Abstract: This paper examines the impact of international economic restructuring and globalisation in urban areas, with particular reference to Ireland’s capital city, Dublin. These trends, often depicted as unproblematic, have resulted in considerable polarisation between various social groups and areas, and new inequalities have emerged between “winners” and “losers”. In Dublin, as in other cities, the policy response has been largely a spatial one where “problem areas” have been designated for special assistance and new agencies have been established. The impact of the Designated Area Scheme in Dublin is evaluated, as is the record of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority, whose remits included social and economic regeneration. The paper raises critical concerns about the developmental implications of these interventions, particularly with respect to inner-city communities, education, environmental impacts, land-price escalation and other urban pressures and conflicts.

Keywords: Economic Restructuring, Inner City Decay, Urban Regeneration, Development

JEL Classifications: O140, R120, R580

1. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Ireland is a paradox. In a short period of time there has been a significant change in its relative economic position and its GDP per capita is now close to the European average. Net out-migration has been replaced by net in-migration. Its extraordinary rate of economic growth has earned it the title, “Celtic

---

1 We are most grateful for data and advice to Helen McNamara and Dick Gleeson, Dublin Corporation, Carmel Smith, Peter Coyne, Gerry Kelly and Neil Mulcahy, Dublin Docklands Development Authority, Alan Kelly and Hamish Sinclair, Trinity College, Carmel Sherry, Department of the Environment and Local Government and Danny McCoy and Edgar Jardine of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society. We are indebted to Sheila McMorrow, Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin for cartographic work. The views expressed and any remaining inadequacies are obviously our responsibility.
Tiger”, at a time when nurses and bus drivers have gone on strike because of low pay. The house price bubble threatens to burst while considerable numbers remain in housing need. Access to education (much of it free) has improved significantly, but educational disadvantage is a serious problem among the lower income groups and adult literacy levels are poor. This “polarisation” is a global phenomenon - arising to some extent from the restructuring and globalisation of economic activity. It is particularly obvious in the major cities where new economic activity is at its most frenetic alongside persistent difficulties, including unemployment and social exclusion among a marginalised minority.

In this paper we first examine the impact of international economic restructuring with particular reference to urban areas. Second, we assess the way Ireland was affected by such restructuring from the 1950s, with particular reference to the economic and social difficulties which emerged in Dublin's “inner city”. Third, we offer an assessment of a number of "regeneration" policies designed to deal with these difficulties.

2. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING

In recent decades, it has become increasingly clear that general forces have emerged on a global scale producing socio-economic transformations that, to varying degrees, have impacted at every level. These changes have worked through every dimension of the economic and social structure, with profound implications for the work and living conditions of people and communities across the world. The term "globalisation" has become current in much of the literature in all the social sciences to describe the process, a term that attempts to capture a world of socio-economic, cultural and geographic change. One of the primary forces behind such change is a complex and multi-faceted international restructuring of economic activity.

This restructuring process has produced a range of both positive and negative outcomes. These outcomes have been well documented by researchers, particularly in a number of perceptive recent studies on regional and urban restructuring in various countries. Some of the common difficulties that have arisen in urban areas internationally are highlighted, in particular the economic difficulties of the inner cities. In many cases, these difficulties eventually provided the rationale for “regeneration” or “renewal” strategies. The approaches adopted have varied in important ways, particularly in the level and nature of public intervention and the degree of reliance on market-driven approaches or public sector activity. The impacts of these regeneration strategies in general raise important questions about the nature of the inner city problem and the appropriateness of the approaches adopted to respond to it.

A number of commentators have defined the globalisation concept primarily in terms of the “internationalization” of trade and of firms, a change that is underpinned by technological innovations and neo-liberal policies:
"Globalisation of industry refers to an evolving pattern of cross-border activities of firms involving international investment, trade and collaboration for purposes of product development, production and sourcing, and marketing. These international activities enable firms to enter new markets, exploit their technological and organisational advantages, and reduce business costs and risks. Underlying the international expansion of firms, and in part driven by it, are technological advances, the liberalization of markets and increased mobility of production factors" (OECD, 1996, p. 9).

This view, which promotes a positive and unproblematic impression of these changes, is broadly representative of one section of the literature on this topic. It is argued that these changes are beneficial because they lead to improvements in productivity and efficiency generally, resulting in increased rates of economic growth. There is an oppositional view, however, which arises from a more critical examination of the specific outcomes at different geographical levels and of the wider social costs involved and the uneven impacts. Some of these perspectives are referred to in the discussion that follows.

In broad terms, the globalisation concept suggests a changing political-economy, characterised increasingly by international rather than domestic or local trade, growth in the importance of foreign direct investment, and the removal of barriers to trade and other concessions implemented through various trade agreements. All these interconnected elements suggest an emergent international economic integration. There has also been a fundamental socio-spatial restructuring of production, which has led to the view that a fundamental historical shift has occurred, which is sometimes described as the move to "post-fordism". This has involved many important transformations, notably a concentration of ownership and control through mergers and acquisitions and the increasing centrality of multinational corporations, changes in the labour process arising from technological innovations and deskilling, and changes in the spatial structure of industry.

Other important shifts include the increased importance of the service sector and the rise of "new" technologies, which have underpinned the emergence of knowledge-based or "informational" industries and services. There has also been greater "flexibility" in production, with firms and branch plants becoming increasingly mobile and relocating internationally to maximise profits, while relatively place-bound communities are left to suffer the consequences of disinvestment. In confronting these new socio-spatial realities, local and central states must increasingly adopt entrepreneurial roles, diverting resources to "sell" (and prepare) particular locations as sites for investment amid significant international competition (McGuirk, 1994; Harding et al., 1994). At the same time the labour force itself is restructured by the increasing use of "non traditional" labour sources (such as women and immigrants) and the growing share of temporary, part-time and even informal employment arrangements.
A key driving force behind all of these changes is individual firm strategies, reorientated towards exploiting competitive advantages on an international scale and benefiting from favourable factors (such as cheap and unregulated labour) and infrastructures in particular locations. This raises one key dimension of recent rounds of restructuring, what the OECD describes as the “division of firm operations into separate segments carried out in different countries” (OECD, 1996, p.15). This has meant an increasing division between “conception” and “execution” (i.e. between “mental” and “manual” labour), which has facilitated an important geographical restructuring of functions (Massey, 1995).

For example, the “higher end” functions such as ownership and control (headquarters) and R&D may be concentrated in particular areas or cities to benefit from more sophisticated infrastructure or the availability of highly skilled labour (e.g. New York, London, Tokyo, Silicon Valley), while components manufacture and assembly functions may be “decentralised” from the traditional industrial regions and cities to take advantage of cheaper, unorganised or “untraditional” labour reserves in depressed regions, the “periphery”, or less developed countries. A related change in all of this is the redundancy of some of the traditional industrial skills, which were long a source of relatively well paid employment in the older industrial cores, through the dual impact of technological innovation and the socio-spatial restructuring outlined above.

In this light, one of the most striking elements within the recent restructuring of industry that emerges is the changing economic geography and the increasing importance of intra-firm trade, which means that an important component of international economic activity involves relations between geographically distinct branches of single firms:

“The old spatial division of labour based on sector, on contrasts between industries, has gone into accelerated decline and in its place has arisen to dominance a spatial division of labour in which a more important component is the interregional spatial structuring of production within individual industries. Relations between economic activity in different parts of the country are now a function rather less of market relations between firms and rather more of planned relations within them” (Massey, 1995, p. 287).

This leads to a reformulation of the definition of globalisation to encompass the fundamental reorganisation of the spatial structure of production, with important implications for questions of regional inequality and the changing economic function (and stability) of urban centres:

“...a new division of labour has emerged on a global scale : a division not based on product (Lancashire cotton, Sheffield steel) but on process (London and New York global finance, Berkshire and Westchester back offices, Leeds and Omaha direct telephone sales). In so far as an activity can be decentralized to a lower-cost location, it will be; and, while
manufacturing moves out from the advanced economies to Thailand and China, so services now move out to suburban or provincial locations, limited so far by linguistic and cultural barriers, but doubtless soon overleaping those too. What remains, and what grows, is a cluster of highly specialized activities based on access to privileged, esoteric information: financial services of the most speculative kind, specialized business services depending on face-to-face encounter, media services and the like. This is often described as globalization.” (Hall, 1996, p. 404).

These various elements of recent restructuring have had complex and sometimes contradictory effects. In simple terms, a number of analysts in a range of fields have highlighted that the general process of development and change that constitutes “globalisation” is characterised above all by inequalities in its impacts and meaning. In short, while it is accepted that a general restructuring of the global economy is now underway with implications for all nations, regions and communities, actual empirical investigation reveals differential outcomes on the ground. For instance, the “deindustrialisation” that occurred in many developed countries undermined the economic viability of many areas, including many inner cities, generating social problems locally such as poverty, unemployment and community disintegration.

Although reinvestment eventually followed earlier rounds of disinvestment in many urban cores, further transforming these areas, the occupational opportunities created were often unsuitable or inaccessible to the communities that were devastated by the earlier decline. The social distance between these urban working class communities and much of the new employment in the restructured urban economy is of great significance - for instance, financial and other professional services and knowledge based employment in the informational economy have transformed many urban economies but have been of very little relevance to the indigenous inner city communities that grew up around the traditional economic base.

The inner city therefore provides a specific example of the general point about the uneven outcomes of global restructuring: while certain social groups and geographic areas have profited like never before from integration into a worldwide system of economic activity, others have not been so fortunate, in some cases to the extent that they have been “delinked” or “excluded” entirely from the international economic order. The urban planning expert Peter Hall summarised the general socio-spatial dilemma as evidenced in the urban context when he described an emergent phenomenon, “the city of globalized, polarized reality” (Hall, 1996, p. 402). This highlights a key point emerging in recent decades: there are contradictory social outcomes to this general process of change that only become apparent in more detailed studies of the specific or local impacts. A number of studies of the urban experience offer good examples in this respect. This is because:

“... the less fortunate groups are likely to be increasingly dammed up in the cities, where they will perhaps be housed after a fashion, all in the name of sustainable urban development. The good news, if any, is that the cities will be where some of the more exciting new economic developments are
taking place. The bad news is that these groups may not be playing much role in them. Rather, they may find themselves in but not of the city, divorced from its new mainstream informational economy, and subsisting on a mélange of odd jobs, welfare cheques and the black economy. It is a fate not too far removed from that of the dockers and match girls of London's East End, or the sweatshop labourers of New York's East Side, a hundred years earlier; save that for these, their descendents, the way out may paradoxically be even harder, because other kinds of jobs no longer exist” (Hall, 1996, p. 422).

There is also a growing body of evidence that points to a new and intensifying trend towards polarisation in the developed nations. For example, recent evidence from Canada indicates rising degrees of income inequality since the early 1980s and greater polarisation: the proportion of workers earning between 75 and 150 percent of the median income was lower in 1991 than in 1981 and substantially lower than in 1961 (Betcherman, 1996). The figures suggest a new and more marked social division, with the "winners" doing far better and the “losers” faring much worse than in the past, and this phenomenon has been described as a key outcome of the restructuring of the economy in the post-war era. These “new” inequalities are nowhere more evident than in the major cities at the core of the new world order: the “dual” or “divided” city may well be the most telling product of global economic restructuring (Castells, 1989, 1998; Sassen, 1991; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992).

“...there is a new form of urban dualism on the rise, one specifically linked to the restructuring process and to the expansion of the informational economy. It relates first of all to the simultaneous processes of growth and decline of industries and firms, processes taking place most intensely at the nodal points in the economic geography, namely, the largest metropolitan areas where most of the knowledge-intensive activities and jobs are concentrated. This occupational transition, unlike the shift from agricultural to industrial societies, is characterized by a mismatch between the characteristics of labor being phased out and the requirements for new labor” (Castells, 1989, p. 224).

The "dual" city is also closely linked to - indeed, is in large measure produced and reproduced by - the rising importance of the service economy and related changes in the labour process and in the variable "quality" of jobs (formal, secure, well-paid employment alongside informal, temporary, low-paid work). The pervasive influence of information technology and related forms of new employment are also implicated - computer literacy is increasingly a minimum requirement, yet even in the developed world, a significant minority still do not have even basic literacy skills. In all of these changes, there seems to have emerged an increasing "excluded" or marginal population, who find themselves surplus to the needs of the economy altogether - moved from a position of structural exploitation to structural irrelevance, languishing in the "black holes of globalisation" (Castells, 1993).
Part of the new potential labor force, especially among ethnic minority youth, is not integrated into the new labor market, and becomes surplus population. The majority of labor is restructured, both by the imposition upon it of new working conditions, generally in a different sector of activity, and by changing characteristics of the labor pool itself, increasing the proportion of women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities in the labor force, taking advantage of the greater social vulnerability of these groups in a social context of gender and racial discrimination. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of labor, recruited from the better educated social groups, is upgraded in skills and social status, and becomes the backbone of the new informational economy, both in advanced services and in high-technology manufacturing. The differential re-assignment of labor in the process of simultaneous growth and decline results in a sharply stratified, segmented social structure that differentiates between upgraded labor, downgraded labor, and excluded people. Dualism refers here both to the contradictory dynamics of growth and decline, and to the polarizing and exclusionary effects of these dynamics (Castells, 1989, p. 225).

This social division in the globalised city also had an important spatial dimension in that the "losing" groups generally found themselves "segregated" into the "devalued" spaces of the city, whether in the traditional inner city areas that had decayed under the twin forces of disinvestment and depopulation or in the new peripheral estates, often isolated without the necessary services or local economy to sustain an urban community. These are trends common to most Western cities, and they are symptomatic of the general restructuring process.

Throughout the 1980s the spatial impact of economic change was highly uneven. In many cities there was growing economic, social and political dynamism which did create increased prosperity. In others there was continuing economic decline. But neither prosperity nor poverty was equally distributed as different parts of cities and different groups within them were affected differently by change. Some benefited; others clearly did less well. As a result, in many European cities there is a continuing process of economic marginalisation, social exclusion and physical segregation of vulnerable and marginal groups (Harding et al., 1994, p2).

Some commentators have argued that Los Angeles above all other urban centres is the paradigmatic example of the restructured city in all its globalised, divided, segregated reality.

One can find in Los Angeles not only the high technology industrial complexes of the Silicon Valley and the erratic sunbelt economy of Houston, but also the far-reaching industrial decline and bankrupt urban neighbourhoods of rust-belted Detroit or Cleveland. There is a Boston in Los Angeles, a Lower Manhattan and a South Bronx, a Sao Paulo and a Singapore. There may be no other comparable region which presents so
vividly such a composite assemblage and articulation of urban restructuring processes” (Soja, 1989, p. 193).

The product of restructuring in a world city like Los Angeles is typical of the "dual" characteristics noted above, with a boom in high-tech industries and low-pay service and manufacturing jobs (with a notably high immigrant population), as well as an agglomeration of finance, banking, and corporate functions. The differential outcomes of restructuring highlight stark inequalities:

“... against these indicators of rapid aggregate growth in the regional economy, however, are equally startling indicators of decline and economic displacement: extensive job loss and factory closures in the most unionized sectors of blue-collar industry and a steep decline in the membership of industrial labour unions; deepening poverty and unemployment in those neighbourhoods left behind to fend for themselves in a growing informal or underground economy; the multiplication of industrial sweatshops reminiscent of the nineteenth century; the intensification of residential segregation in what has always been a highly segregated city-region; unusually high rates of violent crime, gang members, and drug use, as well as the largest urban prison population in the country. A particularly acute housing crisis has been boiling for many years...” (Soja, 1989, p. 192-3).

The trends in Britain also exhibit some of the important outcomes of recent rounds of restructuring. The economic base has been rapidly and intensely de-industrialized, with over 1 million manufacturing jobs disappearing between 1966 and 1976, a loss of 13 percent. Against this, the service sector expanded, with over 3 million new jobs created between 1971 and 1988 (Pacione, 1997). Accordingly, by 1987, the manufacturing share of employment had declined by 14.5 percent to account for only 21.6 percent of employment (Greenhalgh and Kilmister, 1993). These changes have had serious effects on British cities, where the industrial collapse and insufficient growth in service employment were key elements of the inner city problem, undermining the fabric of many communities and producing long-term problems of unemployment and deprivation.

