There is a widespread belief, which is fostered by superficial writers, and by even more superficial speakers, that the history of the world is a record of continuous progress. According to this view, man has ascended from barbarism to his present eminence by stages of varying rapidity—sometimes slowly and sometimes swiftly, but, whether slowly or swiftly, he has been ascending all the time.

This belief has no foundation in fact, and is entirely unsupported by history, which shows that many civilisations have come into being, reached their zenith, and passed away, leaving mankind to struggle up again. One such period of retrogression which will occur to every student of history was that from the fifth to the eleventh century. Only the ignorant would venture to assert that, in any of the things which make up civilisation—knowledge, literature, the fine arts, material comfort (everything, in short, outside of the sphere of religion)—the world was as far advanced in the eleventh century as in the second. If a Roman of Caesar's time could have come back to earth and seen the Europe of 1100 A.D. he would have been appalled at the depths to which it had sunk.

The present civilisation is a thing of comparatively recent origin and of remarkably rapid growth. It is already diffused over a much larger portion of the world than that occupied by any of the earlier civilisations. It differs utterly in type from any civilisation which preceded it. In some respects it can claim no superiority over earlier civilisations. For example, in the arts of poetry, sculpture and architecture we can still learn from Greece. In the science of government and law-
making we can still learn from Rome. But in respect of material comfort and convenience it stands on a plane by itself. The advance in scientific knowledge has led to inventions which have changed the face of the earth and revolutionised human life. Machinery, supplemented by the organisation of industry on the principle of division of labour, has enormously multiplied man's power of producing material wealth, that is, of producing all the things which minister to his physical needs, comfort and convenience.

In one vital respect, however, this civilisation of ours does not differ from those that came and vanished ages ago—namely, that it depends for its continuance on maintaining the stability of relations between man and man; or, shall we say, between the individual and the community, although it really amounts to the same thing? The community expresses itself in institutions, of which the chief is the State, but which also embrace other essential organisations. If the institutions develop in a direction such that they no longer harmonise with, but go counter to the instincts, sentiments and actions of the people, or if the people change so that the institutions (and in particular the State) no longer function effectively, decay sets in. Sooner or later chaos takes the place of order, and what was a nation becomes a mob.

The historian, who is in the happy position of being wise after the event, can generally put his finger on the particular internal change or changes which led to the collapse of the various ancient communities, and, with equally belated wisdom, can perhaps even indicate by what measures the evil could have been averted if taken in time. He may ascribe the breakdown to a change in the social habits or in the moral standpoint of the people, to which the government and other national institutions were not sufficiently elastic to respond, or to ill-considered, inexpedient changes in the form of government, or in the organisation of industry with which the political or industrial development of the people could not keep pace. With such enquiries as these we are here not concerned, at least it is not proposed to deal with them in this paper. What does concern us is to observe that, as all civilisations depend for their continued existence on the continuance of conditions which enable men to live and work together, a civilisation is doomed when the relations between the individuals and the community, that is, between the parts and the whole, cease to be a harmony and become a discord.

There is nothing inconceivable in the proposition that the present civilisation may develop in a direction fatal to its own
existence and finally collapse. There is nothing mysterious about the causes which brought this civilisation into being and which made its advance so rapid. And the conditions on which its continued existence and farther advance depend are fairly plain and definite.

Roughly speaking, 20th century civilisation had its birth in the Industrial Revolution which began in England in the 18th century, and which has since extended into every quarter of the globe. The essential feature of the Industrial Revolution was the application of machinery to industry, which enormously increased man's power of doing and making things. But the invention and application of machinery to industry would not in themselves have brought about the vast changes which we have seen. In order to get the full benefit of machinery it was necessary that production should be on a large scale. This implies organisation, and organisation implies the co-ordination of labour. In order to make possible the huge output of the great industrial machine, which at the present moment has its ramifications in every corner of the world, there must be co-operation, conscious or unconscious, not merely between the human units that form a single factory, not merely between factory and factory, but between industrial units in widely separated countries. If this essential co-operation ceases to be forthcoming or if men become swayed by new ideas and ideals the effect of which is to frustrate co-ordination of labour, the industrial machine must sooner or later break down. It will fail to "deliver the goods," as the Americans put it, and with the non-delivery of the goods this very elaborate and delicately-balanced civilisation of ours must collapse as others have done before.

