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Catia Batista, Aitor Lacuesta, Pedro C. Vicente

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Testing the ‘Brain Gain’ Hypothesis: Micro Evidence from Cape Verde

Catia Batista†, Aitor Lacuesta‡, and Pedro C. Vicente§

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Abstract
Does emigration really drain human capital accumulation in origin countries? This paper explores a unique household survey purposely designed and conducted to answer this research question. We analyze the case of Cape Verde, a country with allegedly the highest ‘brain drain’ in Africa, despite a marked record of income and human capital growth in recent decades. Our micro data enables us to propose the first explicit test of ‘brain gain’ arguments, according to which the prospects of own future migration can positively impact educational attainment. Our most conservative estimates using individual specific variation in economic conditions at the destination indicate that a 10pp increase in the probability of own future migration improves the probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling by nearly 4pp for individuals who do not migrate before age 16. These findings are robust to the choice of instruments and econometric specification. Counterfactual simulations point to significant human capital gains from lowering migration barriers.

JEL Codes: F22; J24; O12; O15.

Keywords: brain drain; brain gain; international migration; human capital; effects of emigration in origin countries; sub-Saharan Africa.

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† Trinity College Dublin and IZA. Email: catia.batista@tcd.ie
‡ Bank of Spain. Email: aitor.lacuesta@bde.es
§ Trinity College Dublin, CSAE-University of Oxford, and BREAD. Email: vicentep@tcd.ie
1. Introduction

The last decades witnessed striking growth in international migration flows.\(^1\) In particular, the international movement of the highly educated experienced an impressive surge: according to Beine et al. (2008), from 1990 to 2000, there was a 63.7% increase in the number of highly-skilled immigrants residing in OECD countries (to a stock of 20 million), whereas the number of unskilled immigrants had only increased by 14.4% in the same ten years. This extraordinary trend has brought renewed interest and significance to the old ‘brain drain’ debate. Concerns about ‘brain drain’ were introduced in the late 1960s and 1970s, and soon became well rooted in the economics literature.\(^2\) ‘Brain drain’ became a general label for the depressing effects arising from the loss of the most skilled national citizens in a country. In the 1990s, however, a new strand of theoretical literature proposed the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis: according to this proposition, it is possible that the outflow of educated migrants (and the possibility of own future migration in particular) can lead to a net increase in the origin country’s stock of human capital.\(^3\) Despite the existing abundant theoretical literature on the ‘brain drain’ theme, the empirical literature has lagged until recently. This is due, at least partly, to data unavailability on the skill content of migration flows. Indeed, the dataset assembled by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) opened an avenue of renewed interest in the theme, prompting new research to verify and qualify the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis across countries and over time (notably, Faini, 2006; Ozden and Schiff, 2006; and Beine et al. 2007, 2008). In our opinion, what remains to be done in this literature is, importantly, testing this hypothesis at the micro level - i.e. to examine explicitly whether the probability of own, future migration improves individual educational attainment. This is precisely the purpose of our paper.

In order to answer our research question, we make use of a new dataset: a tailored household survey conducted by the authors in Cape Verde in 2006. Cape Verde is a very interesting country for our purposes as it displays the highest ‘brain drain’ rate in the African continent,\(^4\) and yet also presents a fast

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\(^1\) Chiswick and Hatton (2003) offer a detailed description of this historical evolution and underlying mechanisms.

\(^2\) Scott and Gruber (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) were the main proponents for the ‘brain drain’ theories. The ‘brain drain’ effects presumably include the disappearance of a critical mass in production, research, public services (notably health and education) and political institutions, which could potentially be magnified by positive human capital externalities, or complementarities with factors of production or total factor productivity. In addition, massive emigration of the most educated could entail fiscal losses due to foregone revenues from public education of those who emigrate.

\(^3\) This theory was put forward by Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998) and Vidal (1998). It proposed that a ‘brain gain’ could happen if expected returns to education increased when emigrating was possible (as would be the case if host countries have higher returns to education than origin countries) and enough skilled individuals eventually decided not to emigrate.

\(^4\) Our source is Docquier and Marfouk (2006), who report the ‘brain drain’ rate to be 67.5%. ‘Brain drain’ is defined as the fraction of highly educated Cape Verdean nationals who reside abroad.
growing stock of human capital, at least since 1990. These are apparently contradictory facts under the light of traditional ‘brain drain’ theories, which point to the possibility of a ‘brain gain’ in this instance.

In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effect of the own future migration probability on education decisions using the full migration histories of all household members in our dataset. In doing so, we assume that individuals who reside in Cape Verde decide around age 12 whether to complete a non-compulsory intermediate level of secondary schooling. At that point in time, they have certain information about their prospects of future emigration - which may or not actually happen in the future. Our most conservative estimates using individual specific variation in economic conditions in the family destination countries point to a 10pp increase in the probability of own future migration improving the average probability of completing intermediate secondary school by nearly 4pp. These results are robust to the choice of instruments and econometric specification.

In order to give precise meaning to our econometric estimates, we use a simultaneous equation model of migration and education decisions to simulate the behavior of an economy hit by changes in migration barriers - e.g. intensified immigration restrictions in destination countries. In particular, we are able to measure the effects of this counterfactual exercise on migration decisions and on the educational attainment of both non-migrants and of migrants – for which purpose we complement our survey data with information from censuses of the main international destinations of Cape Verdian emigrants. Our results show that a rise in migration barriers has non-linear effects (the elasticity of educational responses to changes in migration seems to increase with the size of the shock) with differential impact on migrants and non-migrants. For instance, a shock decreasing migration by 9pp, reduces the educational attainment of non-migrants by 7pp (implying an elasticity of 0.21), and that of migrants by only 2pp (implying an elasticity of 0.06). This evidence supports the importance of the ‘brain gain’ mechanism, even after we account for the educational upgrade abroad by early migrants who may return when migration policies are made more restrictive.

Our work is related to two main strands in the migration literature. The first is the previously mentioned, cross-country empirical work on the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis as defined at a macro level. This approach has the advantage of distinguishing between countries that are more or less affected by ‘brain gain’ – indeed, only in poorer countries with sufficiently low emigration rates does human capital accumulation seem to benefit from skilled emigration. However, the simplistic definition of ‘brain gain’ at the macro level (as a country’s native tertiary schooling growth due to migration of skilled workers) misses

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5 Batista et al. (2007) show that, over the period 1990-2005, the stock of human capital in Cape Verde grew at an annual rate of 3.5%. In addition, according to their growth accounting results, human capital accumulation is the aggregate input that accounts for most of the excellent growth performance of the Cape Verdian economy over those 15 years.

potentially important individual heterogeneity and is, by design, incapable of identifying the channels through which these positive effects work. Our study overcomes these limitations by using micro data from our tailored household survey, which enables us to explicitly test and find supportive evidence to the own probability of future migration channel - i.e. the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis.

