This volume contains some studies compiled by Egyptian, Italian, German and Hungarian scholars within the academic activities of the Bilateral Project “History of Peace-building: peaceful relations between East and West (11th - 15th century)”. The project is totally funded by the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) and the Italian National Research Council (CNR).
Studies in Peace-building History

STUDIES IN PEACE-BUILDING HISTORY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST THROUGH THE MIDDLE AGES AND MODERN ERA
Studies in Peace-building History between East and West through the Middle Ages and Modern Era

Editors:
Aly Ahmed Elsayed
Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar
Ahmed Mohamed Sheir

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FOREWORD

The human world is a multidimensional world where people from different cultures and religions have lived together. We live in one world which has a multitude of dimensions. The phrase “between East and West” has different meanings in Rome, in Cairo, and in Budapest. In a geographical sense “the East” can refer to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea (the Levant), it can refer to the Arab world, or it can refer to the Far East depending upon context. From Cairo “East” is mostly considered as the synonym of the Arab world, even if the Maghreb countries are located to the west of Egypt. From a Central European point of view “the East” means the Arab world, and, at the same time, the Moscow-oriented territories, while “the West” denotes the Euro-Atlantic region. These alternatives have historical reasons. Looking at the phrase East and West from a civilizational aspect, it can refer to the differences between cultures, their connecting points, their coexistence and earlier conflicts, too. There has been interaction between Christianity and Islam since the Middle Ages, including the Iberian Peninsula and the crusades directed at the Middle East. The equalization between East and West started in the modern era, and this process has continued into the present.

This volume presents histories of peaceful coexistence between various people, empires, cultures and religions from the Middle Ages to the end of the 20th century. The authors examined the contact points of different cultures from the Byzantine Empire, through the Trebizond Empire period and into the Seljuk Sultanate. The history of the crusades has already been elaborated upon by European as well as Arab historians and is presented in one of the studies of in this volume. We also present insights into the peaceful coexistence between Egyptian Copts and Muslims in the period from 1882 to 1952.

The relations between Christians and Muslims were simultaneously marked by the alternating periods of war and peace. In history there are several instances of peaceful coexistence, to which the present volume, too, would like to contribute. According to the historian Edward Hallett Carr, history begins when people think about the passing of time in the form of series of events in which they are involved of their own will, being able to influence them consciously, rather than thinking in categories of natural
phenomena, such as the cycle of seasons or life expectancy. History is nothing else than the man’s struggle by means of his reason, in order to understand his environment and to act upon it. (What is History? Pengium Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1986)

János Sáringer

Head of the Institute of Social Sciences and Pedagogy, Budapest Business School

* A public university business school specialised in business studies and social sciences. Founded in 1857, BBS is officially the oldest public business school in the world, and second oldest among business schools, after the ESCP Europe.
Studies in Peace-building History

(I)

(ABDALLAH ABDEL-ATI AL-NAGGAR

ACADEMY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY (ASRT)

“HISTORY OF PEACE-BUILDING” PROJECT TWO-YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION BETWEEN ASRT-CNR

7
This paper was a lecture, in its abbreviated version and was originally written to be delivered in our workshop held in Rome on December 13, 2017, organized and headed by our Italian counterpart, Luciano Gallinari. This paper has two aims: the first is to present our experiments and challenges we faced in all the various steps along the way.

These several pages provide considerable detail in an overview of the process of the two-year project, as I would like to make it as a guide for other colleagues/historians, sharing with them the possibilities of how they can find foreign research partners, submit applications for international projects, and how they can win such funds through clearly understood procedures, as well how to organize workshops, conferences, seminars, and other activities of the grant. The second target is to list the full data of the project, and to show the achievements and decisive gains we have made further to presenting all the Egyptian and foreign colleagues who participated in the different stages of the project, reporting some information about each one of them. Basic Data:

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\textsuperscript{1} A non-profit organization, responsible for science and technology in Egypt. ASRT is the Egyptian house of expertise. It brings together outstanding Egyptian scientists and experts from universities, research institutions, the private sector, NGOs, policymakers, and prominent Egyptian scientists in the Diaspora to deliberate on Egypt’s problems, propose and carry out scientific studies, and develop future strategic basic plans to tackle these problems. ASRT crafts a comprehensive plan for developing Egyptian S&T to support relevant national ministries and research institutions in creating an integrated system of scientific research for increasing the number of trained scientists in Egypt, and giving science a leading role in the country’s development and knowledge based economy.

\textsuperscript{2} The largest public research institution in Italy, the only one under the Research Ministry performing multidisciplinary activities. Founded as a legal person on 18 November 1923,
**Egyptian Research Team:**

Prof. Ali Ahmed Al-Sayed\(^3\), Professor of Medieval History, Faculty of Arts, Damanhour University – Former Dean of the Faculty

Asst. Prof. Dr. Al-Matwaly Al-Sayed Tamim\(^4\), Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education, Damanhour University

Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Abdel-Salam M. Al-Naggar\(^5\), Academy of Scientific Research & Technology (PhD – University of Szeged, Hungary)

Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Sheir\(^6\), PhD student and Asst. Lecturer, Damanhour University (MA. Uni. of Gottingen, Germany)

CNR’s mission is to perform research in its own Institutes, to promote innovation and competitiveness of the national industrial system, to promote the internationalization of the national research system, and to provide technologies and solutions to emerging public and private needs. In the CNR’s research world, the main resource is the available knowledge which means people, with their skills, commitment and ideas. This capital comprises more than 8,000 employees, of whom more than half are researchers and technologists.

\(^3\) Professor of Medieval history, Faculty of Arts, Damanhour University and head of the department for ten years until 2011. 2011-2016: Deputy-Dean of Education and Student Affairs. He obtained his Bachelors (1977), Masters (1988) and Ph.D. (1994) from the University of Alexandria. He has many publications on the history of the Crusades and medieval history. He supervised about 30 theses (Master and PhDs). He attended numerous national and international conferences and is a member of a number of historical societies.

\(^4\) Member of the History Department Council’s Students’ Affairs Committee, Faculty of Education, Damanhour University, and member of the Egyptian Society of Historic Studies. MA (1996) and PhD (2004) in Medieval History, Faculty of Arts, Mansoura University.

\(^5\) 2014: PhD, History and International Relations, History Program of the Doctoral School – University of Szeged. Doctoral dissertation “The Egyptian-Hungarian Relations between the Two World Wars”. 2004: Diploma in Hungarology from the Balássi Bálint Institute, 2004. Bachelor’s Degree, Italian-Hungarian Department, Faculty of Languages “Al-Alsun”, Ain Shams University. Member of the Association for Historical Studies, Federation of Arab Historians, Association of Egyptian Translators. He has about 25 compiled and translated books, in addition to 22 scientific papers published in Cairo, Budapest, Rome.

\(^6\) Ph.D. researcher in the history of crusades, Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies (CNMS), Marburg University, Germany. Sheir obtained his MA degree in 2014 from Göttingen University, Germany, as MA-Erasmus Scholar (2012-2014). In 2008, he graduated at Alexandria University, Damanhour branch. He worked as a teaching assistant and lecturer in history in Damanhour university, 2009-2012, 2014-2016. Besides working on his PhD-Dissertation on the legend of Prester John and Its implication on the Crusader-Muslim conflict, Sheir works on the Crusades’ memory in the Arab world and its impact on the Peaceful relations with Europe.
Distinguished colleagues,

I would like to tell you what a great pleasure and honor it is to be talking to you today at this important event organized by the ISEM and led by Prof. Luciano Gallinari, head of our Italian partner research unit. Now I am going to speak in general and in brief about Egyptian-Italian scientific and cultural relations, and also about the different steps, aims, achievements, and personal experiments, as well as some situations and challenges we faced during the implementation of our joint project.

Egyptian-Italian relations go back to the medieval ages when Italy was divided into a number of states or Maritime Republics. Their relations developed and branched out into many fields at the beginning of Mohamed Ali’s era.

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7 BA in Political Science, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics & Political Science, British University in Egypt (BUE). Award programme: Political Science. 2003-2006 Rajac American High School. He specializes in International Relations and has a number of publications on that subject.

8 The Institute of History of Mediterranean Europe (ISEM), part of the National Research Council (CNR) established in 2001 from the consolidation of an institute and two centers: the Institute of Italian-Iberian Relations (IRII), the History of Technique Studies Centre (CST) and the Literature and Culture of Emergent Areas Studies Centre (CSAE). In 2010, a new branch of the University Tor Vergata was established in Rome. Since 2012 he also has an office at the Istituto Storico del Medio Evo. In 2014, as a result of CNR internal reorganization, the Branches of Genoa and Turin converged and joined into a new CNR Institute, the IRCRES. For more information about this prestigious institute, please visit its official website: http://www.isem.cnr.it/index.php?page=istituto&id=1&lang=it

9 Ottoman Albanian commander in the Ottoman army, who rose to the rank of Pasha, and became Wāli, and Ruler of Egypt and Sudan with the Ottomans’ temporary approval. He is regarded as the founder of modern Egypt because of the dramatic reforms in the military.
Mohamed Ali dispatched educational missions to Italy to learn typography in particular. He sought the help of Italian experts to establish a modern state in Egypt, in the fields of archeology and mineral excavations and in charting the first survey map for the Nile Delta. The Italians designed the Royal Opera House as well, and the Alexandria Corniche. And it was the Italian contracting company Jarroso Zafarany built the Egyptian Museum in Cairo in 1901.

Realizing the importance of scientific cooperation between Egypt and Italy, and believing in the powerful and influential role both countries have in the Mediterranean region, the two countries have a long history of modern cooperation that goes back to the early nineteen seventies.

I would especially like to remind you of the year 2009 which was announced as the Egyptian-Italian Year for Science and Technology (EISY09). It was officially launched on January 10, 2009 at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina under the auspices of H. E. Hani Helal, Egyptian Minister of Higher Education and H. E. Mariastella Gelmini, Italian Minister of Education, Universities, and Research. It has produced an array of scientific and cultural events, conferences, seminars, workshops, and exhibitions.

The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Egypt’s academy of sciences, the Egyptian house of expertise and national think tank, doesn’t support any scientific project related to history even though since its establishment in 1971 it has been the national authority responsible for science and technology leadership in Egypt. The lack of interest in economic, and cultural spheres that he instituted. He also ruled Levantine territories outside Egypt. The dynasty that he established would rule Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and Sudan until the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

10 It was reborn in October 2002 to reclaim the mantle of its ancient namesake. It is a vast complex where the arts, history, philosophy, and science come together. Moreover, the myriad activities it offers have made it a place for open discussion, dialogue, and understanding.

11 Hany Mahfouz Helal, Minister of Higher Education and State Minister for Scientific Research, and served as the Cultural and Scientific Chancellor in the Egyptian embassy in Paris. Helal worked as professor in the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (1993), and the Head of Singor University, Alexandria (October 2004). He was as an expert in Earth Sciences Programs of the UNESCO’s regional office in Cairo (1993), and the UNESCO consultant of International Laboratory for Scantron, Jordan (2002).

12 Italian politician and attorney (specialised in administrative law). She served as Italian Minister of Education in the Berlusconi IV Cabinet until November 16, 2011.
humanities in general and in history in particular has continued, even after ASRT was reorganized in 1998 by the Presidential Decree that further defined its mission, function, and activities.