For man cannot, even if he wished, return to the old simple life, when each little group was practically self-contained and self-supporting, when all the needs of the individual were supplied by his own labour, supplemented by that of a few of his immediate neighbours. The supplying of the daily wants of the ordinary man of to-day, even of the humblest class and narrowest means, makes a call on the labour of thousands of his fellow men scattered throughout the world from China to Peru. A mere pin has passed through a score of hands before it comes into his own. It is no exaggeration to say that even the humblest wage-earner of to-day commands the services of more of his fellow creatures in the satisfaction of his needs than did the most powerful despot of the middle ages. Moreover, in the course of the evolution of this remarkable civilisation man himself has changed. While his wants have been multiplied
tenfold, his ability to satisfy by his own efforts even a few of his simplest and most pressing needs has suffered an enormous reduction, for he has now become specialised to the performance of a single task, and that generally a very simple one and one quite useless unless co-ordinated with the performance of other equally simple tasks by groups of other men. If the industrial machine, in which most of us are mere cogs, broke down the vast majority of men would be quite helpless to fend for themselves, and the reign of anarchy and starvation would set in.

So far there has been no serious failure on the part of the world's millions to answer to the call of the present industrial system and perform the tasks allotted to them in return for a varying and often inadequate share of the fruits of their combined labour—and civilisation is in no immediate danger. But we are already aware of a falling off in the readiness and completeness of the response to the call, which must be regarded at least as a symptom and a portent and which it behoves us to examine seriously.

The motives which induce men to perform severe tasks, the performance of which brings them no personal satisfaction and in which they have no direct interest, have varied greatly in the course of the earth's history. Under the ancient civilisations most large-scale undertakings were carried out with slave labour, and the motive by which the slave was impelled to work was simply physical fear, that is, the fear of punishment. In the middle ages, when the worker enjoyed a semi-freedom, this motive of fear was mingled with and reinforced by feudal habits of obedience, more or less supported by the authority of religion. In later times, when the wage system had become fully established, the predominating motive was still fear—the fear of starvation, coupled with the habit of obedience which had been acquired during ages of political and social dependence. And these motives and these habits have persisted, even under the changed conditions of the present day, sufficiently to enable the great industrial machine, on the working of which twentieth-century civilisation absolutely depends, to function. But it functions with increasing difficulty and friction.

The increasing difficulty and increasing friction under which the industrial machine now works are due to the weakening of the habits and motives which formerly impelled the millions to work. Habits inevitably weaken when the conditions under which they were formed change or disappear. The motive of fear, that is, fear of starvation, which had so long been the chief compelling force to labour, weakened when the masses acquired the power of combination and political
power. The former enabled them to impose on the industrial system conditions or modifications which reduced, or at least which they thought reduced, the danger of disemployment and consequent destitution. The latter enabled them to secure some provision, such as unemployment insurance, against the privations which attend a cessation of work. Unless new motives to work can be called into being, to take the place of the old motive of fear, the industrial machine may come to a stop. It should be the business of education to provide these new motives.

Fear has been described as an emotion called forth by an overwhelming sense of the unknown. Man will generally face with fortitude, if not with philosophy, an impending evil if he has complete knowledge of its nature and magnitude and is fully conscious of its inevitability. It is the sense of ignorance of what is coming to him which paralyses his faculties and throws him into a panic. The new motives to work must be based upon knowledge not ignorance. Men must have a clear and correct conception of the industrial system in which they have a part and of the economic ties which bind them together and make them dependent on each other, even though widely separated in space. Organisation, which is the indispensable condition of modern industry, depends upon co-operation. In future the co-operation must spring not from a slavish or grudging yielding to force majeure but from a general and intelligent recognition of, and acquiescence in, a common purpose. With the greater knowledge which will thus make co-operation possible by making it rational and human there will also come to the worker clear realisation of the limits within which he can pursue his individual interests or the special interests of his own class, and yet not imperil the safety of the general scheme on which his subsistence depends. The worker, using the word in the widest sense and not merely confining it to the man who works with his hands, should be in possession of this knowledge when he enters upon the business of life. It should be looked upon as an indispensable part of his equipment and therefore as an essential part of school education. When this is generally realised and acted upon we shall have gone a long way towards solving the industrial problem.