For example, Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool suffered net employment losses of, respectively, 13.1 percent, 12.9 percent and 25.7 percent in the decade 1981-91 (Pacione, 1997). Not surprisingly, problems of unemployment escalated as a result of the restructuring of the urban economies, and many inner city areas also experienced large-scale population decline, a further factor undermining their social and physical fabric. The problems are typified by cities such as Glasgow and Liverpool, where unemployment rates doubled in the decade 1971-1981, while population declined by, respectively, 22 percent and 16 percent (Midleton, 1987).

A number of different underlying factors have been pinpointed in analyses of restructuring. In an examination of the performance of 31 industries in the period 1968-71, Massey and Meegan (1982) identified three forms of production
reorganisation that were important in the decline: intensification (changes designed
to increase the productivity of labour), technical change (changes in production
techniques) and rationalization (reductions in capacity, cut-backs in employment).
Evidence from London between 1966 and 1974 indicated that the difference
between closures and openings was responsible for 44 percent of manufacturing
employment loss, geographic relocation was responsible for 27 percent, and
shrinkage accounted for 23 percent (Dennis, 1978).

There is also some evidence that a further important factor underlying the trends is
the changing geography of production linked to "globalisation" trends: the largest
100 British manufacturing companies were multinationals by 1970, and this
involved a redirection of investment abroad and a relative lack of domestic
investment (Pacione, 1997). Various studies described the problems as local
symptoms of broader structural shifts and highlighted the fact that the "areas of
need" in urban areas had suffered the worst impacts of industrial reorganisation,
including decline in port activities, the textile industry, mining, car and other
manufacturing (Community Development Project, 1974, 1975).

It may be noted that the overwhelming emphasis of policy in Britain, Europe and the
United States during this extended period was on the "regional problem" as
illustrated by significant differences between regions in relation to income,
unemployment, the lack of employment opportunities to counteract the ongoing
losses from agriculture and migration. In Britain, for example, regional disparities
between the north and south of the country had been high on the policy agenda since
the 1930s and, despite an active "new town" programme pursued from the 1940s to
ease the congestion of London, the difficulties of urban areas received scant
attention. Policies pursued tended to stress the difficulties arising from congestion
in the main urban centres and the need to decentralise population and economic
activity away from them. A significant "urban-rural shift" became obvious from the
1960s, especially from the major cities (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1982; Gudgin,
1996).

During the late 1960s it was realised that a serious urban problem had arisen and
this was particularly obvious in the "inner cities". An "Urban Programme" together
with an "Urban Development Grant" (later to become a "City Grant") was
established to initiate capital projects and educational schemes in areas of special
need. A "Community Development Project" was established to investigate how to
deal with deprivation in large urban communities. A series of commissioned studies
set out the extent of the economic, social and environmental decline which had
occurred in a range of British cities since the 1940s and resulted in a White Paper in
1977. Arising from these studies, the emphasis on "regional" began to shift to
"area-based" programmes in relatively confined areas of Britain’s inner cities. The
belief was that, if one concentrated on the areas which apparently contained the
highest proportions of the population suffering deprivation, the problem could be
resolved without difficulty. Heavy public expenditure in specific areas was also
seen as an important mechanism.
From 1980 a range of “problem areas” in Britain’s cities were given “enterprise zone” status in the hope that the private sector would be attracted by generous tax incentives and lenient planning controls. Special agencies, Urban Development Corporations, were also established outside the main central and local government structure to ensure a “fast-track” approach to development. Perhaps the best known example of this was the London Docklands Development Corporation established in 1980. Various other initiatives were introduced during the 1980s and the whole plethora of schemes was “amalgamated” in 1994 in a new Single Regeneration Budget with a “Challenge” Fund to support employment, training, housing and ethnic minorities in urban areas (Tyler, Rhodes and Brennan, 1999).

The impact of these various initiatives has given rise to a great deal of debate. There is no doubt that change took place in the areas chosen for action. Dereliction was reduced. Significant building programmes took place. In some areas, such as the eastern area of Glasgow, in London and in Liverpool housing for disadvantaged communities received an enormous boost. Tax incentives and easier planning controls resulted in activity which might not otherwise have happened. However, the recurrent theme arising in the various assessments of these initiatives is: who did the changes benefit?

The Enterprise Zone policy received much study. This was an attempt to tackle urban problems by creating an environment amenable to private investment. In this way, it was hoped to foster innovation and enterprise. The whole experiment has been described as both a manageable response to inner city distress and a means of illustrating the value of tax cuts, deregulation of property and associated measures in solving urban problems (Lloyd, 1986). In a detailed evaluation of Enterprise Zones in the mid 1990s, it was estimated that £2 billion had been invested in 22 zones over a ten-year period up to 1993 and a total of 6 million square metres of space had been developed. Allowing for “deadweight” and “displacement”, the study estimated that 58,000 jobs (including short-term multiplier effects) were additional to the local areas at a cost of up to £900 million. However, the narrow “property-driven” impact of the scheme was obvious;

“The Enterprise Zone scheme has established or enhanced local property markets through increased confidence and reduced uncertainty by the removal of dereliction and the provision of new premises” (Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1995).

Although in some narrow respects, Enterprise Zones in Britain could be judged a success, they have proved unsatisfactory in a number of fundamental ways. The most positive outcomes of the policy included the development of significant industrial floor space within the zones, improvements to derelict areas and some related physical improvement in the areas immediately outside the zones. On the other hand, the weaknesses of the policy relate to such things as the creation of a dual property market, the modest effects of Enterprise Zones on innovation and the suggested inequity in terms of benefit. There have also been persistent doubts as to the ability of Enterprise Zones to stimulate business investment or alter business
location or employment choices. There were doubts too about the success of the policy in generating additional output or employment. It appears that the transfer of small firms from elsewhere accounted for much of the additional economic activity.

Rather than fostering new enterprise and generating further investment, the policy merely diverted a good proportion of investment from elsewhere. Any area-based policy unavoidably creates a boundary problem, as considerable benefits are made available within what is ultimately a fairly arbitrarily zoned area. The availability of certain incentives within the areas marked as Enterprise Zones can create a 'dual' property market in place of what would have been a relatively homogenous one. Developers were inevitably influenced by the comparative rate of return on either side of the border of the zones with negative effects for the areas immediately outside the zones (Cambridge Economic Consultants, 1995).

In Britain, benefits were targeted almost exclusively at the property sector. The ten-year rates exemption, one of the most important incentives, generally resulted in increased land prices or higher rents. Landowners increased rents knowing that tenants were not subject to rates, thereby appropriating some of the benefit. Hence, landowners have generally been the major beneficiaries. A related point is that it was the larger firms, with adequate resources to own and develop property, that have best been able to exploit the opportunities presented by both the rates relief and capital allowances. Smaller firms renting premises found the incentives less attractive because of their tenant status.

Much the same conclusion was reached in relation to London Docklands:

"The London Docklands Development Corporation removed the burden of social criteria from decision-making processes. In short, it operated a flexible planning regime and a developer-friendly environment intended to encourage investment and property speculation. The needs of developers were given priority over social and community needs. The development process was streamlined and bureaucratic procedures were simplified at the expense of local consultation and accountability" (Barnes et al., 1996, p.24).

Schemes similar to the above have been implemented in Ireland since the mid 1980s and we examine these in the final section of the paper. Before doing so, however, we examine the nature of industrial restructuring in Ireland with particular reference to the Dublin area, and in particular the inner city.

3. INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND POLICY IN IRELAND: FROM REGIONAL POLICY TO URBAN RENEWAL

In the previous section we reviewed the nature of the international economic restructuring and the differential impact of these trends in various cities. We now
briefly examine the way in which Ireland began to experience, and participate in, significant economic restructuring, particularly from the 1950s and the variable outcomes of this. In the late 1950s there was a fundamental change from "protectionism" to an "outward-looking" approach. This change had crucial implications for the restructuring of Irish industry and had particular effects in the Dublin area which was for many years the main industrial concentration.

One of the most important early policy changes was the introduction in 1956 of the Export Profits Tax Relief Scheme, whereby manufacturing firms were to be freed from taxation on profits earned on export sales. In 1957 Ireland joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The White Paper on Economic Development in 1958 and, arising from this, the First Programme for Economic Expansion (1959-64) gave details of the future approach which would be pursued in relation to employment creation, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The emphasis in the future was to be on outward-looking and export-oriented policies which attempted to attract foreign companies to Ireland and the abandonment of protectionism. During subsequent decades, this approach was to continue and included the cutting of tariffs, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, joining GATT and the European Community and supporting a range of moves towards further European integration up to the present time. (McAleese, 1997).

Ireland's entry to the European Community opened up a particularly important base from which multinational companies could export their products to a rich and varied market in Europe.

In addition to the new moves towards outward-looking policies from the 1950s, there emerged a "regional orientation" to industrial policy, as in Britain and elsewhere, which was to last to the present day. There was a strong justification for this since the western areas of the country had for long suffered disadvantages in terms of poor agricultural structure, low incomes, insufficient employment outside agriculture, poor infrastructure and social provision. The east of the country, and in particular the Dublin area, was at that time performing relatively well in terms of industrial jobs and there was an overwhelming preponderence of service-type employment including government offices and the headquarters of the main state agencies.

Among the policy measures designed to tackle this “regional problem” were the Undeveloped Areas Act of 1952 and the establishment of various agencies, including Shannon Free Airport Development Company (now re-named Shannon Development) and Gaeltarra Eireann (now Udaras Na Gaeltachta), County Development Teams in the Designated Areas of the west and Regional Development Organisations (later to be renamed Regional Authorities) for nine regions around the country. The 1969 Industrial Development Act enabled the IDA to give grants towards the purchase of fixed assets of up to 60 percent of the cost in the Designated Areas and up to 45 percent elsewhere, as well as other preferential measures, including its “advance factory” programme. The policy emphasis on areas in the west of the country was continued in the 1973/77 and 1978/82 Regional Industrial Plans, published by the Industrial Development Authority, although by
this time it was being acknowledged that serious problems of industrial decline were emerging in other parts of the country and particularly in the Dublin area.

How effective was this extensive range of outward-looking, regional and incentive policies, including membership of the Community? One study illustrated a significant difference between manufacturing employment gains in the "Eastern Core" - consisting of the East, the North East and South East regions of Ireland - and the "Western Periphery" containing the remaining regions (Drudy, 1991). It also pinpointed a notable difference between the impact of foreign and indigenous firms. Thus, during the 1970s, gross gains exceeded losses for both Irish and foreign firms and overall net gains were recorded in the Eastern Core and in the Western Periphery. However, the foreign firms indicated a superior performance, with a ratio of gains to losses of 1.6 to 1 compared to 1.1 to 1 in the case of Irish firms.

Second, the periphery fared about three times better than the core, with foreign firms also performing three times better than their Irish counterparts. The foreign net gains were significant in the Mid-West, the West, the Midlands. On the other hand, the East region was the only region to register net manufacturing losses in the indigenous sector during the period up to 1980. Dublin fared particularly badly and this was to continue.

In stark contrast to the 1970s, the 1980s recorded severe losses in employment despite the new “market and enterprise orientation” of policy during this period (Drudy, 1995). Most regions outside Dublin registered serious losses, but Dublin once again fared worst, losing proportionately twice as many industrial jobs as the rest of the State - 22 percent compared to 11 percent. The 1990s recorded exceptional growth in the Irish economy, earning it the title of “Celtic Tiger”. Whether this title is warranted and who are the beneficiaries is a matter of considerable debate. In any case, it can be concluded that, despite some recent modest industrial resurgence during the 1990s and a reduction in unemployment, the Dublin region has suffered a severe contraction in its industrial base over the last 25 years (Drudy and Punch, 1999).

The sectors of the Dublin population that have most directly borne the costs of economic restructuring in recent years - the industrial labour force in particular - have also been those least well-positioned to benefit from the new economic opportunities in the growing sectors, such as financial and business services. The most obvious consequence has been the problem of unemployment for these groups, which we examine below.

Restructuring and Renewal: The Case of Dublin's Inner City

The period since the 1960s had seen an apparent rapid urbanisation, with Dublin increasing its absolute population in every inter-censal period. At the same time, complex trends were taking place within the city, and in particular the inner city experienced serious population loss for an extended period of time, alongside
considerable growth on the periphery. The trends are summarised in Table 1. The decline was particularly stark given that the inner city population in the mid 1930s was 267,000 (Horner, 1999).

**Table 1: Population Change in Dublin, 1961-1996 (000s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Inner City</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Inner City</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner City Total</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>131.5</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. Borough</td>
<td>537.5</td>
<td>567.9</td>
<td>544.8*</td>
<td>478.4</td>
<td>481.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin Region</td>
<td>719.0</td>
<td>852.2</td>
<td>1003.2</td>
<td>1025.3</td>
<td>1058.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of National</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trend is indicative due to boundary changes after 1981.

*Source: Census of Population, 1961-96*

As Table 2 illustrates, the county borough area recorded a significant loss in employment, particularly in manufacturing. At the same time, employment opportunities in services did not compensate. Against this, there was an expansion of both industrial and service employment in the suburbs, see Table 3.

**Table 2: Employment in Dublin Co. Borough, 1961-96**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>68,519</td>
<td>66,432</td>
<td>44,836</td>
<td>30,148</td>
<td>28,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining/Quarry</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec./Gas/Water</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>4,312</td>
<td>3,138</td>
<td>1,906</td>
<td>1,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building/Constr</td>
<td>13,861</td>
<td>17,328</td>
<td>16,601</td>
<td>10,035</td>
<td>8,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>86,364</td>
<td>88,450</td>
<td>64,901</td>
<td>42,239</td>
<td>39,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm/Ins/Fin/Bus.</td>
<td>45,624</td>
<td>45,975</td>
<td>44,223</td>
<td>39,176</td>
<td>44,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp./Comm.</td>
<td>21,038</td>
<td>21,971</td>
<td>19,895</td>
<td>16,262</td>
<td>16,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Admin.</td>
<td>15,031</td>
<td>17,436</td>
<td>20,516</td>
<td>15,002</td>
<td>14,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Services</td>
<td>21,009</td>
<td>26,712</td>
<td>32,633</td>
<td>33,809</td>
<td>39,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/Other</td>
<td>21,751</td>
<td>18,612</td>
<td>19,431</td>
<td>20,416</td>
<td>29,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Services</td>
<td>124,453</td>
<td>130,706</td>
<td>136,698</td>
<td>124,665</td>
<td>144,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trend is indicative due to boundary changes after 1981.

*Source: Census of Population, 1961-96*

Inner city communities were hit particularly harshly by these shifts, losing out to disinvestment (capital flight to the periphery and further afield), rationalisation (technological change, job shedding) and closure. It has been estimated, for example, that the inner city lost around 2,000 manufacturing jobs annually during the late 1970s alone (Bannon et al., 1981). Pressures underlying this change
included the increased international competition ushered in by entry in 1973 to the European Community as well as the recession of the 1980s.

Table 3: Employment in Dublin County, 1961-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>15,396</td>
<td>22,844</td>
<td>31,010</td>
<td>32,092</td>
<td>35,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining/Quarry</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec./Gas/Water</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>2,258</td>
<td>1,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building/Constr</td>
<td>5,109</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>14,362</td>
<td>11,535</td>
<td>12,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Industry</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,632</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,566</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,444</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,214</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,074</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm/Ins/Fin/Bus.</td>
<td>13,701</td>
<td>21,464</td>
<td>40,454</td>
<td>52,715</td>
<td>63,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp./Comm.</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>12,502</td>
<td>15,320</td>
<td>18,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Admin.</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>5,724</td>
<td>11,388</td>
<td>15,227</td>
<td>15,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Services</td>
<td>8,662</td>
<td>14,487</td>
<td>28,991</td>
<td>38,577</td>
<td>47,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/Other</td>
<td>7,816</td>
<td>8,497</td>
<td>12,853</td>
<td>19,207</td>
<td>27,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Services</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,173</strong></td>
<td><strong>57,112</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,188</strong></td>
<td><strong>141,046</strong></td>
<td><strong>172,899</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>59,805</td>
<td>90,678</td>
<td>154,632</td>
<td>187,260</td>
<td>222,973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trend is indicative due to boundary changes after 1981.

