayo during his period of service, this balance would be paid in cloth rather than money. The tradition of paying state labour in cloth went back, of course, to the Incas, and in particular to the way they had paid the army.⁵³ During the 17th century at Huancavelica, there were frequent prohibitions on the use of cloth for paying the mitayos, and we can assume that this meant that it was in fact a common practice.

As early as 1609, the Viceroy Montesclaros had ordered that the mitayos were to be paid directly by the treasury officials in the presence of the Corregidor of their province; they were to be paid individually, and the payment was to be in metal and not in kind (Lohmann 1949:233). In 1623 the Marqués de Guadalcazar, recognising the failure of former systems, had tried a new one in his asiento: tables were to be set out in the town square, and there in the presence of the Governor and the Protector of the Indians, each miner was to be handed over the exact amount of cash to pay his mitayos, which he would be made to do there and then (ibid:267). The wages were calculated according to written accounts, known as quillcas, (from the Quechua for 'drawing') in which subsistence goods and alcohol advanced to the worker were 'discounted' from the final wage. These provisions were repeated in the 1645 asiento, but there is no evidence that they were ever adhered to. In 1683, a zealous Governor of Huancavelica again ordered that the mitayos were to be paid individually, in public, as well as in money, and not in cloth or other kind (ibid:409).

Considering that there were so many different arrangements and provisions made for seeing that the state cash got to Huancavelica for paying the mitayos on time, it is surprising to hear that they were in fact paid in cloth. A scandal that erupted in 1662 shows us how this came about. In that year, one Antonio de Vargas had been in charge of conveying 232,000 pesos of government cash from Lima to Huancavelica, but only 50,000 pesos had reached its destination. Of the rest, it was proved after a Crown secret enquiry that 84,000 pesos had been used to buy cloth in Lima, which was then transported to Huancavelica. This cloth was bought on orders of the Governor of Huancavelica who used it to pay the miners for mercury produced, and the mitayos for their labour. The cash never passed through the Caja Real at Huancavelica, fraudulent receipts were issued, and the official accounts presented by the Governor bore no relation to his duplicate, private account, according to which he had distributed the value of the remittance (Lohmann 1949:361-364). When so much cloth was launched simultaneously into a small town, it would of course be difficult for the mitayos to realise the value of their wage in money by selling the cloth. However, it should also be borne in mind that over the medium and long term, cloth was a far better store of value than was silver, owing to the generally inflationary nature of the colonial economy.⁵⁴

Payment in cloth is commonly reported in other sectors of the economy. The corregidores discounted the wages of their muleteers against cloth and other kind,⁵⁵ and labourers on agricultural haciendas were paid in the same way.⁵⁶ Assadourian mentions the importance of domestic cloth production (1979:288) and of the development of the obrajes (1982:208) in providing what he calls a 'cloth wage', but unfortunately does not expand on how widely distributed this cloth wage was, and in particular whether it was in use at Potosí.⁵⁷ But it is particularly significant to find the cloth wage in use at Huancavelica, since, owing to the debate about the horrors of the mita there, the mitayos were supposed to receive special treatment. We have already seen Ulloa's assertion that they were exceptional in the 1760 s, not only because of their high wages, but because

they were paid in money, rather than kind. It is possible that Ulloa was here confusing mitayos with free labourers, or simply that he was exaggerating the efficiency of his administration. It is also possible, however, that the economy had become more monetised by this time, since production of silver at Potosí started to pick up after about 1750.⁵⁸

Although it is difficult to prove definitively, all the evidence points to the conclusion that the free labourers at Huancavelica were paid at least a part of their wage in money. Firstly, there is the fact that the prohibitions issued in the 17th century on payment in kind refer only to the payment of mitayos. Secondly, there are the complaints from the Miners that the free wage-labourers take an advance on their wage payment and then do not turn up for work. One good reason why wage-labourers would be demanding advance payment would be to ensure that they were paid in money, rather than fobbed off with goods at the end of the week. Thirdly, there is the fact that so much more attention was paid to actual wage-rates for the free labourers. The official wage-rate for mitayos remained static at 3½ reals a day from 1630 to the beginning of the 18th century, when it went up to 4 reals. During the same period, wage-rates for free workers rose several times, but what is more, quite specific monetary values became assigned to different tasks, such as the 2 reals earned as a bonus by underground workers if they filled up the containers in which the ore was taken to the surface (ibid:397).

The existence of two different circuits of wage payment at Huancavelica has other consequences which will be examined below in section 3. In the present context, the indications that the mitayos could be paid in cloth, whereas the free labourers demanded money, give one more reason why the miners would prefer to employ mitayos. In a situation where money was notoriously scarce the development of cloth as an alternative means of payment was only to be expected, especially given the historial precedent in the Inca mode of production.

e. The positions of mitayos and of free labourers in the labour process

It can very reasonably be supposed that the wage differentials in the labour force at Huancavelica between free and forced labourers corresponded to different jobs involving different degrees of skill, or different positions in the hierarchy of control in the labour process. The evidence on these points is rather fragmentary and not entirely clear, since there is also evidence, such as that analysed above, which suggests that free and forced labourers were doing similar work, although on different payment systems. However, it is perfectly possible to maintain that the different categories of labour did do different work on the whole, but since there was always a shortage of workers to do the dirty, dangerous, underground jobs, free labourers were to be found alongside mitayos on these, though on different payment systems.

A specialisation and division of labour must have developed before 1598, when as well as the first prohibition of wage-labour, the asiento contains a clause ordering that the different jobs at the mine should be rotated (Lohmann 1949:167). The jobs considered most dangerous were underground work and stoking the fires in the furnaces. The same asiento also informs us of the existence of other jobs, since the miners were ordered to provide sickles for those who cut the ichu, the local reed-like grass, whose use as fuel since 1570 had greatly increased productivity in mercury production⁵⁹ (ibid). The asiento also forbade the transport of the mercury ore on the backs of the mitayos, from the mine entrance to the furnaces, ordering that llamas should be used for the purpose (ibid).

It is interesting that 15 or so years later, Guaman Poma should also call for the rotation of jobs, in order to reduce the danger of mercury poisoning:

that in these mercury mines an Indian who goes down the pit of any mine one day should not go down again until he has gone to the mercury furnace... (Poma de Ayala 1936:528).

The underground inspection of the Viceroy Montesclaros in 1608 tells us more about the division of labour in underground work. One set of workers known as piqueros hacked the ore with iron picks; these hewers were aided by other labourers known as apires who carried the ore on their backs up the ladders and staircases to the entrance. It was then transported by llama to the furnaces (Lohmann 1949:213). In 1613, we hear that the free labourers preferred the jobs on the surface, described as olleros, oyaricos, and carquiches (ibid:238). The olleros (literally 'potters') must have been those who fired the mercury, a process that was done in pots at high temperatures. Oyarico was a word used to denote a government spy in Inca times. Someone describing himself as an oyarico by profession was still to be found in Huánuco in 1562 (Ortiz de Zúñiga 1967:173). Its literal meaning is 'watchman'. As a job in the refining process, then, it could mean either someone who watched the furnaces, or some kind of a foreman - someone who watched other workers. Two hundred years later, in 1811 the workers in the refining process were still described as horneros ('oven-men') and oyaricos (Whitaker 1941:100). Carquiches or 'carriers' were probably those who transported the mercury on llamas from the mine to the furnaces.

It was said that before the construction of the ventilation tunnel was completed in 1645, the free labourers were reluctant to work below ground (Lohmann 1949:330). In 1657 another ventilation shaft was finished (ibid:359), but in 1660 we again hear that the free labourers refused to go down to the deepest part of the mine, where the richest veins were, and which was known as the hoyo negro or 'black hole' (ibid:360). We should not conclude, however, that no free labourers worked underground. It seems likely that the hewers were, as at Potosí, highly paid, skilled labourers. Continuity of labour must have been necessary simply to find one's way around the labyrinth of galleries at Huancavelica. This is borne out by the allusion to free labourers' wages from 1680 which says that they earned 12 reals a day, plus 2 reals known as the cargapa, which was the payment for filling up the tapaderas, the containers in which the ore was carried to the surface (ibid:397). Presumably, then, the

mitayos were engaged mainly as apires underground, that is, in the transport of ore from the faces to the surface. We know that it was in part to reduce the need for apires in the labour process, that the tunnel was built in the first part of the 17th century.

Given this sort of division of skilled and unskilled jobs between the free and forced labourers, the wage differentials found are not surprising. It would not be at all unusual to find a skilled craftsman on piece-rates earning from three to five times as much as his journeyman labourers in 19th century Britain. What we do not know about Huancavelica is whether the free labourers had themselves to pay journeymen or women out of their wage. It is interesting that a wage-list from 1912 shows a very similar ranking of different kinds of mining jobs, and even shows some of the old terms still in use for them:

TABLE 5.4

Wages for an 8-hour Day in the Province of Huancavelica in 1912

<u>Job Description</u>	<u>English Equivalent</u>	<u>Wage in Soles</u>
Operarios de minas (barreteros)	Mine-labourers (hewers)	From 0.60 to 0.80
Apires	Those who carried the ore up on their backs	From 0.30 to 0.40
Carrilleros	Those who trans- ported the ore in trucks	From 0.25 to 0.40
Chanquires	Those who broke up the ore	From 0.20 to 0.30
Mujeres	Women	From 0.20 to 0.30
Operarios metalurgicos maestros	Master craftsmen in metal-refining	From 1.00 to 1.50
Ayudantes	Assistants, journey- men	From 0.50 to 0.80

Job Description	English Equivalent	Wage in <u>Soles</u>
Mayores	Youths (?)	From 0.30 to 0.40
Menores	Children	From 0.15 to 0.30

Source: Sub-prefect's report for Lircay, 1912 (BN E 788).

Clearly, the highest wages were to be had in the refining process, explaining why these were the preferred jobs of the free labourers two and three hundred years before. Even an assistant in the refining process in 1912 could earn as much as an underground hewer, and a master refiner would expect to earn five times as much as someone employed in carrying ore up from the faces or transporting it in trucks to the surface. By comparison, the same report shows a master carpenter or blacksmith earning similar wages to the underground hewers, but less than the refining workers. Agricultural labour at the time was paid at the rate of only 0.20 to 0.25 soles for men, and 0.10 to 0.15 soles for women (BN E 788).

Finally, there is also evidence that the mitayos were crucial to the mine, not because of any mining work they might or might not have done, but because of their usefulness in bringing raw materials to the mine, especially fuel and wood, and in transporting the mercury itself. In 1652 the Governor of Huancavelica wrote that the 120 mitayos who attended the mine were too few to do the work of

minding the herds, transporting goods, and other jobs which are absolutely essential... (PSM 1654).

His counterpart at Cailloma, a silver-mine in southern Peru, who was in dispute for the mitayos from the province of Chumbivilcas, retorted that at Huancavelica the mitayos were

distributed to the citizens and bakers of that town, or even hired out for transport work in Guamanga and Castrovirreyna... (ibid).

We have already seen how the district of Caxa in Angaraes owed 4 mitayos every two months, which had been commuted into the form of coal in 1690 and possibly before that. The title to the Community of Llillinta, also in Angaraes, is a defence written in 1741 by the priest of Julcamarca, a neighbouring valley village. His defence of the rights of the inhabitants of Ingahuasi and Llillinta to the highland pastures then being invaded by the people of Huancahuanca, another valley village, is based on the fact that these lands:

serve as pasture for cattle, sheep, and the llamas which they use for carrying loads of straw for smelting the mercury ore in the enterprises of the Town of Huancavelica; and they transport the metal down from the hill, and carry chalk for repairing the Royal Mine, and they take the refined mercury from all the enterprises to deliver to the Royal Chest... (Llillinta, Community Title, 1942).⁶⁰

The priest states that the community had originally been granted a title to these lands by the Viceroy Conde de Lemos,

in recognition of the service rendered by the inhabitants, and the benefit to the public cause in their service to the Royal Mercury Mine of that town with their llamas... (ibid.).

Twenty years later, when Antonio de Ulloa was engaged in his battle to make the Indians pay tribute, the Lieutenant of the province of Angaraes washed his hands of the subject, saying he was busy organising the repair work, as well as the supply of wood for the mine (BN C 2236).

Since fuel and transport were both major problems at the mine,⁶¹ and since highland communities such as Llillinta do not appear in the mita recounts,⁶² we can surmise that the provision of ichu for fuel and of llamas for transport was performed by such highland groups instead of working directly in the mining mita. We have already seen how Indians from the lower villages of Angaraes were involved mainly in the maintenance and repair work in the mine (la roza). It seems, then, that most of the labour performed as mita was fairly specific. In some underground jobs, there may have been an overlap between free and forced labourers. But generally speaking, the evidence does

not support the assumption, fostered by the Miners' Guild and often naively adhered to by the Spanish government, that mitayos could simply be drafted in to substitute for the expensive free labourers. The assumption can be found, too, in contemporary writing on the mita (Basto Giron 1954). Rather, the present state of the evidence would point to a conclusion suggesting that the mitayos performed certain vital functions in the overall organisation of the process of mercury production and infrastructural work at Huancavelica, which free labourers, permanently resident in the town, either could not or would not do. It is this, rather than a need to literally substitute for the free wage-labourers, that was behind the Miners' continual attempts to have the mita delivered in full, and in person rather than in money or cloth.

* * * * *

The debate over the mita was a complex one, which spanned 150 years. It will be apparent that some of the motives presented here for the Miners' pursuit of the mita are not compatible with other ones. All of them must be seen against the background outlined at the beginning, which is one in which the mitayos, after the very early years, never again formed a very significant part of the labour force working in the mine. It is possible, as suggested, that the jobs they did perform were crucial ones, either down the mine itself, or in subsidiary activities such as supply and transport. The debate over the mita will perhaps always retain some of its ambiguity precisely because the Miners pursued a double strategy: if they could not get actual labour, they would get money instead. The resistance on the part of the Indian caciques was similarly double-edged: they had to resist the temporary exactions in the form of the mita, partly in order to resist permanent loss of their subjects, either through emigration to wage-labour in the mine, or through migration to another province as 'outsiders'.

The idea that free wage-labourers were just 'substitutes' for forced labourers who did not wish to serve their period of service probably arose in the early years before a rigid division

of labour had become established. It is, after all, remarkable that only ten years after Toledo had organised the mercury amalgam process at Potosí, production at Huancavelica should have reached 13,600 cwt. in 1582, a peak that was never again equalled (Vilar 1976:135). The boom continued until the Viceroy Cañete halved the number of mitayos to 1,500, in 1595, mainly because of over-production and stockpiling of mercury, owing to a more economical method of amalgamation introduced at Potosí (ibid:135). Further restrictions were introduced in Viceroy Velasco's asiento of 1598, and production was then drastically cut back in 1604 (Lohmann 1949:162,176,178). It was during these early years that the wage labour force was formed, in part through a process where a mitayo stayed on as a free-labourer, being paid by the man who should have replaced him to be his substitute.

After this early period, when job demarcations must have been laid down and wage differentials established (judging by the government orders to rotate jobs), there is no reason to suppose that the wage labour force at Huancavelica expanded any further.⁶³ Production never again reached the heights it had done in the period 1575-1595. The number of subscribers allowed into the asiento, which had reached a high of 57 in 1590, including 11 Indian entrepreneurs, was cut right back to 13 in 1598 and did not usually include more than 26 after that (see Table 5.1). It is legitimate to speculate that the highly paid, skilled labourers would have formed barriers to entry to their trades, making it difficult for a temporary mitayo to compete for such jobs. Nevertheless, the tight control of population in the provinces kept by the caciques and the corregidores must have removed potential competition for the jobs, and helped keep the wages so high, and the Miners may well have wished for more migration into Huancavelica in the hope that wages would be brought down. However, in order to break the strength of the skilled workers at Huancavelica, the Miners would logically have had to break the articulation of modes of production on which the whole system rested. This they could not do, since the articulation was upheld by the state and the Miners were themselves dependent on the state for the provision and payment of

labour. In a sense, the state legitimation of the colonial articulation of modes of production insulated the working class at Huancavelica from a further development of competitive market forces.

But the mine at Huancavelica was 'insulated' from the market in more obvious senses than this. In order to put this discussion of the working class there in context, we must look at the position of Huancavelica in the overall state control of circulation in the colony, and at how the Miners related to this.

3. The State Control of Circulation at Huancavelica

The asientos signed between the government and the lessees of the mercury mine were essentially a very detailed form of state planning. Not only did they stipulate the quantity to be produced, the number of workers to be employed, wage-rates, the coefficient of productivity per worker, and an official buying price of the final product; they also, as we have seen, laid down a series of regulations governing the exploitation of labour and safety conditions at the mine - such as the ban on night-work, or the regulation of distance between furnaces. The production plans of the asientos at Huancavelica are summarised in Table 5.1.


After the initial impulse provided by state takeover of the mines and the provision of the mita, and apart from the few years around the turn of the 17th century when production was deliberately curtailed, the state plans in fact did little more than limit the number of entrepreneurs to be allowed to sell mercury to the Royal Chest, and follow existing levels of production and productivity at Huancavelica. The whole system had been predicated on the idea of the state supplying and paying the labour force, through the mita. The state undertook to provide each subscriber, or asentista, with a certain number of mitayos throughout the year, and the asentista agreed in return to produce a certain fixed amount of mercury and sell it to the state at the Royal Chest. Any amount produced in excess of the fixed quota could, of course, be smuggled, but the miner had at

least to sell the quota to the state and pay the tax of one fifth on it. The control of the labour supply was so crucial in the projected state control of the mercury mine, that Lohmann Villena goes so far as to say that actual nationalisation was unnecessary. The struggle to nationalise the mines in the 1560s and 70s was a long and bitter one which resulted in an "ambiguous regime", in which sales, transferences, and sub-lettings of property all took place without state approval; asientos were signed communally by the Miners' Guild, but each miner signed an agreement not to pass the limits of his own property (Lohmann 1949:81-83). The overall reorganisation of 1570-72, which included nationalisation, but also the application of mercury at Potosí, the introduction of underground mining at Huancavelica and the use of ichu as fuel there, allowed the state to fix the price of mercury at 42 pesos ensayados⁶⁴ in the first asiento of 1573, whereas it had been 180 pesos previously. As Lohmann says, the state supply of labour was probably a more crucial factor than actual nationalisation in this lowering of costs.

That the mita was the lynch-pin of the state control of the circulation process of mercury is well demonstrated by the fact that in the 1581 asiento the owners of the four richest mines offered to pay the government 40,000 pesos a year for the privilege of exploiting them, without wanting a single mitayo assigned to them (ibid:107). This was apparently carried out (ibid:107, n.14). Again in 1598, when the number of asentistas was cut from 57 to 13, it was said that those excluded from the asiento possessed mines which were both more in number and richer than those owned by the actual subscribers (ibid:163, and n.13). In fact these mines, which had been owned by Amador de Cabrera, the original 'discoverer' of the mercury mines in 1564, were not successfully nationalised until the time of the Duque de la Palata (ibid:415). This was over a hundred years after Toledo had ordered the Corregidor of Huamanga to evict Cabrera from his mines, and the poor man had replied that "his very beard would tremble at the thought of what he had been ordered to do" (ibid:40). In the early boom years, then, when large numbers of mitayos were being delivered to Huancavelica, the owners of the richest mines stayed out of the state agreements because of the

control this implied, preferring instead to operate with wage-labour, and to pay a large rent to the state.

The state's control of the mita had at best been indirect. Once the delivery of the mita ceased to be of any real practical significance, state control became vested in the cash-supply, which quickly grew into an effective source of credit for the miners. For the times when the state did supply cash and credit promptly to the miners, we could describe an ideal circuit of state-money looking like this:



If the system worked properly, the state reaped enormous profits in the form of silver taxes. It also received monetary flows in the form of mercury taxation, the Indian tribute, and a profit on the sale of mercury in Potosí and other places.

However, there were two underlying reasons why the state provision of mercury to Huancavelica tended to be erratic, at any rate until the 18th century. These were apart from temporary interruptions, such as wars, piracy or earthquakes, which were often blamed for the shortcomings. Firstly, the silver-miners appear to have rarely actually paid for the mercury they received from the state monopoly, and since the mercury miners were supposed to be paid out of the receipts from the sale of mercury in Potosí, this meant that the cash was often not forthcoming, or delayed. This problem of the debts incurred by the silver-miners for state mercury was already acute by the end of the 16th century, when they amounted to 1,300,000 pesos ensayados. In 1614, by dint of imprisonments and executions, they were reduced to 513,771 pesos, but in 1629 they once again reached 1,821,459 pesos (Escalona y Agüero 1775:148-149). The latter figure represents over three years' consumption of mercury at Potosí.