At this point, and before turning from the consideration of the industrial relations between the individual and the community, in order to deal with the political and social relations I would like to put myself right with my auditors on one point. I trust that in what I have said above I shall not be suspected of holding a brief for the present capitalistic system and of merely begging the question on its behalf. Practically all the
propositions which I have endeavoured to establish would have equal force and be equally true under a socialistic system. The transfer of the ownership of the means of production from private individuals to the State does not imply a change in the methods of production. There would still be mass production and division and co-ordination of labour, and the organisation which it implies, unless the world is prepared to scrap machinery and go back to primitive methods. And efficient organisation would still be dependent upon the co-operation of individuals which would be impossible without understanding and goodwill. Ignorance on the part of the worker of the principles on which his labour is co-ordinated with that of others and a consequent failure of the individual to appreciate his relation to the whole scheme of production would just as certainly destroy goodwill and thus wreck a socialistic system as a capitalistic system, and would probably be much more rapid in its action.

Next in importance to the industrial machine is that organisation which we call the State. The industrial machine is the instrument by means of which the individual wins his daily bread and the satisfaction of his other material wants. The State ensures to him the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. This it does by restricting the actions of individuals in so far as they tend to be injurious to other individuals, and by protecting the community from aggression on the part of other communities. These are the essential functions of the State and have been recognised as such from the earliest times, but most modern States do much more. The State of to-day does not confine itself to mere inhibition but pursues positive aims and endeavours to direct the actions of individuals into channels that shall be beneficial to the community as a whole. In the pursuit of its aims it imposes on the industrial system from time to time modifications which may or may not accomplish the results aimed at, but which may also possibly seriously affect its efficiency. Even from this bare summary of the functions of the State it becomes apparent that any great change in its constitution or in the relations of the individual towards it may be productive of the most far-reaching consequences—consequences quite unlooked for at the time they took place or were made.

Now a change of the first magnitude, the full effects of which have yet to be seen, has taken place in recent years, namely, the transfer of political power from the classes to the masses. So far as these islands are concerned, it began ninety-five years ago when the first Reform Bill was passed, but it only became an accomplished fact with the Act of 1918, which prac-
tically established universal suffrage and thereby multiplied the electorate by three. It only then remained to extend the suffrage to the still unenfranchised portion of the feminine sex to make the process absolutely complete. This has already been done in the Free State, and we may now say that all political power is in the hands of the people, or, as generally expressed, Democracy is at last established.

The full significance of this is not generally grasped. The word "democracy" itself is ill-defined, inasmuch as it is used in more than one sense. It is often merely another name for the people themselves, as, for example, when we speak of the Irish Democracy. But it more often denotes a form of government, namely, government by the people, as distinguished from monarchy, which is government by one, and oligarchy, which is government by the few.

Now the most remarkable thing about Democracy as a form of government is that, although it has been written about for ages, it has never been tried before. It is a pure experiment; its enemies would say, a leap in the dark.

It is not to be expected that this somewhat startling statement will be accepted without evidence, and as it is important to the general purpose of this paper that it should be established as literally true, I trust that it will not be considered irrelevant to bring forward some evidence, even if at some length, in its support.

History is full of examples of so-called democracies, both ancient and modern, which might appear to contradict my proposition. But the contradiction is only apparent. On examination it will be found that, without exception, the ancient republics possessed features which differentiated them completely from the democracies which have now come into being and which utterly disqualified them from being classed as governments by the people. It will also be found on examination that all the more modern examples of popular governments which might be quoted to show that democracy is not a new experiment fail, in some essential respect, to be true examples of majority rule. In every case it will be found that they have been accompanied with artificial restrictions, deliberately devised in order to frustrate the full working of the democratic principle on which they were supposed to be based.