In my own point of view, the reasons for not supporting joint projects concerning history between 1971 and 2015 are the following: first, the ASRT was not used to sending the requests to the Faculties of Education, and Arts, where the Departments of History can be found; secondly, the history researchers and historians were not motivated or encouraged actively enough to search pure and unique Egyptian grants and means of financial support in order to implement their works; third, ASRT concentrates on providing funds to the fields of Medical, Health and Life Sciences, Agronomy, Animal Production, Plant and Food, Biology, Engineering, Information, Communication and Technologies, Physics, Earth and Space Sciences, Chemistry, and Mathematics. Among the human sciences, the largest amounts of funding provided by ASRT go to archaeological cooperation with European countries.

After being governmentally nominated to ASRT in mid-2013, I have been following the situation of the international joint projects with great interest to well know if they provide grants to historians or history researchers.

The answer based on personal experience was, “No”. By the beginning of 2015, and upon the preparations of the Egyptian-Italian Joint Call, I asked Mrs. Mona Zakaria, respectable and honorable Director General of Scientific Relations Sector at ASRT, who is working under the presidency of Prof. Mahmoud M. Sakr, why the ASRT does not support historical research?

Mrs. Mona Zakaria Ahmed Al-Hariry, director general of Scientific Relations at ASRT. She has had an important role in developing the foreign relations of the Academy during the last ten years, as she was the head of the International Agreement directorate for a long time (2008–2014). She is a hard worker and has a very good reputation between colleagues who are working in research institutes and universities.

President of the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) since April 2014. He had several national positions such as Vice President of the ASRT (2009–2012), Executive Director of the Science and Technology Development Fund (2012–2014). In addition to being Head of the Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology Division (Equivalent to Faculty) of the National Research Center (2008–2009), Sakr was the Co-founder &
In answer to my question, she was surprised and first replied, “History?!! … It is a new field for us, Abdallah. Would you like to form a research team to submit an application? Yes? Why not? You can apply with pleasure.” Honestly, I was so happy after having such a declaration from Mrs. Zakaria that I have had grateful and kind relations with her ever since. This was the preface for a new era of funding history research.

The second step was finding an idea and subject for the proposal. I called Ahmed Sheir and Al-Matwaly Al-Sayed Tamim, members of our research unit, and asked them if they had a valuable and research-worthy subject to work on. Ahmed proposed the “Peace-Building” idea. He sent the subject with further information and details, which were interesting to me, to be discussed, developed, submitted, and evaluated and we succeeded. After that, we asked Prof. Aly to be the PI of our research team as he is one of the best medieval historians at Damanhour University.

The third step was searching for an Italian partner who met the criteria announced by ASRT and first of all, specialized in similar areas of research. I assumed that task. After a long search on the Internet, I found three appropriate and experienced researchers, among them Luciano Gallinari. I sent two of them an email introducing myself and the possibility of cooperation within the ASRT-CNR Agreement. Luciano was so quick and polite, sending me a reply on 8 July 2015:

“[…] Currently I am working outside Italy. I return to my institute next week and then I will respond to your email and you will provide further elements on your project to assess if and how we (myself and my Institute) could participate in it.”

Director of the Center of Excellence for Advanced Sciences (Nobel project) in the National Research Center (2006–2009), he was also the Founder & Head of two research groups at the National Research Center namely, the Plant Molecular Genetics and the Plant transformation research groups. Recently he launched a national program named Wealth of Egypt. The aim of the program is to collect, characterize, preserve and protect national plant genetic resources using up to date technology (DNA Barcoding). He received the state prize for scientific Encouragement in Advanced Biotechnology (1999), the National Research Center prize for scientific Encouragement in Biology (1998), and National Research Center prize for scientific Excellence in Biotechnology (2009). Prof. Sakr was born on 4 April 1965, got his PhD in Plant Biotechnology in 1995, professorship in plant biotechnology in 2006. For more info. and details on this scientific personality, see: http://www.asrt.sci.eg/index.php/short-bio-april-2016
In that email, he asked a question I had expected: “I ask you to let me know why you contacted me because I believe that we do not know each other?”

I replied to him that same day, saying: “I contacted you to be our partner research team in Italy for two reasons: firstly, because I read your excellent CV, and I can see that you are interested in such historical projects as we are intending to do; secondly, because you are working at the Institute of ISEM, which belongs to the Italian CNR, and this is one of the necessary requirements to submit applications according to the Egyptian-Italian (ASRT-CNR) Scientific and Technological Agreement.”

In that email, I sent him more information on our proposal, the Agreement signed between ASRT and CNR, as well as the Joint Call itself. From that date onwards, we have initiated a new phase of discussion on each point and element of our proposal between Luciano, myself, and sometimes Ahmed. After no small amount of urgent mutual work, we finalized the proposal and became ready to be submitted to both sides.

The discussion was in depth and fruitful. It’s enough to say that the project subject was largely modified to be, “History of Peace-Building: Peaceful Relations between East and West (XIth–XVth Century)” instead of “Living in Peace and Peace-Building in the Latin East – Dialogue and Diplomatic Relations between Frederick II and Muslims in the Levant (AH 612–648/AD 1215–1250).”

Luciano suggested that the period examined by our proposed work should not be limited to a few decades of the Thirteenth Century. He added: “In addition, for the research lines of my Institute it would be important to be able to devote attention to the Byzantine world and the presence in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean of other Western protagonists of that period: the Crown of Aragon and its merchants.”

“This morning – on behalf of our research team – I submitted the final proposal to the ASRT. I hope that we get the dedicated fund, which will be an excellent starting point for our bilateral project.” With this short message, I gave Luciano notice of having submitted the bilateral project, including the full scientific proposal, CVs of both team’s researchers,
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suggested a budget, Institutional Obligation\textsuperscript{15}, and Letter of Endorsement\textsuperscript{16}. We submitted the application on 15 September, although the deadline for submitting projects was 30 September. The interval between the date of submission and resulting promotion of the evaluation was not easy. It was full of internal steps, a lot of procedures, hard work, and serious efforts.

The result of both Egyptian and Italian evaluation was positive and promising.

**The Main Objective(s) of the Project**

First of all, we would like to say, that this study focuses on the significance of the relations between Western Europe and the Islamic East and the efforts which were made towards peace-building from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, although that period was considered as the most serious stage in the conflict between the East and West, Islam and Christianity in the Middle Ages.

This is similar to the current conflict in the Middle East and the Jerusalem issue, which need two wise and diplomat rulers such as Frederick II and al-Kâmil, who resolved the problem of conflict surrounding Jerusalem in 1229 without any bloodshed.

\textsuperscript{15} The template can as the following: ... INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION ...

The “Faculty of Arts – Damanhour University is committed to make available all necessary laboratory facilities, consumables, and any additional funds for the execution of the research proposal entitled “History of Peace-building: Peaceful relations between East and West (XI\textsuperscript{th} - XV\textsuperscript{th} century)” according to activities, tasks and work plan indicated in the submitted proposal. Signature and Stamp of the research institution.

\textsuperscript{16} The template of the Letter of Endorsement may be as in the following: I, the undersigned, Dr. Luciano Gallinari, researcher of the CNR’s Istituto di Storia dell’Europa Mediterranea, hereby agree to implement the Bilateral project CNR/ ASRT entitled “History of Peace-Building: Peaceful relations between East and West (XI\textsuperscript{th} - XV\textsuperscript{th} century), whose Egyptian Principal Investigator is Prof. Dr. Ali Ahmed Mohamed El-Sayed, Deputy Dean of the Damanhour University’s Faculty of Arts, from the beginning of 2016 to the end of 2017. Our research project, has been written jointly by myself and the Egyptian colleagues, agreeing on its scientific content, the aims and the different activities for the biennium. At the same time, I declare my interest in working — for the duration of the project — with the Egyptian research team composed of the following researchers: Prof. Dr. All Ahmed Elsayed Asst. Prof. Dr. al-Matwaly Tamim — Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Abdel-Salam Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Sheir — Mr. Sherif Reda Saadeldin Aboushanab. Cagliari, September 25, 2015. Signature and Stamp of the research Institution.
By the end of this project, we will have a scientific historical work in peace-building and the history of the peace at the time of the Middle Ages which was known as a time of conflict between civilizations, and from which we can direct our current world to the path of peace.

Our goals have been a better understanding the diplomatic relations between Frederick II and the Ayyubids (1215–1250), and to reach a better and integrated analysis of the nature of these relations and peace-building and its impact on the Muslim and Crusader societies.

We have been updating the historiography on the relations between Christians and Muslims in the Middle Ages through new documentary research and transdisciplinary reinterpretations of sources already published in the social sciences.

We have been disseminating the research results of the two Research Units through seminars and publications, which will be hosted in the ISEM’s Collection and Digital Journal “RiMe” and in similar Egyptian locations, such as books and scientific journals and periodicals.

The Objectives Achieved during the Reporting Period

We have already adopted the Historical Method to be the method of this study. The original chronicles and sources, as well as the later literature written in the late Middle Ages and afterwards, were analyzed for a better understanding, in addition to presenting the views of historians and critics. Furthermore, the study adopted a deductive method which deals with certain examples and analyzes them in order to reach the historical facts.

We prepared the finalized work plan for the entire period of the project as well as for future cooperation.

We proceeded to find the most recent and historiographical, archival, and narrative research published in Egypt and Arab World in order to deal with the greatest precision possible a *status quaeestionis* (analysis) of the issue of relations between Christians and Muslims, analyzed in institutional, cultural, and
In October 2016, we organized an international conference hosted by the Supreme Council of Culture, and a distinguished workshop held in the Biblioteca Alexandrina, in collaboration with the Italian colleagues, to compare the results of our research. Furthermore, the Italian Principal Investigator completed a scientific visit to Egypt in order to participate in this Conference and Workshop organized by us in October. For further information on this issue, please see Annex (1).

In February 2017, Prof. Aly El-Sayed and Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar, two members of the Egyptian Research Team, visited Rome and participated in a Workshop hosted by Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Étà Moderna e Contemporanea, Via Michelangelo, Caetani 32, Rome. For further information on this issue, please see Annex (2).

For 13 December 2017, our Italian partner team headed by Prof. Luciano Gallinari organized another workshop in Rome, where the Egyptian participation was represented by Prof. Aly Al-Sayed, Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar, and Mr. Ahmed Sheir, in the course of a scientific visit to Italy between 10-15 December. For further info, Please see annex (3).

On 17 December 2017, the Egyptian Team organized another workshop in Alexandria, where the Egyptians and three of the Italian team participated most effectively.

We finished authoring a multilingual (English-Arabic-Italian-Hungarian) book, entitled “Relations between East and West - Various Studies: Medieval and Contemporary Ages,”17 which contains all papers compiled by both research teams. This

17 Editors in chief of this volume are: Prof. Ali Ahmed El-Sayed, Dr. Luciano Gallinari, Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar. Number of pages: 394. It contains 11 papers written in the previously mentioned languages. The book can be found in the official libraries, in Egyptian and Italian universities and in research institutions. The volume in its full version can be downloaded from the official website of the German Uni., Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt: http://menadoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/menalib/content/titleinfo/4510532 as well as from www.Academia.edu, and www.researchgate.net, two important and effective worldwide platforms for academics to share research papers.
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volume contains 11 papers in addition to the well-written preface. Among these papers six belong to Egyptians, four to Italians, and one to a Hungarian. The compiled papers are the following:

**Egyptian papers:**

**Prof. Ali Ahmed Mohamed El-Sayed:** Islamic Awqaf related to Peace-Building among Nations: Tamim Al-Dari Hospice as a Model. (English–Arabic)\(^{18}\)

**Prof. Ali Ahmed Mohamed El-Sayed:** Peace between Muslims and Europeans: A Papal Edict and A Mamluk Decree for Mount Zion Monastery. (English–Arabic)\(^{19}\)

**Dr. Al-Matwaly Al-Sayed Tamim:** Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan II’s visit to Constantinople in 1162 AD. (English–Arabic)\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Ali Ahmed El-Sayed, Luciano Gallinari, Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar: Relations between East and West – Various Studies: Medieval and Contemporary Ages. Cairo–Rome (ASRT–CNR): Dar Al–Kitab Al–Gamee, 2017, 45–95. The research sheds light on a grant by Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him – to a Christian, who had converted to Islam, named Tamim Al-Dari 9AH/630AD. The grant consists of fertile farmlands in Hebron. After about fifteen years, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattāb, the second Caliph, set regulations for its revenues to be divided into three thirds; one for the wandering travelers, another for its architectural development, and a third for its employees. These regulations were strictly followed throughout the Middle Ages, except for almost one century when the Crusaders were controlling the region.