Source: Census of Population, 1961-96

Technological change played a direct role in job loss in port activities, where containerisation decimated a formerly labour-intensive sector, undermining the economic base of the docklands communities. Employment opportunities were severely reduced in traditional docklands activities, including Reg. Armstrong, B&I, Gouldings, I.G.B., Lever Brothers, Bolands, Brooks Watson, ESB, Burmah, ESSO and the Port and Docks Board (ICON, 1998). Unemployment increased accordingly in the county borough area and in particular in the inner city, see Table 4.

Table 4: Unemployment Trends in Dublin, 1961-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dublin Co.</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>25,694</td>
<td>46,416</td>
<td>43,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin County</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>3,369</td>
<td>13,603</td>
<td>31,265</td>
<td>31,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin (Total)</td>
<td>12,678</td>
<td>15,969</td>
<td>39,297</td>
<td>77,681</td>
<td>74,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin Co.</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin County</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin (Total)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trend is indicative due to boundary changes after 1981.

Source: Census of Population, 1961-96
In the light of the trends described above, it was clear that Dublin's inner city and Docklands were faced with a range of problems by the early 1980s. Furthermore, various agencies of central and local government had failed to react and respond positively to industrial change where the Docks and traditional industries were the "dominant employers". It was our inability or failure to replace such dominant employers and to enable their former employees to adapt to new employment opportunities which was the fundamental problem.

Indeed, until relatively recent times, decline was widely regarded as inevitable and there was an unwillingness on the part of the public sector to believe or accept that the difficulties could be tackled and even overcome. As an example, the East Region Settlement Strategy, published in 1985, seemed to accept that it would not be possible (largely on grounds of disinterest by central government) to accommodate a further 10,000 people in the entire inner city of Dublin, although the population had declined by 62,000 people over the previous 20 years (ERDO, 1985).

Apart from notable exceptions, including long-time occupiers and owners of centre city premises, the private sector likewise showed little interest. The construction industry, the banks, insurance companies and others involved in a range of service industries, were wary of committing themselves to, or investing in, the Docklands or indeed in the inner city as a whole. By the early 1980s, much of central Dublin displayed all the symptoms of decline, including rising unemployment, widespread dereliction, educational disadvantage, crime, drug abuse and a range of other social problems. It was an unacceptable situation. It was therefore widely recognised that positive intervention was essential.

4. URBAN RENEWAL SCHEMES: THE CASE OF DUBLIN

Although the economic and social rationale for intervention in Dublin's inner city were particularly strong from the 1970s, it was "political considerations" which eventually brought action in 1981 in the form of the "Gregory Deal". Mr Charles Haughey, then Leader of Fianna Fail, became dependent on the support of an independent Dail representative, Mr Tony Gregory T.D., to form a Government. It was agreed between them that a special Commission would be established to oversee the development of a 27 acre (10.8 hectares) derelict site owned by the Dublin Port and Docks Board beside the Custom House in Mr Gregory’s north inner city constituency, see Figure 1.

The main proposal was the construction of local authority housing and small industrial units for those who had previously lost their jobs in the Docks. Although a Bill was published in 1981 to further this initiative, the legislation was not enacted because the Government went out of office at the end of that year. Various attempts were made between 1982 and 1985 to interest private developers in the 27 acre site, but with little success. Dublin's inner city was also given designated area status for industrial purposes in 1982 in an attempt to arrest industrial decline, but its impact in terms of new job creation was minimal. A Working Party was established to
advise the Government on the Custom House Docks site and it recommended the establishment of a special agency, the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA) to develop the site. In November 1986 this recommendation was given effect by the new coalition government in Section 8 of the Urban Renewal Act which defined a number of "Designated Areas" in Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Waterford and Galway for special consideration.

In this section, we first examine the nature of this Scheme and its impact in terms of physical, economic and social change, with particular reference to Dublin's inner city. Secondly, we examine a subsequent approach in Dublin's Docklands under the auspices of a new body with a wider brief, the Dublin Docklands Development Authority.

*The Designated Areas Scheme in Dublin, 1986-1997*

The 1986 Designated Area Scheme was designed to encourage the private sector to invest in commercial and residential buildings in four "Designated Areas", both south and north of the river Liffey in Dublin's inner city as set out in Figure 1. These included an extensive area of the quays on both sides of the Liffey, an area running north through Gardiner Street, a small development of Georgian houses in Henrietta Street which had been in a derelict condition for some time and the Custom House Docks site mentioned above.
Figure 1: Designated Areas in Dublin City

Source: MacLaran (199)
As outlined earlier, these areas in the heart of Dublin had suffered severe neglect over many years and little action had been taken either by the owners of property or by the state. The objectives of the Scheme were set out as follows:

"New life must be brought back to these run-down areas at the core of the nation’s capital. They must again become attractive areas in which to live and work or for shopping and leisure pursuits... the new incentives will create a suitable financial climate for large-scale investment by the private sector in these areas and will generate the confidence that will lead to a self-sustaining urban renewal process in the years ahead" (Government Information Office, 1986).

The main incentives available in the designated areas were capital allowances, rates remission and rent allowances. The Custom House Docks received the most favourable tax treatment and the special agency recommended, the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA), was established with a specific mandate to plan and develop the area. The Authority was given powers "to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land for redevelopment, either by itself or by others".

A new International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) under the auspices of the CHDDA was also to be a central element of plans for the area. Further additions were made to the Designated Areas in 1988 and 1990 and a special scheme was introduced in 1991 in order to develop Temple Bar - an historic area in the city centre - as a cultural, artistic and tourist attraction. In 1994 further areas and individual streets were designated and a number of “Enterprise Areas” were established. Designation was extended to a whole range of urban centres throughout the country during the 1990s.

We first consider the physical effects of this Scheme in terms of buildings constructed in Dublin’s inner city. Table 5 gives the nature and extent of the area developed under the Scheme over the period 1986 to mid-1997. By 1997, a total of almost 897,000 square metres of space had been built in the Designated Areas, covering a range of uses.

It may be noted that the first buildings under the scheme were completed in late 1988 but the extent of change was modest up to 1992. Between 1986 and 1992 there was a strong concentration on office/commercial buildings, accounting for about 70 percent of the total space developed (Williams and MacLaran, 1996).

This resulted in considerable excess supply and by 1991 there was a 45 percent vacancy rate in new Designated Area office buildings (Hamilton Osborne and King, 1992). This influenced a significant shift towards residential, especially since 1994 when a new scheme was introduced. Residential development therefore was twice as great as office development in terms of physical space in the latter part of the period in question. The first large residential scheme (173 one and two bedroom apartments) was constructed in Gardiner Street and by the end of 1996, a total of
4,665 new units, including 333 apartments in the Custom House Docks and 480 in Temple Bar had been built in the Designated Areas. A further 1,247 were under construction in the Designated Areas while an additional 2,673 units were completed in the inner city outside the boundaries of the Designated Areas. This was a remarkable turnaround from a position where the private sector had built virtually no houses or apartments in the entire area over the previous two decades. We return to the nature of the residential development later in the paper.

Table 5: Estimated Area Developed in the Dublin Designated Areas, 1986-97* (Square Metres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Residential</th>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Custom House</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Custom House</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Docks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>23,450</td>
<td>337,446</td>
<td>360,896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47,818</td>
<td>47,818</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,450</td>
<td>385,264</td>
<td>408,714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>131,200</td>
<td>70,398</td>
<td>201,598</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,796</td>
<td>12,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131,200</td>
<td>83,194</td>
<td>214,394</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>89,533</td>
<td>99,433</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41,600</td>
<td>41,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>131,133</td>
<td>141,033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80,450</td>
<td>80,450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44,615</td>
<td>44,615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>125,065</td>
<td>125,065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>164,550</td>
<td>581,547</td>
<td>746,097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150,777</td>
<td>150,777</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>164,550</td>
<td>732,324</td>
<td>896,874</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Temple Bar not included (data not available)

Source: Dublin Corporation and Department of the Environment.

It may be noted that the brunt of the development noted above (about 83 percent of the total) was "newly built" rather than refurbished. This was largely due to the extent of serious dereliction in the inner city in the mid 1980s rendering refurbishment difficult or impossible, and to the way the incentives were structured in the Designated Area scheme. The tax incentives and rates remission tended to give precedence to new construction over refurbishment, while stamp duty exemption and first time buyer grants for owner occupiers also favoured new build. The new building and safety regulations had the same effect. This preoccupation
with redevelopment had adverse implications in terms of conservation of the city’s heritage (Convery, 1997).

The value of the investment in the Designated Areas over the period 1986-1997 is given in Table 6. The total estimated investment in the various areas amounted to an estimated IR£1.1 billion. The large expenditure on office development is accounted for almost exclusively by the Custom House Docks and the building of the IFSC where the high quality specifications incurred higher costs per square metre. In other Designated Areas however, residential and other uses were predominant. Apart from the Temple Bar area, new build took up the vast brunt of the investment, with refurbishment accounting for only 13 percent of total expenditure.

Table 6: Estimated Investment in the Dublin Designated Areas, 1986-97 (IR£000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Custom House Docks</th>
<th>Temple Bar*</th>
<th>Other Desi Areas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESIDENTIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>2,791</td>
<td>269,464</td>
<td>294,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,593</td>
<td>30,108</td>
<td>37,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>10,384</td>
<td>299,572</td>
<td>331,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>63,306</td>
<td>447,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>6,139</td>
<td>8,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>7,276</td>
<td>69,445</td>
<td>456,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMERCIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>4,867</td>
<td>6,782</td>
<td>95,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,579</td>
<td>20,687</td>
<td>31,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>15,446</td>
<td>88,510</td>
<td>126,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDUSTRIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,935</td>
<td>5,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>2,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,143</td>
<td>8,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>64,052</td>
<td>98,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31,706</td>
<td>31,236</td>
<td>62,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>40,222</td>
<td>95,288</td>
<td>161,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>451,000</td>
<td>20,624</td>
<td>470,580</td>
<td>942,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbished</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52,704</td>
<td>90,378</td>
<td>143,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>451,000</td>
<td>73,328</td>
<td>560,958</td>
<td>1,085,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Temple Bar figures to 1996 only.

Source: Dublin Corporation and Department of the Environment.

It is clear from the above that the physical change and investment was significant in the various Designated Areas. However, as mentioned earlier, a whole range of critical questions arise in relation to schemes of this kind. For example, what was
the extent of the "deadweight problem" - how many projects would have gone ahead in any case in the absence of the scheme? Was there a "displacement problem" - did the new activities result in the loss of some older traditional activities and jobs? Was there a "transfer problem" - were the projects and jobs all net additions to the economy or did some or most of them simply transfer from outside the Designated Area boundaries to avail of the incentives? How many of the new jobs went to the local community? What other community benefits resulted? Were there "negative" effects in terms of escalating land and house prices (as happened with schemes in other countries) which put house purchase outside the reach of many of the less well-off local community? Did the new office and residential developments "integrate" well with the local community? Did the policy attempt to deal with the wider needs of the local communities, in terms of such things as play areas, facilities and amenities for families, appropriate education and training opportunities, a better and safer traffic environment, affordable housing and a safer and friendlier residential and social environment? In short, what impact had the scheme in terms of "community development"? We attempt to deal with some of these questions below.

It is difficult to reach clear conclusions on the "deadweight" problem. There is no doubt that the Custom House Dock area and much of Dublin's inner city were shunned and even neglected by both the private and public sectors for many years. In the absence of the incentives, it can be argued that little would have changed in these particular locations. In relation to the Custom House Docks, for example, its major “flagship project”, the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) had 131,200 square metres of offices by the middle of 1997 and almost 5,000 people were working there at that stage. By any standards, this would appear to be an impressive record within a short period and would have been unlikely in this particular location in the absence of the incentives. The “displacement” problem would have been minimal in the Custom House Docks, since it was, in effect, a derelict site.

As regards the “transfer” problem, it appears from various studies that a high level of re-location of firms did in fact take place within Dublin to avail of the incentives, resulting in a modest net overall gain in employment in the city. In an early assessment of the incentives based on interviews with developers, investors and the construction industry, Blackwell and Convery (1991) estimated that the net gain in investment was only about 20 percent. A study commissioned on behalf of the government likewise concluded as follows:

“Although the schemes result in the location of employment within the Designated Areas, the employment opportunities are limited as the majority of employees move to the area from their previous location. While the majority of firms surveyed reported job creation since they began trading in the Designated Areas, the number of jobs created is very small. Many firms did not take on additional employees” (KPMG, 1996, p. 55).
It was estimated that over the ten year period 1986-95 there was a gross gain in “direct” employment in the Dublin Designated Areas (excluding the Custom House Docks area) of about 21,100, mainly in office and commercial activity. A further 1,100 new jobs (average per annum) were recorded in construction, while “indirect” employment was estimated at 2,500 (KPMG, pp. 107-109). The estimated gross total effect was therefore 24,700 jobs. A number of queries arise. For example, in the commercial sector, consisting in the main of new shopping centres, new jobs which did not exist prior to designation were created within the areas concerned. However, many of those employed were on a part-time basis or on temporary contracts. The same applies to the tourism and leisure sector (KPMG, pp. 61-67).

It may be noted also that no “direct” jobs arose from residential projects, apart from the short-term construction ones. Furthermore, how many of these jobs were “additional” - in the sense that they would not have been in existence in the absence of the schemes? How many simply transferred from outside the area to avail of the incentives? It appears that this net employment effect was in fact quite small in line with the experience in other countries. The estimated net gain in employment arising from the Designated Area scheme on a national basis was only 3,000 jobs in comparison with a gross national gain (“direct” employment) of about 72,000 - suggesting a net employment benefit of only 4 percent (KPMG and NIERC, 1996, p.111). This suggests a very significant “transfer” effect. It must of course be noted that a considerable number of foreign firms came to Dublin from overseas, particularly to avail of the generous tax and other incentives in Dublin, and the jobs held by key personnel from overseas would obviously be net additions. However, this appears to have been a relatively small element in the total.

What was the impact on the local population? In Tables 7 and 8 we provide some data over the period 1991 to 1996. In 1991 the unemployment rates in the north and south inner city were 35 percent and 31 percent respectively. By 1996, these rates had reduced to 32 percent and 25 percent respectively while the overall inner city unemployment rate was 28 percent. At first glance, these figures give the impression of modest improvement. However, closer examination reveals that the above rates simply reflect the well-known "dilution effect" of a new incoming population, most of whom were already employed.

When we examine the absolute numbers involved, we find that unemployment in the inner city increased from 11,098 to 12,009 or by 8.2 percent over the 5 years. This was during a period when there was an additional 3,489 persons recorded "at work" in the area. During this period, the population of the area increased by 4,800, accounted for almost exclusively by new residents from outside the area availing of the tax incentives or seeking to eliminate the difficulties associated with commuting.

Since separate evidence suggests a very low rate of unemployment among this “new” population (MacLaran et al., 1995), it appears that the increase in unemployment numbers above has been accounted for almost exclusively by the indigenous population.
Table 7: Unemployment in North Inner City, Dublin 1991-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DED:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay A</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay B</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay C</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay D</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay E</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballybough A</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballybough B</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inns Quay A</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inns Quay B</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inns Quay C</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountjoy A</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountjoy B</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North City</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dock A</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dock B</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dock C</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotunda A</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotunda B</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total North Inner City</strong></td>
<td>5,768</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is noteworthy that in a number of wards where new economic activity in financial services was most intense e.g. North Docks C (the location of the IFSC), the unemployment numbers increased. Despite the establishment of a Community Liaison Committee in the early 1990s to reflect community concerns and a genuine attempt to set up an apprenticeship scheme for local labour, these translated into very few benefits or ongoing jobs for existing communities.

In 1996, ten years subsequent to the initiation of the Designated Area scheme, a study commissioned by the government reached the following conclusion:

“The indigenous and adjacent communities feel that something is missing and that urban renewal as defined by the incentive schemes has not addressed issues which are central to the regeneration and sustainability of these areas such as employment, the lack of public...
amenities, education, training and youth development” (KPMG, 1996: p.116).