The ancient republics of Greece were not democracies in the twentieth century meaning of the word, if for no other reason from the fact that outside of the actual citizens they included a large servile population, devoid of civil rights. It may be added, too, that the small size of the Greek republics, many
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of which were confined within the limits of a single city, places them in a distinct class from modern states. In such small communities the problems with which we are faced nowadays and which mostly spring from the enormous number of units which make up the many simply did not arise. Both these objections apply equally to the Italian republics of the middle ages. The Roman republic also included a numerous slave caste, and in any case as soon as it extended its boundaries beyond the city wall and took in large subject population it ceased to be democratic in any intelligent sense. If time and space permitted I might examine in turn all the historical examples of so-called democracies, but with the same result. In no case was the government under the effective control of the governed.

But what about the more modern examples of popular governments? Is not the United States of America an example of government by the people, which has stood the test of a hundred and fifty years, and still remains vigorous and sound?

Let us consider the case of the United States. So far as the mere wideness, one might almost say universality, of the franchise is concerned it must be admitted that it satisfies the definition of a democracy, as government by the many. But behind this apparently perfect embodiment of *vox populi, vox dei*, and acting as a most efficient break on the popular will, is that remarkable institution known as the American Constitution. It is a pity that the American Constitution is not better known on this side of the Atlantic. It would well repay study. It includes a President with infinitely greater powers, both on the legislative and executive side, than an English king, and a Senate; which is not a mere ornamental body or debating society like the British House of Peers, but enjoys real power, and uses it. This Senate, it should be noted, is elected on the basis not of equality of franchise but inequality. In its election a small state like Rhode Island, with an area and population less than some of the Irish counties, has an equal voice with New York State, which has a population exceeding that of the whole of Ireland. And dominating all is the Supreme Court of the United States, which can annul any act of the Legislature by a decision that it violates some fundamental article of the Constitution. Nor does this exhaust the list of the forces which in America work against the effective and ready enforcement of the will of the majority. There are a host of obstacles which a bill has to surmount before it becomes law, more particularly, if it is one which involves a change in the constitution of the particular state concerned; in other words, if it is a political measure. Such bills have to be passed by both houses of the
legislature (with a two-thirds majority in some states) and referred to the electors for approval after a two months' interval, passed again through the legislature, submitted again to the electors if any amendments have been added, and once more passed by both houses before they can be placed on the statute book. Evidently the dangers of hasty legislation or precipitate change are reduced to a minimum in the United States of America. In short, the American Republic is a democracy which contains within itself the means of stultifying democracy.

In dealing at such length with the case of the United States I have run the risk of at least appearing to wander from the subject of the paper, but I am anxious to establish the point that undiluted democracy is an entirely new thing, and that in trying to make it a success we shall get very little help from the experience of other countries or other times.

By a curious coincidence (one is almost tempted to say by the irony of fate) the establishment of pure, undiluted democracy in these countries has almost synchronised with a remarkable change in the character and functions of government itself. Until a very short while ago the functions of government were few and simple, so few and simple that they might almost be summed up under two headings: the execution of justice and the defence of the realm. Recent years, however, have seen an enormous increase in the activities of the State, which now concerns itself with and vigorously asserts itself in scores of matters which were formerly, at least in these islands, considered to be quite outside its province. Health Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, Health Boards, Trade Boards, Food Control, and Price Regulations are only a few examples of this rapidly enlarging sphere of government action. Railways and mines are also in a fair way to be added to the list. All this means that government is becoming more complicated and more difficult. It calls more and more for expert knowledge and specialised experience. Now, among the many criticisms that have been launched by various writers, both ancient and modern, against democratic theories, one of the most frequent was that from its very nature democratic government must be a very difficult form of government. This criticism carries much greater weight to-day than when brought forward by, for example, Sir Henry Maine in his work on Popular Government. Never was government, no matter in what form, whether monarchical or republican, so difficult as now. In assuming the reins of power the people have undertaken a much heavier task and are being put to a much more severe test than ever fell to those whom it has superseded.
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It may be admitted that, in the strict sense of the words, there is no such thing as government by the many, for only a few can actually govern. The many must delegate their power. And one of the first conditions of the efficient working of a democracy is that the multitude shall be capable of choosing the right men to whom to delegate their power.