Something can be learnt about mercury credit from an episode when the Crown tried to cancel mercury credits to the silver miners two hundred years later, in 1805. In trying to get it restored, the Viceroy Abascal argued that while the miners had incurred debts of $\frac{1}{2}$ million pesos over 15 years, during the same period the state collection of silver taxes amounted to 12 million pesos. The Miners' Tribunal argued that even if mercury were given out free, the state would still make money on silver taxes (Fisher 1977). It is also significant that in 1811, when the Court of Cadiz ruled that trade in mercury should be free, the Miners complained that free trade would bring profiteering and higher prices (*ibid.*). In fact, it is unlikely that any merchant would have been able to offer such easy credit for mercury as was the Crown. And the state's mercury pricing policy was probably the biggest factor militating against smuggling during the whole period. For the black market prices offered by merchants at Huancavelica were always considerably under the official price, while mercury on sale at Potosí on the black market seems to have cost more than that bought from the state deposit.⁶⁵ The Crown was even prepared to run a loss

in the buying, transport and resale of mercury,⁶⁶ in order to prevent evasion of the silver tax.⁶⁷

Lower prices and easier credit therefore encouraged silver miners to take their money from the state deposit, and pay silver tax, but not repay the cost of the mercury.⁶⁸ Clearly, unless the state officials wanted to open the flood-gates to smuggling, they could not refuse to give mercury on credit to a silver miner. If they tried to control mercury credit, they would force the silver miners on to the black market.

The second basic factor preventing the fulfilment of the ideal circuit of state-money described above was that the "precious metals tended to drain away from the Americas, above all because their value was quite simply higher elsewhere" (Villar 1976:137). It must be remembered that both the units of value that were used in colonial Peru were essentially commodity moneys. The peso ensayado was simply a unit of assayed weight of bullion; the peso de a ocho, cut at 8.75 pesos to the mark (70 reals)⁶⁹ should have weighed 25.94 grams, and in fact weighed 23.36 grams (ibid:138), near enough to count as a commodity money. Goods flocked from Europe to the centres of silver production, where they fetched astronomical prices; while silver flowed away to Europe, through Spain and beyond to France, the Netherlands and England,⁷⁰ where it could buy much more than in Potosí or Huancavelica. It was this basic rationale that lay behind the chronic shortage of silver in the greatest silver producer of the world.

The tendency should not be exaggerated. Recent writers have argued that more silver stayed in the Americas than had previously been thought.⁷¹ However, the evidence from Huancavelica does suggest that it was in fact difficult to make money circulate in the direction of a 'backward linkage' such as mercury. In part this was because money was a commodity, silver, which tended to circulate to where it was worth more in terms of other goods. But as a commodity it was also unique in that its transport did not, as such, increase its value. A lightweight, token money would not have encountered this problem in the same way; but as

silver was a bulky and heavy commodity, whose transport required trains of llamas or mules, it made economic nonsense to carry it long distances into the interior, away from the centres of money production. Because of the delays in receiving money back in Huancavelica from mercury sold in Potosí, remittances were drawn on Lima from the 1590s on. But even then it was just as difficult to make sure that actual cash arrived in Huancavelica, since by buying goods with the cash, handsome profits could be made.

We have already mentioned the scandal involving the official who used the state cash remittance to buy cloth in Lima before undertaking the long journey to Huancavelica (Lohmann 1949:361-4). Cloth would increase considerably in value on being transported from Lima to Huancavelica, whereas the value of money is held constant by state fiat. The practice was presumably widespread, and a source of supply for the merchants of Huancavelica. The scandal seems to have been as much because the official in question had embezzled a lot of money and issued false receipts, as because of the actual conversion of money into cloth.

As long as the mitayos were paid in kind, their consumption could be restricted to a range of wage-goods defined as 'Indian': chicha rather than wine, maize rather than wheat, llama-meat rather than beef or mutton, aguardiente made from sugar rather than from grapes, local cloth rather than European, and, of course, coca-leaf. While food and alcohol could be 'discounted' during the period of service, the final balance could be paid in cloth, whether to the mitayos themselves or to their caciques. We have seen that the corregidores were paying the commutation fee in cloth in the early 18th century, and that the Governor of the mine asked for the 'extinction' of the small workshops that were producing cloth without a government licence to do so. As long as the mitayos were kept within this circuit of consumption of Indian wage-goods, work in the mine would have no particular attraction over work at home in a cloth workshop, or spinning, or minding herds for the cacique. In this way the caciques, with the help of the corregidores, who provided credit


and traded in the wage-goods (as well as luxury foreign goods for the caciques), were able to reassert control over their population in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The really dangerous attraction was provided by free wage-labour, which, by giving access to money, also gave access to a different range of 'Spanish' consumption goods. During the years of growth of the free wage labour force at Huancavelica, this caused the kind of social turmoil described by Guaman Poma. But when over-production caused the government clampdown at the turn of the 17th century, the skilled working-class consolidated itself and the caciques regained their traditional control over the provincial population. In this way, monetisation, a process which could give access to foreign cloth and to import-substitutes, such as wheat, wine and oil, was contained and limited, while still remaining an important factor in social differentiation.

One consequence of the payment of mitayos in kind was that the mita did not work as intended by the state, as the means whereby the Indians could earn the money for their tribute. More generally, there developed a situation where traders in the town could insert themselves between the state and the miners as an alternative source of credit. As in the situation of the encomiendas prior to 1570, it was control of the supply of wage-goods on the market that gave access to a labour force. The state attempted to wrest this control from the encomenderos, who had formerly received the wage-goods in tribute and been able to market them or employ them directly themselves in a 'feudal' way. While the state was relatively successful in breaking the control of the encomenderos, it did not itself take direct control of the wage-goods, but only of the supply of money, as a 'general equivalent' for the wage-goods. In the situation where money tended to flow out of the country to buy use-values for upper class consumption, it was difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the use of money for wage payments. This meant that the merchants who supplied the wage-goods and industrial supplies, such as tools made of imported iron, were in a strong position to gain control of the mining process in any situation where the

state failed to provide the miners with as much credit as they needed.

This, potentially, represented the most dangerous development for the state control of circulation which led to the silver tax, since the merchants could demand the miner's mercury product in return for financing him for the season, - providing the necessary tools and wage-goods on credit (Lohmann 1949:383). We can therefore describe an ideal circuit from the point of view of the merchant, showing how their own need to sell goods on credit would cause them to usurp the position of the state at the centre of the circuit:



It should be emphasised that this is only an ideal circuit, and that in reality the circuit was somewhere between the one drawn

here and the ideal state circuit drawn above. The fact that mercury was officially a state monopoly (with a death-penalty for smuggling) probably meant that it was difficult to smuggle without at least the protection of the high state officials. But in any case, the fact that the state was prepared to sell mercury in the silver-mines at cost price or below, with easy credit, meant that the merchants had always to offer lower prices than the state for buying mercury at Huancavelica, often in order to then resell it to the state at the official price. That smuggling did go on, nevertheless, is not in dispute. The fact that there was a Quechua word in use, guasacho ('the hidden bit') for mercury ore smuggled by the underground workers themselves, must mean that the ore was in fairly general use as a means of exchange. But for the reasons given, this mercury probably eventually found its way to the state deposit in Huancavelica.

In the ideal circuit of the merchants, the state lost out in a number of ways: it lost the tax on mercury production, the silver tax, any profit made on the re-sale of mercury; it also lost the Indian tribute, since the mitayos did not earn money, and the free labourers, as 'outsiders' did not have to pay it. Hence, it really was essential for the state control of circulation that mercury smuggling be prevented, and it is for this reason that such a high degree of insulation was provided for the mercury miners from any market forces, throughout the period.⁷² In this way the state was able to ensure the fundamental exchange relationship of its colonial economy - that of the mercury supply for the silver tax.

4. Plan Versus Market

One obvious precondition of running a state monopoly in so sensitive a commodity as mercury was that no private person should be in a position to gain control of the mercury supply. To this end, association or company formation among the Miners at Huancavelica was strictly forbidden, and only ever relaxed in the case of very small concession-holders.⁷³ In the turbulent period at the end of the 18th century, the powerful Miners' Guild

was eventually abolished, and an ex-miner contracted in 1779 to provide the annual mercury supply of 6,000 cwt. to the government at a price only 62% of the old one (Whitaker 1941:60). But he died a year later 'devoured with grief', and there followed ten years of direct government administration. However, neither this nor the period of free enterprise that followed after 1790 was capable of ensuring the long-term reproduction of the mining system at Huancavelica.⁷⁴ During government operation, the worst collapse in the history of the mine occurred in 1786, as a result of the mining of the props. And while the free enterprise period was initially successful, attracting many small Indian producers, the new mine they discovered was soon flooded through carelessness, and the main mine was never repaired after 1786. In short, neither the state nor the market on its own was capable of maintaining the mine and coordinating repair work to the extent that had the Miners' Guild, in its constant conflict with the state over the responsibility for these things.

As production plans, the asientos of Huancavelica may have had little influence on reality. The mitayos were never provided in the quantities promised, and after the early years, the mine hardly ever supplied enough mercury to meet Peruvian requirements.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the state planning did prevent the emergence of a private class that could challenge state control. The Miners were always dependent on the state for money, credit, and all the vital infrastructural work needed to keep the mine going; the merchants, although they sometimes exerted a grip on production, were not really able to compete with the state, which was basically a bigger merchant capitalist than they were. Ultimately, both the Miners and the working class at Huancavelica, skilled and unskilled, were sheltered from the effects of the market by the state.

It is interesting that the merchants, as representatives of the market at Huancavelica, were essentially neutral as between classes and modes of production. They pandered to the unproductive, luxury expenditure of the Spanish ruling class there and advanced credit to the Miners; they also bought and sold Indian

wage-goods for those workers who were under the control of the caciques and corregidores, whether as mitayos or as workers in the provincial cloth-workshops. The market developed only within the very tight overall state control of circulation at Huancavelica. At the same time, it continually prevented the state from getting a grip on the crux of the problem at the mine, which was that of production. Market wages were too high, much of production was lost to the black market, and the role of the state as creditor was continually usurped, as every state official turned trader in order to make money out of the cash supply.

Huancavelica was the focus of three different kinds of circuit, which met and interconnected there: that of mercury, the state monopoly good, which should only have been exchanged against silver-money, stamped and taxed by the state; that of money itself, exchangeable for all goods including foreign ones, and therefore the central focus of control; and thirdly the Indian wage-goods, cloth, coca and alcohol, which having formerly themselves been objects of control now became the means of controlling the access of the subject Indian population to money. In practice, the merchants, who possessed the wage-goods, could exchange them directly for mercury and so obtain silver, whether these merchants were women selling chicha for ore at the mouth of the mine, or whether they were large traders advancing goods on credit to the miners in exchange for their product. Similarly, the Indian workers could use their mercury product directly as a means of exchange, and so obtain the wage-goods without the intervention of silver. The circulation of silver-money was itself a form of social control since silver was ultimately the ticket that could be exchanged for foreign goods. Foremost among these was European cloth, which was the distinguishing feature of the Spanish/Indian social division which was rapidly becoming the most important one in the society. But it was one that had no basis in production, and could therefore give rise to no new mode of production. A mode of production based on the control of circulation was viable only so long as the goods controlled were the necessary goods: when control became centred on the luxury consumption of an elite, circulation no longer played the

same role in securing labour, and the basis for the old mode of production was lost.

TABLE 5.1

The Asientos of the Huancavelica Mercury Mine

No.	DATE	SUB - SCRIBERS	MITAYOS	DAILY WAGE	MERCURY cwt.	MERCURY, cwt. per <u>mitayo</u>	<u>pesos de</u> <u>a ocho</u>	<u>pesos en-</u> <u>sayados</u>
	pre- 1572						180	
	1572				2,500		43	
	1573		900		1,500		42	
1	1574		3,000	1 real 1 tomin + kind	4,000 MIN. (+ royal eighth)		42	
2	1577	16	3,280		4,000 MIN. (+ fifth)		42	
3	1581	37	3,280	1 $\frac{3}{4}$ rr.	9,000 MIN. (inc. fifth)		42	
4	1586		3,000		7,500 MIN.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	37	
5	1590 1595	57	2,274 (cut by 50%)	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ rr.	6,822 MIN.	3	40	
6	1598	13	1,500	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ rr.	4,000 MAX. (inc. fifth)	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	34	

7	1604 (i)	13	1,300	2½ rr.	2,500 (1604-5) 3,500 (1606-9)	2½	40
	1604 (ii)	11	327		634	2	34
	1605		(+800 for tunnel)		5,000	3	
8	1609		2,300	2½ rr.	4,600	2	37.6 ^a
9	1618					3	37.6
10	1623		1,400		4,200	3	35.2
11	1630	26	1,400	3½ rr.	4,200	3	59p. 2rr. 35.2
12	1645	32	620	3½ rr.	6,820	11	49p. 29.6
	1650		770				58p. 35
13	1683		620	3½ rr.	7,730	11	58p. 35
14	1744 ^b						58p.
15	1779 ^c				6,000		45p.

Source: Lohmann Villena 1949; Whitaker 1941.

- a. Figures in pesos ensayados have been expressed with decimal points, to avoid the confusion of conversion into maravedis. These occur because the price in the asientos of 1609 on occurs without the royal fifth having been deducted as previously. Thus the price in 1608 was given as 47 pesos ensayados, from which the royal fifth was to be deducted.
- b. This asiento is described as substantially the same as that of 1683 by Whitaker (1941:25).
- c. Asientos 1 to 14 were all negotiated with the Miners' Guild of Huancavelica. No. 15 was with the sole contractor Nicolás de Saravia.

TABLE 5.2

Provision of Mitayos from the Provinces subject to the Huancavelica Mita, 1645-1736

PROVINCE	1645 ^a	1683 ^b	1687-8 ^c	1723-1736 Huancavelica	'Other mitas'
Chinchaicocha	58			9	
Tarma	13½			10	
Tarma (other ten districts)				10	
Xauxa	22		(23) ^d 8½	8½	9½
Hananguancas	24		(41) ^d 18	18	18
Luringuancas	57			10½	10½
Angaraes	25			8 (mita)	
				20 (roza)	
Vilcasgaman	20		42 ^e / ₁₄	42 ^e / ₁₄	42 ^e / ₁₄
Chocorbo	10½		2 ^e / ₄	2 ^e / ₄	2 ^e / ₄
Huanta	58				
Lucanas	47½		19 ^e / ₄	19 ^e / ₄	19 ^e / ₄
Andahuaylas	60		25 ^e / ₃	25 ^e / ₃	
Cotabambas	225		43 ^e / ₄	43 ^e / ₄	43 ^e / ₄
Chumbivilcas			34 ^e / ₄	34 ^e / ₄	36½
Parinacochas			7 ^e / ₄	7 ^e / ₄	(25) ^e

Castrovirreyña	(exonerated)	(28)	25 ^f
Aimaraes	44 ³ / ₄	44 ³ / ₄	48 ⁴ / ₇
TOTAL MITAYOS	620 ¹ / ₂	620	281 ¹ / ₂ (256 ¹ / ₂) ^h
TOTAL POPULATION ^j			
(Tribute-payers);	4,343 ¹ / ₂	(7,210) ^k	9,179 (7,210 + 1,969)

Source: PSM 1736.

- a. Taken from Lohmann (1949:331 n.35).
- b. The Duque de la Palata's asiento of 1683 provided for 620 mitayos, but how these were to be provided is not known. In practice, only 286 mitayos were working in the mine in 1684, and by 1685 only 44.
- c. This column is only a partial reconstruction of the mitayos allocated in the Duque de la Palata's census, carried out in the Huancavelica area in 1687 and 1688. It is based on the numbers that the provinces declared in 1736 as having been owed according to the 1687-8 census, and therefore probably includes lowerings that were obtained after the completion of the census.
- d. Xauxa and Hananguancas figure twice in the 1736 Index. The figures in brackets are those declared in recounts made in 1727 (PSM 1736:38,39), while the second figure in each case was the one declared in 1736 (PSM 1736:51,52,53). In both 1727 and 1736, as in other provinces, these figures were said to have been the ones provided for in the Duque de la Palata's census.

- e. The arithmetic was done differently in this province, so that this figure is my own calculation, based on PSM(1736:15-18). Parinacochas claimed only to send one quarter of its mitayos to Huancavelica, the rest going to other mitas.
- f. These were 25 mitayos owed to the silver-mines of Lucanas, and are probably instead of the 28 to Huancavelica, which the province claimed had been exempted by the Duque de la Palata.
- g. The figure of 309 is obtained if one leaves out all the fractions and also the 28 from Castrovirreyna, who had been exempted. This is significant since the PSM contains a memorial from the Miners to the Duque de la Palata in 1682, asking for the restoration of 311 mitayos which were not being delivered out of the total of 620 assigned in 1645 by the Marqués de Mancera. Therefore, the number of mitayos actually owed in 1682 must have been 309, according to the recounts. The 1683 asiento restored the number to 620 on paper, but in practice few mitayos came. There are two possible interpretations of the fact that the number of mitayos owed was still 309 in 1736 when the Index was compiled. Either the Duke's census of 1687-8 had itself merely confirmed the pre-1683 numbers of mitayos, while stating that they could now be provided on a one in twenty-one basis, since the population had grown; or new lowerings were obtained after the 1687-8 census, which lowered the numbers to the status quo ante 1683.
- h. Obtained by leaving out the dubious figure from Parinacochas.
- j. Total population of adult male Indians owing both tribute and mita. Figures obtained by multiplying total mitayos by 7 for 1645, and by 21 for 1687-8. The figures for Huancavelica mitayos for 1723-1736 are again multiplied by 21, while those for the 'other mitas' are multiplied by 7, as in PSM 1736.
- k. If one takes 343½ as the total number of mitayos declared in 1736 as having been owed under the 1687-8 census, then multiplication by 21 gives a figure for the adult male tribute and mita-paying population of 1687-8.

TABLE 5.3

Wage rates of Free and Forced Labourers at Huancavelica, 1574-1736

DATE	WAGE OF MITAYO per day per two months	WAGE OF FREE LABOURER per day per two months	COMMUTATION FEE	OTHER WAGE RATES
1574	1 real, a 10 pesos (?) 1 tomin ^a + kind ^b			$\frac{1}{2}$ tomin
1581	$1\frac{3}{4}$ rr.	8 p. 6rr.		
1590	$1\frac{3}{4}$ rr. (?) 10p. (?) + 1 r. per week for subsistence + travel-money			
1609	1 r. per day advance allowed for subsistence			
1613	$2\frac{1}{2}$ rr.	12p. 4rr.	8-9rr.	40-45p. 20-25p.
1630	$3\frac{1}{2}$ rr.	17p. 4rr.	'about double a mitayo'	4rr. (Potosí). 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -3rr. (Spain).
1641		12rr.	60p.	

1650 ^c	5rr.	25p.	
1652			40p.
1662	3½rr.	17p.4rr.	12rr.
1674			'triple a mitayo'
1680			12rr. + 2rr. 'cargapa'
			70p.
			60p.
1693 ^d	3½rr.	17p.4rr.	10rr.
			50p.
1712	3½rr.	17p.4rr.	20rr.
			100p.
1736	4rr.		
			32p.4rr.
			70-80p. ^e

Sources: Lohmann 1949; PSM 1736; BN C 1209.

- a. 1 to[´]min was officially worth 50 maravedis, and was a subdivision of the peso ensayado (450m.). In practice, this would be a measure of some everyday currency, which explains why Lohmann states that this wage was worth "almost two reals" (1949:98) when 1 real and 1 to[´]min should together have been worth 84m., considerably more than 2 reals (68m.).
- b. 2½ lbs. of meat every fortnight, and 1½ celemines of maize every month. in 1604, the 2½ lbs. of meat per fortnight is again mentioned, and was worth 2 reals, i.e. the equivalent of the 1 real a week allowed for food in the 1590 contract.

- c. In the time of the Conde de Salvatierra Lohmann states that wages of mitayos were 25 pesos per two month period (Lohmann 1949:354). It is not clear how this fits with all his other data, which give the wages of mitayos as $3\frac{1}{2}$ reals post-1630. One possibility is that a bonus of " $1\frac{1}{2}$ reals at the end of each two month mita period" listed in the 1590 asiento (Lohmann 1949:145) was in fact a daily bonus.
- d. These are the official rates from when commutation was allowed for the first time by the government, and do not indicate real falls in wages.
- e. This was the rate said to be being charged for commutation by the corregidores (BN C 1209). See text.

NOTES.

1. Whitaker quotes the sayings of various Viceroy's and travellers on the importance of Huancavelica (1941: 3-4, 10, 24, 65, 79, 103-104). See also Lohmann Villena (1949:361). In 1723, it was decided "that the post of governor-superintendent of Huancavelica should henceforth be filled only by the oidores of Lima in rotation" (Whitaker 1941:22). But in fact, many of the 17th century Governors had themselves been either oidores (civil judges) or alcaldes de crimen (criminal judges) of the Royal Tribunal in Lima (Lohmann 1949: 294, 355, 359), the highest posts in the colonial administration (Haring 1947:130).
2. Some exceptions are to be found in Lang (1968), Brading and Cross (1972), and Fisher (1977), but all of them consider Huancavelica only in the context of the production of silver.
3. Whitaker (1941) and Lohmann Villena (1949).
4. The cold amalgamation process using mercury was first introduced at Potosí in 1572. There is evidence that smelting continued to be used on a small scale for extraction of some of the richest ores in the 17th century (Whitaker 1949:106). Brading and Cross state that there was a "straight-forward ratio between mercury and silver production of 100 to 125 marks per cwt." (1972:556). The Gazophilacium Regium Perubicum, of 1645, states that the same amount of mercury is needed as silver obtained, or at times slightly more (Escalona y Agüero 1775:105), i.e. less mercury than in Brading and Cross's ratio. Lohmann Villena uses a ratio of 100 cwt. of mercury to 81 cwt. of silver, again rather less mercury than in Brading and Cross.
5. The other mercury mines were at Almadén in Spain, and at Idria in Hapsburg Austria, today part of Yugoslavia.
6. Vilar, for instance, writes of "the 'black legend' spread in the 17th century by the enemies of Spain, especially the Dutch, who were carrying out acts of colonial violence at the same time with far less scruple than the Spanish" (1976:126).
7. The word 'miner' has been used throughout in the colonial sense of a mining entrepreneur. It has sometimes been given a capital letter, as in 'Miner', either because this was the way it was written in a colonial document, or because the reference is to the Miners' Guild of Huancavelica or its members.