This paper is also related to microeconometric work on the effects of having a migrant in the household on the educational attainment of Mexican children, as in Hanson and Woodruff (2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). Unlike these studies, we model the simultaneous decisions of educational attainment and own migration, which allows us to test explicitly for the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis. In Hanson and Woodruff (2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) it is not that clear which mechanism is underlying the positive correlation between parental emigration and children’s education.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we begin by presenting a brief overview of Cape Verde. We then proceed, in section 3, by presenting our data sources, namely the household survey we use in our empirical work, including descriptive statistics, and our estimates for ‘brain drain’ in Cape Verde. In section 4, we present the econometric model and identification strategy. In section 5, the main ‘brain gain’ positive empirical findings are presented and discussed, along with robustness checks. In the following section, counterfactual scenarios are computed under which barriers to migration are increased, and the effects on migration and education are discussed. Section 6 empirically examines briefly the possible reasons why a higher likelihood to emigrate may promote increased educational attainment. Finally, section 7 summarizes our findings and presents policy implications.

2. Cape Verde: a short introduction to the country

Cape Verde is a nine-island country with 441,000 inhabitants, according to the 2000 census. It became independent from Portugal in 1975 and has been a stable democracy since 1991. The country is currently ranked by the World Bank as a “Lower Middle-Income” economy, and had a GDP per capita of 5900 PPP-Adjusted Dollars in 2003, according to Heston et al. (2006).

Cape Verdean economic growth clearly exceeded the Sub-Saharan African average of 0.6% GDP per capita growth over 1980-2004 (again according to Heston et al., 2006). Indeed, it was the third fastest country in terms of per capita growth out of the 45 sub-Saharan countries in Heston et al. (2006), after Equatorial Guinea (11% average annual growth rate) and Botswana (5%). These countries are both rich in natural resources and exports account for a large fraction of their GDP (47% and 55%, respectively). Unlike them, Cape Verde stands out growing at an average annual rate of 4.4% (4.1% over 1981-1990, 5.8% over 1991-2000) but with exports accounting for only 20% of its GDP and no natural resource abundance - rather the opposite, as droughts and famines were recurrent in the country’s history.
Droughts and famines indeed prompted the massive emigration phenomenon that has characterized this country for many decades. According to our calculations, there are more than 100,000 Cape Verdean currently residing abroad, or about 19% of all nationals. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) estimate the percentage of the highly educated labor force of Cape Verde living abroad at 67.5% - the largest such number in the African continent. In addition, the magnitude of international remittances received in Cape Verde is impressive: these flows account for 16% of GDP on average over 1987-2003 (according to the World Bank, 2010), and we should note that these are official numbers, likely underestimated as they do not include informal channels. These figures are again the largest in sub-Saharan Africa and translate the especially important role of remittances for the country, particularly given the similar magnitude when compared to Official Development Aid and the much larger magnitude relative to foreign direct investment inflows.

A final note is deserved to the educational system in Cape Verde, which potentially provides the supply side restriction to our question of interest. This system functions remarkably well, particularly for sub-Saharan African standards, at least before the university level. Primary (six compulsory years of schooling) and secondary schooling (six further years grouped in three levels) are widely available at the local level (there is at least one secondary school per municipality, even more so at the primary level). Higher education institutions only started working in the country in 1995 and are located in the capital island. The following diagram illustrates the age of a child when the household decides whether to keep her in school or not.

3. Data description

Data sources
Our empirical work is mainly based upon a household survey on migration and the quality of public services designed to answer our research questions. The survey was conducted in Cape Verde from

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To compute the number of Cape Verdean living abroad we sum the number of Cape Verdean in the censuses of the main destination countries for which we have available data (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain), and divide it by 0.92 (emigrants to these destination countries represent, according to our survey, 92% of all emigrants from Cape Verde in the last five years).
December 2005 to March 2006 by the CSAE at the University of Oxford. It was based on a representative sample of 1066 resident households (including both non-migrants and return migrants), and also provides information on a large sample of current emigrants. The questionnaire included two modules: one on perceived quality/corruption of public services; and the other on migration characteristics of the household. The household respondent (someone aged at least 30 years old) was asked to specify socio-demographic characteristics of all members of the household, including children who already live elsewhere. Moreover, he was asked to characterize all migration spells within the household, including who emigrated, where and when. Finally, there were some questions regarding the economic situation of the household such as living standards, income or whether any member of the family received remittances in the previous year. More information regarding the survey can be found in Appendix A.

As detailed in the following sections, we complement our dataset with several secondary data sources. In particular, we make use of the Cape Verde Census (INE 2002); the Income and Expenditure Household Survey (INE 2004), designed and conducted by the Cape Verde National Statistics Office (INE) in 2001-2002 under the sponsorship of the World Bank; and several censuses for the main destination countries to Cape Verdelan migrants, available from Ruggles et al. (2004).

**General descriptive statistics**

The main limitation of our survey to accurately depict the migration reality in Cape Verde is that it misses a particular type of emigrants; those who did not leave family behind. In order to correct for the potential selection bias induced by this imperfection, we use census data characterizing Cape Verdelan immigrants in the main destination countries.8 This information allows us not only to estimate the stock of migrants abroad, but also to examine observable characteristics of migrants, such as gender, age and education.

The figures for migration flows for the period 2000-2005 in our survey are relatively close to those presented in the INE (2002) census for the period 1995-2000: in 2000-2005 the flow of migrants represented 3.96% of residents in Cape Verde in our survey, as opposed to 2.80% in 1995-2000 according to the censuses; in terms of return migrants arriving between 2000 and 2005, they represented 19% of the total migrant population in our survey (vs. 25% in 1995-2000 according to the censuses). In terms of the main destination countries for Cape Verdelan emigrants, according to both our survey and the INE (2002) census, Portugal and the USA account for respectively about 55% and 20% of the total emigration flows.

8 We used the 5% sample of the American census from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004). Information on Cape Verdelan in Portugal was provided by the National Statistics Office of Portugal and information for other European countries was taken from Eurostat.
Table 1 compares information from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004) on the number, gender and age of Cape Verdean that reside in France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain, with the same information for those who reside in Portugal and the USA. It is evident that the stock of emigrants abroad coming out of the survey is smaller than our estimates based on the censuses of the main international destinations. This mismatch reflects the fact that several whole and reunited families reside abroad. The results show that there are minor gender differences, but that the age profile of emigrants to all destinations is remarkably similar. As could be expected, and still according to Table 1, the age profile of emigrants in our survey and that coming from the censuses is similar, except for the fact that our survey tends to exaggerate the fraction of individuals aged 21-30 years old, which are likely to be emigrants leaving their (interviewed) families behind. Conversely, children aged 10 years old or less, who likely emigrated with their whole families, are under-represented in our survey. Also unsurprisingly, the results in Table 1 show that, relative to residents in Cape Verde, emigrants tend to be slightly disproportionately males and in their prime working years. Return migrants are strongly disproportionately males and aged more than 50 years old.

We now turn to characterizing the educational attainment of Cape Verdean emigrants relative to residents in the country. This is directly related to conventional narrow measures of ‘brain drain’, defined as the proportion of highly-skilled Cape Verdean living abroad.

Table 2 describes the educational attainment of Cape Verdean individuals aged at least 25 years old who reside in Portugal and the United States (representing nearly 75% of all Cape Verdean emigrants). We observe that the educational attainment of emigrants differs in the censuses and in our survey. Namely, the survey displays a larger fraction of emigrants with higher education. This is probably due to the fact that the survey misses information about complete household emigration, thereby increasing the relative weight of those individuals who emigrated alone with the purpose of pursuing higher education.