As it is pretty generally admitted that democracies have mostly shown themselves so far to be less efficient as governments, both in peace and war, than autocracies we are bound to admit that the multitude have not up to the present manifested any marked capacity for choosing the right men. And it would be astonishing if it were otherwise, for there is nothing in the education of the ordinary citizen, no attempt at instruction in the relative values of men and things, which would help him in appraising the fitness of any particular individual for a given task. As it is, the average elector recognises only one qualification for a representative or administrative position, namely, the ability to talk. He has never been taught that the man who can say things is not necessarily the man who can do things, and that, as a matter of fact, the two qualifications are not generally combined in the one individual. This inherent weakness in democracy can be seen in other matters than the business of electing a representative to the legislature. Many a movement or scheme, social, charitable or even industrial, which has been made popular and brought within sight of fruition by the enthusiasm and eloquence of a group of men has been sterilised by the futility or wrecked by the inefficiency of those same men when entrusted with the task of putting their ideas into practical execution. With a better knowledge of human nature and human faculty it would have been realised that there is a stage in such a movement when the men of words should be put aside and the services of the practical and often inarticulate men requisitioned in their place.

The elector in a democratic state has not only to choose men but to choose measures, or at least he has to choose from the many views and policies put before him by those who seek his suffrage, for this is all that is commonly called the popular will really amounts to. This choice of measures makes an even greater call upon his knowledge and intelligence than the choice of men, unless he clings to a conception of representative government which whether sound or not is now hopelessly out of date, and is willing to entrust his interests without question to the capacity and goodwill of the men whom he chooses. It is easy to accept Bentham’s proposition that the object to be aimed at by government is “the greatest happiness
of the greatest number," in spite of, or perhaps even on account of, its vagueness. Nor is it difficult to go with him in his contention that as the greatest number would naturally seek their own good, therefore government should be in the hands of the majority. But we are still left with the question whether they are in a position to know what is their greatest good or what is the best method of securing it.

In making his choice among the various measures and policies which are offered to him the elector is instinctively seeking what Bentham calls his "greatest good." But if he has clearly grasped his place in the democratic scheme he will recognise that there are limitations to his choice, that he cannot choose blindly. He must respect the fundamental principle on which democracy is based and the violation of which would render such a government impossible. The fundamental principle is that the well-being of the individual must depend in the long run on the general well-being. The parts cannot flourish if the whole is languishing. If everybody pursues his own private interest or that of his class at the expense of the rest of the community the general well-being will suffer, and sooner or later he will suffer too. Each individual, before committing himself to any course of political action, should submit it to the crucial test by asking himself the question: If other individuals or other classes take a similar line to that which I am taking what will be the total effect upon the community of which I am a part? It should be a mere commonplace of political education that, although it is quite possible for a section of the people to secure a temporary gain at the expense of the rest, nevertheless sooner or later they will be deprived of their gain by similar action from other quarters, and the net result will be a loss. The man who declares that his rule of life is just to mind his own business or, as he sometimes puts it, to look after Number One and leave others to do the same, is simply ignorant of the world in which his lot has been placed. In the tenth century when the world was different he might have passed as wise, but in the twentieth he is simply a fool, and a dangerous type of fool moreover.

It is evident that to recognise clearly and perform worthily his duties to the community as a political, an industrial and a social unit require intelligence, knowledge and goodwill on the part of the individual. Intelligence is a gift from God with which we are endowed in different degrees but which can be stimulated and developed by training and education. Knowledge can be imparted and acquired, and its acquisition forms a large part of school and after-school education. The third essential, goodwill, calls for special attention.
On first consideration it would appear that the goodwill of an individual will depend upon and can be measured by his natural selfishness or unselfishness, and that he has a clear guide in the golden rule, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you." In other words, that it is simply a question of that "duty towards your neighbour," which is, or at least should be, an essential part of all Christian teaching.