Table 8: Unemployment in South Inner City, Dublin 1991-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DED:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansion House A</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansion House B</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay A</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay B</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay C</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay D</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay E</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay F</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Exchange A</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Exchange B</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kevin’s</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dock</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers A</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers B</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers C</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers D</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers E</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers F</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Quay A</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Quay B</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total South Inner City</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>5,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Inner City</td>
<td>11,098</td>
<td>12,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One community leader used a rather different wording:

“One community leader used a rather different wording:

“Single parents - some very young, children rearing children, dysfunctional families, dropping out of school early, living off the social welfare, no proper home life, boredom, joy-riding, the buzz, no role models, no incentives, no hope...” (Fay, 1997).
Table 9 describes the social structure of the inner city in 1996. There are a number of noteworthy points here. First, 12 percent of the population belong to the professional classes, reflecting essentially the “dilution effect” of the “new” population introduced under the renewal schemes. This class is somewhat more prevalent in the south inner city. This is the group most able to benefit from the new employment opportunities linked to the restructuring of the economy in recent decades, a fact supported by the trends in income inequality by social class reported in successive issues of the *Household Budget Survey* between 1973 and 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>North Inner City</th>
<th>South Inner City</th>
<th>Total Inner City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,327</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5,895</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled/Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>9,143</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>8,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Declassed&quot;</td>
<td>14,062</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>12,291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, 20 percent of the population were recorded in the lower strata of the working classes (semi-skilled, unskilled), representing the indigenous inner city population. By contrast, this was the group which suffered most under conditions of economic restructuring as “accessible” job opportunities (e.g. the traditional dock-related employment) disappeared. It is precisely this sector that has therefore been most vulnerable to unemployment.

Third, the proportion of people in the most vulnerable "de-classed" category (including lone parents, the disabled and others marginal to the labour force) formed 30 percent of the population in the inner city in 1996. This compares with a figure of 13 percent for the Dublin region and a national figure of only 12 percent. This is the most marginalised group in terms of disposable income (Central Statistics Office, 1997) and it seems clear that the new urban renewal schemes had little impact on them.

We mentioned above that a large number of new residences were constructed in the inner city under the scheme. What was the impact of these? First, it is clear that the vast majority of the new residences were constructed for the new incoming population. The vast majority of the new residences contained just one or two bedrooms appropriate for single or double occupancy with virtually no attention paid to families. Many apartments were purchased for investment purposes by those able to avail of the significant tax relief under Sections 23 and 27 of the Finance Acts. The new owner-occupiers (most of whom were able to avail of the tax incentives) tended to be relatively young, upwardly mobile and transient and forged few connections with the local communities. (MacLaran *et al.*, 1995; Drudy and MacLaran, 1996; Convery, 1997).
At the same time, the number of new Local Authority units provided for low-income families in the inner city during the period of the scheme was very small. By 1997, therefore, there was a perception of a new relatively well-off group of the population closeted in modern expensive apartments which did not cater for the needs or the income levels of the local population. As regards the wider needs of the community, the Designated Area scheme did very little to tackle problems of local unemployment, educational disadvantage, inadequate supply of local authority or other affordable housing, lack of facilities and amenities or the increasing problem of traffic. (KPMG, 1996, Drudy and MacLaran, 1996, Riverrun Consortium, 1997, Dublin Docklands Development Authority, 1997, Department of the Environment, 1998).

The Fundamental Question : Does “Renewal” constitute “Development”? 

In strictly economic terms, “development” has, in the past, been viewed as the capacity to generate and sustain significant economic growth, as measured by such variables as Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product. It was invariably assumed that increases in economic growth would either “trickle down” to the less well-off population in the form of employment and other economic opportunities or create the necessary conditions for the wider distribution of the ensuing economic and social benefits. Problems of deprivation, poverty unemployment, educational disadvantage, literacy, housing and health were seen as of secondary importance to that of achieving high economic growth. Over the last few decades, however, this view of development has been increasingly questioned. As Professor Dudley Seers put it in 1969:

“The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result “development” even if per capita income doubled” (Seers, 1969, p.3).

The fundamental question raised by Seers and others was whether a sustained increase in economic growth or per capita incomes result in a reduction in unemployment or other measures of deprivation and an improvement in the “quality of life” of the population. According to Edgar Owens:

“It is high time we combine political and economic theory to consider not just ways in which societies can become more productive but the quality of the societies which are supposed to become more productive - the development of people rather than the development of things” (Owens, 1987, p. xv).
In its 1991 *World Development Report*, the World Bank also supported this broader definition of development when it stated:

“The challenge of development is to improve the quality of life. A better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes - but it involves much more. It encompasses as ends in themselves better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life” (World Bank, 1991).

In a Barrington Lecture to this Society on “sustainable development”, McCoy also stressed the need to embrace these various “quality of life” concerns and the need to take into account the inter-generational well-being of society (McCoy, 1992) - a view now widely accepted in the international literature (see, for example, Todaro, 2000, pp. 14-16).

In the light of the foregoing, can we say that sustainable development is taking place if a significant proportion of the population is unable to improve the quality of their lives, if educational disadvantage and unemployment persists, if the benefits of economic growth accrue largely to those who are already relatively affluent? The foregoing section raised serious questions as to whether property-led regeneration in urban areas brings “sustainable development” to the poorer sections of the local population. Escalating land and house prices, as well as rental increases, have, in effect, brought significant gains to investors who can avail of generous tax incentives, but have been of little or no benefit to those on lower incomes. In Dublin's inner city, for example, the vast majority of the children of the local population, as well as those on low incomes aspiring to live in the inner city, are currently effectively excluded from doing so.

**Dublin Docklands: A New Approach**

In January 1996 the Government had decided to adopt a more wide-ranging approach to development of the Docklands as a whole and established a special Task Force to report on the problems and potential of an area, comprising 520 hectares (1,300 acres), see Figure 2. A substantial part of the "undeveloped" or "unused" land was in the ownership of state bodies, such as Coras Iompar Eireann, the Electricity Supply Board and the Gas Board.
Figure 2: Dublin Docklands Development Area

Source: DDDA (1997)
However, the overall amount of "undeveloped" land was only about 95 hectares (235 acres). The Task Force reported quickly to the Government and recommended that CHDDA should set up a project team to report in more detail on the possible options for development.

At the same time, work began on new legislation and the Dublin Docklands Development Bill was published in November 1996. This became law in March 1997 and a new Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA) was established on 1 May 1997. This new Authority subsumed the functions of the CHDDA as from that date. The Authority comprises an Executive Board with a Chairperson and seven other members as well as a Council of twenty-five providing broad representation from the public and private sectors and from local community groups.

The Authority has the general responsibility under the Act to secure:

1. the social and economic regeneration of the Docklands on a sustainable basis,
2. improvements in the physical environment in Dublin Docklands,
3. the continued development in the Custom House Docks area of services of, for, and in support of, or ancillary to, the financial sector of the economy.

A range of more specific functions were assigned to the Authority under the Act. These included:

- the preparation of a Master Plan for the regeneration of the area,
- the preparation of "Planning Schemes" for particular areas,
- the acquisition, management and development or conservation of land,
- the provision of infrastructure or environmental improvements required to encourage people to work, shop and live in the area
- the provision in particular of education and training opportunities for residents
- the development of existing and new residential communities, including a mix of housing for people from different social backgrounds

The various issues set out in the legislation were dealt with in some detail during the detailed work and consultation which took place to produce the Dublin Docklands Area Master Plan by the end of 1997. Fundamental to the Master Plan was the active involvement of the local communities at the planning stages. One of the first items agreed therefore was the establishment of a new Community Liaison Committee in order to maximise the involvement of local communities in the redevelopment of the area over the 15 year period of the Plan, to provide an ongoing link between the Authority and developers and to maximise employment opportunities for the local population.

Alongside this, a Business Liaison Committee was also established to maximise the involvement of the private sector and to provide a link between the Authority and local communities. Arising from detailed discussions with these two Committees, together with the Council and Board of the Authority, and reflecting submissions...
from a range of bodies, it became clear that a number of key issues would have to be
given priority in the Master Plan if it were to be significantly different from
previous schemes. These were employment, education and training, housing, traffic
and amenities - issues regarded as central to “sustainable development”. Before the
Master Plan could be "signed off", there had to be agreement by the Council and
Board of the Authority that the content and proposals in relation to these issues were
acceptable. We will examine these issues below.

Employment and the Local Labour Charter

As outlined earlier, high unemployment was a very serious problem in Dublin's
inner city and Docklands. Long-term unemployment (where people are out of work
for a year or more) was a particular concern, since well over half of those
unemployed fitted into the long-term category. Of the 20,700 people who held jobs
in the Docklands area in the mid 1990s, only 1,600 or 8 percent were residents.
Similarly, only 5 percent of the total holding jobs in professional and business
services (two of the main growth areas nationally) were residents of the Docklands.
Higher proportions of employed local residents were therefore in relatively low-
skilled manufacturing and personal services (14 percent and 15 percent of the total
respectively). These figures underlined the simple fact that the brunt of the local
population had so far failed to enter the "growth areas" of employment which were
also relatively well-paid (ESRI, 1995).

The Docklands Area Master Plan set out an ambitious target for employment in the
Docklands over a 15-year period. The overall target was a minimum of 30,000 new
jobs to cater for both the existing and new population. In order to reach this target a
number of critical assumptions were made, including a continuation of the current
high levels of national economic growth, a favourable international climate for
financial services, the expansion of existing Enterprise Centres and the
establishment of a research-based "Technopole" and a “Digital Park” in the
Docklands (DDDA, 1997; pp 156-160).

The main areas proposed for specific attention are given in Table 10. These
estimates were derived following detailed discussions with the Industrial
Development Authority. It may be noted that international services and financial
services together constitute over half the projected additional employment.
International services (including software, telemarketing and back office activities)
are being targeted nationally as a "growth area" and this sector could yield 38,000
extra jobs in the Dublin region over the next 15 years. The Master Plan stressed
that, if 11,000-15,000 were to be procured for the Docklands area, “the social,
environmental and locational advantages will have to be highlighted and marketed”.

Over the period of the Master Plan, it was estimated that some 12,000 extra jobs
could be created in financial services. However, with the recent decision to phase
out these incentives in the Docklands, it seems likely that other areas of Dublin and
the rest of the country may attract a good proportion of the additional employment.
In view of the solid base already in place in the Custom House Docks area, the
Docklands Authority estimated that the Docklands would secure between a half and two thirds of the national increase i.e. 6,000 - 8,000 jobs (Dublin Docklands Development Authority, 1997, p.157).

**Table 10: Employment Targets in Dublin Docklands over 15 Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Employment Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Services</td>
<td>11,000-15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>6,000-8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural, Tourism, Hotels and Leisure</td>
<td>3,500-5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business &amp; Community Employment</td>
<td>1,500-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>1,700-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technopole, Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>2,000-3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Office Business</td>
<td>3,000-3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support, Maintenance &amp; Administration</td>
<td>1,500-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Target Range</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,200-40,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Dublin Docklands Area Master Plan (1997).*

The proposed "technopole", small enterprises, community development projects, as well as education and training were estimated to have the potential to provide up to 5,000 new jobs in the Docklands. A technopole is an organised concentration of technology-based activities, closely linked to education, research and local enterprise. The particular application of the technopole concept as developed by Trinity College Dublin for the Docklands Authority would involve harnessing and developing the existing strengths already present in the area to create sustainable employment in knowledge-based business and industry.

The strengths included the educational, research and innovation activities of Trinity College Dublin working with other research-based institutions and bodies, as well as the small enterprises in the College's Enterprise Centre in Pearse Street and a local population needing jobs. These were seen to represent a sound foundation from which to attract both Irish and international industries seeking a research-based and enterprise location (Mitchell, Drudy, Hegarty and O'Neill, 1996 and DDDA, 1997, pp. 35-37).

The above sectors demand particular levels of education and skills which most of the local population do not currently have. It is inevitable therefore that in the short term the vast brunt of such jobs - assuming they eventually materialise - will be held by skilled employees from outside the Docklands. The fundamental aim however must be to enable the younger generation in the Docklands to avail of such opportunities in the future. This will involve a major and intensive educational effort over at least a decade. We deal with this issue further below. However, assuming that a range of short-term measures can be implemented to improve current skills levels, a range of jobs listed in Table 10 could also be accessible to the local population in the short term. These include jobs in tourism, the hotel and
leisure industry, the retail trade, maintenance and security. In order to ensure that
the local population is given the opportunity to secure such jobs, a Local
Employment Charter was agreed by the Dockland Authority. The Master Plan
states:

“The policy of the Dublin Docklands Authority is that 20 percent of new
jobs created in the Docklands will be on offer to residents of the docklands
in the first instance and thereafter in its hinterland. This proportion can be
divided into full-time jobs and apprenticeships. The Dublin Docklands
Development Authority accepts that this policy is dependent on the
availability of appropriate skills in the area. The Authority will work to
provide the necessary education and training to rectify skill shortages.”
(DDDA, 1997, p. 189)

Although it is too early to reach any firm conclusions, it is possible to report some
progress in relation to the above employment targets. As mentioned above, the
number employed in the first phase of the IFSC in 1997 was estimated to be almost
5,000. The latest estimate based on Docklands Authority data suggests that, when
we include the second phase which is now nearing completion, this figure had
increased to more than 10,000, including financial, commercial, leisure and
international services by mid 2000 (DDDA, 2000). A number of major employers
such as Bank of Ireland, Citibank and A&L Goodbody have located in the second
phase of the IFSC, and a total of over 60,000 square metres of space have already
been provided. We are unable at this stage to assess the “deadweight” and
“displacement” effects of the above increase in employment and space. However,
the latter would appear to be minimal in view of the previous derelict nature of the
site in question. As regards the “transfer” problem, we have estimates relating to a
sample of the job increases over the period since 1997. These are given in Table 11.
The transfer element in Phase 1 of the IFSC amounted to 49.3 percent compared to a
figure of 85.6 percent in Phase 2. The overall transfer proportion for the two phases
was 74.6 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Jobs</th>
<th>Transfers</th>
<th>Transfers as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own estimates and Dublin Docklands Development Authority Data

What has been the impact of the Local Employment Charter? While there had been
early concerns among some employers that the Charter would be unworkable, such
concerns were unfounded. A survey of the second phase of the IFSC on the
construction sites owned by the Docklands Authority showed that by March 2000 a
total of 130 formerly unemployed locals were employed in various activities. This
represented 21 percent of the total employed on the sites and included employment
and apprenticeships in electrical, bricklaying, plastering and plumbing as well as
positions in window installation, scaffold erection, stone facing, security and
general site work. This compares with a total of only eight locals employed or in
apprenticeships in construction firms in the adjacent area in December 1997. The
numbers involved and the limited range of work represents a modest success during
the first few years of the scheme, but it is in contrast to the previous record. It has
also been important in terms of “image” in an area which has fared so badly for so
long.

It may also be noted that local unemployment has dropped significantly in recent
years in line with trends in Dublin and in the country as a whole. For example, the
numbers on the Live Register (not directly comparable with the Census data given
above) in Cumberland Employment Exchange area (which caters for the Docklands)
declined from 10,884 in January 1996 to 2,889 in January 2000. Similar declines
have been recorded throughout the inner city, see Table 12. This may be due to a
whole range of factors, including the significant number of new employment
opportunities (including part-time) throughout the inner city in recent years,
particularly in construction, services, leisure and tourism and various training
schemes which reduce numbers on the Live Register. It could also be caused partly
by out-migration from the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gardiner St</td>
<td>6,982</td>
<td>3,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werburgh St.</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>3,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland St.</td>
<td>10,884</td>
<td>5,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas St.</td>
<td>5,888</td>
<td>2,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tara St.</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>1,472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Live Register, Central Statistics Office, Dublin.

A critical question for the local population concerns the "quality" of both short-term
and long-term employment. Will the majority of the jobs be sustainable, well-paid
and full-time or will a high proportion be temporary, low-skilled and poorly paid?
The jobs currently being provided in construction locally are in the main all short-
term. A major task for the Dublin Docklands Development Authority must be to
ensure that the brunt of the jobs are viable, well-paid and have career prospects and
that the local population is prepared for them. This underlines the critical role of
education which we now examine.