4. Econometric model and identification strategy

The hypothesis of ‘brain gain’ suggests that the possibility of one’s migration in the future may improve his or her educational attainment in the origin country even if this person ends up never migrating. In this section, we propose an econometric model and methodology to identify this ‘brain gain’ effect, i.e. to explicitly estimate the impact of the own future probability of migration on schooling decisions in Cape Verde.

Econometric model

In order to estimate the ‘brain gain’ effect, we propose the following latent variable model.

There are three latent variables $S^*, M(a)$ and $M'$, which govern, respectively, the decisions on: educational attainment, $S$; (future) migration decision made at age $a$, $M(a)$, when the decision of
completing education is also made; and actual migration decision, $M$, made at the age of actual migration. These choices may be represented in a timeline in the following way:

![Timeline Diagram]

While the first two latent variables, $S^*$ and $M^*(a)$, are known simultaneously, the third one, $M^*$, may be thought of as an update to $M^*(a)$ at some point in the future:

$$S_i = 1(S^*_i \geq 0) \quad \text{with} \quad S^*_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha M^*_i(a) + \alpha'_i X_i + \epsilon_i,$$

$$M^*_i(a) = \beta_0 + \beta S^*_i + \beta'_i Y_i + \epsilon_m(a),$$

$$M_i = 1(M^*_i \geq 0) \quad \text{with} \quad M^*_i = M^*_i(a) + \epsilon_{mi}.$$

The idea behind (1) - (3) is that at age $a$ individual $i$ makes two human capital investment decisions: she decides whether it is worthwhile to invest in further education or not and whether it is worthwhile to migrate or not. According to these rules, child $i$ will acquire education ($S_i = 1$) as long as the education latent variable $S^*_i$ is non-negative. Similarly, migration in the future will occur ($M_i = 1$) as long as the respective latent variable is non-negative, i.e. $M^*_i = M^*_i(a) + \epsilon_{mi} \geq 0$.

The latent variable governing the education decision, $S^*_i$, depends on several factors ($X_i$) that potentially vary at the individual, household and regional levels. In addition, it is also influenced by the determinants of the own migration decision at the date schooling choices are made, $M^*_i(a)$. This latent variable in turn depends on several covariates ($Y_i$) that potentially also include individual, household and regional characteristics, and depends in addition on the determinants of the educational decision, $S^*_i$. In the future, however, regardless of the individual migration plans at age $a$, there may be unexpected shocks ($\epsilon_{mi}$) that impact the realized actual migration decision, $M$, as described in (3).

Mathematically, the three latent variables depend on vectors of variables $X_i$ and $Y_i$ which include individual, family, and locality-level characteristics of child $i$ and additive random error terms, $\epsilon_{i}$, $\epsilon_{mi(a)}$ and $\epsilon_{mi}$, which may be correlated. For example, it is possible that individual $i$ has an innate ability to learn, which could decrease both the costs of acquiring education and of migrating (e.g. if this ability facilitates the study of foreign languages and integration in foreign communities).

Model (1) - (3) presents a practical problem if one is interested in estimating its parameters: we do not observe the migration decision at age $a$, but only the actual migration decision realized at some point in
the future, $M_i$. This problem occurs even if one is only really interested in estimating $a_1$. In order to overcome this problem, we can rewrite the previous model as follows:

\[
S_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M_i + \alpha_2 X_i + \epsilon_i \quad \text{where we observe} \quad S_i = 1(S_i \geq 0) \tag{4}
\]

\[
M_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 Y_i + \epsilon_2 \quad \text{where we observe} \quad M_i = 1(M_i \geq 0) \tag{5}
\]

**Identification strategy**

Under this framework, our ‘brain gain’ test will depend crucially on the value taken by parameter $a_1$. Several estimation issues arise. First, as previously discussed, there may be unobserved characteristics of the individual that simultaneously make her both more likely to emigrate in the future and more likely to get a higher educational attainment. Second, there is likely reverse causality, i.e. this individual may emigrate with a higher likelihood if she is more educated. We therefore need exclusion restrictions on $X$ with respect to $Y$ in order to identify our parameter of interest. In particular, we need variables that affect the migration decision and are known at the time the education decision is made, but which do not directly affect this education decision. For this purpose, we exploit the full history of migration in the household, which we have available from our survey, and propose two main sets of instruments. First, we use the full actual duration (as measured at the date of the survey) of the longest migration spell in the family starting when the child was aged 12 or less years old. We simply label this instrument in the remainder of the paper as “family migration duration at age 12”\(^9\). Second, we use economic conditions (namely unemployment rates and nominal GDP per capita) in the main destination countries where families in our sample have sent migrants in the past in the year in which an individual is 16 years old.\(^10\)

Let us now discuss the adequacy of each of these sets of instruments in turn.

The rationale behind using “family migration duration at age 12” as an instrument is that it provides us with information regarding the success of the closest migration experience to the child, which we argue should only affect the child’s educational attainment through the child’s own migration decisions. It is straightforward to understand that longer migration spells in the household likely reflect more successful migration experiences that should translate into higher perceived benefits of emigrating, as well as deeper access to migrant networks, hence lowering migration costs.\(^11\) However, there are a couple of

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\(^9\) The choice of age 12 corresponds to the age at which the decision to pursue secondary schooling is made by Cape Verdean children. Moving this threshold to age 13 or 14 does not significantly change results.

\(^10\) Age 16 is presumably the age at which migration decisions are actually taken, while at the same time there has been enough time for individuals to complete intermediate secondary schooling. The results are not sensitive to using age 18 instead.

\(^11\) Considering the maximum duration of a family migration spell further ensures that we are capturing this effect, as it allows us to exclude smaller “trial” or “follow-up” migration experiences. Considering the actual full duration as measured at the date of the survey provides us with a comparably good measure of the family migration experience success, regardless of whether the migration spells are completed or ongoing at the time of the educational decision. Education decision makers should have further information on the success of family migration experiences, but we cannot observe it so that we take the measured
threats to this identification strategy. First, a successful family migration experience may promote asset accumulation and therefore relieve financial constraints impeding children’s educational attainment. We evaluate this hypothesis by checking how asset accumulation between 1997 and 2005 varies with family migration duration and family migration status for one aggregate and three disaggregate asset types (land, house and car ownership). We find no statistical evidence in our sample that the duration of family migration spells significantly promotes any category of asset accumulation or that having a migrant in the family promotes asset accumulation. In addition, to further mitigate this concern, we include asset ownership as a control in our regressions. A second threat to the validity of this exclusion restriction is that success or failure of the family’s migration experience may be correlated with the level of education of the family migrant, which in turn could affect the educational level of the child. To limit this concern, parental education is included as a control in our model specification. Formal econometric tests support the validity of our instruments: despite all control variables included in our baseline specification, “family migration duration at age 12” remains a relevant instrument as shown in Table 4.