The trouble is over the word "neighbour." Who is your neighbour? In primitive times when each small community was practically self-supporting and self-sufficient and therefore little interested in the doings and happenings of other similar communities more or less distant, a man had no difficulty in determining who was his neighbour. It was the man whom he saw and conversed with daily, the man with whom he worked, the man from whom he bought or to whom he sold, in short, the man with whom he had direct social and industrial intercourse. Nobody else could harm him or be harmed by him, and therefore nobody else mattered. But it is not so now. The meaning of the word "neighbour" has to be enormously extended in order to adapt the old rule of life to the needs of the twentieth century. The man of to-day has millions of neighbours, very few of whom he will ever meet in the flesh, but to whom he is linked by industrial and other ties and to whom he owes a duty. From the collective action of these millions of neighbours he may suffer far more injury than from the doings of the man next door. He cannot live his life unless he takes them into consideration and co-operates with them. Plainly he requires both knowledge and imagination merely in order to realise who is the neighbour to whom he owes a duty. And it should be an important part of the work of school to impart this necessary knowledge as well as to awaken the communal spirit and develop the sense of solidarity of interests with one's fellow-beings, which together form the goodwill referred to in the preceding paragraph.

When Mr. Robert Lowe, who had fiercely opposed the extension of the franchise to the working classes in 1867, surprised the House of Commons three years later by warmly supporting a Compulsory Education Bill, he justified his action by the somewhat cynical remark: "We must now educate our masters." Unfortunately the "education" then, for the first time, placed within the reach of the British masses, included very little more than instruction in "the three R's," which, although very useful arts, do not in themselves constitute a complete preparation for the exercise of the franchise and still less for the realisation and performance of the many duties
which the individual owes to the community. Nor has any real attempt been made since, either in Great Britain or here, to equip the masses (or for the matter of that the classes) with the knowledge or imbue them with the spirit which is necessary in order to make democracy workable. Surely some instruction and training are needed. We have all been reared in an atmosphere of almost pure individualism and self-seeking under a scheme of life which Carlyle, without great exaggeration, summed up as “Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.” Can we, with any hope of success, take up a new scheme of life while still imbued with the old spirit and shackled with the old habits?

All classes require education for the new democracy. In some respects the middle classes require it more than the workers. The trade combinations into which the worker has been forced for the protection of his interests have at least taught him to subordinate his personal inclinations and desires to the interests of his trade or class. It only needs a further widening of his conception of duty so that it may include the whole community instead of merely the section to which he happens to belong, which is rather a question of increased knowledge than of greater goodwill, and he will be well on the way to democratic efficiency. The so-called educated classes, on the other hand, have not yet learned even to combine.

On every side we see the evil consequences of selfish action on the part of individuals or groups. Profiteering has had more to do with popular discontent than any measures for which government can be held responsible. “Ca-canny” has probably inflicted as great an injury upon trade as even the World War, as well as helping to hold up reconstruction by reducing the output of labour and thus increasing its cost. The most beneficent and best laid schemes of the state or private philanthropy are thwarted or distorted from their purpose by the conduct of the ill-disposed or ignorant. Thus the unemployment benefit which was devised as a shield against destitution for the innocent victims of unpreventible disemployment has been converted by a minority of “work-shies” into a dole which will relieve them from the painful necessity of doing their bit in the general scheme, with the result that restrictions and conditions have had to be imposed, from which the chief sufferers have been the genuine seekers of work. The load of taxation under which we, in common with the rest of Europe, groan is only partly due to the war and its aftermath of reconstruction. Most public undertakings cost more than similar private undertakings because so many people look upon the national purse as
an inexhaustible treasure, to be exploited by all who are so fortunate as to get the opportunity. Thus, land or other property required for public purposes suddenly jumps up to many times its real value. To buy from the government at rubbish value and sell to them at fancy prices is looked upon as business enterprise instead of (as it would be in a healthy community) as mere brigandage. At every turn the people's money is milked, the process being greatly facilitated by the marked difference between the attitude of many government servants towards the expenditure of public money and the expenditure of their own.