8. Bakewell has discounted the possibility of significant mercury smuggling, arguing that there is "not much comment on illegal entry of mercury to Potosí from treasury officials of Potosí or the Audiencia de Charcas" (1975:83). However Lohmann (1949) devotes much space to the question of smuggling between Huancavelica and Potosí, and Whitaker quotes the good authority of a Potosí silver-miner, Miguel Antonio de Escurrechea, who in 1750 wrote that mercury smuggling was still rife, because of the way mercury sales were used to compute the amount of silver tax owed on production (Whitaker 1941:27-28).
9. A mint was set up in Lima in 1568, but the main centre of operations was transferred to Potosí in 1572, coinciding with Toledo's introduction of the mercury amalgam there (Haring 1947:309).
10. See Banaji (1977) for an exposition of this argument in relation to European feudalism.
11. Sánchez-Albornoz analyses some of the conflicts arising from these functions of the caciques (1978:99-107). See also Cornblit (1970:30).
12. See Whitaker (1941:Chapter VI) for a discussion of this episode.
13. The report was that of José Cornejo é Ibarra, who had been superintendent of the mercury mine at Almadén for five years. It was written in 1734 (Whitaker 1941:23).
14. Lohmann (1949:210,212).
15. Brading and Cross (1972:560); Spalding (n.d:18-19).
16. At Pachuca, in Mexico, Brading and Cross tell us that "a weekly repartimiento of 1,108 Indians drafted from the surrounding villages in 1576-9 dwindled to a mere 57 by 1661." (1972:557).
17. See Whitaker (1941: Chapter III).
18. Lohmann Villena inclines to this view (1949:174).
19. The Viceroy Montesclaros handed this hospital over to one of the religious orders in the town, but it is interesting that before 1609 it had been a 'royal' hospital' receiving a grant of 4,000 ducats a year, possessing 120 beds, a chaplain, and a doctor with an annual salary of 500 pesos (Lohmann 1949:21).

20. See below, Section 2.d.
21. This must be one of the reasons why so little research has been done on colonial Huancavelica.
22. On the mines of Huancavelica, the Gazophilacium tells us: "Repartes Indios para su labor...La paga de estos jornales la hace su Magestad de su hacienda, remitiendo de la Caxa de Lima a la de Guancavelica en todas las mitas mayores y menores la cantidad necesaria" (Escalona y Agüero 1775:106).
23. 'Pieces of eight', equivalent to eight silver reals, or 272 maravedís.
24. This aspect of the mita as monetary subsidy has received some attention in the literature, for instance in Whitaker (1941:28-29,98-99,109), Haring (1947:71 n.69), Brading and Cross (1972:560), Sánchez-Albornoz (1978:70-72,102), Spalding (n.d:18-19). Sánchez-Albornoz has a useful footnote on terminology: it appears that indio de plata ('money-Indian') was used when a hired labourer was taken on in place of the mitayo who had paid the commutation fee; indio de faltriguera ('pocket-Indian') was used when the miner 'pocketed' the commutation money and did not use it to hire a wage-labourer instead (1978:71-72 n.5). The note also confirms that the Quechua word minga, which became hispanicized as mingado, simply has the meaning of 'hired labourer'. There has been a tendency to translate it as 'substitute', which was not its original meaning, but simply one acquired during the early years of operation of the mining mita. However, it has been used by those reluctant to admit that the coca, salt, alcohol and food paid to labourers from Inca times to the present day constitute a 'wage'. Thus, the present-day usage of minga has been interpreted as meaning a festive, communal, work party, making the connection with the colonial usage very obscure. In fact, the connection is clearly that they are both forms of labour rewarded with a wage, as opposed, for instance, to being repaid with similar labour at a later date (See Bradby 1982b).
25. The Procurador de Indios was an office dating from the early 17th century. The occupant was a special solicitor, responsible jointly with the Procurador Fiscal to the Audiencia in Lima for the defence of Indian rights. (Haring 1947:61).
26. The corregidor was an office of local government. The appointee was nominated by the King of Spain, for five years if resident in Spain at the time of appointment, and for three if in the colony (Haring 1947:140).

27. It was not until 1630 that the Conde de Chinchón made the Corregidores personally responsible for delivering the mita to Huancavelica (Lohmann Villena 1949:288). On this basis, Celda, the Governor of Huancavelica at the time, suspended the Corregidores of Andahuaylas, Cotabambas and Vilcas, for not having delivered the mitayos (ibid.) Later on, the ambiguity of responsibility for delivery of the mita, as between caciques and corregidores led to disputes. The archive of the Municipality of Huancavelica contains one of these. In 1648, the Procurators of the mine ordered the cacique of Chinchaycocha, Don Cristóbal Ticcsi Runa Atoq, to hand over the mita of his province. He replied that it was the responsibility of the corregidor. The Procurators asked for the corregidor to be compelled to deliver the mita, and for the cacique not to be allowed to leave the town of Huancavelica until the mita arrived (PSM 1648). Some light is thrown on this episode by an earlier one, quoted by Lohmann (1949:266). The Indians of Chinchaycocha had apparently made an offer to the Marqués de Montesclaros (i.e. around 1610) to deliver an extra 400 mitayos to the mine, if he would relieve them of work in a cloth-factory, to which they had to give 300 workers at the time.
28. Sánchez-Albornoz quotes documentary evidence for the area subject to the Potosí mita, showing how the caciques would appoint certain colquehaques, or rich Indians, each of whom would be charged 160 pesos a year, to cover mita commutation for the community concerned. The payment would be made either in cattle or in money (1978:102). See also Rivera (1978:8-9).
29. The reference to gunpowder is particularly interesting here, since there are the beginnings of a debate about when blasting was introduced at Huancavelica. Lohmann (1949:292) shows that blasting was experimented with there in 1631, in order to try and advance the excavation of the ventilation tunnel, which was proceeding very slowly. It was calculated that blasting would allow them to progress 300 metres in a year, as opposed to 10 metres with picks and crowbars. But soon afterwards the method of blasting was abandoned, since it was endangering the galleries in the rest of the mine (ibid.). Whitaker (1941:110 n. 59) states that blasting was introduced in 1635, and that it was strictly banned in 1736 when Sola took up the post of Governor of Huancavelica. Both authorities agree that it was not adopted in Spanish mines until the early 18th century. The reference in the present quotation to the corregidor delivering gunpowder to the miners may well indicate that it was being used for blasting, despite the official ban.

29. It is also possible, of course, that the gunpowder was only for use with the guns (escopetas) also on offer from the corregidores.
30. See below, section 2.d.
31. In the last quarter of the 16th century, the outwork system of spinning and weaving under the encomienda largely gave way to a system of factories, known as obrajes. Regulations forbidding the employment of Indians in New Spain in the factories and sugar mills were issued in 1601 and modified in 1609 (Haring 1947:66, and n.55). It was in this same decade that the majority of the obrajes in Quito, then part of Peru, were issued with their first licences (Assadourian 1982:203-4). It was often thought that Spain pursued a very protectionist line towards her own exports to the Americas, preventing import substitution there. Both Haring (1947:260) and Lohmann (1947:Chapter I) reject this view. Assadourian has recently clarified the matter with regard to textile production, showing that European imports to the Americas were mainly of fine cloth, with everyday production being produced locally (1982:192-196). The function of the licences issued to the obrajes, therefore, seems more likely to have been a fiscal one (ibid:196). Competition from unlicensed workshops, known as chorillos, is commonly thought to have been a cause of the decline of the larger obrajes in the later 18th century (Burga y Flores 1974:7). It is, therefore, interesting to find a reference to the nuisance caused by unlicensed cloth workshops from so early in the century, indicating that the conflict between 'formal' and 'informal' sectors was older than had been thought.
32. This is most obviously the case with the census carried out under the Duque de la Palata, between 1683 and 1689. See below, and also the account in Sánchez-Albornoz (1978:74-91).
33. The legajo in question contains some documents, mainly recounts of particular provinces, from the years 1636-1685, apart from the general 'Index of provisions' that forms the bulk of it and which dates mainly from 1736. For reference purposes the documents preceding the general recount of 1736 will be identified by their date, e.g. 'PSM 1643', since the folios are not numbered, but the documents are in chronological order. The 1736 Index, or general recount, will be identified as 'PSM 1736' followed by the number under which the district in question is listed in the Index; e.g. PSM 1736:18 would identify the entry headed Guainacotas, in the province of Parinacochas.

34. See Whitaker (1941:Chapter III).
35. See above, note 32. Although the census took 6 years to complete over all, the area subject to the Huancavelica mita was counted in the years 1687 and 1688.
36. The proportion of the population subject to the mita at any one time had been fixed at one seventh by Toledo. In order to reduce the burden on the Indian population, it was reduced to one ninth in 1623, but had been raised to one seventh again by the Conde del Chinchón in 1630.
37. The following table gives details of forasteros in the 1736 Index:

TABLE 5.5

Forasteros as % of total adult males in provinces
subject to the Huancavelica mita, 1736

Province	Tribute-payers	Forasteros	Forasteros as % of total adult males
Lucanas	779	167	18%
Parinacochas	649	268	29%
Cotabambas	1,452	86	6%
Chumbivilcas	1,125	105	9%
Yauyos	87	5	5%
Aymaraes	1,968	594	23%
Andahuaylas	772	536	44%
Xauxa	3,641	264	7%
Tarma	809	252	24%
Castrovirreyna (1745)	179	99	36%

No figures are available for the province of Angaraes. Those for the province of Vilcasgaman are presented in such a way that forasteros cannot be separated from the total of 'reservados' or those exempted from the mita, "because of privileges, offices of the Republic, and illnesses" (PSM 1736:22). In fact, it is quite clear that the category of forastero does not

always indicate an immigrant, whether landless or otherwise. The 99 forasteros of the 1745 recount of the Guachos of Castrovirreyna are described as Indians who "pay tribute but do not serve mita because of privileges". (PSM 1745). In other words, it was possible to buy oneself into the category of forastero in a mining province such as Castrovirreyna. This casts doubt on Cornblit's thesis that the forasteros were a displaced mass of vagrants who were easily mobilised in the 18th century rebellions (1970).

38. In fact, where the documents give some continuity, it seems that totals are derived fairly closely from early 17th century recounts (See note 39).
39. There is material that could be of use, however, in the modern debate on the colonial population. For instance, the existence of various recounts makes it possible to say that the population of Belille and Chamaca, two districts of Chumbivilcas, grew from 105 adult males (including 8 caciques and cobrades in 1599, to 193 in 1652. In 1724 the adult male population of the same two districts had increased to 237. This was without any significant influx of forasteros, of whom there were only 6 in 1724 (PSM 1652; 1736:2,3). It is extremely significant that such an ordinary pair of districts as these should contradict trends that have been asserted confidently on the basis of the unreliable general census of 1754, which is thought by most authorities to represent the low point of a downward swing which started with the Conquest (Cook 1965; Cornblit 1970:23). Sánchez-Albornoz puts his low point at around 1720 (1978:34).

It is also significant that the district of Collanas in Parinacochas owed 23 mitayos in 1649, giving a total population of 161 adult males. In 1723, the population was counted as 160, possibly indicating that the 1649 total had just been re-used, but certainly not indicating any fall in population over the period, especially as 63 forasteros were resident in the district in 1723, in addition to the 160. (PSM 1669; 1736:17).

40. Assadourian has written of the importance of what he calls the 'agrarian mita' which was imposed on the Indian population after 1570 (1979:287). This would seem to be a similar concept to that of the 'ordinary mitas' found in the documents under consideration here, but it will become evident that much more was involved than compulsory agricultural labour.
41. The meaning of the Quechua word callana in the present context must be something like 'guarding'.

- However, it is not clear what it comes from. Kallana, in the Ayacucho dialect, usually means a broken fragment of pottery, such as is used for toasting grains. Possibly 'callana' is from the root jallay, which can have the meaning of to prosper, so that jallana would mean prosperity (Chouvenc and Perroud 1970).
42. It is possible that these exemptions have to do with the collaborative role played by the Indians of this region in the conquest of the Incas by the Spanish (Espinoza Soriano 1971).
 43. See Sánchez-Albornoz for a general assessment of this census and the subsequent lowerings under the Conde de la Monclova (1978:74-91).
 44. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the caciques deliberately confused the Spanish about the villages and ayllus existing in the area. For instance, the list reproduced here seems first to have been drawn up for the ayllumitmas chancas, which theoretically formed 'half' of each village. Here the list is assumed to apply to the whole province, i.e. including the angaras who formed the other 'half'.
 45. This must cast doubt on the common assumption, based no doubt on arguments used by the caciques at the time, that the lowerings obtained under the Conde de la Monclova were needed as a result of loss of population in the earthquake of 1687.
 46. Whitaker (1941:Chapter IV). See also Whitaker (1935).
 47. The parallel with the practice of observing 'Saint Monday' as a day off work in the Industrial Revolution in Britain is very striking. There, as in Peru, it was particularly a practice among well-paid and skilled workers, and was commonly associated with alcoholism (Reid 1976:76-93). It is possible that the situation had only been aggravated by Ulloa's attempt at prohibition. There are clear indications, too, that the Miners were trying to lengthen the working week from the 5 days implied in the 17th century, when the mitayos only officially worked 40 days in two months, and less when saints' days and holidays occurred.
 48. This property is described by Ulloa as "house, farm or mill", giving an indication of the status of the tax-collectors imprisoned (BN C 2236).
 49. Juan y Ulloa (1748). An English translation A Voyage to South America was published in many editions.
 50. The mention of fifty working days in the two-month

- period would seem to indicate an attempt to lengthen the period of work from the previous forty days (See above, note 47).
51. The translation is my own. The positioning of guarmi (= woman) in the compound word makes it an adjective qualifying chakra. In contemporary usage, chakra means 'field' or 'farm', but it can have the meaning of a source of subsistence supplies, as in the expression 'chakra plazayoqmi kani' meaning 'I live by buying everything in the marketplace' (Chouvenc and Perroud 1970). The compound warmichakra (or guarmichakra in the hispanicised spelling used in colonial documents) should not, therefore, be confused with a compound such as chakraruna. Whereas the latter means 'man of the fields' or peasant, the former must mean 'supply from the woman', that is, a female market-seller.
 52. See above, section 1.
 53. See Chapter III.
 54. While the information available is fragmentary, it does suggest that Peru did not experience the period of falling prices which began in France and Spain around 1630 (Vilar 1976:194-202). The continual rise of free wages at Huancavelica is one indication of the inflation. Lohmann also gives data that show that the price of cloth had doubled between 1570 and 1684, and that in the same period the price of maize had tripled (1949:405 n. 18).
 55. A witness from the province of Carangas, in the Enquiry of 1690 published by Sánchez-Albornoz, stated that the corregidor and other Spaniards used to take 100 Indians each year for transporting goods, often with their own animals, "and they give them Peruvian cloth and other materials, accounted at 2 reals a day, which is what they pay them for their work" (1978:128).
 56. Spalding (n.d: 24-25).
 57. Assadourian does, however, present excellent data on the mushrooming of the market in cloth at Potosí, which went parallel with the silver boom (1979:229-235). In the years prior to 1570, when the Indians worked at Potosí in the capacity of small independent producers, the relationship where cloth and coca etc. were exchanged for labour was particularly clear, since the Spaniards had to 'buy' silver from the Indian producers with goods. After the massive introduction of forced labour by Toledo, the relationship was formally obscured by the intervention of the wage and by the division of labour in the work-force. It remains to be discovered whether this

wage was really paid in money, or whether it went on being paid in kind, as at Huancavelica.

58. See Assadourian (1979:28)
59. Ichu was discovered as a fuel for the mercury furnaces because it was in local use for making salt (Lohmann 1949:42).
60. In 1975-1976, when I read these documents, the then military government in Peru had distributed all the title deeds of the Peasant Communities to the regional offices of SINAMOS, which was dealing with their development. In former years these titles were referred to as part of the Padrón de Comunidades Indígenas which was kept in the Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas in Lima.
61. Whitaker (1941:92, 123 n.50).
62. The first mention of any highland Indians in the recounts of the region of Angaraes is in that of Antonio de Ulloa, carried out for purposes of tribute assessment in 1760, where 34 "Indians of the puna" are listed (BN C 2236).
63. Whitaker quotes figures for the population of the town of Huancavelica towards the end of the 18th century. Total population was only 5,146, of whom 560 were Spaniards and creoles, 731 were mestizos and 3,803 were Indian (1941:12).
64. The peso ensayado was a unit of gold or silver assayed bullion, used mainly for accounting purposes and normally valued at 450 maravedis. In fact, payments were made in pesos corrientes ('ordinary pesos') which were worth about 300 maravedis. Towards the end of the 16th century, the peso corriente became standardised at 272 maravedis, representing 8 reals of 34 maravedis each, and became known as the peso de a ocho, or 'piece of eight'. However, the Crown made payments at Huancavelica until at least 1630, by converting the pesos ensayados owed into ordinary currency at the rate of 140 pesos de a nueve ('pieces of nine') to 100 pesos ensayados (Lohmann 1949:285). The 'piece of nine' was an accounting unit worth 9 reals, or 306 maravedis. Thus in 1630 one cwt. of mercury was valued at 44 pesos ensayados, which was converted into 61.6 pesos de a nueve, or 554 reals and paid in actual money with 69 pesos de a ocho and 2 reals. The miners earned a premium of 12.5% on their payments, which was presumably intended to compensate for the low conversion rate of 140:100.

65. Whitaker states that the aviadores bought mercury at 43 pesos a cwt. and sold it to the government at 58 pesos "at one time" (1941:16). In 1786, the aviadores were said to be offering 30 pesos the cwt. (Lohmann 1949:383). It is not clear whether these prices allow for the 20% royal production tax or not. Lohmann states that around 1580 mercury was being sold in Potosí at 110 or 120 pesos a cwt. on the black market, at a time when the official sale price was 85 pesos (ibid:108).
66. In the period of government operation (1780-1793) a total loss of 1,120,976 pesos was sustained, since the government sold mercury to the silver miners at 75 pesos the cwt., which was 38 pesos below the cost of production, which worked out at 111 pesos (Whitaker 1941:72). However, this phenomenon was not merely one of the late 18th century. In 1628, a year when only 1,600 cwt. of mercury was produced, costs of production and transport worked out at 71 pesos ensayados, 6 tomines and 8 granos, while the selling price at Potosí was only 70 pesos ensayados.
67. The Crown's leeway for operation had definite limits. The official price of mercury at Potosí fluctuated around 100 pesos de a ocho until the middle of the 18th century. If 1 cwt. of mercury could produce 50 lbs. (100 marks) of silver, which were worth 875 pesos (at 70 reals to the mark), then the tax due from the sale of 1 cwt. of mercury would be 175 pesos. Not only did the mercury sale represent a significant proportion (36%) of the Crown's expected revenue, but also, if no money were recovered from the mercury sale, then the silver tax revenue compensated this loss by a margin of only 27%. For the individual silver miner, smuggling was viable as long as the cost of mercury + interest payments for credit on the black market + additional costs of evading control, did not exceed 175 pesos, the value of tax saved + the cost of repayments due on credit from the state mercury monopoly. Since the price of mercury on the black market at Potosí reached 120 pesos in the late 16th century (see note 65), the temptation to smuggle may not have been as great as has been supposed.
68. Another reason adduced by the silver miners for not paying promptly, or at all, for their mercury supply, was that Huancavelica mercury was twice as expensive as mercury from Almadén in Spain, even with the cost of shipping it to Peru (Whitaker 1941:28, 111, n.67). Even at the end of the 18th century, however, the Crown was insulating the Peruvian mercury producers from this international competition by selling all

other mercury at Huancavelica prices (ibid: 119, n.134). With the upsurge of silver mining in Mexico in the 18th century, the Peruvian silver miners were of course jealous of the Mexican miners' lower mercury costs. Why so few innovations were brought in at Huancavelica in the later 17th and in the 18th centuries, despite some government encouragement, must remain a mystery. There was some substitution of blasting for picks and shovels in Sola's time (1736-1748) (ibid: 25), but the new Idrian furnaces were still not in use when the Nordenflucht mission visited Huancavelica in 1790, and all their efforts could not persuade them to bring them in (ibid: 69). Whitaker blames this on the inadequacy of ichu as a fuel for the new furnaces (ibid: 123, n.150). It is possible that resistance on the part of skilled workers may also have been a factor in preventing technical innovation.