In the first stage regressions, it is individually significant at the 1% level, and an F-test on the excluded instrument rejects the hypothesis of it not having explanatory power, regardless of the critical values used: 10 from Staiger and Stock (1997)’s rule-of-thumb; 8.96 from Stock and Yogo (2005)’s more carefully derived results. Because our F-statistic is computed taking into account clustering at the household level, we deem our comparison with i.i.d. critical values as conservative.12

We use the “local proportion of migrants” as an additional exclusion restriction to provide an over-identification test. This variable is given by the fraction of migrants in the locality where the child resides, and is closely related to the historical regional rates of migration previously used in the related literature, namely by Hanson and Woodruff (2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). The underlying idea is that past migration proxies well for existing networks, which strongly affect current migration at the local level, through their effects on the net benefits of migrating. In order for this to be a valid instrument, it is important that the reasons that first started historical migration are uncorrelated with the current motives to complete intermediate secondary education. In the case of Cape Verde, this fact seems plausible since migrations in Cape Verde started many decades ago mostly due to droughts and famines. Because the structure of the economy has changed (namely becoming more dependent on duration of family migration as the best possible approximation to the degree of success of family migration experiences. Note in addition that this instrument presents individual variability on its own (as opposed to household or regional variability only).12

Note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is not available in the econometric literature a precisely suitable critical value against which to compare our F-statistic to test for weak instruments (i.e. no critical values exist that account for clustered standard errors). For this reason, we take into account both the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb for a suitable instrument, and the Stock and Yogo (2005) 2SLS/LIML critical values for an instrument that meets the maximal 10% size distortion for a 5% Wald test criterion, even though these critical values are computed assuming i.i.d. errors. An alternative possible criterion for the strength of an instrument could be not to exceed the maximal bias of 10% of the IV estimator relative to the OLS inconsistency. Critical values for this criterion are, however, only available when at least three instruments are used. Using these critical values, we can already reject the null of weak instrument, despite the fact that critical values for this criterion are decreasing in the number of instruments.
services instead of on agriculture), it has become less sensitive to droughts, which implies that current migration happens more as a result of networks created by past migration than because of famine-causing droughts). We attempt to control for any remaining general equilibrium effects on educational choices by including in the econometric specification several regional variables such as island fixed effects, local unemployment rates, or local ratios of skilled relative to unskilled workers. Our efforts to address the limitations of our instruments seem to be satisfactory as both instruments are individually significant in the first-stage regressions, even if F-statistics on the excluded instruments are only borderline passing weak instruments tests as displayed in Table 4.\textsuperscript{13} Note, however, that the hypothesis of weak instruments is clearly rejected when robust methods, such as LIML (Limited Information Maximum Likelihood) or CUE (Continuously Updated GMM Estimator) are used, and that changes in the estimated coefficients of interest are small relative to 2SLS when these estimation methods are used. We feel therefore reassured that this is not a major problem. Finally, this specification provides us with a joint test for the exogeneity of both “family migration duration at age 12” and “local proportion of migrants”. Exogeneity of both instruments cannot be rejected by a Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (robust to clustering at the household level) as shown in Table 4.

Following Hanson and McIntosh (2010), among others, we consider an alternative set of instruments provided by economic conditions in destination countries where families in our sample have sent migrants in the past in the year in which an individual was 16 years old. To account for households that send migrants to several destinations, these economic conditions are weighted by the cumulative migration spell spent in each location by family members, which provides a proxy for the intensity of communication flows between migrants and their families back home.\textsuperscript{14} Note that these instruments are set in a way that allows them to vary not only across households (as households vary in the countries to which they send their migrants), but also across individuals within the household (as households vary in the ages of children). We take the unemployment rate as an indicator of labor market conditions, which should be an important factor in a potential migrant’s decision to leave, while having no other direct impact on the educational attainment of this potential migrant. In the same way, an important determinant of migration decisions is the average wage level in the destination country, which may be proxied by nominal GDP per capita.\textsuperscript{15} We use this variable similarly to unemployment to provide us with an over-identification test, which fails to reject the null of valid exclusion restrictions. F-statistics of the excluded instruments in both specifications are all well above 10, also limiting our concerns relative to weak instruments.

\textsuperscript{13} Note that we are still comparing F-statistics adjusted for clustering at the household level, whereas the critical values used for comparison are computed assuming i.i.d. errors, which should lead to too little rejections of the null of weak instruments.

\textsuperscript{14} Batista and Narciso (2010) examine experimental evidence of the role of communication flows between migrants and their networks back home in determining migration decisions.

\textsuperscript{15} Unemployment and GDP per capita data are taken from the World Bank (2010)’s World Development Indicators.
Note that using these instruments requires that the estimation sample is restricted only to households that have migration histories, which severely reduces our sample size. In addition, because good historical macroeconomic data (particularly unemployment) is not available for many African countries such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau or Sao Tome and Principe, we can only focus on the educational impact of Cape Verdean emigrants who decide to leave for economic motives to European countries or the United States. This does not seem overly problematic given that they total more than 90% of all emigrants from Cape Verde, which is a less developed economy. However, it highlights the limitations of using instrumental variable strategies to identify our effects of interest even if we are ready to accept their validity. We need to acknowledge the local nature of identification using our (and indeed any) instrumental variable strategy, although we hope to mitigate this concern by using a number of different instrumental variables, each with its merits and demerits, but all providing estimates suggesting the existence of a quantitatively plausible ‘brain gain’ effect for the case of Cape Verde.

**Estimation strategy**

In order to estimate our parameter of interest, \( \alpha_i \), we focus on a standard linear probability model. This has the advantage of simplicity and better-established properties and tests (e.g. for the weak instrument potential problems discussed above). In addition, as shown by Angrist (1991), the use of 2SLS to estimate binary outcomes can be justified and indeed shown to consistently estimate average treatment effects.

In a linear setting, \( P(S_i \mid X_i) = S_i^* \) and \( P(M_i \mid X_i) = M_i^* \). Therefore, one can write \( S_i = S_i^* + u_i \) and \( M_i = M_i^* + u_{2i} \). The regression model hence becomes:

\[
S_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M_i + \alpha_2 X_i + u_i \tag{6}
\]

\[
M_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 Y_i + u_{2i} \tag{7}
\]

In this context, \( \alpha_i \) can be simply estimated by 2SLS on (6). The non-linear model (4)-(5) can also be estimated consistently following Mallar (1977), taking into account the characteristics of our model (namely the dependent variables’ continuity) that make it different from the model underling conventional “IV Probit” estimates. The method proposed by Mallar (1977) consists of estimating a reduced form of the index \( M_i^* \) in equation (5), which we can then use as a regressor in the structural estimation of equation (4). Note that it is possible to follow this two-stage procedure given the continuity of the index function, \( M_i^* \).

The model to be estimated therefore becomes:

\[
S_i^* = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 M_i^* + \alpha_2 X_i + \epsilon_i \quad \text{where we observe} \quad S_i = 1(S_i^* \geq 0) \tag{8}
\]
\( M_i^* = \pi_0 + \pi_1 X_i + \pi_2 Y_i + u_i \quad \text{where we observe} \quad M_i = 1(M_i^* \geq 0) \) \quad (9)

The same strategy will apply to the structural estimation of equation (5). Notice that, as pointed out in Maddala (1983), we can only identify the actual parameter up to a constant. If \((\varepsilon_{1i}, \varepsilon_{2i})\) is distributed following a bivariate normal,

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
0
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_{\varepsilon_1} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_12} \\
\sigma_{\varepsilon_12} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_2}
\end{pmatrix},
\]

the coefficient for \(M_i^*\) in (4), estimated by maximum likelihood, is a consistent estimator for \(\alpha_{i1} \frac{\sigma_{\varepsilon_12}}{\sigma_{\varepsilon_1}}\).