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 145–186. Pope Alexander III issued a papal edict on 1178 for Mount Zion Monastery at the south of Jerusalem, which was renewed four times after, increasing its powers till the extent of reaching the status of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem; as it included a wide range of exemptions, donations, privileges, and several other rights. In addition to its possessions in the Levant, the monastery was given other assets and large amounts of yields in Western Europe which reinforced the relations between the monastery and Europe embodying the idea of the Crusades. To untie this relation, the Muslim rulers followed a clever policy that aimed at eliminating the spirit of hostility, especially after Saladin had regained Jerusalem. These elements and more clarification can be seen and read in this exciting article.

\(^{20}\) Ibid, 119–144. The main purpose of this research is to study Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan II’s visit to Constantinople in 1162 AD. This includes previous events, especially the years 1158-1162 AD. Those years are considered the peak of the surrounding forces’ alliance against the Sultanate Seljuk of Rum and attempts to eliminate and totally destroy it. This research also addresses how Kilij Arslan II was able to engage those forces, resorting to wars sometimes, or by using diplomacy on other occasions. His visit to Constantinople in 1162 AD was one of those diplomatic encounters.
Ahmed Mohamed Abdelkawy Sheir: The Legend of Prester John versus the Peace Negotiations between the Muslims and the Crusaders in Damietta (1218-1221/ 615-618 AH). (English–Arabic)

Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Abdel-Salam Mohamed: The Egyptian-Hungarian Peaceful Relations during the Events of 1956, and the Italian Situation. (English–Arabic)

Italian papers:

Prof. Luciano Gallinari: The firsts Muslim incursions in Sardinia and their consequences on the island (6th-11th century). Some reflections. (Italian–English)

Esther Martí Sentañes: Libres d’ordinacions and strategies for peacekeeping among different communities in Sardinia. (Italian–English)

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21 Ibid, 224–271. This work examines the legend of Prester John, one of the most influential legends at the time of the Crusades and afterward, by focusing on the extent to which it captured the Crusader-Western imagination and how in turn it affected the peace and reconciliation negotiations between the Latin Christians of the Fifth Crusade and the Muslims. It also investigates if the legend influenced and shaped Muslim thinking. In so doing, the present paper aims to clarify the degree to which this legend was actually reflected in the collective imaginings of Latin Christians in the West and in the Levant during the Fifth Crusade, and how it contributed to shaping the real events of peace negotiations in Damietta at that time.

22 Ibid, 337–377. The main objective of this study is to show the bilateral peaceful relations between Egypt, Hungary, and Italy during the great and serious events of 1956. The development of the close relations between the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 directly affected the Suez aggression on the Hungarian situation, as the two crises influenced and affected one another.

23 Ibid, 7–44. This paper investigates the possible presence of Muslim permanent communities on the island between the 8th and the 11th century, and the origin of the Giudicati after the dissolution of the ancient Archonship of Sardinia. The period between the 6th and the 11th century - discussed in this paper - was full of events of major political importance for Sardinia, but documented by sources which always provide great interpretative difficulties. They are quite rare and, with regard to the relations between Sardinia and the Muslim world, in many cases, the sources with a remarkable chronological distance from the events described reproduce a few others of the 9th – 10th century, almost without any new data. This article studies in details the circumstances of those events and more.

24 Ibid, 271–294. Esther, through this research, has as objective the analysis of the different Libres d’Ordinacions of different royal cities of the Crown of Aragon, between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. These documentary collections that regulate the
According to our plans related to this project, we, the Egyptian Research Team, have intended to publish another volume, but only in English, and it does not have the same large size. We welcome the very useful participation of our Italian and foreign other colleagues in this work. As a result of this intention, we compiled this volume, found in our hands, which contains 9 papers written by distinguished researchers from Egypt, Italy, Hungary, and America. In addition to the present section, which you are reading now, the paper’s articles are the following:

25 Ibid, 295–336. The travelling experience between the Middle Ages and the modern age. Travelling, namely departing from the place where one’s certainties lie, corresponds to the need to reify the places of one’s everyday actions and life, to recognize and re-elaborate them from a cultural as well as a material viewpoint. That is, to recognize oneself in a place which has otherwise been mythologized, dreamed of, longed for. We also need to explore “other” places, to connect our own truths and certainties with the unknown and the territorial “emptiness”. We need to expand our knowledge and to experience new geographic realities (Spagnoli 2011). The passage from one dimension to another – from the known to the unknown, from the familiar to the uncertain – has always characterized human societies.

26 Ibid, 107–131. The Fatimid caliphate rise (909-1171), brought a significant increase in wealth in the Mediterranean countries that led to flourishing industrial production with a consequent enlargement of markets and trade. The population growth that followed the economic expansion led to an increasing number of consumers whose needs for goods and services they were unable to produce themselves but required satisfaction. Craftsmen and artists were called to meet the requirements of a wider and more various range of customers. Together with luxurious rock crystal items, intended for high dignitaries and to embellish caliphs’ courts, simpler and traditional consumer goods were produced in order to satisfy society’s daily needs. The increase of glass production was probably linked to the expansion of the Fatimid caliphate and consequently to the expansion of trade. In a short period of time these artifacts spread throughout the Mediterranean as simple bargaining chips or gifts thus reaching the Italian peninsula and the European countries, stretching to the Scandinavian coasts.
Studies in Peace-building History

Lorenzo Bondioli: Islamic Legal Attitudes to Trade with the Dār al-Ḥarb (2nd-6th centuries AH/8th-12th centuries CE)27


Prof. Abd al-ʿAziz Ramadān: Arab apostates in Byzantium: Evidence of voluntary conversion and assimilation29

Dr. Al-Matwaly Al-Sayed Tamim: The conflict between the Seljuk Sultante of Rum and the Empire Trebizond on the southern shores of the Black Sea in the early 13th century AD30

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27 The paper investigates legal attitudes to trade with non-Islamic polities as mirrored in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) literature produced between the 3rd/9th and the 6th/12th centuries. The main focus is on the Maliki madhhab, on account of its paramount importance in the shaping of the legal discourse and praxis of western Mediterranean Islam; the Maliki legal tradition is then briefly contrasted with the Ḥanafī, to highlight the coexistence of parallel and alternative trajectories within Islamic legal discourse. Lastly, a tentative reflection on the relationship between legal theory and social praxis is attempted.

28 This paper deals with the development of the peaceful relationships between the Seljuks of Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. The author first gives a broad historical overview of the encounters and relations between the two parties through the first decades of the twelfth century. He then tracks the changes in the mutual approaches between Damascus and Kingdom of Jerusalem as a result of their alliance against Imad ad-Dīn Zanki, who aimed to control Damascus with his fights against the Crusaders. Since that time, the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Damascus tended to hold peaceful relations and to ally against Zanki. This study argues that such refrainment of the hostility and turning to peacebuilding; regardless that it was a result of political interests, acts a sort of peaceful coexistence during the crusades which is worthwhile to be studied and examined.

29 This article seeks to retrieve available evidence that can be used to trace Muslim minorities that have permanently settled in the Byzantine Empire and achieved a degree of integration within their community. It tries to explain the motives that led some Arab Muslims, especially among the inhabitants of border areas and dissidents against the official Islamic authorities, to the voluntary conversion of Christianity, the position of the Byzantine authorities towards this, the mechanisms used to assimilate them and finally the position of the Byzantine society towards them.

30 This research aims to study the strife of the Seljuks of the Rum with the Trebizond Empire in order to reach one of the southern shores of the Black Sea. It involves strife that started at the end of the twelfth century AD, and lasted until about the middle of the thirteenth century AD. It resulted in the Seljuks, not only succeeding in taking control of the port of Sinop on the Black Sea, but also in subjugating the Trebizond Empire to the influence of the Seljuk of the Rum Empire.
Prof. Albrecht Fuess: Why Venice, not Genoa? How Venice Emerged as the Mamluks’ Favourite European Trading Partner After 1365.

Ahmed Mohamed Sheir: Between Peace and War: The Peaceful Memory of the Crusades between the Middle Ages and the Modern Arabic-Egyptian Writings

Dr. Aly Afify Aly Ghazy: The Peaceful Coexistence between Muslims and Copts in Egypt (1882-1952)

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31 Professor of History and Islamic Studies at the Center for Near and Middle East Studies at the Philipps-Universität Marburg. 2007-2009: Research Fellow at the Research Center of the “Région Center,” at the Equipe Monde Arabe et Méditerranée (Université de Tours). 2002: research assistant at the Chair of Islamic Studies at the University of Erfurt. He has numerous numbers of publications focused on the Mamluk studies and early Ottoman period. Currently, he is engaged in several research projects. He is a member of several scientific and academic societies and the financial director of the German historical society “Mediävistenverband”.

32 The present paper deals with the relationship between the Mamluk State and both Italian commercial cities Venice and Genoa after the attack of Cypriot King Peter I of Lusignan on Alexandria in 1365. Although Venetian and Genoese ships participated in this campaign, the concerns of Venice and Genoa about how to deal with the Mamluks from that time onwards led to different results. The Venetians opted for stable relations and refrained from aggressive actions. The Genoese did not adopt this policy, allowing their subjects’ acts of piracy against the Mamluks. The different approach of Genoese and Venetians towards the Mamluk Empire had cultural consequences, as well, as will be explained in the latter parts of this paper.

33 Sheir seeks to examine the memory of the crusades reflected in some writing-models of modern Arab works and to discover the developments in crusade historiography between the past and present. This paper studies some selected models of the peaceful correspondences between the Latin Crusader Kings and Muslim Ayyubid rulers to measure reflections of such peaceful memory in the modern time. The second part of the paper aims to give an overview of the memory of the crusades and its perception through selected writings and cultural materials of the 19th and 20th centuries, to measure the crusades’ memory and its role in shaping peace and war between West and East.

34 Independent researcher specialized in Modern and contemporary history, Editor in Chief of the Rewaq of History and Heritage journal published in Doha by Hassan Bin Mohamed of the Center for Historical Studies. He obtained his Ph.D. degree in 2014 from Damanhour University, and his Masters in 2009 from Alexandria University, Egypt. He attended, participated in and organized many forums and conferences. He has several publications and writings in history, heritage, literature, art and Arabic calligraphy in Arab and international Journals and magazines.

35 This study strives to discuss the sectarianism issues, showing their nature in the Egyptian society under the British colonialism. Ghazy believes that the sectarianism issue was used as an instrument by the British imperialist to justify their colonisation of Egypt. However, the reality of the relations between Egyptian Copts and Muslims were and still are entirely something else. It is are and long have involved peaceful coexistence and social coherence.
The most important benefit gained from our project is that it opened the door for all the Egyptian historians and history academic researchers to submit applications to fund their internal and external projects. This possibility was not available between 1971 and 2015.