The Role of Education

It has long been recognised that education is one of the key determinants of good
employment opportunities and a better quality of life. However, despite significant
investment in education over the past few decades, the benefits of education have
been unequally spread and today there is still a significant minority who fail to
complete secondary education and have little prospect of ever entering a third level
college. It may be noted that those from the highest socio-economic groups fare best of all in terms of participation. On the other hand, those in the lowest occupational categories record very low participation rates (See, for example, Kellaghan et al., 1995; Coolahan et al., 1994; Clancy, 2000, Lynch, 1999, Points Commission, 1998).

It is important to recognise that this latter group has the same innate abilities and potential as the former. However, their different backgrounds, lower levels of awareness regarding the importance of education and weaker financial circumstances mean that such abilities and potential remain underdeveloped. As in the inner city, educational disadvantage is a serious problem in the Docklands with large proportions dropping out of school early and few attending third level education. This is one of the major challenges facing the Docklands Authority.

The Master Plan sets out a series of measures needed to deal with this problem ranging from pre-primary to second level to third level and beyond, including training schemes and continuing education. The stated objective is to facilitate a co-operative venture involving a whole range of educators and trainers in order to raise awareness concerning the critical importance of acquiring relevant skills. For example, the expansion of early childhood education provision and the establishment of adequate childcare facilities are viewed as being important to the programme since these are the first stages in the formal education of young people and are an essential requirement if disadvantaged adults, and particularly women, are to be enabled to upgrade their education. This link between the education of the young and adult education is of fundamental importance. The Docklands Authority has committed itself to working with primary, second level and third level institutions as well as the Department of Education, the national training agency, FAS, and its associated Community Training Workshops (DDDA, 1997).

As in other parts of the country, a range of educational and training initiatives have been in operation in the Docklands area for some years quite independent of the urban renewal schemes. These include special initiatives established by the Department of Education, several Community Training Workshops and special training schemes organised under the auspices of FAS, a number of community "After School Projects" organised by local community groups and a range of adult education courses in schools, colleges and community centres. The various Colleges of the Dublin Institute of Technology and Trinity College (both adjacent to the area) have also long served the area with certificate, diploma and degree courses as well as continuing education programmes and the use of facilities.

Trinity College Dublin has been committed to tackling problems of educational disadvantage for many years. For example, a "Mentoring Programme" (organised in association with St Andrew's Resource Centre) involving hundreds of Trinity students working with primary and second level students has been run for almost twenty years. In 1993, the College established the Trinity Access Project (TAP) to encourage second level students to aim for a third level place. A Foundation Course for Mature Adults was initiated in 1997 to facilitate adults who had previously no
opportunity to attend third level. In 1998 the College agreed to extend its "access programmes" significantly and established a Centre for Educational Access and Community Development (proposed in the Master Plan) for this specific purpose. In 1999 the College initiated a new Foundation Course for Young Adults to increase the participation rate of those who were prevented by socio-economic circumstances from attending at third level.

Over the period since the Dublin Docklands Authority was established a number of other initiatives have also been taken and strategies have been proposed. For example, it has been agreed that the National College of Ireland (formerly the National College of Industrial Relations) will re-locate its main activities from its current site in Ranelagh to a 1.3 acre site allocated to it free of charge by the Docklands Authority just north of the river Liffey. Apart from its normal teaching programme catering for students from all parts of the country, the NCI will provide a range of courses relevant to disadvantaged communities in the Docklands.

A number of other recent initiatives are also worthy of note. For example, the Authority provided £1 million towards a replacement of a derelict Community Training Workshop in Seville Place and the building re-opened for occupation in February 2000. Second, a scholarship programme has been launched by the Authority in association with Reuters to encourage up to twenty young people to attend third level Colleges. The Authority is also involved in a Schools Job Placement Programme where about 20 second level students are given work experience with appropriate employers (e.g. in the IFSC) during holiday periods, in the hope that they may be prepared for long-term employment there. These various initiatives are worthwhile. However, the extent of investment in such initiatives has so far been modest. The results remain to be seen.

The Land Question and the Housing Problem

The provision of a range of quality housing is one major element in the objective to achieve social and economic regeneration in Dublin Docklands. Residential development to date has failed to reflect the "diversity of needs" which would cater not just for "executive housing" for the better off, but would pay specific attention to the needs of residents on low incomes, including couples with children, single parents, people with disabilities and Local Authority tenants. Section 24 of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority Act requires that the Master Plan shall "include proposals for the development of existing and new residential communities in the Dublin Docklands area, including the development of housing for people from different social backgrounds." In order to cater for those on relatively low incomes, it is proposed that at least 20 percent of all housing units should be in the "social and affordable" category (DDDA, 1997, p. 56).

These are laudable objectives. However, there are some difficulties. For example, the price of land has accelerated dramatically in the Docklands over the last three years. The price rises are almost certainly due largely to the “hope value” inherent in the drawing up of the Master Plan by the Dublin Docklands Authority and the
capital allowances and rates remission available in certain designated areas. The price of land is of central importance in contributing to the rise in house prices and it accounted for 36 percent of the average house price in 1998. Since land is one of the critical resources required for housing, whether for sale or for rent, the fundamental question arises as to how the Authority or the government can acquire sufficient land at a reasonable cost for housing purposes, particularly for local needs and others on low incomes. If it were possible to acquire sufficient land at a reasonable cost, such land could then be released in an orderly fashion with appropriate conditions to private and social housing providers in response to requirements. However, the level of prices being paid for land in the Docklands renders this development objective impossible.

Since 1996 the price of land for either commercial or residential purposes has escalated. For example, two small sites were recently sold for the equivalent of £12 million and £16 million per acre. Such a price dictated by “the market” can only mean high density, high-rise, high price schemes. At present, it is clear that we are in the absurd situation where actions taken by the state or its agencies (e.g. Dublin Corporation and Dublin Docklands Development Authority) on behalf of the community (e.g. via designation for renewal, re-zoning, planning permission or the provision of infrastructure) can result in enormous “uneared” profits to landowners who bear little or no public infrastructural costs associated with residential or other development. Furthermore, both Dublin Corporation and the Docklands Authority then have to compete in “the market” for the same land and therefore find it difficult or impossible to meet the social and affordable housing needs of the population they serve.

It may be noted that a number of successful efforts had already taken place to provide “affordable” housing in the Docklands, involving co-operative efforts between Dublin Corporation and groups such as the National Association of Building Co-operatives (NABCo) and a local community development organisation, City Housing Initiative. In order to make further progress on this front, the Authority has agreed in line with the Master Plan that 20 percent (39 units) of the housing on the second phase of the International Financial Services Centre should be for social housing, managed by the St Pancras Housing Association. The Authority has also purchased a number of key sites where housing is to be a central element. These include a half-acre site on Sheriff Street where residential development is to take place under the auspices of the Housing Association, Respond. A further site of 2 acres will be developed under its own new Affordable Housing Scheme (DDDA, 1999).

Given that the minimum part ownership cost of housing under this scheme has been set at about £110,000, despite a significant subsidy element, the local reaction has been largely one of serious concern to date. This is of course only one model and is heavily influenced by the high market price of land. The total housing output using these sites will be 134 and should all be available within the next twelve months. While this is welcome progress, it must be stated that the impact to date is small in
terms of appropriate and affordable housing provision for the local population and other solutions must continue to be pursued (see Drudy et al., 1999).

The Living Environment: Traffic and Amenities

As argued above, sustainable development must incorporate elements which improve the quality of life. We briefly examine two further issues which are relevant to this issue. These are traffic and amenities. One of the most pressing difficulties in Dublin Docklands is that of traffic congestion, leading to a very poor environment either for living or for working. Public transport is widely agreed to be inadequate and use of the private car is the norm. There is a particular problem with Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) which must travel to and from the busy and expanding Port. Approaching from the north or west of the city, such vehicles have no alternative but to gain access to the Port via either Sheriff Street, North Wall Quay or East Wall Road. From the south, the preferred route seems to be via Ringsend and the East Link Bridge. The end result is that traffic congestion and pollution is a major problem, especially at peak times, while safety, visual amenity and living conditions are seriously compromised. Further proposed developments in the Docklands will undoubtedly exacerbate these problems. It is an unacceptable situation which must be resolved as a matter of urgency. This underlines the critical requirement to have a clearly inter-linked and integrated land use and transportation policy.

The remit of the Dublin Docklands Authority in relation to transport and traffic was set out in the 1997 Act. This requires that any proposals pursued by the Authority must be consistent with the Final Report of the Dublin Transportation Initiative (Steer Davies Gleave, 1994). This Report, adopted as government policy, placed particular emphasis on the need to reduce the use of the private car, to minimise road-based solutions to the problem of traffic congestion and to increase the use of public transport. Particular attention was given to the traffic associated with Dublin Port on the edge of the Docklands and a tunnel was proposed to facilitate the movement of HGVs between the C-ring motorway to the north of the city and the northern section of the port. These vehicles were also to be excluded from some streets in the city. These sorts of measures are of course in line with international thinking on transport and met with widespread public approval. The Master Plan reflected this view and stated that the Docklands Authority will:

- promote the reduction of the penetration of the private car through a variety of control, infrastructural and public transport measures;
- support all appropriate measures, until the Dublin Port Tunnel is opened, that will reduce the impact of Heavy Goods Vehicles in the area, including the Iarnrod Eireann proposal to develop an inland distribution depot (to the west of the city) connected to the port;
- promote a programme of traffic calming in residential areas;
- promote the provision of a dedicated public transport system, Dublin Area Bus System (DABS) and/or LUAS at an early stage;
• promote a "park and ride" policy;
• support the provision of a dedicated and safe network of routes for cyclists and pedestrians throughout the area (DDDA, 1997, pp. 83-84)

These policies were agreed in the Master Plan with the endorsement of the Community Liaison Committee and the Council, reflecting in particular the views of the local community groups most affected by the traffic problem. However, traffic is one of the issues on which very little progress has so far been made, apart from a government announcement in 1998 that a light rail system would eventually serve the Docklands, as proposed in the Master Plan. At present, public transport provision in the Docklands is completely inadequate and, while the Docklands Authority strongly supports a comprehensive public transport system, the implementation of proposals or plans is simply outside its formal remit and rests instead with the national transport authority, Coras Iompar Eireann (CIE).

Dealing with the HGVs is particularly problematic. At present these vehicles proceeding to and from the Port have no alternative to using the limited number of roads in residential areas mentioned earlier. Although the planning stage for the proposed Port Tunnel is virtually complete, it is unlikely to be built in the near future. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Port Tunnel is due to terminate in the Port. Even after it is completed, therefore, it is quite unclear as to whether traffic accessing the port from the north would (or could) be compelled to return north along the tunnel instead of seeking an alternative route to the west or south along existing routes. In this scenario, traffic congestion on such routes could get worse rather than better. It is therefore of critical importance that the entire routing of traffic using the Port should be planned and implemented without further delay.

It may be noted that such a routing - an Eastern By-Pass over or under Sandymount strand towards the south - has been debated for over twenty years. Controversial and formerly rejected by Dublin Corporation, this has recently been incorporated into Dublin Corporation's 1999 Development Plan. In view of the enormous cost of such a scheme and a whole range of planning and environmental issues and difficulties, including those related to the adjoining Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council area, this scheme is unlikely to be agreed (if at all) in the foreseeable future.

In any case, it is essential that a range of options (in addition to the proposed Port Tunnel) should be explored as a matter of urgency for resolving or at least alleviating the port and Docklands traffic problems. These could include a further tunnel under the Liffey which has already been examined as a possibility (Steer Davies Gleave, 1994).

A further difficulty relating to traffic within the Docklands itself arises from the significant increase in private car registrations and use in recent years. It would be very difficult to provide adequate controls on private car use in the absence of a viable alternative in the form of a comprehensive public transport system.
Furthermore, there has been an apparent weakening of resolve in relation to the difficulties associated with road-based solutions. For example, a recent *Action Plan* published by the Dublin Transportation Office (a successor to the Dublin Transportation Initiative) proposed a range of road-building programmes, including the construction of a further bridge across the Liffey linking Macken Street with the North Wall Quay in the heart of the Docklands (Dublin Transportation Office, 1998). This proposed bridge was agreed in Dublin Corporation's 1999 *Development Plan*. However, the rationale for the proposal remains unclear in the light of the declared policy in the *Final Report of the Dublin Transportation Initiative* (Steer Davies Gleave, 1994) and the *Dublin Docklands Area Master Plan* (1997) to reduce the penetration of private cars in the interests of the population and the environment.

A Draft Environmental Statement relating to the proposal was produced on behalf of Dublin Corporation in April 2000 (Dublin Corporation, April, 2000). Estimates were provided of the expected increase in traffic by the year 2006. However, no estimates were included in relation to Heavy Good Vehicles, since it was assumed that all of these would be catered for with the proposed Port Tunnel. This is an untenable assumption and represents a serious weakness in the study. Nevertheless, the authors predict that at peak time the proposed bridge would carry 2020 vehicles per hour, representing a 190 percent increase on Guild Street on the north side of the river and a 120 percent increase on Macken Street on the south side. According to the statement, "the proposed bridge has the potential to cause significant community severance" and could "act as a significant barrier to pedestrian movement into and interaction within these communities".

Furthermore, a significant increase in air pollution is expected. According to the Statement, concentrations of nitrogen dioxide are likely to increase by 25 percent in areas in the vicinity of the bridge (Dublin Corporation, April 2000, Sections 6 and 7). In the light of this, it is surprising that a revised draft reached the conclusion that the proposed bridge "will effect a significant positive impact on the local resident, working and visiting communities of the area" (Dublin Corporation June, 2000, p.7). Despite rejection by a majority of the elected representatives on Dublin Corporation, the Environmental Impact Statement has been referred at the time of writing (September 2000) to the Minister for the Environment and Local Government for decision. It may be noted that the proposed bridge would be generally welcomed in the Docklands if it were restricted to public transport, cyclists and pedestrians.

From the foregoing, it seems clear that the traffic problem remains unresolved in Dublin Docklands and a number of major initiatives will be required if serious progress is to be made. Fundamental to creating a good living and working environment in the area must be a resolve to significantly reduce the use of private vehicles (either for passengers or goods) in the area. This would involve a clear acceptance that the building of further roads or bridges for vehicular traffic within the area would exacerbate rather than resolve the current problems. At the same
time, a solution must be sought as a matter of urgency to deal with traffic using the
Port. It is critical that such traffic should have a dedicated route either around or
under the city. At the same time, a comprehensive public transport plan should be
put in place. This could include the new bus system proposed by the Docklands
Authority, an extension of the LRT system, safe routes for cyclists and pedestrians
and detailed traffic management arrangements. These are not luxury items; they are
prerequisites for good living and working conditions.

In addition to resolving the traffic problem, the provision and maintenance of
sufficient recreational and social amenities and facilities are also prerequisites for an
acceptable living and working environment. Yet the Docklands communities fare
badly in relation to the availability of community and youth centres, water-based
facilities, parks and open spaces. To date a number of initiatives have been taken by
the Docklands Authority. For example, the campshires (the open space between the
roadways and the river Liffey) have been purchased from the Dublin Port and
Docks Board and are being re-cobbled and prepared for public use. Secondly,
remediation work will commence shortly on the old Gas Works site of 24 acres (9.6
hectares) purchased by the Authority. This site will be used in due course for office,
commercial, and residential development, including social housing, but the
remediation work is long overdue. Thirdly, the Authority has agreed to finance a
number of "community development projects" proposed by various community
groups. These include the extension of two community centres, the refurbishment
of a boxing club and the refurbishment of some run-down residential property for
social housing.

The total allocated to these community projects to date has been £500,000.
Although this is modest in relation to the requirements, it is a welcome beginning.
The Authority is also actively involved in various community events such as the
annual Docklands Festival.