69. A mark of silver was valued at 2,380 maravedis (Bakewell 1975), so that 70 reals were cut from it. Of these, 3 reals were taken to pay the staff at the mint (Haring 1947:308), so that in practice the mark came to be worth 67 reals.
70. It is worth noting that between 1564 and 1613 exports of cloth from England increased from £900,000 to £2,250,000 (Hammond and Hammond 1926:56). This increase of 227% exactly parallels the increase in Spanish imports of precious metals, which increased by 238% between the periods 1561-65 and 1611-15, probably indicating that the 'price revolution' had reached England. The quantity of English cloth exports is also striking: the value of 1613 exports expressed in pesos ensayados would be nearly 8 million pesos, more than the peak annual rates of imports of precious metals into Spain, which reached nearly 7 million pesos in the 1590s.
71. In questioning how much silver stayed in the Americas, Vilar points out that of a probable annual American silver production of 300 tons between 1560 and 1640, only 185 tons a year was imported into Seville (1976: 136). He also points out that production of mercury fell much less than did exports of silver from Peru after 1630, indicating that silver was being produced, but not exported (ibid: 137). Brading and Cross have added that Peru was actually importing mercury between 1630 and 1645, indicating that "Peru consumed more mercury than ever before" and therefore produced more silver (1972:574). They therefore incline to the view that the falling imports of silver to Seville, as well as the falling silver tax returns at Potosí, simply reflect official inefficiency and corruption (ibid). However, Brading and Cross have also overestimated the reliability of mercury imports. In 1630, a remittance from Idria in Hapsburg Austria,

which should have contained 4,000 cwt., arrived five months late with only 543 cwt. on board (Lohmann 1949: 270). A subsequent Viceroy, the Conde de Alba y Liste, wrote that of 69,240 cwt. of mercury embarked in Seville between the years 1623 and 1653, only 30,985 cwt. had arrived in Callao (ibid:264). The losses were usually blamed on leaky containers, but clearly corruption was involved, and a lot of the mercury stayed in Tierra Firme (Panama), and from there presumably reached Mexican mines (ibid:264). The Mexican Viceroys were reluctant to allow any of their mercury supply from Almadén through to Peru: in 1634, 150 cwt. was allowed to be shipped to Peru, but even then 20% was lost in transit (ibid:288-289). However, it is true that production at Huancavelica picked up in the 1630s, owing to the introduction of the new process of refining, and it does seem that this increase was reflected in increased silver production at Potosí, as the following table, based on Bakewell's series, shows:

TABLE 5.6

Average annual production of silver
at Potosí in marks, 1591-1670

Period	Average annual production of silver, in marks	Percentage change over previous decade
1591-1600	797,986	
1601-1610	753,079	- 6
1611-1620	662,213	-12
1621-1630	584,890	-12
1631-1640	599,195	+ 2
1641-1650	517,404	-14
1651-1660	447,514	-13
1661-1670	356,909	-20

Source: Bakewell (1975).

It is, of course, striking that the decade after 1630, when silver imports to Spain decreased by around 40% (Vilar 1976:147), is the one decade of the 17th century when production at Potosí actually increased. The theory that much silver stayed in Peru is the

starting point for Assadourian's work on the internal markets of colonial South America (1979; 1980; 1982).

72. See note 67.

73. In the 1623 asiento miners who only had small concessions of mitayos were for the first time allowed to associate with each other (Lohmann 1949: 267).

74. Whitaker's judgment that "the history of Huancavelica in the eighteenth century seems to illustrate the widespread contemporary trend towards the liberation of land, labor and enterprise" seems unwarranted (1941:90). The pallaqueo free enterprise system was allowed only when the financial losses of government operation could no longer be borne. The claim that government operation itself marked the culmination of eighteenth century trends would be easier to justify.

75. Whitaker (1941:18).

CHAPTER VI

PLANNING THE MARKET: THE 'DISTRIBUTIONS OF GOODS' TO THE INDIANS BY SPANISH OFFICIALS

The repartimiento de efectos, or compulsory Distribution of Goods for sale to the Indian population of the provinces by the Spanish corregidores¹, is one of the better-known aspects of Peruvian colonial history. Several books and articles have dealt with the subject and have documented the opposition that the Distributions undoubtedly provoked, particularly in the second half of the 18th century.² The question raised for debate, however, has usually been the relative weight to be given to this opposition in the analysis of the causes of the rebellions which took place throughout the 18th century, and which culminated in the General Rebellion led by Tupac Amaru in 1780. By contrast, very little argument has attached to the question of why sales of goods to the Indians took this compulsory form. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that the Distributions were 'forced marketing', that the exchange with the Indians was an unequal one, and that a surplus was thereby extracted from the Indian population by the Spanish.³ The Indians had to be forced to buy goods because they were living in a basically subsistence economy, still in possession of their own means of production, and therefore had no need of the goods on offer.⁴ Golte has recently developed the thesis that the

Distributions were the principal way of forcing the Indian population into wage-labour as their only means of paying for the goods (1980:14). The thesis is interesting, but has been controversial mainly for its contention that the Distributions were the cause of the 1780 rebellion, and does not greatly extend the framework within which the Distributions are conceived.

We shall return to the question of the rebellions later, but this chapter will first of all attempt a reinterpretation of the Distributions in line with the analysis developed in previous chapters. It will try to get beyond the simplistic conception of Spanish merchants, backed by monopoly powers given them by the state, exploiting the native Indian population through the market. While this conception has an intuitive plausibility as a description of the late 18th century, it fails to account both for the earlier forms of Distribution of Goods and, critically, for the role of the Indian caciques in the process. Our analysis will see the conflicts that developed as not simply expressive of Indian discontent with the market that was being forced on them, but as a struggle for control over circulation between the Indian caciques and the Spanish corregidores, at a time when developments in the market sphere were threatening to completely erode the control that the caciques had over production in their communities.

1. A Reinterpretation of the Role of the Distributions of Goods

a. Sales of goods on credit from the 16th to the 18th centuries

There has been a curious tendency in the literature to treat the analysis of 18th century Peru as something completely separate from that of the 16th century. This coincides largely with a division between those who see the export, mining sector as the primary motor of the economy, basing their analysis on the structures set up in the 16th century, and those who see the moving force as having been the Distributions of Goods, whose analysis centres on the 18th.⁵ Recently there has been criticism of the 'dualism' inherent in a situation where economic historians study the Spanish sector of the economy while

anthropologists study the evolution of the Indian communities (Spalding n.d:5,32-33). We could outline two attempts to reintegrate these areas of study.

The first is that of Spalding, who argues that the two sectors can be linked by an analysis of the role of the colonial state in enforcing the Distribution of Goods to the Indians by the Spanish corregidores. In order to pay for these goods, the Indians had to market both their own products and their labour-power (ibid:31). Peru in the colonial period was

a society in which the labor force has not been separated from its access to the resources and means of production (ibid:6).

In these circumstances "mechanisms of coercion" are necessary, both to make people buy goods they would otherwise produce themselves, and to make them do wage-labour which otherwise they would have no occasion to do. It was the "political system", therefore, that "created both the market demand and the supply of goods and labour" (ibid:6). However, as well as forcing the Indians away from their communities, the Spanish authorities

did their best to maintain the native Andean community as the basic productive unit of colonial society (ibid:30).

Without Indian labour as a basis, there would be no surplus for the Spanish to extract at all. Because of the self-contained nature of this "native Andean community", together with the recognition that it had to be preserved, the Spanish sector of the economy was incapable of functioning on its own:

there was no internal dynamism fostering continued expansion of economic activity, or growth, and the dynamism of the economy was not generated within the system of production itself, but from outside, through the coercive mechanisms applied by the colonial state (ibid:6).

For Spalding, then, it is the colonial state that bridges the 'dualist' gap between export and subsistence sectors, mainly through the mechanism of the forced Distributions of Goods.

In attempting to avoid the 'dualism' of much development economics,⁶ Spalding has fallen into a classically 'Asiatic' dualism. The self-sufficient village communities are presided over by a state which extracts surplus from them while preserving their stagnant economy. The extraction of surplus is therefore analysed as taking place through the political level. Its effects on the organisation of production are arbitrary and indeterminate. The 'integrated whole' proposed is that of a political superstructure exploiting a closed economic base. This kind of analysis has been well criticised in the attacks on Marx's concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' (see Chapter III, note 20).

A further problem with Spalding's theoretical piece, however, is that, despite its attempt at integration, it still appears to read the whole of colonial history through the events of 1750-1780. Up until 1750, the colonial state cannot be said to have enforced the Distributions of Goods to the Indians; on the contrary, while the state in practice turned a blind eye, the Distributions were formally forbidden until 1752. But even then, the Royal decree legalising the practice "sought to put an end to the excesses in the Distributions" (Golte 1980:84), and the Arancel or Tariff list drawn up in 1754 quite clearly set limits to the amount of goods that could be distributed in each province. The legalisation and the Tariff were the attempt by the state to plan the marketing of goods to the Indians, in order to control and limit it. Spalding's piece, then, is successful neither at bridging the theoretical gap between Spanish and Indian sectors, nor at spanning the whole colonial period from the 16th to the 18th centuries, something which she implicitly claims to do.

A second attempt at integration is that of Assadourian (1979; 1980; 1982). In all his work he argues strongly that the export sector cannot be seen as separate from the growth of the internal market that it generated.⁷ Far from the traditional 'dualist' thesis that the only link between the subsistence sector and the export sector is through the provision of

a labour supply, Assadourian argues that "the circuit of mining capital took place almost entirely within the area of the colonial Andes" (1980:23). Of inputs to mining production, only iron was imported, while an estimated 85-90% of consumption goods sold in the mining centres were produced locally (ibid). Since the value of this internal commodity production was of the order of 50 or 60% of the value of international exports, the mining economy must have reoriented the local production of use-values and brought them into its own circuit of exchange-value (ibid:24-25). So that, far from suggesting the traditional conception of subsistence agriculture surrounding enclaves of exchange-production in the mines, Assadourian argues that the development of the colonial mining economy

produced and reproduced an agrarian structure whose orientation was predominantly towards the production of exchange-values (ibid:35).

In line with this, Assadourian also argues against those who base their analyses of the whole colonial period on events of the 18th century:

the setting up of the colonial economic system must be situated during the time of maximum levels of production reached by colonial mining in the Andes, that is, in the last quarter of the 16th century and the first of the 17th (ibid:29).

For Assadourian, it was this early mining economy that was the significant factor both in the destruction of the remnants of the Inca state economy, and in the emergence of the new market economy that rapidly integrated the regions of the "colonial space" (ibid).

While effectively making the linkages that other writers have failed to, Assadourian has overstated his case. If the colony had really become an integrated market system, with production primarily oriented towards exchange-value in both the mining and agrarian economies, why then were the impositions of the colonial state necessary at all? While it is possible

to agree with Assadourian that a class of wage labourers did develop in the mines from fairly early on, some explanation is necessary of the phenomenon of the Distributions, which were clearly not simple market sales. In correcting the bias of contemporary research away from the final collapse of the colonial system and towards its origins in the mining economy of the 16th century, Assadourian has put the analysis of the Distributions to one side.

It is significant that neither Spalding nor Assadourian has any need for the indigenous ruling class in their analysis. For Spalding, the relationship of surplus extraction is set up between the Spanish state and the communities, with the caciques as mere collaborators in the process, siding with the corregidores in the hopes of personal monetary gain (1974:54-55). In effect, the caciques simply become part of the Spanish ruling class. For Assadourian, the relationship between Spanish and Indian sectors is simply set up through market exchange. Compulsion comes in through the forced labour system, both in the mines and on agricultural estates owned by Spaniards, but neither the market system nor the compulsory labour in benefit of the Spanish really needs an indigenous ruling class in order to explain it.

By contrast with these authors, it will be contended here that there are essential continuities between the economic structures of 16th century mining and of the 18th century Distributions, and that this can be revealed in an analysis of the need on the part of the caciques to keep their traditional control over the circulation of the wage-goods, and thereby limit their subjects' access to the market. The Distributions of Goods in the 18th century were the logical continuation of the sales of goods on credit made by Spaniards to the caciques in Chucuito in the 1560s. We could take them further back still, and link them to the 'compulsory gifts' of the Incas.⁸ The continuity is not simply in the use-values handed out on credit; it is also in their function as wage-goods in the traditional economy. These aspects will be examined in the

next section. The point to emphasise here is that both in the 16th century, when we first hear of sales of coca, wine, and cloth on credit to the Indians in Chucuito, and in the 18th century, when these sales on credit became formally institutionalised, the transactions were always conducted through the caciques. It is the caciques who receive goods from the corregidores, who draw up lists of the people they are to be distributed to, and who are in charge of collecting payment.

We should also note that the goods distributed were essentially the same ones as were on sale in the markets in the mines, which were also the goods in which mining labour was generally paid. We can therefore see the institution of the Distribution of Goods, including its antecedents in the 16th century, as linked not to an attempt to force the Indians away from their subsistence production in the communities but to its opposite: by bringing the market to the people, the people could be more easily prevented from migrating to where the markets were. Golte has wrongly interpreted the growth in mining activity in the second half of the 18th century as caused in part by the growth in quantity of the Distributions of Goods.⁹ On the contrary, our interpretation here would see the causality as operating in the opposite direction. The generally increased volume of economic activity in the second half of the 18th century of course meant that more goods could be sold in the communities. But that sales took the form of the institutionalised Distributions must also be explained by the increased difficulty of keeping the population stable in the communities, as opportunities for migration to wage-labour multiplied and thereby loosened the ties of dependence on the caciques. In this way, the events of the 18th century can be seen as the logical development of structures set up in the 16th, the contradictions in which were already evident at the time of the Visits of the 1560s or in the writings of Guaman Poma.

b. The use-values distributed

In Chucuito in 1567, most of the witnesses interviewed mentioned

what they saw as the great harm being done by sales of goods on credit to the caciques and principals. The goods most frequently mentioned are coca and wine, which have been analysed in Chapter IV as products of the vertical colonies; but there are also references to cloth being sold in this way. The words used for cloth are either paño, the English "flannel" - a coarse woollen cloth without a nap - or ropa, a generic word that can mean either "cloth" or "clothes". Martín Cusi spoke of the Spaniards living in the province as being occupied in

selling them coca on credit and wine and cloth paño and other things of which, usually, they have no need (Diez de San Miguel 1964:36).

Pedro Cutinbo said that

many Spaniards who come to this town entertain its caciques and Indians with flagons of wine and coca and cloth ropa, and these on credit, and they get into debt for it and later they throw them into prison to make them pay it; and it causes great harm and detriment to give cloth on credit to the Indians, especially wine sic since they can well survive without it (ibid:43).

A Spaniard who occupied the post of chief constable in the province makes it apparent that the cloth being sold was foreign cloth. He describes the goods being sold to the Indians as "wine, coca and other things", and later goes on to say that

it would be better if by no means at all goods could be given on credit to the Indians...because these Indians never buy things on credit that are products of this land, but rather those of Spain, of which they have no need (ibid:59).

While other Spanish goods were doubtless on sale, Assadourian's data on imports in the 16th century make it clear that cloth was the major consumer-good being imported to Peru at this time. An account of Potosí in 1567 already puts the value of annual sales of Spanish cloth at 200,000 to 300,000 pesos (Assadourian 1979:231). At that time, silver was still produced by small, independent Indian miners, so that the goods had to be offered

in exchange by the Spanish. if the silver was to pass into their hands. The level of silver production was therefore dependent on the supply of goods, and ultimately of imports, if the silver was to get back to Spain. The account of 1567 therefore condones the sale of foreign cloth to the Indians, on the grounds that the silver tax (the 'royal fifth') will thereby be augmented (ibid:231 n.17).

In fact, the interpretation of the references to sales of cloth on credit in Chucuito as being to foreign cloth is the only one that makes sense, since Chucuito was itself one of the chief producers of woollen cloth in the vice-royalty at the time. It seems likely, then, that the foreign cloth was being worn by the caciques and rich Indians of Chucuito to distinguish them socially from their subjects, while the woollen cloth exported from Chucuito to Potosí was serving as means of payment in the mines. Assadourian has argued recently that the Spanish policy of protecting its cloth exports to Peru against competition from Peruvian manufacturers was directed mainly at fine cloth, and not at rough, ordinary cloth, whose production was actively encouraged in the colony, if only for fiscal reasons (1982:194-196). In fact, our analysis of the role of cloth under the Incas (Chapter III section 4) would imply that once the Inca state was removed there would be little sense in the continued production of cumbi, or fine cloth, in Peru. The function of the elaborate symbolic communication of weaving in distinguishing tribute-payers and controlling their movements was now redundant, since it was replaced by actual writing under the Spanish. Inasmuch as fine cloth had served as a distinguisher of social rank under the Incas, foreign cloth after the invasion could serve this purpose equally well or better, since it would separate out those who wore it from the mass of the population even more clearly than would fine local cloth.

By the end of the 17th century, the items most frequently mentioned in the trade of the corregidores are

untrained mules, local cloth, wine and, occasionally, coca, agricultural tools, and even maize and flour (Sánchez-Albornoz 1978:97).

In some areas, the corregidores were distributing the goods three times a year (ibid); there are also references to their organising transport of these goods to the mining centres (ibid: 98). We have already encountered the annoyance of the Huancavelica Miners' Guild in the early 18th century at the practice the corregidores had of paying the price of the mita commutation of their subjects in the form of local cloth, as well as gunpowder and muskets.

In the highlands of Bolivia, from where the information analysed by Sánchez-Albornoz comes, wine, coca, and maize were all products of different ecological levels, which in former centuries would have had to be obtained from vertical colonies. Mules were also reared in coastal areas or in the grasslands of what is now Argentina. So that in effect the corregidores, in alliance with the caciques, whom Sánchez-Albornoz calls the pieza maestra or 'keystone' of the whole colonial system, were monopolising the products of the old vertical colonies.¹⁰ Cloth was, as formerly, a second-tier product which could be obtained by using the vertical products as means of payment for labour in cloth workshops. That all these products being traded by the corregidores in the 17th century were means of payment for labour at the time is clear from the contemporary accounts of how the corregidores paid the Indians whom they requisitioned as muleteers:

the wages of these carriers are paid in untrained mules, cordellate cloth, baize, and wine, which are given out at exorbitant prices, so that the Indians always work in vain, and their labour is discounted in these goods (ibid:118).¹¹

But this witness also makes clear the role of the caciques in the process, since

even with this form of payment the caciques end up with these mules and cloth, and make the Indians go on journeys in vain (ibid).

Half a century later, the goods that were permitted in the Arancel or Tariff list, issued in 1754, are still basically the same ones, with one rather glaring omission. The Tariff did not include the sale of wine to the Indians. We may conclude from this that the institutionalisation of the Distributions was in part an attempt to clamp down on sales of alcohol to the Indians. We have already seen the complaints about the highland sugar-farms for distilling rum, and the attempt by Antonio de Ulloa to prohibit the sale of aguardiente on Sundays in Huancavelica.¹² The 18th century seems therefore to have seen a general growth of anti-alcohol measures taken by the authorities, and not simply a desire to protect vested interests in the coastal production of wine and brandy.¹³

The totals of the different goods allowed for distribution in the provinces in 1754 can be calculated from Golte's publication of the Tariff list (1980:90-105):

TABLE 6.1

Total Value of Goods to be Distributed According to the Tariff List of 1754

<u>Good</u>	<u>Value in Pesos</u>
Mules	3,699,500
Local cloth	607,300
Quito cloth	594,000
European goods	1,094,600
Coca	140,000
Iron	134,000
<hr/>	
TOTAL	6,143,400

It is clear from Golte's reproduction of a detailed tariff list for the province of Aymaraes that, apart from a few items, such as paper and dyes, the majority of European goods imported were varieties of cloth, such as ruanes, clearly from Rouen, bretañas

from Brittany, or perpetuanes ('long-lasters') from England (ibid:86). Since Quito was by this time outside the Viceroyalty of Peru, the amount of foreign cloth permitted for distribution by the Tariff is very striking.¹⁴ 'European goods' represent 18% of the total value of goods permitted in the Tariff, and 50% of all cloth to be distributed. If we count Quito cloth as foreign, then the category of foreign cloth amounts to around three-quarters of all cloth to be distributed.

Mules were, in a sense, the infrastructure of trade between the highlands and the coast. Llamas could not survive for long in the heat of the coast; neither could they carry as heavy a load as a mule. It seems sensible to assume that the mules were mainly distributed to the caciques and richer Indians, who would be in a position to participate in trade. However, it is also possible that their distribution did make for a greater number of petty traders (Spalding n.d:25).

We may be sceptical about the success of the Tariff list in halting the trade of the corregidores in wine. Although the opposition to the Distributions that developed in the second half of the 18th century does not seem to include complaints about wine, this may be because it was not a trade that was resented, rather than because it suddenly stopped.¹⁵

The importance of locally produced cloth in the Distributions seems to have been exaggerated. Our calculations show foreign cloth to have been more important. In addition, it can be shown that only a small proportion of the cloth being produced in Peru was actually marketed through the Distributions. In an earlier publication, Golte stated that six of the northern provinces paid for their Distributions in cloth, and that the value of this cloth was 1,561,600 pesos.¹⁶ This represents 3 million yards of cloth from these provinces alone, while the amount to be distributed according to the Tariff was only 607,300 yards. The importance of the foreign cloth in the Distributions will become clear when we look at the causes of the rebellions.