**Challenges faced:** Most happily, we faced no problems during the term of our Egyptian-Italian project, except for the financial limitations caused upon the currency devaluation of November 3, 2016. As a result, Prof. Aly, Egyptian PI and myself dedicated much (fifty-fifty) of our own money to increase the amount available to the project so as to be able to achieve all the aims of the project.

This contributes to developing better understandings between East and West and the peaceful relations between Islam and Christianity. Luciano was unlucky as well, as the devaluation of the Egyptian pound occurred only two days after he fulfilled his first visit to Cairo. If he had started his visit on November 3, 2016, and not at the end of October, as he did, he would have saved approximately 50% of the total of his daily spending.
limit (accommodation and others). Before November 3, 1 euro = 9, 50 EGP. After November 3, 1 euro = 19.50 EGP.

**Future work plan:** We intend to continue implementing our project through submitting another integrative historical project entitled “Intercultural Influence between East and West: 11th-21st Centuries” to ASRT and CNR to complete the whole vision that we brought together in the beginning. I can say with pleasure and confidence that we will win the funds required for this project for which we have worked on a well-written proposal for a long time with Luciano Gallinari and Prof. Heba Saad. Our future plan contains the following goals:

Realization of historical, artistic, archaeological, and literary research to update the historiography on the political and commercial relations between Westerners and Muslims (11th-21st C.), their impact, and their mutual influence and to do so through the analysis of public and private collections of Art.

To examine and conduct in depth studies of the strong ties between the Islamic writings and Dante Alighieri’s *La Divina Commedia*, and the presence of Muslims in Italian Literature, such as Saladino in Giovanni Boccaccio’s *Il Decameron*.

To examine Alexandria’s heritage as a case study proving the influence of foreign communities on the formation of the city’s heritage, analyzed through sources such as Italian magazines published in that city.

To organize conferences and workshops for monitoring the progress of research and an ever greater interconnection among the researchers.

**In conclusion,** I have no choice other than repeating the words of Luciano, written in his introduction to our first joint book:

> Based on this amicable spirit, and with this etic, Egyptian and Italian members intend to proceed in future initiatives of this Bilateral Project, certain that they can make a contribution - no matter how small it is - to a subject of fundamental importance for the contemporary world: an improvement of mutual understanding between Westerners and Muslims so as to overcome harmful stereotypes and to achieve an ever better coexistence.
# ANNEX (1)

## CONFERENCE AGENDA

**PEACE-BUILDING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST XI-XVI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:20</td>
<td>Opening ceremony – Coffee &amp; refreshments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:20-10:30</td>
<td>Introduction and Info. about the Conference Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ari Al-Naggar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1ST SESSION: 10.30-11.45 & Moderator: Prof. Tarek Mansour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30-10:55</td>
<td>Prof. Aly Al-Sayed, Uni. of Damahour, Egypt (In person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic and European Peace: A Papal Edict and a Marunue Decree for Mount Zion Monastery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:55-11:20</td>
<td>Prof. Luciano Gallinari, CNR, Italy (In person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A land without a Germanic or Muslim domination: Sardinia in the Early Middle Ages (5th-11th c.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:20-11:45</td>
<td>DISCUSSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45-12:15</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2ND SESSION: 12.15-13.30 & Moderator: Prof. Abdel-Aziz Ramadan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.15-12.40</td>
<td>Dr. Al-Mowallay Tamim, Uni. of Damahour, Egypt (In person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilih Arslan II. Visit to Constantinople 1162</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.40-12.55</td>
<td>Dr. Giovanni Serrelli, CNR, Italy (Via Hangouts, Skype)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuity and catastrophes in the evolution of settlement in Late Antique and Medieval Sardinia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.55-13.05</td>
<td>Dr. Ottavia Domenici (Via Hangouts, Skype)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glass and rock-crystal manufactured in Egypt in the Medieval Mediterranean (10-12th c.)</td>
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<td>玻璃和玻璃水晶。10世纪至12世纪的埃及。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.05-13.30</td>
<td>DISCUSSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.30-14.30</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3RD SESSION: 14.30-15.45 & Moderator: Dr. Adel Helal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.30-14.55</td>
<td>Dr. Yasser Mostafa Abd el Wahab, Uni. of Kaif El-Sheikh (In person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Attitude of Islamic Administration toward the Europeans’ Visits to the Holy Places '1187-1291'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.55-15.20</td>
<td>Prof. Alex Maelwee Univ. of Lancaster, UK (Via Hangouts, Skype)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace treaties made between Muslims and Christians during and after the Norman Conquest of Sicily</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|             | (1061-91). لقاءات المسلمين والمسيحيين أثناء وبعد هزيمة الأردوبيين جزيرة سيردينيا.
|             |Peace treaties with Muslims and Christians during and after the Norman conquest of Sicily (1061-91).|
| 15.20-15.45 | DISCUSSIONS                                                                                     |
| 15.45-16:00 | BREAK                                                                                            |

### 4TH SESSION: 16.00-17.15 & Moderator: Prof. Zebeida Mohamed Atta

Prepared by Dr. Abdallah Al-Naggar
Studies in Peace-building History

CONFERENCE AGENDA

16.00-16.25
Mr. Ahmed Sheir, Uni. of Damascus, Egypt
The peace on the Beaches of Damietta between the Legend and Reality (1218-1221)

16.25-16.50
Dr. Anna Maria Oliva – Dr. Luisa Spagnoli (ISEM-CNR) – Prof. Arturo Gallia (Univ. of Rome – Tor Vergata)
Travel, Descriptions and Representations: Egypt between the XIV and XVI Century

16.50-17.15
Dr. Esther Martí Santesots, CNR, Italy (Via Hangouts, Skype)
Libres d’ordinances and strategies for peacemaking between different communities in Sudania

17.15-17.30
DISCUSSIONS

17.30-17.45
BREAK

Abstract: This project proposes the analysis of the nature, quantity and quality of peaceful relations between Christians and Muslims between XI and XV century, in an area between the Berber Peninsula and the Levant. The aim is to reconstruct the mode of peaceful co-existence at different levels: from that of the Catalan, Genoese, Pisa and Venetian merchants present in their funds across to that of the rulers of the Western European “States” and their counterparts: the Byzantine Empire and the different Islamic Entities. It also aims to examine the nature, quantity and quality of peaceful relations between Frederick II and Muslims (Ayyubids) in the Holy Land at the time of the crusades; analysis to what extent they deliberately attempted to live in peace; and explore how and why peace was made and kept. It is important to study not only the military aspects but also the diplomatic and political interrelations. Positive results were achieved thanks to the personal relationships of mutual respect existing between the leaders of the long diplomatic negotiations that led to a share of the common Christian-Muslim holy city of Jerusalem. With great pragmatism Frederick II attempted to achieve a realpolitik more impressed on a possible peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims, as he had previously made in Lucera (Apulia). The purpose of this study is to discover, understand and analyze the diplomatic relations between east and west, moreover its impact on the Eastern and Western society. This will be done by studying the exchanged missions, letters, and negotiations between the two sides, in addition to examine the various historical narratives in the oriental and western, Muslim and Christian, Arabic and foreign-language sources, chronicles and literature.


Prepared by Dr. Abdullah Al-Naggar
Studies in Peace-building History

ANNEX (2)

The project proposes the analysis of the nature, quality, and quality of peaceful relations between Christians and Muslims from the Second Fatimid Caliphate to the Levant between the 11th and 13th centuries, when the two faiths were often at war, and, in particular, the Muslim society often posed problems of communication and understanding, especially for the diversity of behaviors, cultural, and religious codes.

A second aim of the project, no less important than the first, serves for the reflection on the peaceful exchange of the ideas between Christians and Muslims not only in academic environments but also outside them through dissemination activities in schools and civil society with the purpose to temper and deny many stereotypes still prevalent on Christian-Muslim relations; to identify moments and places of peaceful coexistence as examples of good practices to consider, especially in light of the current affairs that tend to provoke a growing tension in the relations between Christians and Muslims, considering almost the positive examples of coexistence and acceptance.

Rome
Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea
Palazzo Antico Mattiacci di Giove
14th February 2017

4:00 pm
Welcome Greets

Prof. Riccardo Puccetti
(Professor of the CNR’s Department of Social Science and Humanities - Cultural Heritage)

Prof. Marcello Verza
(Special Commissioner of the Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea - Director of the CNR’s Department of Social Science and Humanities - Cultural Heritage)

4:15 pm
Dr. Luciano Gallinari

Presentation of the CNR / ASRT Bilateral Project

4:30 pm
Prof. Ali El Sayed
(University of Damahour, Egypt - Egyptian Principal Investigator of the CNR / ASRT Bilateral Project (2016-2017) “History of Peace-building: peaceful relations between East and West (11th - 13th Century)”

The Modern Egyptian Historiography in the Field of Medieval Ages

5:00 - 5:30 pm
Coffee Break

5:30 - 6:30 pm
Round Table
Dr. Luciano Gallinari (ISERM-CNRS)
Dr. Anna Maria Chiara (ISERM-CNRS)
Dr. Luisa Speroni (ISERM-CNRS)
Dr. Arturo Gallo (University of Roma Tre)
Dr. Abdallah Abdel Ati Al-Naggar (ASRT - Egypt)

6:30 - 7:00 pm
Conclusions
Studies in Peace-building History

ANNEX (3)

Rome
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
Room "Divagno"
13th December 2017

9:30 am
Welcome Greetings

Prof. Marcello Verga
(Special Commissioner of the Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea - Director of the CNR’s Istituto di Storia dell’Europa Mediterranea)

9:45 am
Dr. Luciano Gallinari - Prof. Ali El Sayed

Relations between East and West. Various Studies: Medieval and Contemporary Ages

Presentation of Proceedings of the International Conference (Cairo, 26th October 2017)

10:00 am
Prof. Ali El Sayed (University of Damanhour, Egypt)
Damascus-Crusaders Peaceful Steps till 1140 AD / 53 4H Treaty

10:20 am
Mr. Ahmed Sheir (PhD. Scholar, CNMS, Philipps-Universität Marburg - Germany)
Aspects of Peaceful Correspondences between Muslim Rulers and Latin Kings during the Crusades versus Memory and Perception of the Crusades in the Modern Era

11:00 am
Prof. Elmotwalli Elsayed Mohammed Tamim (University of Damanhour, Egypt)
The Conflict between the Seljuk Sultanate and the Empire of Trebizond to control the Black Sea trade (First half of the thirteenth century AD)

11:50 - 12:30 pm
Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Nagar (ASRT - Egypt)
"History of Peace-building" Project - Two years of Scientific Cooperation between ASRT-CNR

12:10 am - 1:00 pm
Round Table
Prof. Marcello Verga (ISEM-CNR)
Prof. Ali El Sayed (Damanhour University)
Dr. Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Nagar (ASRT - Egypt)
Dr. Ahmed Sheir (Marburg University - Germany)
Dr. Luciano Gallinari (ISEM-CNR)
Dr. Anna Maria Oliva (ISEM-CNR)
Dr. Luisa Spagnoli (ISEM-CNR)
Dr. Arturo Gallia (University of Roma Tre)

1:00 – 1:30 pm
Conclusions

10:40 am
Prof. Rocel Sabsté i Cornell (University of Lleida, Spain)
Relations between Muslims and Christians in the cities of the Crown of Aragon

11:30 - 11:50 am
Coffee Break

30
(II)

LORENZO BONDIOLI

PhD-RESEARCHER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

ISLAMIC LEGAL ATTITUDES TO TRADE WITH THE DĀR AL-ḤARБ (2nd-6th CENTURIES AH/8th-12th CENTURIES CE.)
The Muslim conquests of the seventh and early eighth centuries brought the entirety of the southern Mediterranean coastline, from the Iberian Peninsula to Syria, under Islamic rule. This momentous and comparatively sudden development was to define a new epoch in the history of the Middle Sea. In the late fourteenth century CE, the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 784 AH/1382 CE), looking back on this foundational moment, famously claimed that the Muslims had then acquired mastery of the Mediterranean, rendering the “Christian nations” (al-umam al-naṣrāniyya) powerless on its waters. Yet in the eleventh century CE, Ibn Khaldūn lamented, marauding Latin ships started encroaching upon Mediterranean waters, and progressively gained the upper hand as a result of Islamic rulers’ neglect of naval power.