Integrated Area Plans

An important initiative has been taken in recent years by Dublin Corporation. In
response to the narrow focus of the earlier Designated Area schemes, the
Corporation had decided from the mid 1990s to adopt a more "holistic" approach,
using the concept of an "Integrated Area Plan" (IAP). See McDonnell (1996). The
first of these (the HARP scheme) was for an area of 109 hectares stretching west
from O'Connell Street and consisting of four "cells". This concept was incorporated
into a new Urban Renewal Act in 1998 where five IAPs were approved for Dublin's
inner city, various incentives became available from late 1999 and will apply until
December 2002. In order to qualify for the incentives, the Corporation must certify
that the activities proposed are consistent with the objectives of the IAP and will
contribute to "community gain". This can include:

- the allocation of a proportion of residential development to “social or
  affordable” housing which could be purchased by agreement by the Local
  Authority,
- a financial contribution towards the provision of community and leisure facilities,
- provision of facilities such as play areas, youth club facilities, community resource centres, enhancement of small neighbourhood squares or parks,
- permanent employment opportunities for members of the local community.

"Unlike previous Urban Renewal initiatives, these plans take into account the needs of existing communities in relation to community support programmes, employment and educational issues as well as renewal of the physical environment" (Dublin Corporation, 1999).

The first of the plans - the HARP area - has attracted over £400 million investment to date. However, it is too early to assess the impact of this and other plans in terms of “community gain”. We strongly support Gleeson’s argument that the implementation of IAPs (as well as other schemes) must include a regular monitoring of performance in relation to stated social and environmental objectives (Gleeson, 1999).

Development for whom?

As shown earlier, the Designated Area scheme had little positive impact for inner city communities. Has the Docklands Authority done much better? Will the Integrated Area Plans constitute “development”? We mentioned above a number of initiatives taken by the Docklands Authority e.g. the establishment of a Community Liaison Committee, the implementation of a Local Labour Clause, the provision of a small site for the National College of Ireland and various educational initiatives, the purchase of the campshires, £1 million funding towards the replacement of a derelict Community Training Workshop, the purchase of the old Gas Works site (requiring remediation) and a number of sites for affordable and social housing and the initiation of a number of community development projects.

In the light of this, it may seem surprising that a great deal of concern still persists in the Docklands regarding the future of the area and its residents. During recent years there has been an enormous amount of opposition to various building proposals - most of which were contrary to the Master Plan in relation to height, density and bulk. A well-publicised Oral Hearing held under the auspices of An Bord Pleanala (the Appeals Board) related to a proposal by the Spencer Dock Development Company (a consortium of the state agency, Coras Iompar Eireann - the Irish Transport Company - and a group of private property developers). The proposal was to build 560,700 square metres (6 million square feet) of space in the Docklands on a 50 acre site owned mainly by Coras Iompar Eireann.

This plan included significant commercial and private residential elements as well as a Conference Centre. Dublin Corporation had given full planning permission for the Conference Centre as well as two office blocks and a Planning Scheme to facilitate the Conference Centre had already been agreed by the Dublin Docklands Development Authority. The Corporation also gave "outline permission" for the
remainder of the scheme. At the appeal, the Conference Centre was generally welcomed by the local communities. However, the remainder of the proposed development met with strong local opposition and a range of environmental groups were similarly opposed. The Dublin Docklands Development Authority also opposed the proposal (apart from the Conference Centre) for a variety of reasons, including the fact that it was in serious conflict with the Master Plan.

There was particular concern among the communities and representative groups as to the precise physical, social and environmental impact of the proposal. Fundamental questions were asked as to what benefit, if any, would derive to the local population and even to the city as a whole. Indeed, the overall conclusion reached by the local communities and others was that the impact of the proposals would be largely negative. Accordingly, a vigorous campaign against these developments, including street protests, petitions and an appeal to An Bord Pleanala, was organised by a range of local groups such as South East Network, Docklands Communities Against High Rise, Community Technical Aid, East Wall Residents Association, North Wall Community Association and An Taisce. The arguments against the proposed development included the problems of overshadowing, overlooking, invasiveness and physical presence, inappropriate design, traffic, pollution, lack of proposals for social housing, and segregation. A comment published in a community bulletin captured the mood locally:

“"Our concern is that they ... may underestimate the strength of the reactionary forces against a vision of the future of Dublin based on the needs of people and not profit. They also do not seem to appreciate the depth of the irreversible damage already done. Would not the measure of a city’s progress better be the elimination of the social misery which was caused by generations of state neglect and which has led to the alienation of whole sections of a once proud working class? Is it not ironic that the people whose labour was exploited to build the docks should now be considered persona non grata when it comes to examining the impact of urban renewal policies? How then is the development of Dublin to be measured? By bricks and mortar, by the number of cranes blighting the landscape, by the growing rate of profit, by the sale of brown bags or by the indicators based on social justice and a fairer distribution of wealth?” (Community Technical Aid, 1999).

A comment from Fr. John Wall, parish priest to one of the Docklands Communities, was equally instructive:

“"We live in fear and dread of the Spencer Dock development. We’re hoping this time that the people won’t be walked on again. That’s why the people are speaking out and standing up for their rights. As a Christian and a priest, I have to stand with my people” (Wall, 2000).

In July 2000, An Bord Pleanala granted planning permission, subject to various conditions, for the Conference Centre and associated works. This was in line with government policy regarding a national conference centre, the Dublin City
Development Plan and the Dublin Docklands Area Master Plan. However, it refused permission for the remainder of the proposed development. Detailed reasons were given. In particular, it was concluded that the scale, bulk and mass of the proposed development would constitute an inappropriate urban form of development for Dublin. It would fail to integrate with the pattern of development in the city and locally and would seriously injure the visual amenities of part of the city. Furthermore, it was argued that the proposed parking was considered to be excessive in view of the central location and the potential to create serious traffic congestion (An Bord Pleanala, 2000).

The reaction to the Spencer Dock proposal was indicative of a much broader concern. One community representative offered an interpretation of “renewal” in terms of displacement, segregation and exclusion (Gallagher, 1999):

“The people of the city are not seen as a living community, as an asset. Rather they are seen as a problem, a problem to be either moved on or shunned. As a result of all this, the people who live mainly within the old city fabric are becoming ghettoized. Our streets, our shops and even our schools have been left out of the equation of the new city and the people who are moving in refuse to relate to us. It is like we are tainted, modern lepers living inside our beloved city but excluded from its benefits”

This ongoing conflict is instructive and it is important to note it here for a number of reasons. It reflects a general problem with property-driven renewal schemes that has been highlighted internationally for many years. “Renewal” of this kind tends to encourage speculative activity, producing a high proportion of large-scale buildings for exclusive uses. The same process had been described in America as "cataclysmic" as opposed to "gradual" development (Jacobs, 1961) and in Britain as the invasion of “low-value” uses by “high-value” uses (Ravetz, 1980). Although this may well engender rapid physical development and prove lucrative for well-placed land-owners and developers, the outcome for poorer inner city communities and the local infrastructure of small businesses, services, facilities and amenities that sustain them may not be so favourable.

Indeed, segregation or displacement of the older communities has frequently been the most notable local implication of this kind of physical change. One possible example of this was the “detenanting” and subsequent demolition of the Sheriff Street Flats, which were sold by Dublin Corporation to a private developer. The site is currently undergoing redevelopment for exclusive and expensive private apartments. A large proportion of the first phase were purchased for investment purposes and, because of the rapid escalation in prices, few of the local population could ever aspire to live there. These difficulties make it clear that critical questions have yet to be resolved if the Docklands Development Authority is to realise the broader vision of "development" as set out in the Master Plan and as defined earlier.
5. CONCLUSIONS

In recent decades we have witnessed significant international restructuring and
globalisation of economic activity. These changes have, in the main, been regarded
as positive and unproblematic, leading to greater productivity, efficiency and
increased rates of economic growth. There is, however, a growing body of literature
which suggests that the outcomes of restructuring and globalisation can have
significant negative effects, leading to a degree of “polarisation” between “winners”
and “losers” in the population. Such polarisation has become most obvious in the
major urban centres around the world. For a significant minority, the decline in
traditional industry and the growth of the new service and information economy has
meant marginalisation, exclusion and segregation.

The Republic of Ireland has, in some respects, made remarkable progress in recent
years. Yet it offers a good example of a degree of polarisation which has arisen, to
a large extent, from the international restructuring and globalisation of economic
activity. As in other cities, the outcomes of these processes are particularly obvious
in Ireland’s capital city, Dublin. By the early 1980s, Dublin’s inner city displayed
many symptoms of decline - significant industrial and population losses, high
unemployment, widespread dereliction, educational and social disadvantage. A new
urban renewal scheme was introduced in the mid 1980s in the hope of arresting the
decline. While significant physical change took place and new investment was
attracted to previously neglected “Designated Areas”, the impact in broader
economic, social and “development” terms was unsatisfactory. There was a clear
division between “winners” and “losers” - the latter were overwhelmingly found in
the lower socio-economic groupings and among the “local” population. The “new”
population and those most able to avail of generous tax incentives gained most.

In recent years there has been broad acceptance of the need for a more inclusive
vision which defines progress in much more than physical terms and in which the
local population is properly involved. Legislation in 1997 clearly signaled the need
to adopt this new approach and was reflected in the Dublin Docklands Master Plan
and in the Integrated Area Plans by Dublin Corporation. We have offered an
assessment of achievements in the Docklands on this broader front in terms of new
employment, educational provision, housing, transport and amenities for the local as
well as for the new population. While progress has undoubtedly been made on
some of these issues, a range of questions arise and some fundamental problems
remain to be resolved. Employment in the Docklands has increased while
unemployment has declined significantly in recent years. This cannot of course be
all attributed to the efforts of the Docklands Authority, but the favourable tax, rates
and rental incentives have attracted firms which would otherwise remained outside
the area. As with schemes elsewhere employment gains have resulted from
significant “transfers” from other areas. The new overall employment gain to the
city or country may have been modest.
While some progress has been made in relation to better educational provision, tackling educational disadvantage must remain a top priority and greater resources and time must be devoted to it. A good start has been made in relation to social and affordable housing and the provision of various amenities but much remains to be done. The fundamental problem relating to the high price of land demands radical and urgent attention. Significant increases in traffic and congestion have led to a further deterioration in the quality of life of Docklands residents and progress has been painfully slow. Among many of the local population there remains a serious concern and skepticism regarding the possible outcomes of current initiatives and activities. If Dublin Docklands or the inner city in general is to be a success in terms of "sustainable development", it must involve and impact favourably on all groups in the population. A great deal remains to be done if this is to become a reality rather than an aspiration.
References


Community Development Project, 1975. Coventry CDP: Final Report, City of Coventry Community Development Project.


Dublin Docklands Development Authority, 1999. Dublin Docklands Area Affordable Housing Scheme, Dublin.


DISCUSSION

Professor Peter Tyler: The paper by Drudy and Punch begins by emphasising that globalisation and the pace of economic restructuring associated with it has led to particularly dramatic restructuring in urban labour markets. Many of the changes have disadvantaged the residents in urban locations, an obvious example being the decline in the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers who have traditionally been disproportionately concentrated in such areas. The pace of change has produced many inequalities. As the authors indicate whilst some social groups and geographic areas have benefited like never before from ever integrating national, regional and local economic systems others, particularly those in inner urban areas, have not been so favoured. In the worst cases a high degree of economic and social exclusion has resulted. By skilfully bringing together the work of many researchers the authors make the point that those who may be regarded as ‘losers’ in the labour market have found themselves ‘segregated’ into the ‘devolved’ spaces of cities either in inner city areas or isolated peripheral estates.

Whilst similar processes have been occurring across many parts of Northern America and Europe the authors observe that British cities have suffered particularly badly from the changes which have taken place. However, those in government responsible for the formulation of urban policy appear to have been blinkered to the problems which were emerging throughout much of the post war period. Thus, urban policy in Britain was focused on ameliorating urban congestion through New Town and over-spill policies. It was not until the White Paper in 1977 that there was much by way of a significant policy shift towards helping Britain’s inner city areas.

Drudy and Punch focus on the experience of British policy because of the relatively rich array of policy measures which have been deployed. Thus, throughout the 1980’s a range of essentially ‘area based’ policies were adopted like Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations. In the 1990s a more ‘holistic’ multifaceted approach was used, as in the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund. As the authors comment evaluation evidence has pointed to relatively mixed achievements from the policy initiatives. Property led regeneration has been successful, but at considerable cost in terms of public sector expenditure and often associated with displacement of economic activity. It has also not been clear who the beneficiaries have been and whether the outcomes have been those desired. The overall impact on the socially excluded in urban locations has been mixed.

Section two of the paper considers spatial problems in Ireland and begins with a discussion of the broad ‘outward looking’ approach adopted to attract new investment. Evidence points to undoubted success from the measures used but the scale of the achievement has varied considerably through time. In the 1980s job losses in Dublin were particularly serious. The process of industrial restructuring and technological change referred to by the authors in the first part of their paper led
to particularly severe job decline in the inner city area and the Docklands area of Dublin.

As the authors emphasise, by the early 1980s much of Central Dublin had all the symptoms of decline including rising unemployment, widespread dereliction, educational disadvantage, drug abuse and the like. In the face of the sheer scale and breadth of the problems a range of urban regeneration initiatives have been tried, including the use of financial incentives like rates relief and capital allowances in a manner similar to the British Enterprise Zone experiment.

The policy initiatives have achieved a considerable amount but, as the authors observe, the same criticisms can be made of them as with UK policy. One issue is how much ‘deadweight’ has been associated with the initiatives – or in other words how much of the property development would have happened anyway?

The paper then switches to discuss more recent approaches to urban regeneration in Dublin as embodied in the New Dublin Docklands Development Authority established in May 1997. This body is charged with securing the physical, economic and social regeneration of the area concerned. A number of interesting proposals are currently being developed including the technopole concept developed by Trinity College for the Docklands Authority.

Early evidence as to the achievements of the Docklands Development Authority is encouraging. However, many unknowns remain as to whether jobs can be created which fit with the needs of local residents. Improving the capabilities and educational attainment of residents remains of pressing concern. The authors also refer to the need for the Development Authority to tackle pressing land assembly and housing problems as well as betterment issues whereby the actions of the state in bringing about local regeneration leads to windfall increases in land values for private sector landowners. The increases in land values further diminish the ability of those on low incomes to gain access to local housing.

As the authors conclude the overall impact of regeneration measures on Dublin’s inner city and Dockland areas remains mixed. The problems are similar to those experienced in the United Kingdom and relate to trying to encourage physical and economic development which benefits local residents and leads to a sustainable improvement in their quality of life. At the present time the likely outcomes of existing policy support measures remains uncertain and the authors leave the clear impression that the evidence base with which to help formulate and develop policy remains weak. The message they convey is clear. Government must continue to monitor and evaluate polices in order to ensure that they are helping those who are socially excluded in the areas concerned and in the most effective way possible.

**Dr. Frank Gaffikin:** This response offers comment on the paper by Drudy and Punch, and develops from this response a summary analysis of the key theoretical understandings of the urban change they identify, concluding with an outline
evaluation model appropriate for urban regeneration. Two dimensions of the term evaluation suggest themselves in this regard. First, we are assessing what added value is generated by particular interventions. Second, we are recognising that such assessments are not themselves value-free. Rather, they are premised on concepts such as development and growth, whose definitions in turn are subject to dispute.

Indeed, the linguistics of this debate has changed notably over the years. Whereas we used to talk about ‘poverty’, now we talk about ‘social exclusion’. Whereas we used to refer to ‘multiple deprivation’, now we speak of the ‘multi-dimensionality’ of the issue. Whereas we used to emphasise ‘co-ordination’, now the mantra is ‘integration’. And while once we advocated ‘participation’, now the word is ‘partnership’. A cynic might suggest that because we could not change the problem, we settled instead on changing the vocabulary. Yet, the vocabulary is important.

A welcome aspect of the Drudy and Punch paper is that it brings us back to these basics. They open with the implied contention that measuring regeneration effort is dependent on a conceptual and theoretical clarity about the problem such inputs seek to redress and on the diverse social meanings attached to over-used words like renewal. In short, they acknowledge that cities are sites of both consensus and contest. Land, labour and capital are in limited supply — in particular, land. Thus, key research questions derive from this premise: how are such scarce assets deployed, by whom, at what cost, to whom, and for whose benefit? Related to this, how are disputes regarding allocation resolved, and in whose favour?