Given its appropriateness to precisely capture the effect of a certain probability of future migration (a positive and small number limited to be between 0 and 1) on the probability of acquiring a certain level of education, this non-linear model is particularly relevant to interpret the discrete variable IV results, as well as to perform precise counterfactual exercises.

5. Empirical results

In this section, we summarize the main empirical results in this paper. In particular, we present, interpret and discuss the robustness of our ‘brain gain’ estimates. We start by discussing our estimation procedures. First, we choose to restrict our sample to dependents aged 16-30 who never migrated before age 16.\(^{16}\) Focusing on those who stayed in Cape Verde until at least age 16, we can safely assume that the schooling decision was made before emigration – recall that intermediate secondary schooling should be completed before or around age 16 (allowing for repetition and other delays in completion). We therefore estimate the effect of the probability of future emigration on the decision to complete schooling for this subsample.\(^{17}\)

In addition, we perform our estimations on a subsample of dependents whose parents were both not migrants at the time educational decisions were made (i.e. when dependent is 12 years old, as described in the previous section). This restriction helps us to isolate the effect of the expected own probability of migration, which should not in this way be confounded with other effects of family structure (such as

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\(^{16}\) Changing this threshold to age 18 did not significantly change our results. We choose to focus on dependents aged no more than 30 years old to ensure we have full information on these individuals, particularly at the household level (given the design of the survey, as detailed in Appendix A). This is also a particularly interesting interval to analyze as this corresponds to a prime working age, at which emigration movements peak.

\(^{17}\) In addition, choosing this subsample to run our regressions is most suited to the characteristics of our survey, which, as described in Table 3, fails to capture early emigrants who left with their whole families. By focusing on individuals aged 16 to 30 years old who emigrated after age 16, we are able to minimize any selection effects that the use of our survey could imply. This is confirmed by further detailed comparisons between our survey and census data, available from the authors upon request.
the absence of parents in their roles of models and guardians, as well as the requirement of older children to take on household responsibilities, be it working at home or outside) on school attainment. Our estimation output reports results for an initial specification including all dependents aged 16-30 who never migrated before age 16, which can be compared with the specification where individuals whose parents were migrants at age 12 are excluded in order to evaluate the impact of parental migration on education via the child’s own migration. In this same vein, it is informative to examine a third specification where we restrict our estimation sample to include only families with a history of past migration.

Finally, note that the measure of educational attainment we use is that of a certain school grade by children in a certain age interval. This specification allows us to evaluate what the effect of migration is on attaining a given school level for children at a precisely-defined age. In our baseline specifications, we consider attainment of an intermediate secondary school grade (9 years) by dependents aged 16-30 years old whose parents were both not migrants at the date of educational decisions. This grade is relevant because it is attained by around 40% of students and it is not compulsory, unlike primary schooling. Complete secondary schooling (12 years) would also be interesting to study, but is only attained by a small fraction of individuals.

**Preliminary evidence**

The results in Table 3 display simple OLS estimates of the (intermediate secondary) schooling attainment of migrants relative to non-migrants. Without controlling for any other covariates, there seems to be a striking statistically significant difference between the educational attainment of migrants relative to non-migrants: nearly +16pp for all migrants whose parents were not migrants at age 12, although this effect falls to +9pp if we restrict the estimation sample to families with migration experience.

Following the standard in the literature on determinants of educational attainment, we consider whether the observed educational differences are still relevant after controlling for the traditional covariates: (i) individual level characteristics empirically related to performance (gender, age); (ii) household level proxies for available resources (number of children, asset ownership), as well as for the quality of family environment (highest completed parental educational level) and for perceptions of the quality of schooling (which are likely related to the expected benefits to be derived from education); and, finally, (iii) local level variables such as island, urban area, and other average local variables (such as unemployment, average per capita household expenditure and the skill to unskilled labor force ratio) that

---

18 McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) also take completed school grades as their dependent variable, but require the use of censored-order probit models to account for problems caused by right-censoring. Because we consider a particular grade only, in addition to adopting appropriate age intervals, right-censoring for our variable of interest is unlikely.
may affect local returns to schooling. After controlling for all regressors, there is a difference of a little more than +14pp between the educational attainment of migrants and non-migrants whose parents were not migrants when these individuals were 12, which remains strongly significant. The size of this impact is however lower (+8pp) if we restrict our sample to include only families with a migration history.

**Estimating the ‘brain gain’ effect**

We now turn to estimating the ‘brain gain’ effect, i.e. the impact that the own future probability of migration has on individual educational attainment. Results using 2SLS to estimate equation (6) are displayed in Table 4.

Following the identification strategy proposed and defended in the previous section, we start by using “duration of family migration at age 12” as an exclusion restriction. The estimated effects in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 are substantial and statistically significant: an increase in the probability of migration by 10pp would increase the probability of attaining intermediate secondary schooling by 11.2pp, ceteris paribus, for dependents aged between 16 and 30 years old who did not migrate before age 16 and whose parents were both non-migrants when the individual was 12 years old. Using a sample of all such dependents (i.e. including those individuals whose father and/or mother were migrants when the individual was 12 years old) for the estimation allows us to evaluate the effect of having migrant parents on the educational impact of the expected own probability of migration: in this instance, as shown in column (1), evidence points to a lower impact of expected own migration, which can be understood as it being positively correlated to parental migration educational effects.

Column (5) of Table 4 displays our estimation results when using “unemployment rates in the main destination countries” as our instruments, following the discussion in section 4. The estimated ‘brain gain’ effect is still positive and significant, but of a smaller magnitude than before: an increase in the probability of migration by 10pp would increase the probability of attaining intermediate secondary schooling by only 4.6pp.

**Robustness check 1: choice of exclusion restriction**

In section 4 we examined in detail the adequacy of the exclusion restrictions we use to identify the ‘brain gain’ effect. It is now useful to inspect the sensitivity of our estimates to the choice of these instruments.

We first include a proxy for local migration networks as an additional determinant of an individual’s probability to emigrate. Including both the “duration of family migration at age 12” and the “local proportion of migrants” as exclusion restrictions, the estimated ‘brain gain’ coefficients are still positive.

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19 Even though these are not reported, note that the signs of all significant coefficients are as expected and do not vary with the type of estimation.
and significant, but of a somewhat smaller magnitude, pointing to an effect of around 9pp for a 10pp increase in the migration probability, as can be seen in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.

We also combine the unemployment rates at destination with nominal GDP per capita as exclusion restrictions, again following the discussion in section 4. The results we obtain, displayed in column (6) of Table 4, show only a small decrease in the magnitude of the estimated effect, which keeps positive and significant, at nearly 4pp for a 10pp increase in the migration probability.

Overall, concerns about our identification strategy are, in our view, mitigated by the use of a variety of carefully examined instruments providing a plausible and narrow range of “brain gain” estimates for the case of Cape Verde.