What must be emphasised here is the continuity between the 16th and 18th century in terms of the kinds of goods being distributed. Although foreign cloth grew in importance, the goods being distributed could still all be used as wage-goods. Golte has stressed the function of the Distributions in forcing the Indians out of the communities to earn money to pay for the goods distributed on credit. The position proposed here would be that these goods could still function directly as payment for labour, without the intermediary of money. Indeed, the fact that they were continually given out on credit against future labour indicates that credit was the main form of money in use in Peru throughout the colonial period. In the next section we shall examine the forms that payment for the Distributions could take.

c. Forms of payment for the goods distributed

It is difficult to clarify two questions on the basis of the evidence presented in the existing literature on the Distributions. The first is how far the Distributions were paid for in money, and how much in kind; the second is how far payment actually devolved on individuals, or whether it was the responsibility of the caciques and other rich Indians.

On the first point, Spalding asks the question:

Where did the Indians get the specie, or the goods accepted in lieu of specie...that they were forced to hand over to the corregidor in payment for the goods he made them accept? (n.d:24).

Having admitted that payment was often in products, she then goes on to conduct her analysis solely in terms of means by which the Indians could obtain money (ibid:25). Golte makes similar assumptions: while explaining how cattle and agricultural products could be confiscated as payment for Distributions (1980:122-123), his principal hypothesis is that the Indians obtained money for payment by going to do wage-labour in the mines and cloth factories (ibid:121).

The problem with these assumptions is not that there is any doubt that the Indians were doing labour in the mines and cloth factories. The doubt attaches to whether, apart from free labour of a skilled nature in the mines, this labour was being paid in money. Spalding herself suggests that workers on agricultural estates were paid mainly in the products of the estate itself (n.d:25). And in Chapter V we have looked at the evidence suggesting that most labour in the Huancavelica mercury mine was being paid in cloth and other kind.

On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the Distributions were paid for primarily in kind. Golte quotes a passage from the decree which legalised the Distributions, which justifies the practice on the grounds that the credit advanced by the corregidores in the form of mules and of iron tools is necessary in order for the fields and mines to be worked at all; without the advances made in cloth, the Indians would not even be clothed; the corregidores also often make money loans to allow fields to be worked. All this credit is given for six months, a period which no ordinary merchant could afford to wait for payment. Nor could any merchant take on the complex task of collecting payment, for the credits are "for repayment not in money, but rather in the fruits of the land". The decree also states that it is well known that this form of payment alleviates the burden on the Indians (Golte 1980:84-85).

We have already cited the fact that the six northern provinces paid for the Distributions with cloth produced there. Spalding also quotes the fact that in the 1780s a list was made of the most profitable provinces for a prospective corregidor to pick from the point of view of the yield that could be expected from the Distribution. Two of the highest-ranking were Conchucos and Huaylas, both placed high by the compiler of the list on the grounds that they were "major producers of the light woollen cloth and baize that was widely used in the viceroyalty" (Spalding n.d:28). Another work on the economic role of the corregidor mentions that in Ica payment for the Distributions was made in aguardiente, which was valued at 4 pesos the flagon (Moreno Cebrian 1977:217). A reference to Distributions:

in Cuzco in 1636 says that maize and sheep were taken from the Indians to pay for the goods (ibid:216).

It seems, therefore, that we should not be misled by the monetary valuations put on the Distributions into thinking that they were therefore paid for in money. There is more evidence to suggest that they were on the whole paid for in kind. There is a further argument in favour of this interpretation and against Golte's thesis that wage-labour in mining centres was done in order to find money to pay for the Distributions. This is that in Huancavelica, a province where, as Antonio de Ulloa pointed out in 1765, the Indians had ample opportunity to earn money in the mercury mine, the volume of the Distributions was negligible. In fact, from Golte's maps it appears that the most important mining provinces, Potosí, Porco, and Huancavelica, as well as the most important cloth-producing provinces, Huaylas, Conchucos, Cajamarquilla, Huánuco, and Chucuito, were among those with the lowest Distribution of Goods per head of population (Golte 1980: Map 17, page 229). In these provinces, the Distribution of Goods worked out at from 1 to 5 pesos per year, a very negligible amount. There is therefore an inverse correlation between the level of economic activity in mines and obrajes and the level of the Distribution of Goods.

This is explained by the fact that the markets in the mining centres for cloth, alcohol, etc., were well established, and organised by the miners and resident merchants. In these provinces it was more difficult for the corregidores to organise Distributions since the channels for paying labour with these goods were already occupied. Golte's argument that increased mining activity in Potosí and other places was caused by the increase in goods distributed is therefore difficult to sustain.

The second question about the form of payment is whether payment was exacted from individuals, or whether the caciques and rich Indians paid on behalf of the community. The general assumption in analyses such as those of Spalding and Golte is that the goods were distributed to individuals: a list was made,

and at payment time, the employees of the corregidor went round and charged for the goods. Some contemporary descriptions quoted do suggest that this is in fact what happened (Golte 1980:121), but it should also be borne in mind that these accounts were probably exaggerated for effect at a time when the Distributions had become very unpopular, and that they also include details such as that the first thing that was done at payment time was to place all the inhabitants of the village in the prison, from where they were released only when they could pay (ibid).

However, there is also much evidence that the Distributions, in common with other exactions of the colonial state, were paid for from either the produce of communal lands, or from money obtained by renting them to mestizos or townspeople.¹⁷ Rivera has documented how a 17th century cacique left lands to the community in his will so that they should be able to afford such things as tribute payment by renting them out (1978:17). There is also evidence that very little distinction was made by the caciques between funds destined for the payment of tribute and those destined for the payment of the Distributions (Golte 1980:158-160). The corregidores are said to have appropriated tribute payments for themselves, taking them as payment for the Distributions of Goods made, and then accusing the caciques of not paying tribute (ibid:158).

Spalding has asked whether the answer to her question about where the Indians found money to pay for the Distributions may not lie in small community workshops for making cloth (n.d:32). But given that mita commutation at Huancavelica was being paid in cloth at the beginning of the 18th century, and that the Miners complained about this in the context of a memorial asking for "the extinction of the cloth workshops and sugar farms" (BN C 1209), there seems little doubt that cloth production was used directly for paying the corregidores. In Huancavelica, the main form

of levy exacted by the corregidores was the mita commutation; but in other provinces, where the Distributions were of more importance, it seems reasonable to assume that the cloth produced in the small workshops would have been used to pay for the goods distributed. Since all these payments were collected by the caciques in order to be channelled to the corregidor, the workshops, though nominally belonging to the community, would in practice be small businesses under the control of the caciques.¹⁸

The evidence is not decisive, but it is possible that further research will not resolve these ambiguities, which stem partly from the fact that payments made in kind were very often accounted in money terms during the colonial period. The other ambiguity arises because the state levies - both mita and tribute - as well as the official Distributions, were assigned according to lists of the tribute-paying population that were kept by the caciques. But this does not necessarily mean that the caciques actually distributed the responsibilities, or the goods, to each individual tribute-payer. The practice of appointing rich Indians to take responsibility for the community's mita and tribute payments may well have extended to the Distributions of goods. It seems very unlikely, for instance, that foreign cloth would have been distributed to any but rich Indians, given the role of cloth as an indicator of status. The same applies to mules. Rough cloth, iron tools, coca, and probably wine, could all have been used by the caciques to obtain labour from their subjects, part of the product of which would go to paying back the corregidor for his advances of wage-goods, at the end of the credit period.

d. The alliance between caciques and corregidores

We can now describe a general model of the class alliance between caciques and corregidores in the colonial period. It does not seem right to analyse the caciques as mere tax-

collectors for the Spanish, nor can we agree with Golte that

the position of the caciques was similar to that of the provincial bourgeoisie, including that of the Spaniards at the time (1980:155).

Our analysis suggests that the caciques played a different material role in the organisation of the production of a surplus from that of the corregidores. The caciques were only able to collect taxes and other payments for the corregidores because they themselves organised the surplus labour of the communities. They also kept lists of population¹⁹ and organised the Distributions of goods which the corregidor wished to market in the province. In these ways the corregidor was completely dependent on the caciques of his province if he was to make any profit at all during his five-year period of office.

But the caciques were also dependent on the corregidores for the provision of certain key use-values. On the one hand, they needed the wage-goods, the products of the old system of vertical colonies. The system itself had largely disintegrated by the 17th century, due either to the occupation of these lands by the Spanish on the grounds that they were 'unpopulated' or 'lands of the Inca', or to land sales, or the pattern of reducciones imposed after Toledo. So that in part the corregidores were simply bringing the old vertical products, coca and alcohol, to where they could be used to obtain labour; in addition they brought what we have called the 'second tier' product of local cloth, which was also frequently used as a means of payment for labour. On the other hand, the corregidores brought foreign cloth, which the caciques needed in order to maintain their status in the community. Golte quotes the case of a cacique in Larecaja, who, in the 18th century, was described as well able to read, write and make contracts, and who

always went around well dressed in overcoats of best quality Castillian flannel, behaving in every way, both in his dress and his habits, like any Spaniard of wealth and good breeding (quoted in Golte 1980:154).

The difference between this cacique and the wealthy Spaniard, however, was that most provincial Spaniards were still to some extent dependent on the caciques to provide them with labour. It might be argued that the agricultural haciendas, or estates, in the sierra constituted an exception to this generalisation, in that the Spanish owners, particularly during the 18th century, appear to have accumulated a permanent labour force, usually described as being of a 'feudal' type. But it seems more plausible, in line with the argument developed here, to describe these Spaniards as having become assimilated to the native ruling class. Much like the caciques, the owners of these estates kept control of their servile population by controlling the entry of wage-goods. Within the estates, it was possible for the Indians to have their own lands and cattle, just as it was for them in the communities under the caciques. The mode of control, while clearly a long step from the vertical colonies of the early colonial period, is nevertheless more recognisably 'Andean' than 'feudal', in any generally accepted sense of the word.

2. Distributions and Rebellions

We can now return to the question of the 18th century rebellions, and make some suggestions as to a possible reinterpretation. But it is first perhaps necessary to define what is at stake in the debate over the rebellions and their causes. Clearly there were many more or less immediate economic causes of the rebellions - the increased intensity of the mita of Potosí, the Spanish tribute, the Distributions of Goods, increasing 'serfdom' or 'debt-peonage' on the estates - and the whole was overlaid with anti-Spanish and messianic Inca-revivalist ideologies. The problem with all such

explanations is not that they cannot explain why the rebellions happened, but why they did not happen sooner, since most of these economic factors had been present since the beginnings of the colonial period.

Two clear and opposed positions can be discerned in the recent literature on the rebellions. One is that of Cornblit, who maintains that

the rebellions spread like wildfire throughout those regions where the proportion of foreign Indians /forasteros/ was highest...It was easily checked in regions...where the proportion of foreign Indians was much lower (1970:43).

For Cornblit, the main target of the rebellion was the corregidor, and the system of Distributions was an important cause of resentment (ibid:35-37). In all this, he seems very much in agreement with Golte, who similarly insists that it was not 'abuses' in the Distributions, but the very system itself that provoked so much opposition, since it forced the people into wage-labour against their will (Golte 1980:108-109). The point of disagreement between Golte and Cornblit is over the role of the forasteros, the 'outsiders', or in Cornblit's expression 'foreign Indians'. For Golte, the outsiders were only significant inasmuch as they too revolted against the attempts to include them in the general Distributions of Goods. For Cornblit, they were ideal fodder for the rebellion: geographically mobile, prone to disorderly behaviour and drunkenness, with no strong attachments to local caciques, for them the act of supporting Tupac Amaru "meant to become a member of a movement endowed with power and strength" (Cornblit 1970:42).

From the perspective developed in this chapter, this disagreement can be seen as one over whether the primary impetus of the rebellion came from those of the population who were still under the control of the caciques in their communities, or from those who had left their communities, and

were therefore outside the caciques' control. In fact, the category of 'outsider' contained at least three very different social groupings: firstly, there were Indian wage-labourers in the mines, who had left their communities, and are the 'outsiders' referred to when Cornblit reproduces accounts of disorderliness and drunkenness (ibid:26); secondly, there were those who had settled on highland estates in districts such as Paucartambo and Paruro in the province of Cuzco (Burga y Flores 1974:5) and thirdly, there were those who had settled in another community, either with or without lands. To be an 'outsider' meant not to be liable for tribute or mita, and the rapid increase in the number of outsiders in the 18th century is usually ascribed to a desire to get outside the tax net, as well as to escape the Distributions of the corregidores (Cornblit 1970:24-25). However, the mita and tribute had been in existence for nearly 200 years, and the Distributions had been going on informally for about as long. The real difference in the second half of the 18th century was the increase in economic activity, which meant an increase in opportunities for wage-labour, particularly in the mines since cloth production was generally beginning to feel the impact of European imports by the latter half of the century (Spalding n.d:28). If the Distributions increased in volume, as Golte maintains they did after 1754, we can interpret this not as the attempt by the caciques and corregidores to force their subjects away to the mines, but rather as their attempt to compete with the market in the mines and towns, and thereby prevent the further migration of their subjects.

However, two economic factors militated against the strategy of the caciques and corregidores for keeping the Indians stationary and employing them in small workshops, or mines such as that owned by Tupac Amaru in Surinama in Cuzco (Vega 1969:14). One was the impact of foreign cloth, already mentioned, which was clearly very important in the

Distributions of the corregidores. A local priest in the 1770s complained of the prices charged to his parishioners in the Distributions of "velvet, silks, and Castillian cloth unnecessary to their poverty" (quoted in Golte 1980:117). But despite the complaints of excessive prices, which were made very generally about the Distributions, European cloth seems to have been beginning to undercut Peruvian if the quality that could be obtained for the price is taken into account. The decline of the Peruvian cloth factories in the 18th century is evident: the survival of small workshops in these conditions can be compared to the growth of sweatshops in Britain as the large-scale textile industry declined under the impact of far eastern imports in the 1970s. Greater intensity of labour, often through exploitation of the labour of women and children, can enable small workshops to compete long after larger factories have disappeared.

Secondly, silver mining was having to compete with the boom in Mexican mining in the 18th century (Brading and Cross 1972:574). The reorganisation of mercury production at Almadén, the Spanish source that had normally supplied the Mexican mines, had led to greatly reduced costs of production there (ibid). The Peruvian Miners responded by lowering wages of mitayos in the silver mines, and generally intensifying labour there (Tandeter 1980).

It seems probable, then, that the value of the goods that could be used to pay for the Distributions was falling relative to that of the goods distributed. In addition, there is the frequently mentioned factor of the separation of the new Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776, formed in part to keep the British off the Falkland Islands, as well as to control British smuggling up the River Plate (Haring 1947:100). This separation interrupted the long-distance trading activities of small merchants such as Tupac Amaru, who had already had good cause to resent the trading activities

of the corregidores. But Tupac Amaru was no longer a landed cacique, with a base in a community. Although he still owned some coca fields, most of his lands were rented out (Vega 1969:14). The General Rebellion has been described as a "war to the death among two fractions of the native aristocracy" (ibid:23). Whether or not this opinion is exaggerated, the loyalist caciques and their troops were certainly crucial in putting down the rebellion over the two years that the battles lasted. One of the best known of these loyalist caciques, Diego Chuquiwanca of Azangaro, owned much land and cattle; his traditional and authoritarian rule lasted for 60 years (Piel 1975:201; Golte 1980:156-157). The two fractions of caciques seem to have corresponded to merchant capitalists on the one hand, such as Tupac Amaru, and Tupac Catari, who operated on a smaller scale as a "carrier of coca and woollen cloth" (Golte 1980:191); and on the other hand to stationary caciques like Chuquiwanca, who exploited their subjects along the traditional pattern, with the help of the corregidores as traders. One big problem with Golte's attempts to correlate provinces where there were rebellions, with certain socio-economic variables, is that where there were rebellions there were also loyalist troops available to fight the rebels. It is not enough simply to write off this phenomenon as Spanish manipulation. The Spanish could not have supplied these loyalist caciques with arms at such a dangerous time unless they had been very confident of their ability to control their subjects, as well as of their loyalty.

We can draw two brief conclusions from this discussion of the rebellions. One is that the caciques who revolted were engaged in mining, cloth production and long-distance trade, all of which were activities that were being dealt heavy blows by foreign competition in the last quarter of the 18th century. The corregidores were in part the transmitters of this foreign competition, since ultimately the amount of silver they could take back to Spain was dependent on the

amount of cloth they had been able to bring with them when they first embarked in Cadiz (Golte 1980:119). It is also likely that since Tupac Amaru traded down the River Plate route, he would have had access to foreign goods brought much more cheaply by British smugglers than was possible for the Spanish officials.²⁰ This trade route broke the hold that the corregidores had over the import of foreign cloth to Peru, which had been a key part of their alliance with the caciques. Other caciques, whose base was more in land and cattle, stayed loyal to the Crown and to the corregidores, on whom they were still dependent for the import of wage-goods and of foreign cloth.

Secondly, it is not possible in the present state of research to say anything very exact about the social origins of the rebels, or about those who fought in the loyalist ranks. But Golte has shown convincingly that the institution of the Distribution was an important target of many local rebellions in the 18th century (1980:141-147), and that the abolition of the Distributions was one of the first demands of the rebels that was granted in 1780 (ibid:198-199). However, we can turn Golte's reasoning on its head and say that the Distributions were not hated because they forced people to go to the towns and mines to do wage-labour; rather it was the renewed possibilities in the towns and mines that made people hate the institution of the Distributions back in the communities. For wage-labour meant either payment in money, which gave access to the controlled goods; or it meant payment in these goods themselves, and to judge by the frequent complaints about the inflated prices being asked by the corregidores, prices in the towns and mining centres were lower, so that wages in kind would have been correspondingly higher. The revolts against the Distributions must be seen as revolts against a control of circulation that had in many cases lost the relation to production that it had once had in the economy of the vertical colonies.

3. Planning the Market

From the viewpoint of the theory developed in this and preceding chapters, it now becomes clear that there are two things wrong with the usual interpretation of the Distributions as being the "forced marketing" of goods to the Indians. Firstly, insofar as this is a statement about the state in the period from the 1750s to 1780 when the Distributions were legalised and the Tariff list was drawn up, it is a misinterpretation. The Tariff list of the amount of each good to be sold in each province, and the price at which it was to be sold, was another instance of Spanish economic planning. Its intention was quite clearly not to increase, but to decrease the volume of trading undertaken by the corregidores, and in particular to curb the sales of alcohol to the Indians. It was unrealistic in that as long as the corregidores were not paid salaries much higher than the existing ones, they were likely to go on trying to make profits for themselves in the colonies. But the intention of the state was to limit this personal profiteering, and plan the market more so that useful things like iron tools and fertiliser (guano) would be given out in order to increase agricultural productivity (Spalding n.d:22).

If, on the other hand, we take the "force" involved in the marketing to have been that of the corregidores, then we have to explain why revolts did not develop sooner about the Distributions, since sales on credit to the Indian caciques had been going on since at least 1567. What seems to have happened is that a situation that developed in the 18th century has been assumed to be general for the whole colonial period. This situation was one in which the Distributions started to appear like a "compulsory market", since by then many local markets had developed, particularly in the newer, smaller, mining centres, and people were more

easily able to earn money that would give them access directly to these markets, and could start to compare prices and qualities of goods. The early Distributions seem to have been linked to the rise of the cloth factories at the turn of the 17th century. As such, they were an expression of the alliance between caciques and corregidores whereby the cacique provided the labour, and the corregidores brought the wage-goods, plus foreign cloth for the cacique. In a sense, these early Distributions to the caciques were also planned, rather than 'forced'. The situation was rather like that in Dahomey, where, in the absence of the market mechanism, European traders had to bring the exact use-values required by the kings of Dahomey for the reproduction of their control. And just as in Dahomey this involved the Europeans in trading in objects such as cowries, which to them were useless, so in Peru, the Europeans started trading in coca, in order to bring the caciques what was "necessary for their rule".

The power of the corregidores was not simply an ideal one. It had a material basis in that there was a constant stream of these officials plying backwards and forwards from Spain to the Peruvian provinces. They brought cloth and other European luxuries for the caciques and in return they took back silver to Spain. But this exchange was not a direct one; it required complex mediations. Generally, what the corregidor had to do was to acquire wage-goods on credit in Lima which could then be advanced to the caciques against future production - either agricultural or in cloth - which the corregidor could sell back to the merchant by whom the credit had been advanced. The "forced marketing" therefore was in origin the planning of a circulation of use-values, which involved both an internal and an external circuit. The place at which these circuits met was in the person of the cacique.