Ibn Khaldūn’s interpretation was to have a long fortune.¹ In the early twentieth century, Belgian historian Henri Pirenne quoted him directly, and employed similarly hyperbolic tones, in formulating his controversial ‘thesis.’ Pirenne claimed that the Muslim conquests fractured the economic unity of the Roman Mediterranean, bringing a halt to trade, and setting continental Europe on a fundamentally divergent path from North Africa and the Middle East.²

Notwithstanding objections being raised ever since the appearance of Pirenne’s Medieval Cities, the ‘Pirenne thesis’ found many an advocate after the death of its eponymous proponent.³ The debate dragged into the

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¹ on the reception of Ibn Khaldūn’s work following its translation into French, and the related question of orientalist/colonialist approaches to the indigenous intellectual tradition, see Abdelmajid Hannoun, “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary: Ibn Khaldûn Orientalist”, History and Theory 42.1 (2003), 61-81.
³ e.g. Alfred F. Havighurst (ed.), The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism, and Revision (Boston: Heath, 1958) and VV.AA., Fortune historiographique des thèses d'Henri
1980s, when Richard Hodges and David Withehouse first attempted shifting the attention to a radically different set of evidence than Pirenne’s. Hodges’ and Withehouse’s work capitalized on the development of medieval archaeology to provide a counterweight to ‘Pirenneian’ narratives of political conflict and economic stagnation that mostly relied on (or deliberately privileged) literary sources.

Two monumental works of the early 2000s, Chris Wickham’s *Framing the Early Middle Ages* and Michael McCormick’s *Origins of the European Economy*, represented the culmination of this new phase of the debate. In these two works, Wickham and McCormick consistently moved back and forth between archaeological and narrative sources to map the extent of south-north and east-west connectivity across the early medieval Mediterranean basin. Both aimed to chart as exhaustively as possible the long centuries bridging Late Antiquity and the central Middle Ages, the very period for which Pirenne had postulated an absolute Mediterranean rupture; both works broke off before the year 1000 CE, past which documentary evidence starts to become abundant, revealing a dense network of cross-Mediterranean exchange.

In particular, the documents of the Cairo Geniza, picking up in large numbers starting from the 1020s CE, shed a sudden light onto the lively merchant communities and busy trade routes linking Egypt to North Africa (Ifrīqiya), Sicily, and the Iberian Peninsula (al-Andalus). No comparable repository has been discovered for the preceding period, though isolated documents and scattered references in literacy sources, such as Ibn Khuradādhbih’s famous description of the ‘Radhanite’ Jewish merchants, suggest that similar merchant communities might have existed well before the eleventh century CE.

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The richness of the material found in the Cairo Geniza prompted Shlomo D. Goitein to paint the picture of a veritable “Mediterranean Society” in which men, goods and ideas circulated freely – a far cry from Pirenne’s fractured sea. Moreover, while Pirenne himself had admitted that by the eleventh century transmarine Mediterranean trade was again in full swing, he had put the stress on the urban revival in Europe and on the ventures of the Italian seafaring city-states. A similar focus is apparent in the later work of Roberto Sabatino Lopez, whose influential The Commercial Revolution painted a grim picture of Islamic societies as deadlocked and stagnant, already condemned to a passive role vis-à-vis the entrepreneurial initiative of European traders.

In sharp contrast with Eurocentric perspectives, Goitein’s work lifted the veil on an eleventh-century southern Mediterranean trading world, a world the vitality of which had long been misrepresented, and one in which the Italian tradesmen were still very much secondary players. Yet, because of the very nature of the evidence at his disposal Goitein’s work mostly focused on the Arabic-speaking Jewish merchants whose papers were deposited in the Cairo Geniza. As a result, though his work did contribute to showing the extent of Mediterranean exchange, what it could not do is to fully represent the role that Muslim traders played in these networks.

A century after the first appearance of the Pirenne thesis, the spectre of a complete interruption of Mediterranean trade between the seventh and the eleventh centuries CE has been dispelled. Yet our understanding of the actual dynamics of transmarine exchange in the period remains incomplete. In particular, while a wealth of sources and studies exist documenting the

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history of Italian and other European merchants’ journeys to the markets of the Islamic Mediterranean, the role of Muslim traders in Christian Europe have not received a comparable coverage.

Olivia Remie Constable’s *Housing the Stranger* represents a notable exception in this regard, though mostly focusing on the later period. Constable concluded that “Muslim merchants rarely journeyed to European markets”, and highlighted the absence in Christian Europe of structures comparable to the fundūq as a partial explanation.\(^\text{10}\) For Constable, “[t]he reasons for this absence of Muslim merchants in most southern European ports are complex, and they shifted over time. […] Logistical, cultural, and religious factors must also have played a role, since the lack of appropriate lodging and other facilities for Muslim traders in most Christian ports discouraged their travel and trade in these markets. Yet these considerations were neither universal nor insurmountable.”\(^\text{11}\)

This paper proposes to tackle precisely one such ‘factor’, namely the legal attitudes to trade with non-Islamic polities as found in texts of Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh. The initial focus of the paper will be on the Mālikī madhhab, one of the four main sunnī schools of law, on account of its paramount importance in the shaping of the legal discourse and praxis of western Mediterranean Islam. The Mālikī madhhab formally assumed preeminent status in al-Andalus under the Umayyad emirs and caliphs and exercised widespread influence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean – Ifrīqiya and Miṣr – as well.\(^\text{12}\) The Mālikī legal tradition will then be contrasted with that of the Ḥanafī madhhab, another school of law which was prominent in the region and that occasionally enjoyed the sponsorship of dynastic governors loyal to the Abbasids, such as the Aghlabid emirs of Ifrīqiya.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{10}\) Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 110.

\(^{11}\) Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, 328.


Trade with the dār al-ḥarb in Mālikī madhhab

In the academic vulgate, Islam is generally regarded as a religion fundamentally favourable to trade. Although this judgment rests on a wide range of literary evidence, it should be noted that some branches of the Islamic scholarly tradition maintained a rather ambivalent attitude to commerce, especially when involving dealings with countries and people falling outside the dār al-Islām – the abode of Islam. This is the case of the Mālikī madhhab, the school of law that attained predominance in the Islamic West, a region that because of its very geographical position constituted a natural commercial interface between Muslims and Christians.

Although Mālik b. Anas (d. 179 AH/796 CE), the eponymous imām of the school, did not deal explicitly with the issue in his foundational work, al-Muwatṭa’, he seems to have held strong opinions on the matter. The later compilation of the prominent Mālikī jurist Saḥnūn b. Saʿīd al-Tanūkhī (d. 240 AH/855 CE)\textsuperscript{15}, al-Mudawwana al-kubrā, includes an entire section dealing with the tijāra ilā ard al-ʿadūw – trade with the land of the enemy.\textsuperscript{16} The compilation of this early compendium of Mālik’s juridical opinions marked a watershed in the diffusion of the Mālikī madhhab in Ifrīqiya, where Mālik’s teaching had only recently been made largely accessible thanks to the diffusion Asad b. al-Ḥarāt’s (d. 213 AH/828 CE) Asadiyya.\textsuperscript{17} Like Asad, Saḥnūn seems to have drawn most of his knowledge of Mālik’s teaching from the latter’s disciple Ibn al-Qāsim al-ʿUtaqī (d. 191

\textsuperscript{14} on the complex notion of dār al-Islām, and of its complementary terms (dār al-kufr, dār al-ḥarb), see Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad, “The Notions of Dār al-Ḥarb and Dār al-Islām in Islamic Jurisprudence with Special Reference to the Ḥanafi School”, Islamic Studies 47.1 (2008), 5-37.
AH/806 CE),\textsuperscript{18} on whose authority Mālik’s opinion on trade with the dār al-harb, the abode of war laying outside the abode of Islam, is reported in the *Mudawwana*:\textsuperscript{19}

I asked Ibn al-Qāsim: “Did Mālik hate for a man to conduct commerce with the dār al-ḥarb?” He replied: “Yes, Mālik hated it strongly, and he would say: «one should not go to their countries, lest the statutes of idolatry be applied to him.»\textsuperscript{20}

The tendency to rely heavily on Mālik’s opinion, ra’y, is typical of the formative stage of Mālikī jurisprudence, when scholars such as Asad b. al-Furāt and Saḥnūn himself set out to retrieve the substance of Mālik’s teaching, at the same time as other disciples of the master, such as Ashhab b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (d. 204 AH/819 CE), compiled their own rival compendia of Mālik’s opinions.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, Mālik himself became a veritable source of law, a development that illustrated the incipient ‘personalization’ of the madhāhib, schools of law.\textsuperscript{22}

Indeed, it is probably on the basis of the related opinion of Mālik that another seminal work of Mālikī jurisprudence in Ifrīqiya, the *Risāla* of Ibn Abī Zayd (d. 386 AH/996 CE), equally disapproved of trade with the dar al-ḥarb. Yet, rather than expressly quoting Mālik’s authority, the *Risāla* introduces a Prophetic saying, ḥadīth, to justify the forbiddance:

Trade to the land of the enemy and the country of Sūdān is blameable, since the Prophet, may peace be upon Him, said: «travel is a part of chastisement.»\textsuperscript{23}

The appearance of a ḥadīth in Ibn Abī Zayd’s text is no coincidence. Indeed, the third Islamic century seems to have witnessed a general quest

\textsuperscript{18} id., 323-25.
\textsuperscript{19} on the debated legal definition of dār al-ḥarb, see Ahmad, “Definition of Dār al-Harb”, 13-15.
\textsuperscript{20} Saḥnūn, *al-Mudawwana*, iii, 294.
\textsuperscript{21} Talbi, “Kairouan”, i, 323.
\textsuperscript{22} Christopher Melchert, *The formation of the Sunni schools of law, 9th-10th centuries C.E. (Leiden & New York: Brill, 1997), 32-47.
for Prophetic sayings, ḥādīth, supporting the raʾy of the masters, a quest particularly apparent in Ḥanafī circles operating closer to the centre of Abbasid rule. This tendency has been interpreted as the result of the second-century struggle between traditionists and ahl al-raʾy, the proponents of independent legal reasoning, a conflict centred on Iraq and inextricably intertwined with the contemporary caliphal politics of the Abbasid court.24

The result of this period of theoretical polarization was a compromise between the two positions, as proponents of Abū Ḥanīfa sought to remodel the master’s legacy by purging his biography of the suspicion of impiety and strengthening the authority of his opinion by assembling a respectable panoply of relevant aḥādīth.25 In parallel to this development, the Mālikīs as well undertook a similar process of corroboration of the master’s doctrine.26

The same tendency evident in Ibn Abī Zayd is to be found in later commentaries of the Mudawwana, which equally seek to give a sounder foundation to the prohibition of trade with the dār al-ḥarb. The Andalusian scholar of the late Almoravid period Ibn Rushd (d. 520 AH/1126 CE),27 grandfather of the homonymous famed philosopher (the Averroes of Latin literature) and probably the most prominent Mālikī jurist of his age, provides a good example of this trend, although in his exegesis he followed a different path than Ibn Abī Zayd’s.