**Robustness check 2: sample choice**

Another potential limitation of our approach is that one could think that our estimates are only capturing a local effect on a particular subgroup of individuals. In particular, one could conjecture that the ‘brain gain’ effect should be concentrated on those who actually end up migrating at some point in the future.

In order to check this hypothesis we consider the following latent variable for the decision of obtaining education for individuals who never migrated:

\[
S_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Pr(M_i = 1) + \alpha_2 X_i + \epsilon_i, \text{ where we observe } S_i = 1(S_i^* \geq 0) \tag{10}
\]

According to (10), child \(i\)’s educational attainment \(S_i\) depends on \(\Pr(M_i = 1)\), the probability of own future migration. In order to identify our parameter of interest \(\alpha_1\), the first step in our empirical procedure is the estimation of the probability to emigrate for dependents aged 16 to 30 who never migrated. We then proceed to a second step in which we use characteristics of individuals at age 12 (using our full history of residents and migrants’ lives and associated characteristics) to predict their probability of emigration at that age. In a third and final step, this predicted probability of future emigration evaluated at age 12 is used as an independent variable. To account for the estimation procedure of the probability of future migration, standard errors are bootstrapped.

The estimates obtained from this procedure are summarized in Table 5. We find that the effect of the own probability of future migration on those who never migrated seems to actually be similar or larger than for comparable individuals who migrated from age 16 regardless of the instrument and subsample used in the estimation.

**6. Counterfactual results: educational responses to migration barriers**

As discussed before, our focus on a standard linear probability model is justified by its simplicity. However, because we are interested in precisely capturing the effect of a certain probability of future migration (a positive number limited to be between 0 and 1) on the probability of acquiring a specific
level of education, the non-linear Mallar (1977) model is better suited for our purposes.\(^{20}\) Note that the Mallar estimation coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, but their positive sign and significance are in line with the 2SLS results.\(^{21}\)

In this section we then attempt to illustrate the economic significance of the ‘brain gain’ estimates we obtained. In particular, we derive the quantitative implications on educational attainment of changing barriers to migration (e.g. caused by tightened immigration policies in destination countries) by using our estimation of the simultaneous-equation Mallar (1977) model. Unlike existing studies, which assume the educational attainment of current and return emigrants would have been the same had they not emigrated, our model allows us to consider the impact of migration policy shocks on both education and migration decisions.

Using this framework, we start by examining the impact of changes in migration barriers on emigration and, as a consequence, on the educational attainment of individuals aged 16-30 who never resided away from Cape Verde until age 16. Our simultaneous equation model allows us to evaluate the differential impact on educational attainment for those who choose to emigrate and for those who do not.

We then turn to analyzing the impact of the same shock on the emigration and educational decisions of all Cape Verdean born individuals aged 16 to 30. This includes individuals who emigrated before age 16, who will potentially have obtained (further) education after migration. For this reason, in this exercise we complement our survey with data from the censuses of the main host countries.

**Changes in migration barriers for individuals who resided in Cape Verde at least until age 16**

We begin by creating a counterfactual shock decreasing emigration prospects in our empirical model.\(^ {22}\) It basically consists of exogenously reducing the constant term in the migration equation (5) by an amount \(\delta \sigma^2\), where \(\delta\) is an arbitrary positive value and \(\sigma^2\) is the variance of the error term in the reduced form of the migration equation. This shock may be interpreted as an increase in emigration barriers that do not directly affect the incentives to invest in education - for example, a tightening in immigration policies of receiving countries.

As detailed in Appendix C, given our parameter estimates and the individual values of \(X_i\) and \(Y_i\) in our sample, we can simulate individual decisions of educational attainment and migration and, given those decisions, calculate the educational attainment of migrants and of non-migrants, as displayed in column (2) of Table 6. Indeed, columns (1)-(2) in Table 6 show that our procedure approximates well actual migration rates and educational attainment of both migrants and non-migrants.

---

\(^{20}\) In other words, we do not want to capture the effect of migrating or not \([0,1]\), but the effect of a certain probability of future migration (a number between 0 and 1). We believe that this distinction is essential in order to understand why the results using the linear probability model should not be interpreted directly.

\(^{21}\) Mallar (1977) estimation results are available from the authors upon request.

\(^{22}\) Appendix C presents in detail the derivations underlying our methodology.
For a given counterfactual shock, we can re-compute relevant parameters, and again simulate individual migration and education decisions. Columns (3)-(6) in Table 6 describe what happens when barriers to migration gradually increase. First, as expected, a gradual increase in migration barriers implies a gradual decrease in the probability of emigration. Second, as a consequence, educational attainment (especially of non-migrants) is strikingly affected by the lower probability of migration: when emigration falls by 11pp, the probability of attaining intermediate secondary education decreases by 16pp for non-migrants (implying an elasticity of 0.32), whereas the reduction for migrants is smaller but still sizable (nearly 7pp, implying an elasticity of 0.10). Note that the educational costs of closing migration possibilities seem to be non-linear (indeed non-monotonically increasing): instead of cutting the stock of migrants from 13% to 2% as in the example above, it is much less costly in terms of educational attainment to bring the stock of emigrants down from say 13% to 9% of Cape Verdean nationals (which implies an elasticity of 0.19 for non-migrants, and 0.07 for migrants). Overall, these counterfactual results are strongly supportive of the hypothesis of ‘brain gain’ as opposed to ‘brain drain’.

Changes in migration barriers for all individuals who were born in Cape Verde

The counterfactual scenarios just described may be over-estimating the educational costs of restricting migration. Indeed, changes in migration barriers may prompt those who emigrated before age 16 to return to Cape Verde, and these individuals may have attained intermediate secondary schooling with a higher probability than the corresponding person in Cape Verde or an emigrant departing at an older age. To investigate this possibility, we now propose a way to account for the number and characteristics of individuals who migrated before age 16 by combining information from census data of the destination countries.

As detailed in Appendix C, we propose to re-weight the original survey individual observations in order to account for the missing individuals who migrated before age 16. The idea is to use weights in order to increase the importance of migrants who departed after age 16 in our sample and whose characteristics match the characteristics of all migrants.

Table 7 shows the reweighted results. Compared to Table 6, both non-migrants and migrants display slightly increased educational performance. This happens because our counterfactual scenarios now

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23 This asymmetric behavior is due to the positive correlation between the reduced form error terms ($u_{1i}$, $u_{2i}$). In the counterfactual world, when it becomes harder to emigrate, only those who have very high random draws, $u_{2i}$, will eventually emigrate. Those individuals also present high $u_{1i}$, decreasing the effect of the overall reduction on $S^*$ due to the fall in $M^*$. 24 Note that additional human capital gains from emigration are created by return migration. We abstract from this channel in the present exercise as return migration does not seem quantitatively important for our specific counterfactual exercise: indeed, only 4% of all emigrants aged 16 to 30 years old report to have returned. This is consistent with the odds of temporary migration increasing with the age of migration (Lacuesta, 2006). A more adequate treatment of the ‘brain gain’ from return migration can be found in Batista et al. (2007). 25 Recall that early emigrants (before age 16) are not well described in our survey, as they mostly left with their whole families.
indirectly include some of the migrants departing before age 16, who are likely better educated than those who are leaving later in life. Nevertheless, it is clear that educational attainment still falls visibly when emigration decreases: a 12pp decrease in the probability of migrating is associated with a fall of 12pp in the educational attainment for non-migrants (implying an elasticity of 0.26), and a drop of 3pp in the educational attainment for migrants (implying an elasticity of 0.06). Once more, we observe that the educational costs of closing migration possibilities seem to be non-linear: it is much less costly in terms of educational attainment to bring the stock of emigrants down from 17% to 13% of Cape Verdean nationals (implying an elasticity of 0.17 for non-migrants, and 0.05 for migrants), than from 17% to 3% (implying an elasticity of 0.29 for non-migrants, and 0.08 for migrants). This evidence is again suggestive of the importance of the ‘brain gain’ mechanism, now even after we account for the educational upgrade by early migrants who may return when migration policies are restricted.