As has already been pointed out, the planning of the market had one further aspect, which was that as markets and

opportunities for wage-labour increased in the second half of the 18th century, the caciques and corregidores had to increase the volume of the Distributions in order to keep the population stationary. As the market increased, the planning had to increase too in order to keep pace with it. That the attempt to plan the market in this way would ultimately prove contradictory seems fairly obvious. Once people had to migrate to other markets in order to pay for the Distributions, then of course the Distributions themselves would come to be seen as a "compulsory market". This tendency would have been accentuated when the terms of trade worsened for Peruvian cloth against European cloth as the 18th century wore on, making it more difficult for the communities to pay for the Distributions with cloth.

NOTES

1. See above, Chapter V, note 26. The corregidores were paid a salary proportional to the tribute-paying capacity of the Indians in the province to which they were appointed. But in practice the office was from early on bought in Spain by the appointee for a sum ranging from two to seven times the value of the salary of the appointment (Spalding 1974:131).
2. Lohmann (1957), Tord (1975), Moreno (1977), Golte (1980), and Spalding (n.d). all focus primarily on the economic role of the corregidor. See also Rowe (1957), Cornblit (1970: 31-35), Spalding (1974:127-146), and Sánchez-Albornoz (1978:95-99).
3. For instance, see Long and Roberts (1978:300), Sánchez Albornoz (1978:97), Golte (1980:14-15), Spalding (n.d: 20,24).
4. Golte (1980:14-15), Spalding (n.d:6).
5. This statement should be qualified by saying that in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the mining economy of the 18th century (Brading and Cross 1972; Fisher 1975, 1977; Tandeter 1980). However, none of these attempt to make any link between the increase in mining output and the phenomenon of the Distributions of Goods in the 18th century.
6. See above Chapter I, section 1.
7. Assadourian actually argues that, paradoxically, the time of greatest export expansion in Peru was also that of greatest import-substitution, that is, the period from about 1570 to 1630 (1979:232 n.23). His paradox can be explained by the fact that although local production was being substituted for imports of certain products, principally agricultural ones such as wheat, oil, and wine, imports of other products were increasing very fast. Principal among the latter was high quality cloth, followed by iron and paper; the import of African slaves to Peru also accounted for a large amount of the value of silver exports at this time (Assadourian 1979:283).
8. See above, Chapter III, section 4.
9. Golte's argument relies quite heavily on his assertion that the 1780s saw a "prolonged stagnation" of mining activity both in Potosí and the rest of Peru, which he attributes to the abolition of the Distributions (1980:39-40). As regards Potosí, his assertion of falling production in the decade of the 1780s is simply not correct on the basis of his own figures, presented in his Table 7 (ibid:38), provided

that production of gold is taken into account as well as that of silver. For the rest of Peru, Golte quotes figures from Fisher, which according to his own Table 8 (ibid:39) show an increase of the index of production from 124 in the period 1776-1780 to 128 in the period 1781-1785. In the next 5-year period, that is, from 1786-1790, the production index leaps to 153. It is therefore completely unclear how Golte thinks his figures can show a "prolonged stagnation" in the 1780s. If production did not increase as fast as formerly in the first half of the decade of the 1780s there are some very obvious factors that this can be attributed to: firstly there was a General Uprising that developed into a virtual civil war lasting from 1780 to 1782; secondly, production of mercury at Huancavelica plummeted after the death of Saravia at the end of 1780, and the war between England and Spain prevented supplies being brought from Europe between 1780 and 1783 (Fisher 1975:27). Golte also tries, perversely, to explain the peak silver production year of 1780-1781 by the existence of the Distributions (1980:39). This is very strange, since the Distributions were actually formally abolished and most of the sierra plunged into civil war in 1780. In any case, the high silver production of 1780-1781 can be well explained by Saravia's efforts in his first year of operations as sole concessionary of the Huancavelica mercury mine. Probably by dint of mining the pillars, Saravia did produce nearly the 6,000 cwt. required by his contract with the government; but after his death the mine was in a bad condition, and production only partially recovered in the years 1783-1785 before there was a bad collapse of the mine in 1786 (Whitaker 1941:62-66).

10. It is interesting that Golte calls the corregidor the "cornerstone" of the system (1980:14), thereby showing up his relegation of the role of the caciques in the colonial class structure to one of secondary importance.

11. I have not been able to find out the exact meaning of cordellate. I suspect it was a kind of rough worsted.

12. See above, Chapter V.

13. See also Assadourian (1982:161-162).

14. It is not clear why Spalding refers to Quito as "technically within the viceroyalty" (n.d:23), since the period she appears to be talking about is 1752-1782 (ibid:21) and Quito had been made part of the northern vice-royalty of New Granada in 1739 (Haring 1947:98).

15. Vega quotes a document about one Alos, Corregidor of Chayanta in 1781, where the Spanish authorities themselves accuse him of wanting to be "the sole merchant of all kinds of coca, aguardiente and the like" to the exclusion of other merchants in the province, a role which had earned

him much hatred from the smaller Indian traders (Vega 1969:43). This indicates that the corregidores had not stopped trading in alcohol because it was not allowed in the Tariff list.

16. Golte (1976:16).

17. In 1812, after the abolition of the mita, an attempt was made to expropriate community lands that had been used to pay the mita commutation, usually by renting them out. These lands were known as 'mita lands'. A document in the National Library in Lima is the record of a survey done in the province of Angaraes to find out the quantity of these "excess lands" (BN D 6062). Not surprisingly, those who carried out the inquiry in 1817 were told that there were none, except in the district of Tayacaja, where the income from letting these lands was said to have been 4,552 pesos 2 reals in the year 1815.

18. See also Burga and Flores (1974).

19. It is interesting that the institution of the colonial Church does not ever seem to have functioned as intended by the authorities, as the main keeper of population records. This was in part because the priests usually needed Indian labour themselves in order to survive, build churches, and sometimes to exploit them for personal gain. It was also because the caciques seem to have been able to make the priests collude with them in 'hiding' Indians. Lohmann Villena states that as early as 1609 the payment of a guatancha to the cacique by an Indian who wished to be absolved from mita responsibility was a common practice (1949:211). The meaning of watancho in Quechua is "just a year", and in this context the meaning is that the Indian was erased from the list as having been dead for one year. Later on, Lohmann writes, the parish priests "did not lag behind, but listed all the Indians as dead, at the same time as they charged each 'outsider' one peso for the right of residence in the parish" (ibid:404-405).

20. For some discussion of the impact of the trade route from Buenos Aires on the economy of highland Peru, see Whitaker (1941:65, 120 n. 137), Haring (1947:96-99, 329-331), Piel (1975:203), Golte (1980:28-29).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: CIRCULATION AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING LABOUR

We started out in Chapter I by criticising theories of under-development for the way they have concentrated on exchange and the market, to the exclusion of all other forms of circulation. The history of Latin America was chosen as a paradigm case by those who insisted that the market itself was capitalism, as well as those who said it was not. The discoveries of gold and silver in the Americas were a landmark in the process of creation of a world market where all the countries of the world were linked by trade. For some, this world market system was already capitalist in the 16th century, and sparked off a dual process of creating poles of development and of under-development that has been going on ever since. Others protested at the absurdity involved in "reading history backwards" (Banaji 1977) and calling the 16th century expansion 'capitalist' when industrial capitalism had never been heard of, and when the expansionist countries such as Spain and Portugal were in the throes of various feudal crises. For them, the creation of the world market had to be seen as in some way preserving, even intensifying, pre-capitalist relations of production. Production for the world market turned out to be quite compatible with serfdom in eastern Europe, while slavery, state conscription, and hybrid forms such as debt-peonage were all found on estates in the New World.

Both of these approaches could be criticised on a priori grounds. The theory that equates capitalism - meaning the extraction of a surplus - with exchange has to assume some mechanism of inequality as built into the market system. But in that case a simple answer for a country that finds itself at the wrong end of the polarity created by the market would be autarchy, or not exchanging at all. Frank gets round this by saying that the links with the world market are maintained by a bourgeoisie that imports foreign luxuries. But there are two difficulties with this answer: firstly, if only luxuries for the bourgeoisie are being imported, it is not clear why the rest of the country cannot just ignore them, since they fulfil no material function in the production of raw materials for export. Secondly, it seems completely arbitrary in whose favour the unequal exchange works. If the criterion is 'dependency', then the metropolitan country is rather more dependent on the peripheral country for the supply of a raw material that cannot be obtained elsewhere, than is the peripheral country for the supply of luxuries which can very often be obtained from competing sources. This, for instance, was the case with Peruvian silver production in the 16th and 17th centuries, when Peru was the main producer of silver in the world, and different countries competed to send their cloth exports either by way of Spain or through smuggling up the River Plate. Vilar writes that the foreign companies stationed in Cadiz sent "a constant stream of instructions about the tastes of the Lima clientele" to the cotton manufacturers of Barcelona" (1976:268).

On the other hand, the theory that the world market reinforces pre-capitalist relations of production seems unsatisfactory since, if this were so, we should expect the pre-capitalist ruling classes to go from strength to strength as the world market expanded, rather than either disappearing or themselves becoming capitalists. However, the proponents of the theory do not seriously sustain this, but have at some stage to go into retreat and reverse the action of the market to one of 'undermining' the pre-capitalist rulers. What is more, this strengthening of pre-capitalist relations is not usually proposed

as the general rule, but only happens at some times and places.

The theories of 'articulation of modes of production' were an advance on the theory that the spread of the market simply spread capitalism everywhere it reached; and they pointed the way to a theory of capitalist development that saw it as emerging from previous class societies, where surplus labour was already being appropriated by non-producing classes, as opposed to the myth of capitalism as emerging through independent, classless producers meeting and exchanging their products. But the theories of articulation still failed to grapple with the realities of the different forms of pre-capitalist circulation, as described, for instance, by Polanyi and other economic anthropologists. Similar difficulties arose with the assumption that money is an institution that was born with the market. Less intuitive but more convincing theories of money suggest that money was originally the facilitator of exploitation by the state, rather than the facilitator of exchange among independent and equal individuals.

We therefore proposed to look again at the history of Peru and its incorporation into the world market by Spanish colonialism, in order to try and develop a theory of pre-capitalist circulation, as distinct from the market exchange that is usually assumed to interact directly with pre-capitalist relations of production. Having done this, we shall now draw out some general conclusions about the nature of the forms of circulation found in Peru.

1. Circulation and Modes of Production Again

The first conclusion is that throughout the whole period we have looked at, the primary means of extracting surplus labour from the direct producers was through controlling the circulation of certain key use-values. There were pockets of development of wage-labour in the colonial period: we have looked at one important one in the production of the state monopoly good, mercury. We shall have to consider this, and also how the Incas controlled the direct producers of their state monopoly goods. But the

bulk of surplus production was not directly controlled, either in the sense that it is under slavery, or in the way it is under capitalism. The Indians were nominally free individuals during the colonial period, and even the rather tight control of population movements kept by the Incas does not seem to amount to a form of slavery. Neither were the direct producers generally separated from their means of production, as under capitalism, so that control over production could not be exerted in this way.

Rather, as already stated, labour was obtained through controlling the circulation of certain goods. In the next section, we shall consider what kind of goods these were, and what made them suitable for becoming objects of control, or what we shall term "means of circulation". But vital among them were the goods that were actually exchanged in return for labour, such as the "coca, salt, and chilli" that were common means of payment in Huánuco, or the "coca, wine, and cloth" that the corregidores used to bring the caciques later on. These goods were originally simply use-values that could be used to obtain labour from the mass of the population, who were kept out of the areas where they were produced. Their use as payment for labour cannot be analysed simply as 'unequal exchange', firstly since we do not know that there was any commensuration involved in their use as means of payment, and secondly because, even if there was, the argument does not depend on this. All that is required for such a mode of production to be sustained is that a certain class control the circulation of goods which the mass of people think of as necessities. The employer of the labourer has to give him or her only the amount of these goods considered necessary to the reproduction of the labourer. Labour can then be exchanged against these 'necessary goods', in a way similar to the exchange under capitalism, of non-specific labour-power, now expressed as an abstract quantity of labour-time, for the value of the 'necessary goods', now expressed as an abstract quantity of money.

There are certain other analogies that can be drawn between the capitalist mode of production and this mode based on the

control of circulation, which we have analysed as the Andean mode, but which may be more general. Firstly, as in Marx's analysis of capitalism, the unequal exchange that allows the accumulation of a surplus does not arise from the fact that the worker is paid less than the value of his or her labour-power, whether that value is defined as a certain group of use-values, as in the Andean mode, or a certain sum of exchange-value, as under capitalism. The unequal exchange arises in both cases because the labourer can produce more in a certain period of labour than what it costs, whether in terms of use-value or of exchange-value, to reproduce the labourer as labour-power. This unequal exchange, which is the very basis of any appropriation of surplus labour, does not have to be analysed as paying the labourer less than the value of labour-power.

The second analogy with payment of labour under capitalism lies in the fact that what is considered necessary to the reproduction of labour-power contains a 'historical and moral element' in the Andes, as well as in modern capitalism. In the Andes the means of payment for labour consisted both of things that could be defined as physiologically necessary to life, such as salt, and others which were only considered necessary because of certain peculiarities of the Andean culture, such as coca, which most cultures manage quite well without. In the same way, the range of necessary goods that the wage is expected to cover in 20th century Britain includes things such as electric lighting, radios, and washing-machines, things which would have been unthinkable at the dawn of the industrial revolution, and which would still be considered luxuries rather than necessities in many underdeveloped capitalist countries today.

However, it is not intended to push the analogy with capitalism any further than this. Capitalism is a mode in which labour is controlled through control of the means of production, not through controlling the means of circulation. The analogy is only intended to clarify that the analysis of the Andean mode presented here does not depend on a theory of 'unequal exchange' any more than the analysis of capitalism does.

2. The Means of Circulation

The second conclusion to be drawn from our study of Peru is that it is necessary to distinguish from each other rather sharply the different kinds of goods whose circulation is controlled. What seems wrong with many theories of underdevelopment is that they assume that all goods controlled by the ruling class are 'elite goods', to use Dupré and Rey's expression, and that these are surplus goods which simply serve to mark off the elite from the mass of the population. The theory that analyses a typical situation of contemporary underdevelopment as being one in which a 'comprador bourgeoisie' buys in luxury goods in return for the export of raw materials should not be read back on to historical situations, even allowing that it is correct for the present period.

The first vital distinction that has to be made, then, is that between the circulation of necessary goods and of surplus goods. But within both these categories we could make further distinctions. Surplus goods, for instance, may be either luxury consumption goods, or they may be goods used for control. Necessary goods may be either ones used in consumption, or ones that are used in production. And within the category of necessary consumption goods we can distinguish those that are strictly necessary to life from those that are merely addictive. We should also consider as a separate category the control of the circulation of women, which seems to span all the categories mentioned so far. We shall now go on to see how these different categories applied in the periods we have considered.

a. Necessary consumption goods

In the Inca period, salt was the foremost among these. We have seen how the caciques in Huánuco included salt among the goods paid to dependent workers, how they received a tribute in salt, and how salt was sent to the state deposits

for the Inca. Their tribute came to them from the ethnic group's saltmaker, resident in the highland salt-works, which were shared, in Inca times, with the saltmakers from other groups. After the Spanish Conquest, salt rapidly became available on the market, where the group of colonists from Cuzco who had been settled in the area by the Incas were able to buy their salt after the salt-works had been taken over again by the yaros, in whose territory they were. The Spanish made one unsuccessful attempt to impose a salt monopoly in Peru, but it seems likely that one of the reasons so little is known about the salt in the colonial period is that, apart from the salt-works near the big silver mines, salt remained very largely an Indian concern. Further research is needed to discover who did control this vital input to silver-mining in the colonial period, who the workers were, and what was the relation of the Indian caciques to the salt supply in the communities.

The second necessary consumption good frequently found as a means of payment, both under the Incas and in the colonial period, is cloth. We do not know, and probably never will, exactly what kinds of cloth were used to pay what kinds of labour under the Incas. It is tempting to assume that the payment of cloth to the army functioned as uniform for the soldiers and that, as in Spain, different uniforms served to single out the ranks of officers for purposes of payment, the only difference being that with the Incas the cloth itself was a form of payment. It also seems likely that if, as is commonly argued, the Incas were in the process of decimalising the Andes when the Spanish arrived, then the place they would have started decimalisation would have been the army. Different patterns of cloth would serve to distinguish fighting units from each other; the same system being applied, rather more slowly, in the collection of tribute. Cloth, in itself a necessary consumption good, can therefore be used as a means of control.

However, given the fact that there was such a well-established division of labour in weaving in Chucuito in 1567,

with the women making plain cloth and the men fine cloth, it does seem likely that not only fine cloth but also ordinary cloth was used as a means of payment by the Incas. The frequency with which cloth is found as a means of payment in the mines during the colonial period also suggests some continuous tradition.

At times wool itself was used as means of payment, or else cotton, both raw materials for making cloth. It seems to have been customary in both Huánuco and Chucuito to pay weaving labour in raw wool, a practice that may have become institutionalised by the Inca state, as a 'compulsory gift' or advance payment for making cloth.

The corregidores also used the Distributions of Goods, both before and after they were legalised, as a means of contracting labour by advance payments. The corollary of the fact that payment for the Distributions in many areas was made in cloth is that the same cloth could be distributed in other provinces, and especially in the mines, as means of payment of labour. Once again, we must note that the different kinds of cloth served as a means of social control, and that class differences in the colonial period appear to have been very clearly marked by different forms of clothing. The ordinary homespun cloth handed out to mine-labourers, particularly the conscripted ones, instead of a wage in money served in part to prevent them getting access to the foreign cloth which they could have bought with money.

b. Necessary production goods

Under this heading we can mention the copper, used for making tools, that the Incas appear to have imported through their port at Chincha, and which came from present-day Ecuador (Murra 1974:264). Chincha was also opposite a group of the famous guano islands, which later provided fertiliser for the so-called Agricultural Revolution in England, but which

were first used by the Incas for the cultivation of state maize. Like the salt-works, these precious resources were shared out among different ethnic groups by the Incas in order to prevent a monopoly by any one group, an arrangement that clearly helped them to control a large amount of the circulation of guano without actually controlling production directly. The discovery that both copper and the worked discs of coral known as mullu were both imported through Chincha has led to speculation that there 'must have been' private traders operating there, parallel to the pochteca in Mexico, who are usually interpreted as having been traders (ibid:266). This speculation is helped by early Spanish accounts talking of the use of copper as means of exchange on the Peruvian coast (ibid:264). However, it is just as likely that copper was a standardised state commodity, and mullu a token money issued against it. The discovery of mullu in the state deposits and in the temples found in the coca-producing areas tends to confirm our theory rather than the one that would link the imports to private traders of some kind.

The Spanish brought iron with them, a great advance in a society that had used metals considered 'precious' by the Europeans for relatively mundane uses. Once again, iron turns up among the goods distributed by the corregidores, which could be used to obtain labour, and which seemed much more defensible to the Spanish authorities than did the Distributions of wine and coca. The mules distributed can also be considered under this heading, since they were an essential 'production' good for transporting goods, an activity which was particularly time-consuming in the vast and mountainous area that is the Andes.

The most important production good whose circulation was controlled in the colonial period, however, was mercury. This good, very easily monopolisable because of its scarcity, was the key to controlling silver production and so the silver tax which for so long financed the debts and wars of

the kings of Spain. Mercury is slightly different from the goods so far mentioned under this heading, in that it was not exchanged directly for labour by the state, but its control was used by the state to tax the incipient capitalist class in the silver mines and so extract surplus labour indirectly.

c. Addictive necessities

It seems that coca and alcohol have been used to pay labour in the Andes from Inca times down to the present. The fact that these goods are also omnipresent in Andean ritual, usually today with the addition of a third addictive good, cigarettes, should not blind us to their function in obtaining labour. For instance, in the annual ritual to bring on the rains in the community of Huayllay Grande in Angaraes, small offerings of coca alcohol and cigarettes are taken by various messengers to all the lakes in the surrounding mountains until the lakes release the water for the rains. The economic form of the ritual is therefore very similar to the advance payments so often made to labour, the 'compulsory gifts', or 'invitations' to work.

Since maize was the raw material for making alcohol under the Incas, its production seems to have been expanded and its circulation controlled by the state and local kuraka. Terraces, irrigation and the use of fertiliser all appear in conjunction with state maize production, as well as in the vertical colonies of the overlords of Chucuito. It is interesting that alcohol was also made from potatoes, (presumably the ancestor of the Irish poteen, which the British state worked hard to try and ban in the 18th century) but this seems to have been despised as an inferior drink. The forms of alcohol consumed changed with the arrival of the Spanish, first grapes and then sugar taking over as the raw material used. By the 18th century, small sugar-farms were becoming a threat to the coastal estates producing wine

and brandy, but it is significant that opposition to this generalisation of the production of strong alcohol came not only from the owners of the vineyards, whose production interests were directly threatened, but also from the Miners' Guild of Huancavelica, who saw the sugar-farms as requiring "extinction" as they detracted from the supply of labourers to the mercury mine. While this can simply be interpreted rather directly, as meaning that the potential mine labourers had their time taken up working on the sugar-farms, it has an additional meaning in the colonial context, in that the growth of local alcohol production would put the means of payment into the hands of more potential employers than formerly.