Ibn Rushd’s magnum opus, a commentary on Saḥnūn’s Mudawwana entitled al-Muqaddamāt al-mumahhadāt li-bayān mā ’qtaḍathu rusūm al-Mudawwana, includes a whole book on the subject of trade with the dār al-ḥarb (kitāb al-tijāra ilā arḍ al-ḥarb). The book opens by paraphrasing Mālik’s vehement dislike for trade with the unbelievers as found in Saḥnūn’s compilation. The reasons of this dislike, reiterates Ibn Rushd, is the incumbency of the statutes of unbelief upon travellers to the dār al-ḥarb.

24 id., 8-13.
26 Talbi, L’Émirat aghlabide.
Unlike Ibn Abī Zayd, Ibn Rushd chose to resort to the Qurʾān itself to reinforce the legitimacy of the ruling:

The origin of [Mālik’s] dislike was on account of this, namely that God Most high made it obligatory for whomever converted in the land of the unbelievers to emigrate to the land of the Muslims, lest their statutes be applied to him. And God said: «As for those who have believed but did not emigrate, you are under no obligation of alliance until they emigrate», and God Most High said: «Indeed, those whom the angels take away while they are wronging themselves, they ask, ‘What state were you in?’ They reply, ‘We were abased in the land.’ They say, ‘Was not God’s earth vast enough so that you might emigrate in it? ’ The refuge of such shall be hell, and it is an evil destination».30 31

Ibn Rushd proceeds to state that there is an established consensus that converts to Islam in the dār al-ḥarb should not remain among the polytheists, mushrikūn, but rather immediately leave to the land of the Muslims – the dār al-muslimīn:

…and similarly, it is [not] permitted to anyone to enter their [i.e. the mushrikūn’s] countries on account of trade or something else, lest their statutes be applied to them, and Mālik, may the Most Hight have mercy on him, used to dislike for one to take up residence in a country where the forefathers are cursed, such as a country where the Merciful is blasphemed and where idols are revered in his place…”32

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29 Q 8:72, “wa-ʾlladhīna ʾāmanū wa-lam yuhājirū mā lakum min walāyatihim min shay’in ḥattā yuhājirū”.
30 Q 4:97, “inna ʾlladhīna tawaffāhumu ʾl-malāʾ ʾikatu zālimī anfusihim qālū fi-ma kuntum qālū kunnā mustaḍʿa afina ʾfi-l-ardī qālū a-lam takun arḍu ʾllāhi wāsī atan fa-tuhājirū fīhā fa-ʿulāʾika maʾwāhum jahannamu wa-sāʾat maṣīran”.
Ibn Rushd then proceeds to convert this general principle into a prescriptive norm with its connected penalty:

And it is not permitted for any Muslim to enter the land of polytheism for trade or any other reason, except in order to ransom a Muslim, and if one enters it deliberately, and not forcibly, for a reason other than this, this is an act causing his imāma and his shahāda to become invalid.33

Even more strikingly, Ibn Rushd then appeals directly to the political authority for enforcement of the forbiddance:

It is incumbent upon the governor of the Muslims to prevent the entrance to the arḍ al-ḥarb (land of war) for the purpose of trade, and he must set up observation posts and lookout post on the roads for this purpose…34

What was framed as Mālik’s ‘dislike’ in the earlier tradition, and styled as ‘blameable’ by Ibn Abī Zayd, thus becomes in Ibn Rushd a much more stringently prescriptive forbiddance. Disobedience is liable of invalidating one’s shahāda, the Islamic profession of faith, and abidance by the norm should be guaranteed by the Islamic ruler.

The latter aspect is particularly interesting if one considers that Ibn Rushd’s career brought him very close to the centres of power of his time, giving him access to the top echelons of the Almoravid court.35 In particular, towards the end of his life and after having held the prestigious post of qāḍī ’l-jamāʿa in Cordoba for four years, Ibn Rushd travelled from al-Andalus to Marrakesh to plead with the Almoravid ruler ʿAlī b. Yūsuf b. Tāshufīn (r. 500-537 AH/1106-1143 CE) for the enforcement of stricter measures against the Andalusian Mozarab population, suspected of colluding with the Christian kings of the north. The encroachments of the latter, and especially of Alfonso I of Aragon (r. 1104-1134 CE), onto Muslim territory represented the backdrop to Ibn Rushd’s advice. In this sense, it is worth wondering if his stricter

33 id., ii, 153-54.
34 id., ii, 154.
interpretation of the traditional Mālikī aversion to travel to dār al-ḥarb was not equally the product of a period of heightened tension and recurrent warfare in the Iberia peninsula.

A situation in many ways akin to that of al-Andalus was that of Sicily in the decades following the Norman Conquest. Here too, the subtraction of the island from the dār al-Islām afterward more than two centuries of Muslim rule raised new legal questions. One of the issues at stake was of course trade: the island had long been a central hub of Mediterranean commerce, as attested by the abundant Cairo Geniza documents bearing witness to the island’s trade connections to Ifrīqiya, al-Andalus, and Egypt.36

Yet from a Mālikī perspective, it would have been reproachable for a Muslim to continue carrying out such trade after the Norman conquest and the end of Islamic rule. A legal debate developed around the topic, its traces now only dimly visible in the much later work of the Mālikī muftī Aḥmad b. Yahyā al-Wansharīsī (d. 914 AH/1508 CE). Al-Wansharīsī Miʾyar al-muʾrib, a vast collection of Andalusian and Ifrīqiyan Mālikī fatāwā, non-binding legal opinions issued by legal scholars, preserved a fatwā on the topic by a contemporary of Ibn Rushd, the renowned jurist Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Mazārī (d. 536 AH/1141 CE).37

As suggested by his niṣba, al-Mazarī was of Sicilian heritage; however, he might have been born in Ifrīqiya of parents who had fled the island in the wake of the Norman conquest. It is not surprising that in such a period of renewed Muslim-Christian belligerence, coloured with religious


overtones on both sides, the question of trade across confessional boundaries would become an inflamed topic of debate. Not only had the Normans subtracted Sicily from the dār al-Islām, but also Italian fleets sailing from the ports of Pisa and Genoa were starting to harass the Ifrīqiyan coasts, succeeding in sacking the old Fatimid capital and great Mediterranean emporium of al-Mahdiyya in 479 AH/1087 CE.

It is probably only a few years after this shocking event that the episode recounted in the Miʿyar took place. Jocelyn Hendrickson has recently analyzed the content of al-Mazarī’s fatwa and offered a translation, which is worth reproducing here in full:

There had befallen us in Mahdīya some forty years ago a famine, during which the people needed to travel to Sicily in order to lower the price of food among us, because of its having disappeared. Two men were involved in a legal dispute, and their affair ultimately reached the sultan. One of them was supported by the testimony of a man whose probity was impugned by his opponent, on account of the witness’ having travelled to Sicily. For even if most of [Sicily’s] inhabitants are Muslim, those who have been given power over them, and the one who has made himself ruler of its people, is one of the Christian kings and his Christian army. The sultan then gathered together all those in the region who issued fatwās, and they disagreed with one another. Some of them opposed the prohibition of travel [to Sicily] because of the need for food.

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41 The sulṭān in question was presumably the Zirid ruler Tamīm b. al-Muʿizz (r. 454-501 AH/1062-1108 CE).
Al-Mazarī decidedly responded that such trade was illicit, adducing as justification of his opinion a passage from the Qurʾān (Q 9:28):

My view is that travel to [Sicily], if the Christians’ laws apply to those who enter there, is not permissible and is not justified by the need for food. The evidence for this is the words of God Most High: “Oh you who believe! The idolaters are indeed unclean; so let them not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year of theirs. If you fear poverty, God will enrich you by His grace, if He wills.”43 Thus [God] Most High indicated that the sanctity of the Sacred Mosque must be protected from the debasement and impurity of the unbelievers, and that the need for them to bring food to Mecca does not render it permissible to abandon the preservation of this sanctity. Likewise, a Muslim’s sanctity should not be violated on account of the need for food, because God – may He be praised – will enrich him by His grace, if He wills.44

Hence, not even primary necessities, al-Mazarī argued, sufficed to justify mingling with the unbelievers. It is interesting that in defending the consolidated Mālikī stand on the matter (although the Mudawwana is not explicitly mentioned, there can be little doubt that al-Mazarī was basing himself on Mālik’s opinion) al-Mazarī felt the need to resort to iṣtinbāṭ, deduction, from the Qurʾān, as did his Andalusian colleague Ibn Rushd.

Still, although his opinion seems to have prevailed, there was no unanimous consensus among the members of the assembly, whence al-Mazarī decided to seek the support of the revered Shaykh and Imām ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Ṣāʾigh, who agreed with him and adduced further motivations, this time of practical nature: “If we travel to them, the price of their food goes up and a great amount of money becomes theirs on our account, which strengthens them in combating Muslims and invading their territories.”45

43 Q 9:28, “inna ma’a-l-mushrikīn najasun fa-lā yaqrabū l-masjida l-ḥarāma ba’dā āmīhim hādhā wa-in khiftum ‘aylatan fa-sawfa yughnīkumu ‘llāhu min faḍlihī’.
44 Hendrickson, “Is al-Andalus Different?”, 379.
45 id., 380-1, contrasting two slightly different versions of the story.
Al-Ṣāʾigh’s line of reasoning reveals a rather practical attitude that well exemplifies the extent to which circumstantial considerations could influence juridical rulings. Indeed, a different version of the same episode has al-Ṣāʾigh’s admitting to the benefits that trade with the dār al-ḥarb could bring to the Muslims, though still deeming the downsides to be of greater consequence.⁴⁶

**Trade with the dār al-ḥarb in the Ḥanafī madḥhab – a different trajectory**

The idea that trade with the dār al-ḥarb could be profitable, and should not be impeded, was indeed not necessarily a minority view.⁴⁷ A brief overview of the position of the Ḥanafī madḥhab, another of the four main legal schools within sunnī Islam, will suffice to prove as much. Since the second Islamic century, scholars of what was to become the Ḥanafī madḥhab seem to have taken the possibility of trade with the unbelievers for granted. The Kūfan scholar ʿAbū ʿAbd Allāḥ Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 187 or 189 AH/803 or 805 CE), an immediate disciple of Ābū Ḥanīfa (d. 150 AH/767 CE) and Ābū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH/798 CE), seems to have expressly allowed for travel to the dār al-ḥarb for the purpose of trade in his *Siyar al-kabīr*, one of the foundational works of the Ḥanafī madḥhab.