As the authors recount the Dublin experience, they illustrate examples of how development of a place does not necessarily lead to development in a place. Implicit here is a view that all ‘development’ should not be automatically endorsed as social progress that promotes the total sum of human happiness. In these terms, they are revisiting a long-standing debate in the urban regeneration arena: should the focus be less on developing place and more on developing the people who reside in that place? But, I will contend in this paper that such dichotomous expressions of the dilemma in the end do scant justice to its complexity.

Understanding Urban Change

Drudy and Punch rightly contextualise urban development in major social, economic and political change. Though they focus largely on the dynamics of globalisation, we can trace many distinct previous spatial shifts that attach to economic restructuring over five decades. From the suburbanisation of people and investment through to a more fundamental urban-rural shift as Fordist manufacturing increasingly located on greenfield sites and in new towns, the mature city has been increasingly ‘hollowed out’. In the most recent period, such changes have been variously characterised under rubrics such as post-Fordism, post-industrialism, dis-organised capitalism, or even more boldly in terms of ‘New Times’ and post-modernism.
However, increasingly, urban researchers are wary of restricting their analytical reference to the purely urban, but rather frame urban developments in wider societal change. Some, like Saunders (1986), dispute altogether the relevance of spatial constructs like ‘the urban’, contending that since modern industrial societies are urban in character, that it is more fruitful to examine the impact of macro-policies of collective consumption than to focus on the relatively modest outputs of urban policy per se. This perspective would also accord with a general Marxist claim that the issue is not so much an urban dilemma but rather a more fundamental turning point in welfare capitalism, transparent since the 1970s. Implicit in these views is an appreciation that the acute urban change over recent decades can only be explained satisfactorily by an account of macro change at the national/global level.

Since the mid-1970s, the three essential foundations of the post-war social democratic order — Keynesianism, welfarism and Fordism — have been transformed. Accordingly, under threat was the indicative planning upon which spatial policy was predicated. Uneven development at regional or urban level in the decades after 1945 had been held to be a residual problem of the new post-capitalist order, amenable in time to area-based policies of positive discrimination, within the context of state management of aggregate demand and confident trajectories of growth and stability.

The problem of sustaining faith in Keynesian solutions to economic disequilibrium became evident in the late 1960s. This period coincided with the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ and the ‘inner city’ problem. Concentration on inter-regional disparities had neglected intra-regional inequalities. But, at this very time, the urgency of inner urban decline confronted the new limits of spatial policy. It could once be defended in terms not only of absorbing the productive capacity of surplus labour in jobless blackspots, but also relieving prosperous places of inflationary costs of over-development. By the late 1960s, the policy conundrum was how to redistribute manufacturing employment opportunities to the most depressed spaces when the process of deindustrialisation had started to take national hold.

For instance, in Britain, early action-research projects designed to alleviate urban deprivation, such as the Community Development Project (CDP), drew attention to the limits of renewal at the community level where socio-economic disintegration was manifest, when the problems were largely generated at a national and increasingly global level (CDP, 1977).

“With one hand the government pours words and money into more ‘special’ policies and programmes designed to relieve the problems of these areas. With the other it introduces severe cuts in public expenditure in the name of restoring profitability and investment in manufacturing industry, doing far more damage to these places than any special policies can make up for.”

In this respect, a key element in the rethinking of Keynesianism was the increased pressure the economic restructuring, to which the authors refer, placed on state
expenditure. In the 1950s, government spending as a proportion of GDP was quite stable, though varied, in most industrial countries. The more faltering use of demand management by the 1970s coincided with, and thus failed to cushion, the massive job drain, which particularly afflicted the manufacturing base of cities. Linked to this retreat from Keynesianism was a crisis in welfarism, even in the solidaristic welfare states of Europe.2 The credos behind socially allocated capital were argued by the New Right to be at odds with the imperatives for re-invigorated capitalism: competitive individualism; the primacy of want, as expressed in market demand, over that of need as generously defined by empire-building welfare bureaucracies; and inequality, properly reflected in the preferential status accorded the risk-taking entrepreneur (Bacon and Eltis, 1976).

Alongside these changes, was a shift away from Fordism as the pre-eminent production form in the post-war growth sectors. Involving, as it did, mass flowline rather than nodal assembly, producing standardised goods at a scale economy demanded by the new consumer society, it offered numerous, reasonably secure and remunerated labour opportunities to urban regions. But in its use of mechanisation to rationalise labour, and its focus on low cost formulae rather than quality design, several rigidities emerged in its vertically integrated corporate decision-making.

Some characterised the manufacturing job drain at this time in blanket terms of ‘de-industrialisation’ (Blackaby, 1979). But some, like Massey and Meegan (1982), understood it as a differentiated process, requiring disaggregation at two levels. First, job loss was an outcome of changes in output and/or productivity. Second, industry’s drive to improve international competitiveness could assume three distinct forms — rationalisation, intensification and technical innovation — each ‘justifying’ labour-shedding. Rationalisation involved a cut in total capacity. Intensification was designed to extract productivity gains without significant new investment or production reorganisation, features inherent in automation and robotisation.

The Drudy/Punch paper captures much of this analysis. However, it speaks less of the contest within urban theory about these patterns. For instance, in addressing the changes in Fordism, Harvey has identified three theoretical responses (Harvey, 1990). One detects a seismic shift in which ‘....markets for standardised mass-produced goods have given way — in part at least — before a growing profusion of shifting niche markets’ Cooke (1988). These new fragmented consumption patterns have coincided with changing production technologies (Saunders, 1984), prompting in the view of Piore and Sabel (1984) and Lipietz (1987) a distinctive regime of flexible specialisation. It represents a change so profound that some like Aglietta (1979) and Scott (1988) have designated it as neo-Fordism, a radical attempt by Fordism at self-adjustment, and some like Murray speak of post-Fordism, as a qualitatively new era beyond Fordism.

Harvey contends that post-Fordism has a social and spatial reality, but that ‘flexible technologies and organisational forms have not become hegemonic everywhere....’ Harvey (1990). This is a view which I think accords most closely with the confused
reality. The experience of Fordism itself for many depressed conurbations/regions has been partial and transitory. In places like Dublin, rooted in commerce and administration rather than industry, Fordism has a faint imprint. Instead, therefore, of conceptualising in terms of ‘neo’ or ‘post’ Fordism, it is my assessment that a more differentiated system is in operation, which, as Hudson remarks, reproduces in modified form, pre-Fordist and Fordist production methods (Hudson, 1988). This more circumspect approach to restructuring and its local ‘reproductions’ is found in Warde (1988), while more fundamental doubts as to whether the most important changes in the 1980s have come from consumption rather than production have been floated by Thrift (1989).

Post Industrialism?

Economic transformation in this period has been more radically framed in terms of ‘post-industrialism’. The term has a pedigree going back to the First World War, when some figures applied it to infer a preference for a return to de-centralised artisan workshops (Rose, 1991). Back in the late 1950s, Riesman (1958) equated the concept with the affluent society, in which the diminishing role of work would usher a leisure society. By the late 1960s, Touraine (1971) associated it with a more pessimistic prognosis about technocratic dominance in a ‘programmed’ society.

By the 1970s, Bell projected that in an information society, the social framework rested upon a knowledge theory of value, by which surplus value derives primarily from information rather than productive labour (Bell, 1980). In this post-industrial age, the service economy would acquire prominence over the goods-producing one, giving pre-eminence in the occupational structure to a professional/technical class.

These ideas can be seen as part of the ‘stages model’ of development, whereby society moves linearly from pre-industrialism dominated by agriculture, through to industrialism dominated by manufacturing, to post-industrialism dominated by services. Plausible reasons are advanced for this move to post-industrialism. The supply-side component of the explanation is that rising manufacturing productivity has created a labour surplus ‘pushed’ into a more labour-intensive service sector. The ‘pull’ factor stems from the recomposition of demand, whereby as income rises in society, a growing share of expenditure shifts from basic material to non-material needs, such as cultural and leisure services.

Clearly, this narrative of automatic sequence is simplistic. For one thing, a burgeoning service sector can often attend a rise in manufacturing, which requires services such as design, marketing, advertisement and distribution. Second, there is no neat pattern of labour displaced from manufacturing being absorbed by services. Moreover, Gershuny has argued persuasively that a buoyant self-service economy is replacing some services with manufactured goods such as television and washing machines, though these in turn rely on services for repair and maintenance.3

Nevertheless, these considerations do not preclude radical social reformation linked to a new pivotal role for services, one that is seen to harbour new contradictions.
For some, like Bell, these include tensions between the bourgeois work ethic and the individualistic, hedonistic lifestyles generated by a credit-card service economy (Bell, 1976). For critics of capitalism, like Gorz (1982), the change threatens a social regression, whereby stratifications are accentuated. Over-worked economic elites purchase leisure time by sub-contracting personal and domestic tasks to a de-skilled servile class for modest remuneration. There is a prevalent concern in the literature that the coming economic order contains structural tendencies for acute labour market segmentation — professional elites and multi-skilled employees at one end, and at the other, an increasingly casualised, flexi-time labour force, forever perched precariously close to unemployment (Allen, 1982). The Drudy/Punch analysis acknowledges these patterns, and their role in producing a tendency to a 'dual city', whereby acute social and spatial segmentations not only abound, but also correspond closely.

But, in explanation for these tendencies, different emphases are found in recent theoretical discourse. For instance, Castells (1989) prefers to assign the term informationalism to the new era. For him, the key social and spatial dynamic derives from 'the interaction and the articulation between the informational mode of development and the restructuring of capitalism....'. In the competitive scramble to secure state-of-the-art technology markets, the state will be pressured to fund expensive requisite infrastructure, thereby demoting its redistributional functions. These government fundings are likely to be legitimated in the form of public-private partnerships, as part of a general interpenetration of state and capital. But, it is a transformed capital from its oligopolistic concentration in industrialism:

“....in the informational era large corporations set up specific alliances for given products, processes and markets: these alliances vary according to time and space, and result in a variable geometry of corporate strategies that follow the logic of the multiple networks where they are engaged rather than the monolithic hierarchy of empire conglomerates.”

Disorganised Capitalism

Lash and Urry (1987) frame these transitions within a more general paradigm, which posits a shift from ‘organised’ to ‘disorganised’ capitalism. In summary, they denote the latter as representing the current period in which: industrial, financial and commercial capital are becoming increasingly globalised: the coalition of state and big capital is overtaken because of the growing autonomy of large private monopolies; and the core economies are suffering the dislocations of deindustrialisation as they sectorally realign towards services, paralleled by competitive industrial development in the periphery.

In turn, these restructurings are exhibiting discernible social, political and cultural ramifications. Social relations of production are being reconstituted. On the one hand, managerial hierarchies are assuming more complicated forms as the trend towards the separation of ownership and control becomes accentuated. On the other, organised labour is losing its national collectivity as plant size contracts,
‘smoke stacks’ collapse and the blue collar working class is deskilled as part of a general recomposition of employment. In a later work, Lash and Urry (1994) propose that since post-industrialism is denoted by knowledge-intensive production requiring innovatory process, it is naturally aligned with post-Fordism, in which flexibility is inherently not only knowledge intensive, but also reflexive. Reflexive accumulation involves greater unification of conceptualisation and execution, evident in the increased role for R&D and design Garnham (1990), and greater expectation of initiative and hermeneutic sensibility at shopfloor level. So, the geographical separation of ‘higher end’ functions such as ownership and control and conception from ‘lower end’ ones such as execution, to which Drudy and Punch refer, may be one of those over-simplified dichotomies I mentioned earlier.

Thus, in the new production form, social and spatial hierarchies are changed, not erased. Politically, these changes are manifested in a diminution of class-based electoral appeals. Corporatist decision-making, designed to promote consensual negotiation amongst relatively monolithic blocs of labour and capital, is deemed to be redundant. The dominance of science and rationality fragments in the face of more diverse cultural idioms, channeled through a globalised media, which promote greater pluralism and less durability in values and fashion.

However, Cooke (1988) cautions against any such universalist claims. First, the organisation of both industrial and finance capital, the social relations around them, and the role of the state, have all differed over time and space. Second, while mass production became the main ‘technological paradigm’, it was not always and everywhere the main form of production. Third, while capitalism has experienced a series of crises since the 1970s, its resilience hardly suggests disorganisation. Rather, as Cooke (1988) suggests

“the picture...is of increasing world economic integration and the reorganisation of spatial production relations, at a rapid pace, without undue signs of disorganisation...”.

The Urban and Post-modernity

Reference to concepts such as disorganised capitalism, post-Fordism and post-industrialism suggests, for some, competing explanations. For instance, post-Fordism seems to address changed forms of manufacturing production as a new industrialism, while post-industrialism shifts the gaze to a radical redirection from manufacturing to services. Yet, these terms all infer some periodisation of polity and economy; they acknowledge to varying degrees new pluralisms and flexibilities, and the current pivotal force of information.

Consistent with the slant adopted by Drudy and Punch, most of their variants identify structural tendencies to more acute socio-spatial polarisation; and they view these changes in the context of greater globalisation and networking amongst ‘wired’ organisations on data highways. Amongst the issues these theories do contest is the extent to which such upheavals have been formative or whether
they constitute simply intensified continuities with the past (Allen, 1992). Are we really in ‘New Times’? Postmodernism suggests that we are. Fundamentally, it queries the modernist project, which at least since the Enlightenment has suggested that the social world can be increasingly understood by scientific rationalism, and being understood, can be socially engineered to a better future.

In fact, it suggests that social reality is not so subject to order and pattern, but rather is much more messy, complicated, and unpredictable than we have previously credited. Thus, in forsaking the historicist meta-narratives, (Lytard, 1986) and the inevitability or even the validation of ‘an emancipatory politics’ (Sayer, 1991), the postmodern approach can disclaim the very ambition of interventions to tackle ills such as urban poverty. This reading of postmodernism stresses its misgivings about ideologies which privilege one totalising schema over another, and concludes that its pluralist posture is a ruse for de-politicisation (Jameson, 1991): since arbitration between theoretical abstractions is inconclusive, concerted action for social progress is misconceived utopianism. In such a fashion, handwringing becomes handwashing.

Implications for the Social Production of Space

The spatial reconfigurations associated with these shifts are acute. Micro-electronics simultaneously allows for the decomposition of the production process and its spatial disaggregation, while integrating management control across distance via online information systems and telecommunications. The new territorial dispersal of industry displaces traditional regional specialisation. Alongside this, the urban-rural shift of jobs and population persists, as manufacturing in city cores virtually disappears. Population density in cities declines along with their tax base, leading to neglect of fixed investment in the urban fabric.

Back in the 1960s, the erosion of the manufacturing base in the ‘smoke stack’ urban zones was characterised in terms of ‘an inner city crisis’ (CDP, 1977 and Lawless, 1986). By the 1980s, this malaise had, in the view of some (Byrne, 1989 and Hasluck, 1987) deteriorated into an ‘urban crisis’, as an accentuated de-industrialisation process extended city economic decline beyond the inner core. There was a changing geography of production associated with this, including the re-location of investment to suburban/rural sites, a certain measure of internationalisation of production, and later for a period in the 1980s in places like Britain a more polarised regional divide between the ‘core’ command South, a semi-peripheral Midlands, and a Northern periphery.

This re-shaping of the space-economy was theorised in various ways. From neoclassical perspectives (Scott, 1982), unfavourable cost factors operated in traditional urban areas whereby, for instance, the tradition of organised labour, the scarce supply of appropriate land and the costs of congestion promoted the decentralisation of investment. In this respect, it might be inferred that new firm formation in such mature spaces demanded not just re-ordering of economic and environmental structure, but also of the social relations of production (Abernathy et
For others, it was more the acute repercussion in urban areas of macrochanges in the industrial labour market (Massey and Meegan, 1978).