Coca and political power seem frequently to have been linked in the Andes, and governments that have not had a well-organised coca monopoly are vulnerable to rebellions. Tupac Amaru owned coca fields, and Tupac Catari traded in it: a supply of coca was probably essential to the organisation of the rebel troops. Since the drug cocaine has become widely used in the industrialised countries in recent years, coca has widened the scope of its power. The involvement of military governments in Bolivia in its trade has become an international scandal; but it is also interesting that the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement that has been operating in Peru since the late 1970s and the return of civilian government is also said to control coca fields to the east of Ayacucho, and to charge protection money from local cocaine smugglers. The Incas seem to have directed their military expansion at least in part towards the conquest of coca fields. Tupac Yupanqui appears breaking up local monopolies over coca lands as far apart as Quivi, near the coast, and in the 'fortress' area of the jungle beyond Huanuco that had formerly been controlled by the chupachu, who regained control when the Inca state fell. The association of fortresses with coca lands in Huánuco is

argued in the Appendix to this thesis. This interpretation seems more convincing than the usual argument that these fortresses were to guard against jungle tribes, since the jungle tribes do not use coca as a habit, although it is universal in the mountain areas. It is also significant that the fortresses such as Vilcabamba and Machu Picchu, where the last of the Incas retreated after the Conquest and held out against the Spanish for several decades, were also in the coca-producing area on the edge of the jungle. Machu Picchu, probably the best-known image of Peru today, is a vast fortress-city built on a peak overlooking the coca lands of the Vilcanota valley. A road, still walked by hiking tourists, leads from there to Cuzco, the Inca capital.

During the colonial period the market in coca developed rapidly. The mountain people had never liked having to work in the coca fields, where they were prone to malaria and other diseases, and the Spanish found them relatively empty. However, there is no evidence that the Spanish were able to organise large-scale estates producing coca, and their role in its circulation seems to have been more as intermediaries, breaking the monopoly of the local caciques over their vertical colonies producing the good. Later on, the corregidores seem to have played an important part in the circulation of coca, which they sold on credit to the caciques, who could use it to obtain labour to pay back the corregidores.

d. The means of control

The Inca mode of controlling the circulation of use-values produced in the vertical colonies depended crucially on the control of population mobility. The people had to be kept stationary, when they were not actually in state service, so that they would need to work for the vertical products. This meant that a complex system of identification was necessary, a function that was performed by the patterns woven into cloth. Cloth served as a visible pass-card that would identify the wearer to the authorities: hence the very strict law against wearing the cloth of any but one's

native district. In the multi-ethnic colonies producing the necessary vertical goods, the workers had also to wear the cloth of their village of origin, the village where they were registered as paying tribute. It is possible that this emphasising of cultural differences helped to prevent the formation of a working-class consciousness among these state workers, just as it has been difficult for migrant workers from different tribes in South Africa to unite themselves as a class, even when living in the same urban hostels. The way the South African state insists on the migrant workers' being only temporarily resident in the towns or gold mines, while registered in the 'homelands' where they are supposedly self-sufficient, is also strikingly similar to the Incas' insistence that workers moved by the state should be registered in a village of origin, whose cloth they always wore, and where in theory they had their subsistence lands.

It is possible that cloth may have been a rather more important means of control in the Andes under the Incas than were the more conventional means of control, arms. The Incas do not appear to have been great manufacturers of armaments, a fact which doubtless helped to contribute to the image of the Inca 'welfare state'. Nevertheless, what weapons and armour there were do seem to have been the monopoly of the Cuzco colonists in the Huánuco area, who made them as part of their tribute duties. In the colonial period, firearms were permitted only to the Spanish. However, the organisers of the 1780 Rebellion were certainly able to buy some guns from merchants (Vega 1969:14), so that there cannot have been any effective system such as the licensing of guns that is used in most modern states in order to preserve the class circulation of the means of control.

e. Surplus consumption goods

There certainly were 'elite goods' under the Incas, which served little material purpose apart from that of impressing

the working masses with the power of the Emperor, and persuading them to take him as their god, equivalent to the sun. Gold, silver, and coloured feathers are examples of such goods, all of which could also be woven into fine cloth for ostentatious use by the Inca, including its ritual destruction. But it is possible to say that, although these goods were what attracted the attention of the Spanish, they were not the most important part of the Inca means of circulation, control of which was firmly rooted in material necessities.

Under the Spanish, these elite goods became much more important by comparison. They were the imports from Spain - the silk stockings, ribbons, velvets, and taffetas worn by the upper classes, as well as books and paper, the heralds of a new form of control. Over the centuries, there was a massive reverse flow of cloth imports to Peru in return for the silver exports. But it should be remembered that the Spanish had first to find the means of payment in order to pay workers in the silver mines, or obtain silver by some other indirect means. It seems to be true as a generalisation that the Spaniards who became the most rich and powerful group were the ones linked to the import trade, not those who organised production in the mines for the export trade.

In the colonial period, there was still some material function for these elite goods, which was to secure the compliance of the Indian caciques. They were given access to foreign cloth, and also to books and education, in exchange for organising some surplus production for the Spanish.

f. The circulation of women

Rather like cloth, the centralised control of women in Inca society seems to have performed a variety of functions. On the one hand, the Inca state was also the church authority

that could perform marriage ceremonies, after which the couple, the man of which was identified as the tribute-payer, were expected to take on normal tribute responsibilities. This purely formal state control of the circulation of women probably corresponded to a more real control by the kuraka at a local level. It was this first marriage that was solemnized and recognised as providing legal heirs by the Inca state. In this way, control of women in primary marriages could be said to come under the heading of control of necessary use-values.

But women were more strikingly controlled as a surplus use-value. Wives could be accumulated by the kuraka for special services to the Inca; perhaps military service or service in the capital, Cuzco, would have been primary among these. And the kuraka could himself distribute women to the lesser local chieftains. These women were secondary wives whose children could not inherit, although their marriage might be earlier or later than the principal marriage. Their primary economic function, apart from cooking and agricultural labour, seems to have been in spinning, weaving and making chicha. They were therefore vital to the accumulation of a surplus by the kuraka and his primary wife.

The Incas appear to have elevated this control of the circulation of women to new levels: they were put in special houses and guarded as part of the tribute duties of the male population. The guard certainly seems to have been more to stop outsiders getting in than to stop the women getting out. Inside they devoted much of their time to spinning, weaving, and making chicha for the state; and according to the Spanish accounts they enjoyed high status in the society. This pool of surplus women was then redistributed by the Inca to the kuraka and other men who had done whatever was required to earn this favour. The agllawasi, the houses in which these 'chosen women' lived, seem to have been an extension of the Incas' vertical principle. Drawn from all

the different communities and destined to be dispersed to different provinces as wives, the women would have found it difficult to organise any effective material resistance. The guards on their houses, which were separated from the main centres of population, were similar to the fortifications in the coca colonies: they served to keep the mass of the people away from the focus of control of circulation.

The accounts of the position of these and other women by the Spanish chroniclers seem to have been as wild, exotic, and exaggerated, as those written about the Amazons of Dahomey. A much better source for analysis of the position of women under the Incas is provided by the early Visits, and there is clearly scope for much more research there. However, it does seem that the caciques in the 1560s gave a paradoxical welcome to the Catholic Church, which has usually been thought of simply as the extinguisher of indigenous Andean religion and culture. The paradox is explained by the fact that Andean society was a class-divided one, and that the control of women, as well as serving the functions described above, also had the more general one of keeping the population resident in the villages and therefore keeping up the numbers of tribute-payers. Especially in the early colonial years, when many single men migrated from Spain, there appears to have been widespread marriage of Indian women to Spanish men, which in part explains the fall in the Indian population and the rise in that classified as mestizo. The caciques, faced with a falling population mainly for this reason, but exacerbated by smallpox and by the migration of men to the towns, sought desperately to keep the population in the villages. They were indignant at what they saw as the failure of the Spanish state to provide them with effective church teaching and marriage ceremonies in the villages, that would have helped them to keep the population stationary, particularly the women, but also, indirectly, the men.

The Spanish Church formally forbade polygyny, but it did not forbid the keeping of female domestic servants; this practice must still today be the commonest expression of the economic dependence of Indian women, and has continued without interruption from Inca times.

* * * * *

One of the reasons why so many goods seem to have been means of circulation in Inca Peru is that in order to control an end product all the inputs to that product have to be controlled, as well as possible use-values that could be exchanged for them. So not only was cloth controlled, but also wool and cotton to make it; not only alcohol but maize, its main ingredient. Potters were sent to special villages where there was clay, and made pots that were essential both in salt-making and in the manufacture and storage of chicha. And one of the reasons why we do not find maize being taken to the jungle region to exchange for coca and cotton is that maize was controlled by the state. Instead the people of the Huánuco region used to take minor items such as dried oca and guinea-pigs, which fell outside the net of Inca control. The end of the planning of circulation was to make it impossible for the mass of the population to gain access either to a surplus of the necessary goods, which they could use to obtain labour, or ultimately to the surplus goods themselves, cloth, arms, noble women, and the sumptuous luxuries consumed at the Cuzco court.

3. Producing the Means of Circulation

One obvious centre for contradictions and opposition in a mode of production based on indirect control through circulation is the production of the controlled goods. What is to stop the workers there turning round and monopolising the good themselves? Various answers have already been suggested to this question. One means of control was in the

mixing of workers from different provinces in the multi-ethnic vertical colonies. They might speak different languages or dialects, and would have different provincial or tribal interests. This was reinforced by the fact that labour in many of the vertical colonies was organised on a rotating basis. However, this does not fully explain why skilled workers, such as miners and saltmakers, who must have been fairly permanent, should not have formed some class organisations. Presumably the reason is that they were so few, and in such geographically isolated places, so that only a whole ethnic group could effectively have taken control of a key resource, such as a salt-mine; and this the Incas' multi-ethnic policy was highly effective in preventing.

Coca fields seem to have required a much stricter control than salt-works. Many more workers were involved, but many of them on a rotating basis (see Chapter IV, Table 4.5); and, as already mentioned, the climate was usually too unhealthy for resident workers to stay very long. There do seem to have been large numbers of Cuzco colonists involved in the production of coca for the state, possibly many of them in a supervisory capacity. But once again, it was other ethnic groups, rather than the workers themselves, who seem to have provided a threat to Inca control.

The Spanish had much more difficulty in controlling the production of their state monopoly good, mercury. Not only did they have the Miners to contend with, who continually threatened to evade state sales control by selling to merchants who could give better credit than the state. The Spanish authorities also had to contend with continual problems over the labour supply, caused in good part because the wage-labourers there earned such high wages. It may again be asked why these wage-labourers do not emerge as more of a class force in the colony. It is possible that more research would reveal new answers to this; but the most obvious way in which the labourers were controlled was by the total state control of who received the other vital input to mercury

mining - the forced labourers, or the cash commutation that increasingly supplanted them. The means of production in the refining process seem to have been Spanish-owned, but it is doubtful whether the Spanish Miners could on their own have reproduced this separation of the direct producers from their means of production, without the continual state subsidy in the form of the mita.

4. The State and Circulation

a. The state and exchange

part of the problem we identified in the theories of underdevelopment and modes of production as the equation of circulation with exchange is related to a tendency to ignore the pre-capitalist state and concentrate solely on the emergence of the market. In so far as the state is considered at all, it is assumed to act in the interests of its own merchant capitalists. For Wallerstein, after the creation of the world market, the truly strong state is the one that can afford to be weak, that is, whose merchant capitalists are strong enough to defend their own position without state military aid (1974:349). For Frank, the state only appears as the institution guaranteeing by force the 'unequal exchange' set up by the market.

Our position is quite the opposite of these. The state control of circulation of certain key-goods, in both Inca and colonial Peru, comes into contradiction with private interests. This is very clear under the Incas, where exchange was simply not allowed to develop, but is less obvious in colonial Peru. However, we have tried through empirical case-studies to show how, in various ways, attempts by the state at planning circulation came up against private exchange. One of these was in the early encomienda system, in which the products of the old Inca plan were simply auctioned in the towns for money; but the marketing of the products there contradicted the mode

of control of circulation on which their production was based. Our next case was that of the conflict between state and private interests in the mercury mine, where, it was argued, the state successfully contained private interests, despite appearances, by always paying more at its offices for the mercury than was offered on the black market. And our third case was one in which private interests clearly outran state attempts at control: the corregidores distributed far more than they were intended to according to the state Tariff, as well as distributing prohibited use-values, such as alcohol; and smaller merchant caciques then led an uprising, not only because the corregidores were monopolising the market for sales, but because they were thereby obtaining labour at a time when the smaller caciques' interests were already threatened by developments in Europe.

b. The state and money

Many of these issues come to a head in the question of money. We have already stated that alongside the elaborate planning of circulation by the Incas there are also traces of a money system. The cylindrical discs of polished coral known as mullu were found in the state deposits, where, according to Pedro Pizarro, they were used for small accounts. But we know from the Huanuco Visit, as well as mythology, that shells were also offered to the jungle temples. What we have to ask, then, is whether these little polished discs, which are of various different sizes, and can be strung on necklaces, were not tokens issued on receipt of tribute goods at the state deposit, which could then be taken and exchanged for coca at the temple. This is only a hypothesis at present, but it seems a more likely one than any concerning the possibility of private trade using these shells.

If it is correct, or even if the mechanisms for using the mullu money were slightly different, then this bears out the theory that money comes in as the facilitator of exploitation, rather than as facilitator of exchange. Provided that the Inca state could successfully prevent the smuggling of mullu, then the circulation of tokens could replace some of the actual physical circulation of goods to and from state deposits and vertical colonies.

Mullu were offered to the early Spaniards for money, but disappeared rapidly, and it seems that their circulation had not in any case been very general. Provided that the population is kept stable and certain key use-values are controlled, it seems that states do not need to introduce token money: some means of accounting over a period of time is enough. This was provided by the Inca quipus, the method of accounting with different coloured knots, and was replaced in the colonial period by writing, as a means of accounting labour. The forced labourers in the mines were paid according to the quillcas, written lists of what they were owed and its 'discounting' in the wage-goods. Similarly, the corregidores had to use writing to keep accounts of what was owed to them, and were very much dependent on the caciques for keeping lists of population. The contradictions that developed in this system of the corregidores were in part due to the fact that such a system could not work unless the population was kept stable. By the second half of the 18th century there are signs that this was no longer the case and that there was much greater geographical mobility than formerly.

It is ironic that credit, usually considered the most advanced form of money historically, actually emerges as the most primitive in the case in question, with token money coming next, brought in to ease the gap between delivery at the state deposit and payment in the monopoly good. The comparative absence of token money in colonial Peru remains a mystery.

The money minted by the state, the peso de a ocho, was a strong currency with a silver content virtually equivalent to its nominal value, which was destined to become an international currency in the form of the dollar. Since Peru was the centre of production, it tended to flow away to Europe, which was clearly the intention of the Spanish state, but made things very difficult for the Spanish colonists. In part this was overcome by the circulation of debased and clipped coins in the colony, but in general we can say that the peso de a ocho was an international money and that its circulation stopped where the circulation of foreign cloth stopped in Peruvian society, in the person of the cacique.

5. The Weakening of Control

We can now qualify the assertion that the entry of the market will tend to undermine a pre-capitalist mode based on control of circulation. The pre-capitalist ruling class can cope well with the entry of the market, provided that at the same time they can keep their populations stable. For a long period during the 17th and early 18th centuries this proved possible, due to the general depression in economic activity, but at times when the mining economy grew it was not. We could go further than this and say that the growth of cloth production in the cloth factories and workshops in the 17th century was achieved on the basis of the marketing of the wage-goods by the corregidores to the caciques. The factories and smaller workshops could be kept relatively close to the communities, so that migration was not so often involved. In any case, the factories were in the countryside and markets were not allowed to grow up around them, as they were by the Spanish in the mining centres. If this is correct, then the recovery of mining in the 18th century, which otherwise comes out of the blue, can be explained as in part a by-product of the decline of cloth production in Peru, a decline which was due to the effects of international competition in the form of European textile imports.

The market was not in itself contradictory for the indigenous ruling class; it was the combination of markets and of uncontrolled population movement. This explains the continual conflict over the 'outsiders' who left their communities, and over the forced labourers and the question of their return home after mining labour. The issue of women's mobility is perhaps again crucial here. Generally, more men than women seem to have been involved in the forced labour in the mines; but, provided the women were back in the communities, there was a material need for the men to return home. The growth of the cloth factories may therefore have helped in this way to keep the population stable. They provided alternative possibilities for women to earn the wage-goods, which were probably comparable to what could be earned in domestic service or in street-selling in the towns, although wages were low and generally paid in kind.

The period of articulation, then, when the world market appears to reinforce the pre-capitalist mode of production, corresponds in the Peruvian case to a period when, after the initial social upheaval of the silver and mercury mining boom, the population was once again stabilised in the villages, perhaps crucially because the caciques employed women in the cloth factories and paid them in the old vertical goods, now obtained on the market. We must now go on, finally, to consider the question of whether a further stage can be discerned, when capitalism, in Rey's expression "takes root" and becomes the "dominant mode" (Rey 1976:161).

6. Pre-capitalism and Underdevelopment

One of the reasons why the theory of articulation of modes of production arose was that it seemed rather obvious that the underdeveloped countries today were those where there had been relatively dense populations organised in pre-capitalist modes of production in the past. Capitalism did not create poles of underdevelopment in places where the native population was either non-existent or was physically exterminated by

European arms and disease, such as North America and Australia. This shows not only that underdevelopment has nothing to do with trade between core and periphery, but that it does have something to do with the previous existence of pre-capitalist modes.

A standard answer presumably would be to argue that the peoples of such pre-capitalist areas were 'backward', stupid, or less technologically advanced than those of the countries that became capitalist. But though this is so common a stereotype as to be generally accepted, it is actually true that capitalism developed from one of the most backward areas of the world, both socially and technically. In the north-west of medieval Europe, there were no centralised state apparatuses, and most of the technical advances were ones that had filtered through from China. There seems little point in trying to quantify and compare technological levels very accurately across societies, since such development is so uneven. But the technical achievements in weaving and tapestry work by the Peruvian civilisations long before the Incas were unparalleled in fineness by anything produced either at the court of Louis XV or in 19th century Manchester (Alden Mason 1968). In fact, the names of many of their forms of 'weaving' are untranslatable into English.

In relation to the Peruvian Andes, the answer of this thesis would be as follows. The entry of the market in the form of the exchange of foreign cloth for silver production, and the development by the Spanish of an internal market in the old wage-goods, in order to pay the labourers in the mines, could be controlled by the indigenous ruling class as long as population was kept relatively stable in the villages. But the decentralisation of circulation of the wage-goods, as compared with Inca times, already meant that much of the complex division of labour developed by the Incas was lost. The replacement of Inca cloth, which had functioned as a means of controlling population, by Spanish cloth, which was

merely an 'elite good', together with the loss of a centralised control over women, meant that it was difficult any longer to control population movement. Writing lists of population did not carry any weight, unless the people listed carried a written pass that corresponded to their name in the list, as in modern South Africa. When the Peruvian textile industry went into decline, which had worked to control population movement for a while by employing women in the communities, the caciques lost control and some of them revolted. The result was the final destruction of the division of labour which had been the achievement of the Inca mode of production. In its place were left a population, whose density, though sparse in geographical terms, is quite thick in relation to the available agricultural lands. Their appearance of having been eternally small peasants in control of their own means of production/subsistence is an illusion; their situation is the result of a destruction, not of any constructive development.

In the Inca mode of production it did not matter if the peasant-workers were largely in control of their own means of production, provided they were separated from a few crucial ones. However, capitalist expansion requires a large mass of population already divorced from the means of production in order to get under way. 19th century capitalism therefore had little impact on the Peruvian Andes. A trade in alpaca wool was important for a while; but, rather like the Spanish occupation of the maize colonies after the Conquest, the largest estates were formed by British and American capital moving in to unoccupied highland pastures. Otherwise, peasant production does not seem to have expanded beyond the limits of the appropriation of the highland pastures, which were former vertical colonies of the valley areas, by a few rich Indians (Roberts and Samaniego 1978). By the time large scale migration to the coastal towns got under way in the 1950s, capitalism seemed to have lost all power to expand and absorb the surplus population

in the peripheral countries. While some have argued that the vast mass of shanty-town dwellers, many of them living from unproductive occupations such as street-selling, show the beginnings of indigenous capitalist growth (Warren 1980:215-217), it seems more realistic to regard these typical problems of underdevelopment as representing massive underemployment. According to this thesis, the broad historical outlines of this social problem must be sought in the role of the market, in conjunction with a state policy that allowed uncontrolled population movement, in destroying the division of labour existing in a society where the ruling class obtained surplus labour through controlling the circulation of key use-values and at the same time controlling population movement.

APPENDIX

GUANACAURE: A FORTIFIED COCA COLONY OF THE INCAS

It is uncharacteristic that Murra seems to have missed the clues in the Visit that show that the fortresses referred to had in fact been in the coca lands. The evidence concerns a place called Guanacaure, several days' journey from Huánuco on the lower slopes of the Andes towards the jungle region. Guanacaure had clearly been an important religious site under the Incas. The leaders of the chupachu describe it as having been a guaca, a 'tomb' (Ortiz de Zúñiga: I 27, 30, 38-39, 49). A road led to it from the Inca hostel or tambo at a place called Ambo, and the chupachu had had to maintain this as part of their tribute in Inca times (ibid: I 27). The Spaniards had pillaged gold and silver from the tomb at Guanacaure (ibid: I 38-39, 49).