A caveat to the real world validity of these counterfactual simulations has to do with the fact that most developed countries are adopting immigration policies that are selective relative to the educational attainment of potential immigrants. This is not taken into account in our simple counterfactual exercise and raises important questions: How quantitatively relevant is the fact that many countries are only willing to admit skilled immigrants in detriment of those unskilled? In other words, how strong are the effects of distortionary immigration policies on educational attainment in the sending country? This is an essential direction for future research that is left unanswered by our analysis.

7. Discussion of results

According to our empirical results, there is a sizable positive effect of the own future probability of emigration on educational attainment. This finding raises further questions. In particular, one would like to understand the mechanisms underlying this effect.

The original ‘brain gain’ theory hinged on the traditional selection arguments proposed by Borjas (1987) and emphasized that the option of emigrating to a country where returns to schooling are higher should increase an individual’s incentive to acquire education. Our evidence points however to returns to education in the United States never overcoming returns to education in Cape Verde. Why should then the possibility of own future migration create incentives for acquiring education at home?

Hatton and Williamson (2001) observe that emigration out of African countries seems to be significantly determined by cross-country real wage differentials. In the likely event that wage differentials between Cape Verde and the destination countries of its emigrants have not been competed away - as assumed

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26 These results and related discussion are available from the authors upon request.
27 Batista (2008) discusses other instances in which this is the case even within more closely integrated economies, namely within the European Union.
by the standard Roy model selection arguments used by Borjas (1987) - it may then be more appropriate to consider a model taking the first (instead of the second) moments of the income distribution across countries (i.e. wage differentials) as determining incentives for educated individuals to emigrate. In this context, skilled individuals decide to emigrate despite the lower relative returns to education abroad because of the sizable absolute differences in wages.28

Table 8 shows that there are indeed substantial differences between annual wages in Cape Verde and the US.29 The average 25-50 year old male, can earn around 12,000 additional international dollars after migrating to the US. This difference is significantly wider (21,000 additional dollars) if we do not adjust for purchasing power differences, which makes sense for those who are able to save and remit US earnings to Cape Verde. If we take into account educational attainment, we observe that the US-Cape Verde wage differential for those who complete intermediate secondary schooling (9 grades) is only 540 international dollars, or 8% of the average unskilled annual wage in Cape Verde. This differential between educated and non-educated workers is much higher when we do not take PPP into consideration: it amounts to 4582 dollars, or 232% of the average unskilled annual wage in Cape Verde. This evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that absolute wage differentials determine positive emigrant selection in Cape Verde (as opposed to relative returns to education). This should be especially the case when there is an intention to save and return to the origin country, or sizable remittances are sent back home. For individuals who emigrate with their whole family and who do not plan to return to the origin country, it is, however, not obvious that it compensates to invest in further education based on absolute real wage differentials alone.

In addition to the observed wage differentials, the incentive to acquire further education for individuals who plan to permanently emigrate in the future may also arise from decreased migration costs due to education (as may be true of language barriers or skill-selective immigration policies in most developed destination countries, for example). In this instance, individuals would be interested in acquiring more education to achieve a higher probability of emigration in the future, in line with the predictions of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) for the Mexican case. This argument is similar to that of absolute wage differentials, but further explores the implications of nominal costs of migration, which may depend on individual levels of education.30 Immigration policies and linguistic distance may indeed be further motives than simple wage gaps for migrants to acquire education before leaving the origin country.

28 As suggested by Akee (2009), this model may be thought of as nested within the Roy model. Rosenzweig (2007), Belot and Hatton (2008) and Hanson and Grogger (2008) all present evidence supportive of this absolute wage differentials hypothesis - the first for Asian students in the US, and the latter two for immigrants in OECD countries.

29 The Portuguese census does not provide information on wages, and in other sources there are too few Cape Verdean in the sample. We compare information on wages earned by Cape Verdean in the US (from IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2004) and in Cape Verde (from INE 2004).

30 Preliminary evidence seems to be supportive of this argument: immigration policy in the US has traditionally been more skill-selective than in Portugal, which is consistent with the observed positive educational selection of emigrants being much stronger
8. Concluding remarks

This paper contributes in various ways to the important but still scarce literature on the effects of emigration in origin countries. It departs from the essential premise that educational choices may depend on own emigration options. This assertion has important implications. First, it requires an explicit test for the effect of the prospect of own future emigration on educational attainment – the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis. Our empirical strategy uses full histories of migrants provided by our tailored microdata survey, allowing us to directly test this hypothesis unlike existing studies. Second, it suggests the need to correct for educational upgrading after emigration. Past work often assumed that the educational attainment of current and return emigrants would have been the same had they not emigrated. In our counterfactual simulations of changes in migration barriers, we take this consideration into account by combining our survey data with information from censuses of the main destination countries, while using an econometric model simultaneously determining migration and educational decisions.

Overall, our results point to ‘brain drain’ not being as serious a problem as traditionally thought. Indeed, this paper finds that massive emigration from Cape Verde seems to have significantly encouraged the accumulation of human capital in the country. Our most conservative estimates using individual specific variation in economic conditions in the family destination countries indicate that an increase in the probability of own future migration by 10pp increases the average probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling by nearly 4pp. The estimation of such a positive ‘brain gain’ effect is robust to the choice of instruments and econometric model specification.

The evidence obtained in this study should lead policymakers in both developing and developed countries not to focus their attention in restricting migration flows of educated individuals. Not only are destination countries likely to benefit from the inflow of these skilled immigrants, as is relatively undisputed, but these flows may also help origin countries as Cape Verde. Indeed, while further studies on other source countries of educated migration are required to make a general argument, for this case at least our counterfactual simulations suggest that keeping the doors of rich countries open to educated migration may be a form of “efficient aid”.

References


Hanson, Gordon, and Christopher Woodruff (2003). “Emigration and Educational Attainment in Mexico”, *Mimeo*, UCSD.