The transmission history of the *Siyar* is unfortunately quite intricate, since the text has come down to us as part of the commentary of the prominent Ḥanafī jurist al-Sarakhsī (d. around 483 AH/1090 CE), the *Sharḥ kitāb al-siyar al-kabīr*, ingenerating some degree of confusion in scholarly literature, where sometimes quotes from the work are attributed to al-Shaybānī without discussion.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, comparison with the *Siyar al-ṣaghrīr* confirms that al-Shaybānī in fact dealt with issues arising from business travel to the dār al-ḥarb.⁴⁹

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⁴⁶ ibid.
⁴⁸ “it is extremely difficult to isolate Shaybānī’s text from Sarakhsī’s commentary, and to distinguish Shaybānī’s opinions from Sarakhsī’s statements” – Osman Taştan, “Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090)”, in Arabī et al. (eds.), *Islamic Legal Thought*, 239-59: 248.
The *Sharḥ kitāb al-siyar al-kabīr* comes to deal with this topic in a subsection of the chapter on jihād, after discussing exoneration from jihād on account of preoccupation for the welfare of one’s parents:

[Abū Ḥanīfa] said: “as for whatever trip a man takes for reasons other than jihād – for trade, or for the ḥajj (pilgrimage), or for the ‘umra (lesser pilgrimage) – when he does not fear the loss for the two of them (i.e. his parents), there is no objection to his leaving, because most of these trips are safe, and no great hardship befalls the two of them on account of his leaving […]”

“And if he departs for the dār al-ḥarb with the amān (safe conduct) on account of trade, and the two of them dislike it, there is no objection to his leaving if [he is heading to] a people who keep the ‘ahd (treaty) and are known to do so, because most of these trips are safe, and this is equalled to a departure to another city of the dār al-Islām.”

Therefore, under condition of peace, travel for business to the dār al-ḥarb is regarded here as not different from any other similar enterprise within the dār al-Islām. Indeed, the main preoccupation seems to be the safety of the merchant.

Business travel to the dār al-ḥarb is even possible in the absence of a safe-conduct (amān) or a treaty (‘ahd), provided that the merchant travels with an adequate escort of soldiers:

“And if he departs for the dār al-ḥarb for the purpose of trade with an army of Muslims, provided that it is a mighty army like [those assembled for] the ṣāʾifā (raiding expedition), there is no objection to his leaving, even if they (i.e. his parents) dislike it, because most of these trips are safe, and he does not expose himself

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51 id. i, 137. On treaties, see Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 202-22.

52 Ahmad, “The Notions of Dār al-Ḥarb”, offers an interesting survey of the implications of the ‘ahd and amān for travel to the dār al-ḥarb (dār al-muwāda’a) in the Ḥanafi tradition.
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to involvement in the fighting, and the mighty army is able to keep
the attacks of the enemy away from him and from itself.”

The contrast with the Mālikī opinion could not be more strident: not only
is a Muslim merchant allowed to travel to the dār al-ḥarb under conditions
of peace with the unbelievers, but also during wartime.

Nonetheless, there are some limitations which need to be respected, for
instance on the goods that the merchant is allowed to carry with him and to
sell outside the dār al-Islām. These limitations are listed in detail in the
Sharḥ kitāb al-siyar, under the heading “chapter on the merchandise which
is allowed for the Muslim to introduce in the dār al-ḥarb”:

It is not allowed for the Muslim to introduce in the dār al-
ḥarb anything which might benefit the ahl al-ḥarb (the people
of war), since this would strengthen them in the worship of
things else than God the Most High.

Then follows a list of the items in question. It is forbidden to export
weapons,

…meaning by weapons what is destined to be used in
fighting, and what is made of iron, since this would strengthen
them in their fighting against the Muslims.

Indeed, the same is true of the pack animals (and of elephants!), which
are regarded in the text as potential war materiel. Even silk and brocade
should not be sold to the unbelievers, since they can be used to weave war
banners. Quivers and scabbards are equally forbidden merchandise.
However, it is not forbidden to import, for instance, cotton and garments,
since they are mostly used for clothing and not fighting, unless the enemy
is known to use cotton-stuffed kaftans.

It is evident that the general principle is that all sorts of goods which
could conceivably be used as war materiel are banished, even unusual items

53 id. i, 138.
54 id. ii, 284.
55 ibid.
56 ibid.
57 id. ii, 285.
such as eagles and falcons, since their feathers can be used to make arrows. Transgressors are to be punished:

And if a Muslim man or a dhimmī (non-Muslim protected subject) introduces such merchandise [to the dār al-ḥarb], and he is aware [of the forbiddance], let him be punished with beating and confinement, because he has perpetrated something which is ḥarām, meaning by it harm to the Muslims, unless he was ignorant [of the norm] and is then excused on account of his ignorance, and he is informed of this, since this ruling is unknown and obscure to most of the people, and the procedure, in this case, is to issue a warming the first time [the offense is committed]. God the Most High said: “for I had already warned you in advance”\(^5\). And if he repeats [the offense], let him be disciplined with beating and confinement.\(^6\)

Interestingly, a parallel concern for sale of materiel to the unbelievers is also found in the Mālikī tradition. In this case the prohibition does not concern the export of such commodities by Muslim merchants, but rather the sale to ḥarbī merchants entering the dār al-Islām with the status of mustʾāminūn, that is under the condition of amān (safe conduct).\(^6\) As stated in the Mudawwana:

I said to Ibn al-Qāsim: “Is it your opinion that the ahl al-ḥarb (people of war) can be sold all sorts of things, such as pack animals, or arrows, or weapons, or saddles, or copper, and other things, according to the saying of Mālik?” He replied: “Mālik said: «as for all things which give strength to the ahl al-Islām (people of Islam), whence they gain strength

\(^{58}\) ibid. Compare the similar prohibition found in the collection of Ḥanafī treatises attributed to al-Shaybānī under the title of al-Aṣl: Kitāb al-aṣl al-maʿarūf bi-mabsūṭ lil-Shaybānī, 5 vols. (Karātashī, Bākistān: Idāra al-Qurʾān waʾl-ʿulūm al-islamīya, no date) iii, 72.

\(^{59}\) Q 50:28, “wa-qad qaddamtu ilaykum bi-l-waʿīd”.

\(^{60}\) al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ kitāb al-siyar, ii, 285.

in their wars, such as the pack animals, and weapons, the equipment, or whatever thing made of copper or something else which is known to give strength in war; indeed this should not be sold to them»”.

Ibn Rush, expanding on the concept, stated that:

And as for the transactions of the ahl al-ḥarb and their trade when they come with amān, this is lawful [...] with the exception that it is unlawful for them to buy pack animals, weapons, and iron from which they might get help in their wars, nor anything with which they could frighten the Muslims in their fights, such as the banners or the cloths which they would wear in their wars, and from which they would take pride over the Muslims, and in the same manner [it is unlawful for them to buy] copper, since they make drums out of it, and use them to frighten the Muslims…

We can thus see how in this instance similar preoccupations informed the positions of both Ḥanafī and Mālikī jurists, and it is not inconceivable that the two madhāhib influenced each other on the matter.

To sum up, one could say that the two key-points of the legal debate over trade with the dār al-ḥarb were 1) the risk of fuelling the unbelievers’ war effort against the Muslims 2) the risk of ritual pollution when travelling to the land of the unbelievers, where the authorities did not apply Islamic law. As we have seen, the first point was addressed in a similar way by both madhāhib: trade with the unbelievers was not outlawed, but war material of any sort was not to be exported from the dār al-Islām to the dār al-ḥarb.

As for the second point, Mālikī jurists took a maximalist position based on the authority of the imām of the school and tended to view travel to the dār al-ḥarb for trade as altogether undesirable or even punishable. Ḥanafī jurists took a much more lenient stance, though not being unaware of the ritual problems posed by the presence of Muslim visitors to a non-Islamic land. Hence, the Ḥanafī tradition elaborated a series of prescriptions for

62 Saḥnūn, al-Mudawwana, iii, 294-95.
63 Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddamāt, ii, 154.
merchants travelling to the dār al-ḥarb aimed at avoiding un-Islamic behaviour.

Such effort is evident in the Siyar al-saghrīr, which includes a range of questions and answers on the topic of the Muslim merchant entering the dār al-ḥarb under amān. Among other things, marriage with a woman from the ahl al-kitāb (people of the Book) is disapproved of, although not completely forbidden; eating animals is allowed only if they have been slaughtered by people from the ahl al-kitāb (both rulings resting on the authority of the Companion of the Prophet and fourth caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib); intercourse with a slave girl of the unbelievers’ religion is forbidden; leaving behind a Christian wife in the dār al-ḥarb automatically nulls the wedlock; and so on.

Once more, the possibility of war with the unbelievers raises further issues: for instance, Muslim merchants trading in the dār al-ḥarb under amān are required to break its stipulations in case they have the opportunity to rescue Muslim women and children taken back as booty by an enemy raiding party. In the case of conquest of the dār al-ḥarb by the Muslims, the Muslim merchant who owned possessions in the area is only allowed to retain his movable property, while the rest would become fayʾ, war booty, as if it belonged to unbelievers. As for commercial law, the Mabsūṭ of al-Sarakhsī expressly states that two Muslim merchants entering the dār al-ḥarb must observe the regulations in force in the dār al-Islām, and should not depart from them. Moreover, the Muslim merchant entering the dār al-ḥarb should not practice usury, and he should not buy inebriating beverages or pigs from the unbelievers. We can thus see how admitting the possibility of trade to the dār al-ḥarb created a whole range of juridical questions that the Mālikī madhhab did not need to address, and which were instead investigated in painstaking detail by the Ḥanafīs. Overall, one could say that the Ḥanafī tradition reflected a more pragmatic – and realistic – approach: trade with the dār al-

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64 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 130-41 and 187-94.
65 id., 136-38.
66 id., 193.
67 id., 189-90.
69 Kitāb al-aṣl, iii, 71.
ḥarb was going to happen, and the best that could be done was to regulate it. In this sense, the Mālikīs and the Ḥanafīs followed two opposed trajectories.

Thus, on the one hand, the Mālikīs strove to justify Mālik’s dislike for travel to the dār al-ḥarb, incrementally creating a tradition of aḥādīth and Quranic quotations that transformed Mālik’s opinion into a fully-fledged normative forbiddance. On the other, the Ḥanafīs had an opposite starting point, that is the assumed legitimacy of travel to the dār al-ḥarb, and had to clearly define the limits within which such travel was permissible.

**Conclusion: legal discourse, litigation, and commercial praxis**

The comparison between prescriptive texts of the two madhāhib attempted above lends itself to different levels of interpretation. From the point of view of the development of fiqh as a literary genre and specialized discipline, the divergence of opinion first and foremost bears out the different history of the two schools. The Mālikī madhhab achieved ‘personalization’ at a very early stage, with an established corpus of Mālik’s opinions forming the base of juridical discussion. In this sense, there is little doubt that Mālik’s alleged dislike for trade with the dār al-ḥarb, authoritatively enshrined in the Mudawwana, heavily influenced later scholars, hampering the exploration of an alternative avenue of juridical investigation. The Ḥanafī madhhab, on the other hand, maintained greater flexibility for a longer period of time, allowing for the accumulation of a richer corpus of jurisprudence concerning trade with the unbelievers.