As can be seen from table 4.4, in 1562 Guanacaure was a cotton colony, inhabited mainly by mitmaq families. Their principal cacique, Francisco Conapariaguana, described Guanacaure as having been "founded by the community in order to work the cotton fields near by" (ibid: II 24). He also said that it "had no principal" but was "subject to himself as cacique" (ibid). The older Andrés Auquilluco contradicted him in his declaration, since while listing it as a village belonging to Conapariaguana he also said that it had a "principal who is called Cristobal Urcuhuaranga" (ibid: II 33). In the inspection of the village of Ananpillao, this personage reappears as Cristobal Urcoguaranga Inga, listed after all the houses have been visited, as living in Guanacaure. He himself and a large family (including his mother, mother-in-law, a brother and a brother-in-law) are all exempted from tribute on the grounds that "their father was a principal who did nothing but give orders and go to the roads". (ibid: II 243). The exemption is very unusual, but may have been similar to that of some other full-time specialist workers. He is said to "recognise" Andrés Auquilluco as the cacique to whom he is subordinate (ibid), and the family are described as "having lands and fields there for they are colonists mitimaes placed there by the Inca" (ibid). Four other mitmaq families

are recorded in the Visit as resident in Guanacaure (ibid: II 189, 225, 226, 237), two of whom are described as having "stayed there since Inca times" (ibid: II 225, 237). The predominance of the mitmaq in Guanacaure is confirmed by the other ethnic groups: the quero had only one family living there (ibid: I 216), the yacha none, and the chupachu had "only one woman there in Guanacaure from this ayllu, but from other ayllus there must be others, put there as mitimaes, who have remained till the present" (ibid: I 249). Probably because they were themselves producing cotton nearer the village, the chupachu were anxious to bring their one woman colonist "back to the village, so that we can all be together" (ibid).

Guanacaure is also described as a 'fortress' using the Spanish word fortaleza. The people living there in 1562 are said by a chupachu principal to have been "placed there in Inca times to guard that fortress" (ibid: I 249). But the mitmaq also frequently described their ancestors as 'fortress-experts', using the Quechua word, pucara, normally translated as 'fortress' (ibid: II 177). They said that they had originally been brought from Cuzco "to guard three fortresses...The Inca Yupanqui had conquered the chupachu at that time and, so that they should not rebel, made fortresses and put people in them..." (ibid: II 197).

Having established that Guanacaure was both 'fortress' and, in 1562, a cotton colony, we can make sense of the explanations of the two oldest witnesses in the Visit as to where they exchange for cotton. Francisco Pitoananga said of his villagers that "they do not grow cotton, nor do they have any in their lands, and they go to exchange for it in the Inca fortresses /pucaraes yngas/ seven days' walk away" (ibid: II 87). Martín Carcay of the chupachu uses the same word pucaraes to explain where his villagers go to exchange for cotton (ibid: I 239). It turns out that his village owns some cotton lands in "Muchque, which are lands for chilli from Inca times", and that they have a resident family there looking after the cotton (ibid: I 243). Among the absent people listed at the end of the inspection of this village, there is "a very old, childless woman who is in the pucaraes" (ibid: I 244). The proximity of the two entries suggests that the pucaraes,

or 'fortresses' are to be identified with the cotton lands of Muchque.

The final clue to this puzzle is provided by Diego Xagua, principal cacique of the chupachu, who had been an official in Cuzco before the Conquest. He describes Guanacaure as "a tomb... in his land; it used to have a field of coca with Indians who cultivated it, and in the same way it had another field of maize with men and women to grow it, and they used to make the chicha to offer to the tomb" (ibid: I 30). So that quite clearly Guanacaure was in the coca-producing area. It was a fortified tomb or sanctuary, supervised by the Cuzco colonists, who were armed (ibid: II 27,34,47). The conquered chupachu had to provide men and women to cultivate maize and coca there and to work on road maintenance, all under the supervision of the mitmaq. Diego Xagua added to his declaration "that this tomb used to have many men and women who were occupied in the service of the tomb and he does not remember how many there were of each" (ibid: I 30). Coca and maize-alcohol were the main offerings made to the tomb, and presumably to its large personnel. There is a suggestion that the Incas also grew chilli in the 'fortresses'. The conclusion must be that, among other things of a religious nature, Guanacaure was the Incas' main fortification not primarily against jungle tribes, but against the chupachu, as is stated in the text. What is curious at first sight is that the Incas had placed their fortresses to subdue the population so far away from the main residential centres. In fact, they had placed them in the coca-fields. Once again, this can only be understood in the light of the theory that sees the vertical colonies as not about 'self-sufficiency' and 'subsistence', but as to do with controlling the circulation of certain goods, and therefore keeping the population out of the areas where they could be produced. Those of the local people brought in to do the labour of growing the controlled goods had to be supervised, and this evidently required a substantial garrison of Inca soldiers.

It is interesting that Diego Xagua also says that "sometimes the caciques and principals used to give offerings of maize, potatoes and guinea-pigs to the tomb" of Guanacaure (ibid: I 30),

since Pitoananga in describing how they obtain cotton in the 'fortresses' in 1562 says that they give "dried potatoes and guinea-pigs" in exchange (ibid: II 87). Similarly, Martín Carcay says that they give "potatoes, guinea-pigs and chickens" in exchange for cotton in the fortresses (ibid: I 239). Others say simply that they barter for cotton by giving "potatoes, guinea-pigs and dried venison" (ibid: I 171), "guinea-pigs and other things" (ibid: II 94), "potatoes, guinea-pigs and other things" (ibid: II 238) without specifying a place where they go to barter. Others say they take these things to the jungle lowlands to exchange for the beeswax for the tribute: for instance, "they buy the beeswax communally, with potatoes, maize and guinea-pigs that they give" (ibid: I 160), or "he gives guinea-pigs and potatoes for the barter for the beeswax" (ibid: I 175). What this seems to indicate is that a traditional assortment of goods used in order to barter for jungle products, principally for coca, was now being spent on bartering for the tribute goods. Two further references bear out this interpretation. A mitmaq principal says that "they go to the lowlands to barter for coca and cotton, and they take guinea-pigs and [for?] cotton, dried meat and potatoes and quinoa and also oca, and these coca-workers also come to their land to barter..." (ibid: II 179). The principal cacique of the yacha, a group that did not possess any lowland colonies, but only highland pastures, says that "to those in the coca lands they take dried venison, dried potatoes and dried oca and they bring back coca in exchange, and with the coca they obtain salt, chilli and cotton, and some Indians go as hired labourers to the coca lands without taking anything else" (ibid: II 58). As the yacha are the only group visited that had absolutely no access to coca lands of their own in 1562, it is significant to find that the traditional goods taken for exchange to the jungle are being used by them to buy coca. The other groups all possessed some coca lands, so that they could now obtain coca directly, rather than having to take goods to exchange, as they had done when the Incas were in control.

A further point is whether this Guanacaure is to be identified with the tomb of Guanacava mentioned in the quipu of tribute given to the Inca, which was recited in 1549 (ibid: I 305-307). For instance, when Xulca Condor says that "he has heard say that by

order of the Inca they used to give men and women to serve the tomb of Guanacaure" (ibid: I 51), this is extremely reminiscent of the item in the quipu, according to which they used to have to give "twenty Indians all the year round to guard the body of Guanacava after his death" (ibid: I 306). A few items before this one in the list, we learn that the chupachu had also had to give 150 Indians "for yanaconas of Guaynacava", presumably when he was still alive, and not after his death (ibid). Now the name Guanacava, or Guaynacava in the quipu has been interpreted by the editors of the Huánuco Visit as referring to Guayna Capac, the eleventh Inca emperor, and father of Guascar and Atahualpa who were at war with each other at the time of the Spanish conquest (ibid: I 421). Their interpretation is borne out by the account of the history of the mitmaq given by Critsóbal Contochi, leader of Curamarca, who says that they had been brought there from Cuzco after the defeat of the chupachu by "the Inca Topa Ynga Yupanqui, father of Guayna Cahua" (ibid: II 177).

It is not, in fact, necessary to assume that the name had become corrupted in so short a time, in order to identify the "tomb of Guanacaure" with the place where "the body of Guanacava" was buried. The word translated here as 'tomb' is the Quechua waka (hispanicised as huaca), while the Quechua kauri (hispanicised as caure) is a synonym for waka. The name of Guanacaure therefore means the 'tomb' or 'sanctuary' of Guana. Since the name of Guayna Capac was transcribed as 'Guanacava' in 1549, and since there are no place names in the Visit which consist of compounds of more than two Quechua words, the use of the name Guanacaure to locate the sanctuary of Guayna Capac seems a perfectly plausible one. Japaq (hispanicised capac) is in any case only a title meaning something like 'king' or 'sovereign'. The reference to the former sovereign would be as in the name 'Victoria Falls'.

In conclusion, this example helps to show how the Incas were able to control such a vast area of territory from so small a base. They did not have to control the people directly, but only certain key goods. Among these, it seems that coca was the most

strictly controlled and supervised and, certainly in this area, it was the one where the Incas concentrated their military resources. Since coca is mildly addictive when chewed, it is quite easy to understand how it was (and still is today) a good considered necessary to life itself by the Andean population. However, we should also bear in mind that salt, which certainly is necessary to life, could not be obtained by commoners without giving coca in exchange. A final point to note is that most of the Huánuco caciques mention the custom of offering "coloured sea shells" to the "tombs and temples" in Inca times (ibid: I 41). There is a myth of the origins of the use of shells for sacrifices recounted in Dioses y Hombres de Huarochiri. In it, Tupac Inca Yupanqui needed to conquer some peoples who had rebelled in la montana, the upper jungle area. He summoned all his huacas, (all those who "receive gold and silver") to Cuzco, and eventually one Macahuisa agrees to help him. After the rebels have been put down, the Inca, frightened for his own life, offers the god anything he wants and tries putting food in front of him. The god refuses the food, and orders shells (mullu) to be brought. When they arrive, he crunches them up in his mouth (Arguedas 1975: 103-105). The suggestion of a new order involving sea shells imposed in the jungle region after a conquest by Tupa Inca Yupanqui has many resonances in the Huánuco Visit. It is possible that the new order was one in which shells were introduced as tokens for which the state monopoly good, coca, was exchangeable. Shells would then have been the first money in Peru - money in Knapp's sense of a token authorised by the state, and as in Bloch's account of the origins of money - exchangeable for the state monopoly good (see Chapter II).

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(Abbreviations:

BN = Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, Peru.

PSM = Provisiones sobre mita).

BN B 1522

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BN C 1209

Sobre carta de las provisiones aqui insertas en que se ordena al Senor Gobernador de la Villa de Huancavelica que apremie a los corregidores de las provincias afectas a la mita de dicha V^a enteren los indios de su obligacion efectivos en persona y no en plata como ba prevenido.

BN C 1619

Memorial que presenta el Excmo. Sr. Virrey Don José de Armendarizi, Marqués de Castellfuerte, a don Melchor de Carbajal en nombre de varios caciques de los partidos de la provincia de Angaraes sobre no haberse cumplido en relevar a dichos indios en los trabajos de las minas de Huancavelica conforme habia decretado el Principe de Santo Buono. Callao. Octubre 1730.

BN C 2236

Provisión de retasas del tributo que deben pagar los indios originarios del repartimiento de Chancas de Cajamarca de la provincia de Angaraes.

BN D 6062

Copia del expediente sobre las noticias que pide el Excmo. Sr. Virrey de los arrendamientos de tierras sobrantes y conocidas con el nombre de mitas.

BN E 788

Informe de Don Damasio Vidalón, Subprefecto de Lircay, provincia de Angaraes.

PSM 1636-1746

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ZUNIGA, ORTIZ DE: see ORTIZ DE ZUNIGA

GLOSSARY OF SPANISH AND QUECHUA TERMS

advenizos	category used by the caciques in 16th century Huanuco in their headcounts of population to describe recent arrivals in a village
aguardiente	spirits, rum
aguardiente de uva	brandy
alcalde	mayor, supervisor
alcalde de crimen	criminal judge
alguacil mayor	'chief constable' - a local officer in colonial villages
alquila	wage-labourer, often hired as substitute by communities owing state labour-service in the colonial period
andes	originally the lower, western slopes of the mountain-range today known as the Andes
angaras	pre-Incaic inhabitants of the area around Huancavelica
apires	workers who brought the ore from the faces to the surface in Huancavelica
aqlla	unmarried women chosen to serve the Inca, for whom they spun and wove cloth
arancel	tariff, tariff list
asiento	contract; in colonial Huancavelica, between the Crown as buyer, and the Miners' Guild as producer of mercury
asentista	contractor; in colonial Huancavelica, one named as a mine proprietor supplying to the Crown
auto	decree
audiencia	audience chamber, high court
avasca	plain woollen worsted
aviadores	suppliers of credit and goods to mining contractors
ayllu	quechua term for kinship or ethnic group, used by the Incas for the organisation of labour tribute

aylluy	to clothe, provide with cloth
ayni	reciprocal exchange of labour between two people
balsa	raft
bayeta	in the contemporary Andes, a coarse woollen cloth without a nap
bretañas	fine linen
cacique	Mexican term, given to local Indian authorities in South America by the Spanish
Caja Real	Royal Chest, Crown safe
callana	see page 267, note 41
cargapa	see page 235
carguiches	porters, carriers
cedula real	royal letter patent, decree
celemin	measure of dry weight, the twelfth part of a <u>fanega</u>
chacra [chakra]	field, farm, source of subsistence
chicha	maize beer
chuño	dehydrated potato, made by rapid drying after freezing
chorillos	literally, 'streams'; term given to unlicensed weaving mills in the 18th century
chupachu [chupaychu]	one of the ethnic groups visited in Huanuco in 1562
coca camayos	hispanicised plural of quechua <u>cocacamayog</u> , a skilled coca grower
cobradores	tax-collectors
colquehaques	term used for rich Indians in Aymara-speaking provinces of 18th century <u>Alto Perú</u> [Bolivia]
cordellate	grogam, a kind of cloth
corregidor	lowest-level colonial official appointed directly by the Crown

cumbi	fine cloth, woven for Inca and lesser authorities
cumbicamayoc	specialist weaver of fine cloth under the Incas
doctrina	the services of a priest, especially that of instruction in the catechism; area under the responsibility of a priest, or religious order
encomendero	in early colonial times, the recipient of a grant of Indians from the Crown
encomienda	area covered by a Crown grant of Indians
escopeta	shotgun
fanega	measure of dry-weight, equivalent to about 100 litres or 2.75 bushels; also the area of land that can be sown with a <u>fanega</u> of seed
fiesta	festival, feast day, holiday
forastero	literally, 'outsider'; colonial fiscal category for one who, by migrating from his province of origin, avoided tribute and <u>mita</u> obligations, the status being inherited by his descendents
fortaleza	fortress
grano	measure of silver, the twelfth part of one tomin
guaca [huaca, waka]	tomb; artefact from contents of a tomb
guarmi [warmi]	woman
guarmichacras	see page 269, note 51
guasacho	see page 249
guatancha	see page 304
hacienda	large landed estate
hornero	oven-stoker
hoyo negro	black hole
huaca	see <u>guaca</u>
huaraca	sling

ichu	<u>stepa ichu</u> , a straw-like grass of the <u>puna</u> region
indio de faltriquera	see page 263, note 24
indio de plata	see page 263, note 24
jallana	see page 267, note 41
jallay	see page 267, note 41
japaq	see page 335
kajcheo	see page 222
kallana	see page 267, note 41
kachaco	one responsible for civil order under the Inca state
kauri [caure]	see page 335
kuraka	political chief of an <u>ayllu</u> under the Inca system
kutacachi	ground salt
la roza	clearance work in the Huancavelica mercury mine undertaken by <u>mitayos</u>
laymi	ethnic group in the north of Potosí Department in Bolivia
legajo	folder of papers in an archive
lupaqa	one of the ethnic groups to the south of Lake Titicaca conquered by the Incas
mañana runa	see page 191, note 22
mañay	see page 191, note 22
manta	shawl or carrying cloth
manu	debt
manuy	to lend
mamaconas	hispanicisation of the quechua <u>mamakuna</u> ['women', 'mothers'] used to describe women living at religious centres in the Huánuco Visit
mayordomo	foreman, supervisor

memorial	official letter
mestizo	of mixed race
minga [minka]	see page 78 and page 263, note 24; also page 113, note 12
mingado	see page 78 and page 263, note 24
mita [mit'a]	rotating labour service owed by the <u>ayllus</u> to the Inca state and adapted by the Spanish mainly for mining labour
mit'ani	to take turns at working
mitayos	hispanicised plural of <u>mitayoq</u> , one taking his turn at compulsory labour; used for those doing compulsory labour in mines in the colonial period
mitimaes	hispanicised plural of <u>mitmaq</u> , used for the descendants of colonists sent by the Inca from one area to another
mitmaq	in general, settlers in regions recently conquered by the Incas, who maintained rights in their community of origin; in the context of the Huanuco Visit, the <u>mitmaq</u> were a group originally from Cuzco
montaña	jungle forest
mullu	shell from the coast of Ecuador, worked into rounded pieces and used for counting
obraje	workshop or mill, licensed by the colonial state
Oidores	civil Judges
olleros	workers who tended the pots for distilling mercury in Huancavelica
oyaricos	see page 235
pachaca	one hundred, a division of the population under the Incas
pallaqueo	name given to the free enterprise system in operation at Huancavelica after the state abandoned the mercury mine in 1790
pañó	flannel
parecer	legal opinion

perpetuanes	'long-lasting' cloth imported to Peru from England in the 18th century
peso corriente	ordinary peso; see page 270, note 64
peso de a nueve	piece of nine; see page 270, note 64
peso de a ocho	piece of eight; see page 270, note 64
peso ensayado	assayed peso; see page 270, note 64
piqueros	pick-workers, those who dug the ore underground
pisco	Peruvian brandy
Procurador de Indios	Procurator of the Indians; see page 263, note 25
Procurador Fiscal	Fiscal Procurator; see page 263; note 25
pucara	fortress
pucaraes yngas	Inca fortresses
puna	grasslands—from around 3,500–4,500 metres above sea level in the Andes, used mainly for pasturing llamas
punchao	daily wage
puricha	literally 'a walk', term given to each load brought up by a mine-worker for piece-rate purposes
quero	one of the ethnic groups visited in Huánuco in 1562
quillcas	written accounts of workers' wages and debts, at Huancavelica, from a quechua word meaning 'drawing'
quinoa	high-protein native Andean grain [<u>chenopodium quinoa</u>]
quipu	knotted cords used for keeping accounts and records by the Incas
quipucamayoc	a keeper of <u>quipu</u> records
qolla	people of the southern 'quarter' of the Inca empire
qollqa	Inca deposit, whose contents were for use only by the state

reducciones	villages in which the dispersed population of the Andes was concentrated by the Spanish
regidor	local councillor in colonial villages
relación	report
repartimiento	[a] Indians under the charge of a <u>corregidor</u> , or the area they inhabited; [b] distribution of goods [see Chapter VI]
repartimiento de efectos	distribution of goods
rescatadores	travelling traders
rescatar	to exchange or trade
rescates	exchanges
reservados	those exempted from compulsory <u>mita</u> labour in the colonial period
rogar	to ask or <u>beg</u>
roza	see <u>la roza</u>
ruanes	cloth from Rouen
runa	man
sal	salt
seje	see page 108
señorío	lordship
soles	plural of <u>sol</u> , the post-independence currency of Peru
suyu	see page 108
tambo [tampu]	Inca roadside storage house
tapaderas	containers for carrying mercury ore
taku [taku taku]	see page 109
tasa	prior to 1570, the tribute in goods owed by the Indian ethnic groups to the Spanish <u>encomenderos</u> ; post 1570, a tax on Indian households assessed in money, but often collected in goods by the <u>corr-egidor</u>

tocricoq	see page 92
tomines	colonial currency, nine of which made one <u>peso ensayado</u>
trato	contract
tributo	tribute
uva	grape
vino	wine
Visita	official visit, made by a Crown-appointed Visitor for the purposes of assessing Indians' tribute payments
waje-waje	contemporary term for reciprocal exchange of labour in the Huanuco area
waka	see <u>guaca</u>
waranqa	a thousand
watancha	see page 304
yacha	one of the ethnic groups visited in Huánuco in 1562
yana	literally 'black', term given to a herdsman subject to a lord in Inca times, possibly because their faces were dark from the cold of the <u>puna</u>
yanaconas	hispanicisation of <u>yanakuna</u> , plural of <u>yana</u>
yaros	one of the ethnic groups in Huánuco in 1562
yunga	name given both to the jungle lowlands to the east and to the coastal lowlands to the west of the Andes in pre-hispanic times; also the language spoken by the people of the coastal lowlands to the west of Cajamarca
yupanaco, yupanakuy	see page 193, note 28