### Tables

Table 1: Characteristics of individuals born in Cape Verde according to their country of residence and migration status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Male population</th>
<th>Censuses Residents Abroad</th>
<th>Own Survey Residents Abroad</th>
<th>Own Survey Residents in Cape Verde</th>
<th>Own Survey Return Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (2001)</td>
<td>United States (2001)</td>
<td>Total to Portugal and US</td>
<td>Total to Main Destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (*)</td>
<td></td>
<td>44060</td>
<td>27059</td>
<td>71119</td>
<td>100924 (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male population</td>
<td>51.27%</td>
<td>51.31%</td>
<td>51.29%</td>
<td>49.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.85%</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
<td>6.09%</td>
<td>6.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.17%</td>
<td>16.58%</td>
<td>15.09%</td>
<td>14.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.06%</td>
<td>16.44%</td>
<td>18.68%</td>
<td>17.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.66%</td>
<td>21.14%</td>
<td>23.32%</td>
<td>25.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.33%</td>
<td>19.25%</td>
<td>19.92%</td>
<td>19.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.82%</td>
<td>8.96%</td>
<td>7.01%</td>
<td>6.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.73%</td>
<td>8.03%</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
<td>5.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.74%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-90 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;90</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own survey and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain) from Ruggles et al. (2004).

(*) Total number of residents abroad is sum of Cape Verde citizens living abroad divided by 0.92, as detailed in text. Number of residents in Cape Verde from INE (2002) census. Number of residents abroad from the survey uses fraction of residents abroad in total residents (11.64%). Number of return migrants from the survey uses fraction of return migrants in total residents (2.46%).
Table 2: Educational attainment of individuals born in Cape Verde and aged 25 years old or more according to their country of residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Censuses Residents Abroad</th>
<th>Estimate (*)</th>
<th>Own Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Total Portugal + United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed intermediate secondary (9 grades) or less</td>
<td>84.45%</td>
<td>29.80%</td>
<td>65.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary (12 grades)</td>
<td>9.34%</td>
<td>63.12%</td>
<td>28.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed university</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
<td>6.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own survey and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain) from Ruggles et al. (2004). (*) As discussed in the text, it is assumed that 25% of all emigrants (those who do not emigrate to the United States and Portugal) share the educational attainment of those in the United States.
Table 3: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate before age 16. OLS estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own migration</td>
<td>0.1292</td>
<td>0.1199</td>
<td>0.1590</td>
<td>0.1459</td>
<td>0.0947</td>
<td>0.0814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0376)***</td>
<td>(0.0375)***</td>
<td>(0.0406)***</td>
<td>(0.0410)***</td>
<td>(0.0404)**</td>
<td>(0.0406)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns (3) and (4) use sample restricted to include only individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. Columns (5) and (6) use sample restricted to include only households with migration experience and individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. Controls included are sex, age, number of children in the household, asset ownership, maximum parental education, local ratio of educated to non-educated individuals, local average unemployment, urban dummy, island fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate before age 16. 2SLS estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own migration</td>
<td>0.8219</td>
<td>0.6527</td>
<td>1.1207</td>
<td>0.9035</td>
<td>0.4572</td>
<td>0.3900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3832)**</td>
<td>(0.3310)**</td>
<td>(0.5177)**</td>
<td>(0.4369)**</td>
<td>(0.2264)**</td>
<td>(0.2264)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>10.06</td>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>55.35</td>
<td>84.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p-value)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns (3) and (4) use sample restricted to include only individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. Columns (5) and (6) use sample restricted to include only households with migration experience and individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. All regressions include as controls sex, age, number of children in the household, asset ownership, maximum parental education, local ratio of educated to non-educated individuals, local average unemployment, urban dummy, island fixed effects.

Instrumental variable set A: Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12. Instrumental variable set B: Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12 + Local proportion of migrants. Instrumental variable set C: Unemployment rates at main destination countries (Portugal, USA, Netherlands, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK, Russia) weighted by cumulative family migration spell to destination when individual is aged 16 years old. Instrumental variable set D: Unemployment rates + Current GDP per capita at main destination countries (Portugal, USA, Netherlands, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK, Russia) weighted by cumulative family migration spell to destination when individual is aged 16 years old.

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who never emigrated and whose parents were both not migrants when dependent was age 12. Estimates from two-stage estimation procedure described in main text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own migration</td>
<td>1.0043</td>
<td>0.7478</td>
<td>1.2522</td>
<td>0.8954</td>
<td>0.8942</td>
<td>0.9248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4809)**</td>
<td>(0.3790)**</td>
<td>(0.6367)**</td>
<td>(0.5000)*</td>
<td>(0.4221)**</td>
<td>(0.3590)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns (3) and (4) use sample restricted to include only individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. Columns (5) and (6) use sample restricted to include only households with migration experience and individuals whose parents were both not migrants when they were 12 years old. All regressions include as controls sex, age, number of children in the household, asset ownership, maximum parental education, local ratio of educated to non-educated individuals, local average unemployment, urban dummy, island fixed effects.

Instrumental variable set A: Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12. Instrumental variable set B: Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12 + Local proportion of migrants. Instrumental variable set C: Unemployment rates at main destination countries (Portugal, USA, Netherlands, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK, Russia) weighted by cumulative family migration spell to destination when individual is aged 16 years old. Instrumental variable set D: Unemployment rates + Current GDP per capita at main destination countries (Portugal, USA, Netherlands, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, UK, and Russia) weighted by cumulative family migration spell to destination when individual is aged 16 years old.

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Counterfactual educational attainment of individuals born in Cape Verde aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate before age 16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock migrants (% of total Cape Verdo born)</th>
<th>Survey (2006)</th>
<th>Estimation $\delta = -0.2$</th>
<th>Estimation $\delta = -0.5$</th>
<th>Estimation $\delta = -0.8$</th>
<th>Estimation $\delta = -1.0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrants attaining intermediate secondary education</td>
<td>62.48%</td>
<td>61.88%</td>
<td>58.88%</td>
<td>54.01%</td>
<td>49.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants attaining intermediate secondary education</td>
<td>76.41%</td>
<td>78.58%</td>
<td>77.23%</td>
<td>75.36%</td>
<td>73.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own survey (2006) and own computations.
Table 7: Counterfactual educational attainment of all individuals born in Cape Verde aged 16 to 30. Reweighted in order to account for individuals missing in the survey. (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimation Counterfactual scenarios for emigration</th>
<th>Lowest Migration Cost delta=-0.2</th>
<th>delta=-0.5</th>
<th>delta=-0.8</th>
<th>Highest Migration Cost delta=-1.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock migrants (% of total Cape Verden born)</td>
<td>17.01%</td>
<td>12.94%</td>
<td>8.26%</td>
<td>5.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrants attaining intermediate secondary education</td>
<td>63.74%</td>
<td>61.14%</td>
<td>56.80%</td>
<td>52.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants attaining intermediate secondary education</td>
<td>80.90%</td>
<td>79.99%</td>
<td>78.49%</td>
<td>77.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own survey (2006), Ruggles et al. (2004) and own computations.

(*) Individuals missing in the survey are those migrants who migrated before age 16 and are currently aged 16 to 30 years old.
Table 8: Average annual wages of Cape Verdean males between 25 and 50 years old.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Dollars (nominal exchange rate)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 years of schooling or less</td>
<td>1975.6</td>
<td>18262.5</td>
<td>16286.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 9 years of schooling</td>
<td>3789.3</td>
<td>24658.0</td>
<td>20868.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4581.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Dollars (PPP-adjusted)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 years of schooling or less</td>
<td>6378.4</td>
<td>18262.5</td>
<td>11884.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 9 years of schooling</td>
<td>12234.1</td>
<td>24658.0</td>
<td>12423.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>539.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>