It is a commonplace that not only is government action more expensive than private enterprise but that it is generally less efficient, and this lesser efficiency is unanimously ascribed to the hampering and shackling effects of what is called "red tape," which, put into plain language, is simply the multiplication of regulations and restrictions on the officials' freedom of action which have been devised for the purpose of preventing him from neglecting, exceeding or perverting his duty and which are based on the unworthy assumption that he will certainly do so if left to himself. Any justification that may really exist for this assumption of official untrustworthiness can be traced mostly to that evil element in public life which leads to the appointment of a man to a public position not on grounds of fitness for the position but as a result of "influence" or "having a pull." Certainly in a state where every individual had been taught from childhood his duty to the community the need for and the justification of "red tape" would be reduced to a minimum. Similarly, in a state where the essential principles on which democracy is based formed a part of school education, the ordinary citizen would realise clearly that the claims of friendship do not include a right to demand aid and support in securing a public position to which he is not entitled on grounds of fitness.

It would be easy to multiply examples of wrong action on the part of the units which has a baleful effect on the well-being of the whole of which they form a part and therefore on their own well-being, but it would lengthen this paper unduly. I can only make a passing reference to the popular attitude towards the claims of the government in the form of taxes which leads the otherwise honest man to take advantage of opportunities of evasion which may come his way, and thus throw a heavier burden on others who have fewer such opportunities or are too enlightened or have too much public spirit to take advantage of them. So also with the common indifference to
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the duty of safeguarding the property of the community. It is sufficient for my purpose if I have shown that these and other similar unsocial actions spring partly from ignorance on the part of the individual of his place in the general scheme and partly from lack of the communal spirit, and if I have thus succeeded in making a case for including instruction in these vital matters in popular education.

This is the object of the paper, as laid down in the title, and I trust that I have at least gone some way towards accomplishing it. Time and space do not permit of much more, but I would like to say something about the feasibility of including instruction in the duty of the individual towards the community in the curriculum of a school. The revolutionary character of the proposal will in itself be a stumbling-block to many, and other objections and difficulties will readily occur to those who give the matter serious consideration. But I believe that all these objections and difficulties can be removed or overcome.

As a matter of fact, the idea of utilising school for the purpose of shaping the views, changing the outlook, directing the sentiment, and thus moulding the character of an entire people is not new. Its feasibility has been demonstrated by actual experiment.

In 1871 the North German States emphasised their victory over France by federating themselves into an empire under the leadership of Prussia. At the time, the prospects of this combination of heterogeneous states becoming a living and durable entity appeared to most outside observers to be very slight. Prussia had little in common with the rest of Germany excepting language. Nor was there anything in the previous history of the other states to suggest that they would pull together in harness either with Prussia or each other. Everything pointed the other way. Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and Hanoverians had fought against each other in the great European wars of the two preceding centuries in which they had taken sides indiscriminately, and they still nourished feelings of jealousy, suspicion and even hostility towards each other. Bismarck, however, and those who followed him in the government of the German Empire set themselves the task of welding these discordant elements into one people with a single purpose, and accomplished it, as we know. By 1914 the easy-going, beer-drinking, dreamy people of South and West Germany had become Prussians in sentiment, willing instruments in a policy of frightfulness and ready to become "cannon fodder" in the cause of "Deutschland uber Alles." Among the most effective of the various instruments by which this revolutionary change
in the character and ideas of an entire people was brought about was the school, where at the most susceptible period of his life every German was instructed in the ideals of "Deutschtum" and taught the duty of unquestioning obedience to the State. It would be outside of the province of this paper to go into details of the methods by which the schools carried out this work. The point is that the work was carried out successfully.

Surely what could be done by school for the narrow and questionable ideals of "Deutschtum" could be done at least as effectively for the broader and more human purposes with which this paper is concerned. The instruction which it is proposed to give and the spirit which it is proposed to instil into the potential citizen do not involve any matters of controversy, or at least controversial matters can easily be sifted out. It would be necessary, of course, first to instruct the instructors and to provide them with material in the form of text books to help them in the performance of their task. This would present no great difficulty, certainly no insuperable difficulty, if the matter were taken seriously in hand. And if the matter is not taken in hand, if democracy is left to drift without compass or light in a sea which is full of hidden perils, it appears to me to be a fairly safe prophecy that this wonderful twentieth-century civilisation of ours will prove to be no more lasting than the civilisations which have come before it, with, however, this difference between it and earlier civilisations that, having been on a much larger scale than the others, it will leave a greater and more complete wreck behind it.