A different view emphasised the interplay of the urban and national. The city was seen to suffer from three features of deindustrialisation. First, there was a national recomposition of employment involving a manufacturing jobs drain and an expansion of service employment. Second, this structural shift was accompanied by poor national economic growth, leading to overall sustained high unemployment. The third aspect, unlike the previous two, has had a specific spatial dimension. “The city has been losing manufacturing jobs at a relatively faster rate: In every region small towns and rural areas have fared better than larger settlements by a sizeable margin. Highly urban regions have declined: more rural regions have grown.” Fothergill et al., (1978) have attributed this distinct under-performance to industrial land constraints in cities, which thereby are disadvantaged on two accounts: they endure job loss associated with increasingly capital intensive production forms and they fail to attract compensating job gains drawn to greenfield sites in small towns and rural areas.

In all of this, the processes of deindustrialisation and decentralisation are each distinctive. The latter has been most evident in the case of large buoyant cities, subject to the price elasticity of demand for space, whereas the former has most afflicted older industrial cities like Belfast. Another relevant factor in determining urban decline is that of peripherality ‘not only in geographic terms but also socially and in terms of trade patterns. Cheshire (1989) argues that the fate of declining cities relates to their particular experience of the permutation of these three causal factors and their adjustment capacity, including their institutional, social and cultural flexibilities.

But, in general, he contends that the city form, built around industry, is primed to adapt to ‘post-industrial’ opportunities. Cities can revert to their pre-industrial functions as centres of administration, commerce and culture, and as chosen residential locations, they also can be an employment source around a range of urban services and amenities. In short, the shift to a service-based economy is the basis for a re-urbanisation. The fastest growing parts of the service sector — insurance, finance, hotel and catering, and retailing — rely either on personal delivery or on deal-making, both of which are facilitated by being located in concentrated settlements of population (Cheshire, 1989):

In terms of economic disadvantages, those particular characteristics of cities—congestion, high unit space costs, and high costs of transport for bulky goods—are much less significant for services. Thus services tend still to be attracted to urban locations and, since it is reasonable to expect most output growth, and even more most employment growth over the next 10 to 20 years to be in services, then that provides strong grounds for believing that an urban employment revival is likely.
Alongside the growth in services, the old division between public and private services is disappearing. As recognised by Bagguley et al., (1990) modes of public service provision have become more differentiated, with new roles for the market, neighbourhood informal economies and the voluntary sector. This has potentially beneficial job implications for local communities if means can be devised to link more closely local employment to local services. Residential choice decisions also are now re-favouring cities. The population movement out of urban areas over many decades now means that the cost of urban relative to ex-urban space is decreasing. Moreover, the income and demographic characteristics of those most impelled to re-urbanise — multiple job holding households — stand to disproportionately increase spending on urban services and amenities, improvements in which then lend further stimulation to urban residential location.

For Castells (1989), the informational city will be one which can accommodate the spatial logic of information technology industries, swayed, as they are, by the availability of quality scientific and technical labour, in a location offering an innovative milieu for networking and organisational synergy. But a lot will depend on the product. In the case of semi-conductors, for instance, a phased process involving knowledge-intensive research and design, advanced engineering, unskilled assembly, and quality testing, invites variable location, each compatible with a particular skill base. Where appropriate, this decentralisation of production is facilitated by the industry’s intrinsic nature:

“Miniaturisation of devices means low weight and low transportation costs. Computer automation of manufacturing makes possible high-quality standardisation of parts that can be assembled anywhere. Computer-aided flexible manufacturing enables production to be adjusted to market requirements without the different production functions being spatially proximate.”

However, other products, such as leading-edge genetic engineering, do not imply the same spatial differentiation, but rather more exclusive attributes. Such selective locations become valuable in terms of real estate, and thereby continue to privilege high value-added activity. For Harvey, the irony is that space-time compression and less-anchored capital actually accentuate the issue of locational advantage, while involving hierarchical realignment in the global urban system: (Harvey, 1989)

“The local availability of material resources of special qualities, or even at marginally lower costs, starts to be ever more important, as do local variations in market taste that are today more easily exploited under conditions of small-batch production and flexible design. Local differences in entrepreneurial ability, venture capital, scientific and technical know-how, social attitudes, also enter in....”

While these perspectives focus on the urban implications of sectoral and demographic shifts, other research has focused on the new spatial divisions of labour related to the corporate strategies of ‘prime mover’ firms, re-structuring in an
increasingly globalised economy (Massey, 1984; Gaffikin and Nickson, 1984; Dicken, 1992). The internationalisation of capitalist relations involved not just the relocation of production in search of low cost labour or new markets, but also a related expansion of producer services, in particular finance (Coakley, 1984). Capital was more mobile across space, and operating at greater speed. A world economy centred on the US gave way to a multi-polar one based around a more integrated industrial core, including Europe and Japan. But the signature of transnational corporations and banks on this integration has led some to dispute the existence of a sovereign national economy, never mind anything recognisable as a discrete city economy (Radice, 1984). Castells (1989) talks about the new age as ‘the last frontier where organisational networks and information flows dissolve locales and supersede societies’.

For those for whom the post-Fordist city is the future, a new economics arises. For example, there is the increasing keenness on the part of big corporations to be in physical proximity to a core set of long-term suppliers capable of ‘just in time’ production. In its most optimistic trajectory, this new period of uncertainty is seen by some like Stohr (1990) to stimulate innovation in a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. But, a new urban politics is also likely, one that is more entrepreneurial and enabling, constituted around a wider coalition of interests, capable of differentiating the city-region in the more acutely competitive arena that is the new global economy. For city governance, the role swap from provider to enabler is linked to the new mixed economy of welfare, in which elements of social consumption are becoming more privatised and remaining public provision more marketised. As its social redistributive role is demoted, local government is assuming greater involvement in economic regeneration, though ironically in the context of a diminution in central state development planning.

The Particularity of Place

But, amid all these grand explanations for urban change, and their complexities and contentions, only partially captured by Drudy and Punch, a simple fact remains. In Massey’s (1984) terms, the global generalities of urban spatial reconfigurations are mediated by the particular history of overlaying rounds of investment and disinvestment, and the specific political-economy of the city-region under review. In that sense, space matters. It is not just that space is socially constructed. The social is also spatially constructed. Capitalist global integration has not ushered ‘the end of geography’, any more than the demise of communism has witnessed the ‘end of history’.

The uniqueness of place, according to Cooke (1987), means that the resolution of the above mentioned dichotomies can only be resolved in any given urban research practice by appreciating the interaction between universal processes, such as capital accumulation and economic restructuring, and local processes. As expressed by Warf (1990), the contingencies of urban formations mean that:
“...within limits, local history and geography could always ‘be otherwise’. With these themes in mind, geography is poised to view cities in existential terms as much as it comprehends them as the products of social logics.”

After decades, when it has been assumed that community has been ‘eclipsed’, or that social relations have been commodified within the frame of global markets, or that new mobilities have liberated people from locality, the significance of place is being rediscovered. It entails a more positive engagement between sociological and geographical imaginations (Agnew and Duncan, 1979). Taking this view, together with some of the logic of post-Fordism, a more optimistic prognosis for urban regeneration emerges. Ironically, it could be argued that the very globalisation of economic life has simultaneously eroded the authority of the nation-state, while providing some opportunity for regions and cities to operate more directly in the global economy. As noted by Strassoldo (1992), far from rendering the local irrelevant, increasing globalisation reconstitutes the significance of space and place.

Clearly, not all cities are going to get in on the game, and a competitive scramble for such selection is linked to the capacity of urban centres to mobilise their full capacities for this end. It might be thought that the current intensification of social and spatial segregation in the city is an unfavourable basis for a common agenda from the various urban fractions. A more hopeful view is that efforts to compose a united portrayal of a city provide new negotiating opportunities for the urban disadvantaged (Mayer, 1992):

....attempts should be made to exploit the structural openness for external groups characteristic of the new local and regional bargaining systems to push for non-exclusive participation and for more representation for marginalised interests.

Relating Theory to the Regeneration Agenda

I have focused on the part of the Drudy/Punch paper related to urban theory because it is a much-neglected aspect of evaluation. Yet, unless we clarify the diagnostic dimension, we cannot assess the appropriateness of particular urban strategies, never mind evaluate their impact. Moreover, without an analysis of the overall dynamic of urban change, there is a greater likelihood of regeneration effort being fragmented into a series of unconnected initiatives in the way described by Drudy and Punch. In Dublin, this takes the form of a specific approach in the Docklands and Temple Bar, the pragmatic response to inner city decline as embodied in the ‘Gregory deal’, and urban renewal policies first in ‘designated’ areas, and more recently in ‘enterprise’ areas. In both Britain and the USA, the effects of such segmentation are apparent. For over thirty years, a series of urban programmes have been tried in both countries. It is true that shifts in analysis and emphasis have been apparent over this time. The early social slant of the intervention switched to an economic one, and more recently, the focus on property has become more balanced by attention to the actual impact on people.
Yet, if we look at particular cities that have been recipients of these programmes, their efficacy comes into question. For instance, Liverpool has experienced the whole range — from Urban Aid, Educational Priority Area and Community Development Project in the late 1960s, through to Inner City Partnerships in the 1970s, to Enterprise Zones, Urban Development Corporations, Task Forces in the 1980s, through to the most recent initiatives like City Challenge. In addition, it not only had a Minister for Merseyside, it also received funding from Europe in the form of Poverty programmes and Objective 1 status. Yet, despite all of this, the structural problems have persisted, and the city remains in great difficulty.

So, perhaps instead of continuing to pilot more and more new initiatives, and to place great store in evaluation on ‘innovative’ dimensions, we should identify those components of all of these previous interventions that have shown clear benefit relative to cost. After all, what is the purpose of evaluation if it is insufficiently robust to assess what works, and why then, after more than three decades, have we not a clear urban agenda in which initiatives of proven value are resourced to a scale and duration commensurate with the problem? In short, we need to move from piloting to mainstreaming, and we need to link effort at redressing urban deprivation to the wider agenda for city regeneration.

In such an approach, the spatial unit of analysis is crucial. As Drudy and Punch acknowledge, spatial strategy in the Irish Republic first focussed on the ‘regional’ dimension, in particular that concerning differential development patterns between the Eastern ‘core’ and the Western ‘periphery’. It is only since the mid-1980s that systematic intervention in the inner city in Dublin has occurred. In Britain, the concentration on the regional dimension evident since the 1930s was complemented by a focus on the inner city since the 1960s. But, by the late 1980s, a wider urban framework emerged, as the structural decline of the industrial city took hold. More recently, there has been the perspective of the city-region, as the new economic geography determines a more metropolitan lens. Beyond this, there is a growing imperative for individual cities to see themselves not only in relation to their regional and national contexts, but also in terms of their niche and comparative advantage in a more globalised economy. Thus, the appropriateness of urban policy instruments needs to be assessed now within these wider units of analysis.

In the case of Dublin, from 1926-1996, the city as a percentage of the combined city and suburbs dropped from just over three quarters to just over a half, as the Greater Dublin Area, as a percentage of the state, rose from 23 percent to 39 percent. In short, the greater concentration of the Irish Republic’s population around the Dublin area has been accommodated through the sprawl of Dublin itself. Meanwhile, the inner city population fell massively from 268,851 in 1926 to 76,558 in 1991, with an interesting resurgence to 86,372 in 1996. By the early nineties, the inner city share of Greater Dublin’s population was a mere 5.7 percent (Bannon, 2000). Clearly, it is no longer feasible to address or assess development in Dublin without a strategic plan for the whole of the Greater Dublin Area.
Evaluating Impact

As Drudy and Punch proceed to measure the impact of the main interventions in Dublin, they confront honestly the standard evaluation problems: getting reliable contextual baselines; measuring what the Americans refer to as the 'counterfactual’ — what would have happened without intervention; assessing the relative significance of determinants of success; distinguishing between outputs and outcomes; and allowing for the time lag in policy effect. Clearly, the problems of data quality, decay and validation can lead to a ‘garbage in – garbage out’ type of evaluation.

If urban regeneration were reducible to property development, the task would be easier. It would be concerned largely with the acreage of land reclaimed, the square footage of occupied building space; and the increased rate and rental returns. But, once we bring people back into the equation, we bring in value judgement. For instance, is an influx of new middle class people into the inner city considered in terms of the problem of gentrification or the benefit of reintroducing a more balanced social mix? Similarly, should we determine compensatory intervention exclusively in terms of indices of deprivation or should we include also indicators of endowment? In other words, should we target resources to those communities most in need, regardless of their capacity to absorb such inputs productively? Or should we encourage them to think also of their assets; locational; infrastructural; human; financial; etc., and make funding levels contingent on their efficient deployment? Of course, as mentioned before, such choices should not be reduced to such dichotomies. Rather, these issues should form a composite and complex consideration.

Thus, we are talking about ‘composite’ methodologies. For instance, there is a battery of mathematical techniques to help measure, disaggregate and synthesize: weighting; Z scores; shift-share analysis; cluster analysis, etc. Such tools are crucial, but incomplete. They need to be complemented with participative research. In other words, a feedback from the programmes’ recipients is also important. Their native know-how brings an experiential knowledge, which though it needs to be interrogated, also needs to be incorporated. In this respect, all of this information needs to be fed in regularly to an evaluation system that operates as the programme proceeds. Such a process will provide for a formative evaluation model, which can influence and improve the intervention, rather than be used in a summative retrospective evaluation, when it is too late to impact on events.

In the case of particular urban projects targeted at distinctive populations, it might appear possible to elude many of these difficulties by adopting an approach based on a randomised control experiment. Here, after the project, the target group would be compared with a randomly selected control group of similar people, who had not been recipients. Apart from other practical problems, such an approach gives rise to ethical concerns about withholding benefits from some of those entitled. A preferable method here is that of the detailed case study, provided it gets beyond an impressionistic narrative. Such a method uses an appropriate mix of participant
observation, focus groups, and postal questionnaires, together with the generation of hard data on participation rates, skill acquisition, and other such relevant indicators.

_An Appropriate Evaluation Model?_ 

Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (1985) define evaluation as the:

"...systematic assessment of the worth or merit of some object... if a study does not show how good or bad something is, it is not evaluation."

But, four aspects of the concept of evaluation need to be emphasised. First, valid assessment is not reducible to what is readily measurable, since the social world can not be understood exclusively in numbers. Second, evaluation can be seen simply in terms of performance measurement, linked to the political imperative since the 1980s for greater fiscal prudence in public services. Such an approach tends to concentrate on auditing and questions about _efficiency_ (the ratio of outputs to inputs), and thus, can be less concerned about _effectiveness_ (the relationship between policy aims and outcomes).

Certainly, evaluation raises the important issues of competent performance and value for money in the allocation of resources. But, as Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (1985) argue, the purpose of evaluation is to provide 'improvement, accountability and enlightenment'. This leads to the third consideration, and one that is prioritised in the Drudy/Punch paper, that a necessary 'proofing' of success relates to the principle of equity, which is achieved when the outputs are distributed fairly. Finally, cost effectiveness occurs where outcomes are maximised relative to inputs.

In an ideal situation, the calculus bringing these criteria together might be represented as:

\[
\text{Net Additionality} = \text{Net Investment (benefit) to target Pop. (beneficiary)} = \text{Gross Investment + Associated Leverage/Bending + multipliers} - \{\text{Deadweight} + (\text{Substitution} - \text{Acceleration effect}) + \text{leakage} (\text{efficiency 'reach'}) + \text{'internal' displacement} + \text{negative macro policy impacts}\}
\]

With all of these outcomes, the key concept is residual change, i.e. the difference between expected change (in line with existing change) and actual change is the impact brought about by programme activity. But, as Drudy and Punch rightly acknowledge, the reality of the urban arena does not permit the application of such pristine models.

_Endnotes_ 

1. Townsend (1978) records how Wilson's 1970s UK Labour government effectively conceded political ground on the defence of full employment. People were persuaded that a temporary rise in unemployment was a prerequisite for economic recovery.
2. Categorisation of welfare states in this fashion is subject to considerable contention, see Esping-Anderson (1990).
3. Gershuny (1978) notes it is also the case that statistics purporting to show shifts in employment and output are themselves contaminated, since they group under services contracted-out activities once done in-house by manufacturing, such as auditing, catering and cleaning. Some businesses assigned to the service sector, such as computer software, could just as readily be designated as manufacturing.

References


Gaffikin, F. and A. Nickson, 1984. *Jobs Crisis and the Multinationals*, Third World Publications, Birmingham; and