But can one move beyond the question of intellectual lineages and legal traditions – beyond the world of scholarly debates, and into that of commercial practice? Comparison between the different approaches of the two madhāhib and their actual effects on the ground is of course somewhat hindered by the different geographical provenance of the works cited in this brief survey: mostly from Ifrīqiya and al-Andalus on the one hand, and mostly from Iraq and Khorasan on the other. The two traditions did cohabitate side by side in the Islamic West. The Ḥanafī madhhab was well-established in Ifrīqiya, its virtual invisibility to the modern scholar most likely a result of the accidents of survival. Indeed, the Fatimids seem to

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71 id., 129-31; Talbi, *L’Émirat Aghalbide*, 274-75.
have deliberately favoured Ḥanafī fiqh, the influence of which is also apparent in the ismaʿīlī law manual authored by the great Fatimid scholar al-Qādī al-Nuʿmān. Even in al-Andalus, where the Mālikī madhhab enjoyed state-sponsored prominence, other legal traditions were well known to Mālikī scholars. For instance, a famous work by the jurist and philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595 AH/1195 CE, grandson to the aforementioned homonymous qāḍī), the Bidāyat al-mujtahid, is precisely a compendium offering contrasting legal opinions from different madhāhib (ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ).

Yet, it would be facile to jump to the conclusion that known instances of Muslim traders travelling to the dār al-ḥarb represented a direct influence of Ḥanafī fiqh. At this stage of the research, what should be stressed is rather the existence of a rich tradition of competing discourses on the matter of trade with non-Muslim lands within the Islamic sunnī legal tradition. The impact of this variegated tradition on the ground remains an avenue open to future research. The implications of sunnī legal pluralism have been investigated in some detail with reference to the Ottoman period; a similar inquiry remains a desideratum for the medieval period, and especially for the centuries in which the four canonical madhāhib consolidated their respective scholarly traditions.

The question of the translation of legal principles as formulated in fiqh literature into practice is of course quite insidious, especially in contexts where the availability of qāḍī court records is severely limited. Ideally, legal prescriptions concerning trade should then be contrasted with the attested praxis of individual Muslim merchants, and the outcomes of sharīʿī litigation, throughout the period – a task well beyond the scope of this

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74 see, for instance, the recent groundbreaking study of Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2015), esp. chapter 3, “Pragmatic Eclecticism in Court Practice A Thousand and One Cases.”
contribution. Yet, as shown by Hendrickson, even in the absence of qāḍī court records, the investigation of fatāwā can offer valuable insights in this regard. The monumental work of al-Wansharīsī remains a golden mine waiting to be quarried, as effectively argued nearly thirty years ago by David S. Powers in his pioneering study of a court case in late medieval Fez, entirely reconstructed on the basis of a series of concatenated fatāwā persevere in the Miʿyār.75 Many other similar collections exist, and can be profitably perused to shed light on sharīʿī litigation, as shown by the work of Delfina Serrano on two legal compendia of the Almoravid period.76

More material would need gathering before one could express a judgment as to the extent to which the Mālikī position on trade with the dār al-ḥarb effectively limited the room of manoeuvre of Muslim traders. One key question would of course be that of enforcement: did Islamic rulers lend an ear to Ibn Rushd’s claim that it was their responsibility to impede Muslim traders from entering the dār al-ḥarb? The broader matter at stake being the relationship between Islamic scholars and Islamic executive authority – a heated question recently taken up in Wael Hallaq’s controversial monograph The Impossible State.77

Yet enforcement of legal prescriptions does not necessarily rest on recourse to direct state coercion. The case of al-Mazarī’s fatwā presented by Hendrickson is particularly interesting in this regard. The whole matter was occasioned by a litigant’s attempt to exclude unfavourable witnesses on the grounds of the witness’ travelling to the dār al-ḥarb. This peculiar circumstance allows for some interesting inferences. First, it would seem to show that knowledge of the official Mālikī position on the matter was current among the Muslim merchant community, and that it could be mobilized in a qāḍī court against one’s opponents. Second, the episode hints at a mechanism by which the prohibition could become self-enforcing, without the need for the state to actively police borders (a

challenging proposition for any preindustrial state) and punish transgressors.

Sharīʿī litigation relies extensively on witnessing and oath-taking as a mechanism for the qāḍī to ascertain facts. In this context, one’s ability to bear witness and take oaths is a fundamental legal capacity – losing it could have grave consequences, especially for merchants who were likely to incur business-related litigation. Certain requirements were imposed on witnesses, and though the exact extent of these requirements was subject to scholarly debate both within and between madhāhib, broad agreement existed on the somewhat ambiguous attribute of ‘adāla, roughly translatable as ‘probity’. Allegations of impiety were liable to put into question one’s ‘adāla, thus rendering one’s witness invalid. This seems to have been precisely the matter at stake in the incident that triggered al-Mazarī’s fatwā: the acceptability of witnesses was being questioned on the basis of their travelling to the dār al-ḥarb.

At the same time, the episode proves that traders did in fact ignore the Mālikī forbiddance, and that the disqualifying of their witness on such grounds was not an uncontroversial matter. More interesting still, the Zirid sultan seems to have taken direct interest in the controversy – it was on his initiative that scholars were gathered to reach a consensus on the matter. This once more bears out the complex relationship between the scholarly class and executive power – or rather the constant reciprocal interpellation between the two, a dialectic dynamic that, however antagonistic, fundamentally fostered the legitimacy of both participants and contributed to the shaping of a hegemonic moral discourse.

This hegemonic discourse, in its own turn, was liable to reflect back on individual conduct. If, at a specific juncture, a hard-line interpretation of the Mālikī position on trade acquired authoritative status within a given scholarly community and obtained the explicit support of the executive

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78 on the position taken by different schools, see Ibn Rush, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, ii, 496-505, trans. by Muhammad Abdul-Rauf, The Distinguished Jurist's Primer: A Translation of Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid, 2 vols. (Reading: Garnet, 1994), ii, 556-67. See also Serrano, “Twelve Court Cases”, 481: “[t]here were also differences of opinions regarding the level of evidence required to disqualify (tajrīḥ) a person of exemplary upwardness (mubarrız)...” Although focusing on a different context, see also the detailed discussion of the procedure of jarḥ wa-taʿdīl in Brinkley Messick, “From Memory to Archive”, Islamic Law and Society, 9.2 (2002), 231-70.
power – as might have happened in al-Mazarī’s days in Ifrīqiya – it is conceivable that Muslim merchants would have been disincentivized from travelling to the dār al-ḥarb as a result. Both state coercion and social reputation mechanisms (especially since reputation was connected with legal capacity) could have contributed to making such ventures unattractive.

Yet, the debate surrounding al-Mazarī’s fatwā shows that even within the Mālikī tradition ample room for disagreement and interpretation remained, despite the ostensibly clear-cut nature of the matter in prescriptive Mālikī fiqh literature. The existence of alternative legal traditions, such as the Ḥanafī, might have contributed to this continued flexibility. No easy univocal causation line can therefore be drawn between Mālik’s opinion, and the tradition that built on it, and the actual conduct of Muslim merchants.

Rather, legal debate around that very tradition is likely to be an indicator of moments of flexion in praxis, in which a maximalist interpretation could be ‘activated’ in response to specific circumstances – such as the encroachment of Christian kings upon Muslim territories in al-Andalus, or the Norman conquest of Islamic Sicily. Flexions in the legal discourse and flexions in politico-economic praxis should therefore always be considered as dialectically intertwined. The same holds true with concept such as “religion” and “culture”, too often simplistically treated in scholarship as fixed, external factors influencing the individual operate of human actors.
(III)

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arab apostates in byzantium: evidence of voluntary conversion and assimilation
Arab apostates in Byzantium: Evidence of voluntary conversion and assimilation

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Islamic Byzantine relations have attracted the close attention of a large number of scholars specialized in the history of the two worlds. Several studies have appeared on various political, diplomatic, and other cultural aspects of these relations. However, there are still some aspects that need to be further highlighted, including the status of the minorities of each side on the territory of the other. In 1998, Stephen Reinert published an article dealing with the Muslim presence in Constantinople from the ninth century until the fifteenth century, which he opened by saying: “The subject I am treating here, namely, the Muslim populations in the Byzantine Empire, is a topic on which extremely little has been written. The bulk of our scholarship linking Byzantines with Muslims focuses on their interactions as military and religious antagonists, or their diplomatic and commercial exchanges. Nonetheless, at the margins of this corpus, one finds a smattering of discussion and fragments of evidence pertinent to our theme.”¹ In this study, Reinert has suggested that the evidence for such a topic consists of 'scattered snapshots' that relate to two main groups: prisoners of war and merchants.²

The titles of subsequent studies seem to harmonize with Reinert's approach, although they deal only with one group, the prisoners of war.³ These studies' content and titles may challenge the assumption that these

² Reinert, Muslim Presence, 126.
two groups are permanent and stable Muslim populations in Constantinople. It is logical that the merchant or prisoner did not settle permanently in the territory of the Byzantine Empire, but his stay was tied to a temporary circumstance and ended either by a commercial deal or redemption. Perhaps this was the basis upon which Gustave von Grunebaum relied in his hypothesis that “The Byzantine Empire did not tolerate a Muslim organization on its soil.” On the other hand, these studies may pose another more important challenge with regard to the extent to which the 'scattered snapshots' available can be used to trace Muslim minorities that have permanently settled in the Byzantine Empire and achieved a degree of integration within its society.

A number of scholars have examined the mechanisms of Byzantine policy to integrate foreign elements in the Byzantine soil. Robert Lopez argued that a foreigner, whatever his origin, could become a real Byzantine citizen if he has his home within the Empire, intermarry with citizens, and accept the Byzantine way of life. Donald Nicol studied the case of the integration of some Latin elements in Byzantine society during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and concluded that the full integration could have been achieved only with three conditions: conversion to Orthodoxy, adoption of Greek, and intermarriage with Byzantine families. From his side, Charles Brand also demonstrated the possibility of applying this model of integration to some Turkish elements during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. More importantly, he revealed the possibility of finding evidence related to other Muslim minorities, rather than prisoners of war and merchants, able to integrate into the social structure of Byzantium, having converted to Christianity and formed Turkish-Byzantine families that had achieved tangible success in the service of the empire. In general, these studies have shown a Byzantine policy to integrate Latin and Turkish elements into society and to benefit from them in conflict with enemies, at a time when Byzantium was looking for a safe place on the map of a new

world, the world of Turkish-Latin expansion since the late eleventh century.

Given that the Muslims had remained for about four centuries a powerful neighbor and opponent of the empire since the middle of the seventh century, it is more likely that Byzantines adopted a similar policy with different mechanisms that conformed to the nature of the Muslim context. In framework of such a policy, it appears that prisoners of war and populations of border areas and dissidents of the official Islamic authorities have provided a suitable and fertile environment for Christianization and assimilation, especially in light of the political and religious confusion of the late Abbasid Caliphate, and the balance of military power has shifted to the Byzantines since the tenth century.

The purpose of the current article is to retrieve evidence, whatever vague, of the justifications that led Arab elements to the voluntary conversion of Christianity, the position of the Byzantine authorities towards this, and the mechanisms adopted for their integration into society, the extent of integration achieved by these elements, and finally the attitude of the Byzantine society towards them. I seek as much as possible to avoid dealing with prisoners of war since, as a recent study has shown in detail,\(^8\) they lack free will, as well as their conversion to Christianity, and of course their stay in Byzantium, has often been linked to coercion and/or physical and moral pressures.

**Residents of border areas:**

As recent studies have noted, despite the military nature of the border areas, the Arab border cities in times of peace served as a local market and trade centers with the Byzantines. The long-term persistence of these borders has imposed a state of peaceful coexistence between their people on the economic and social levels.\(^9\) As Haldon and Kennedy have pointed out, these regions were very different from those behind, for, on their soil,

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\(^8\) RAMADĀN, Treatment, 166-171, 179-190.

distinct cultural and social and economic characteristics grew. This made its inhabitants, as noted by Galatariotou, not interested in the hostile propaganda between Arabs and Byzantines on both the official and religious levels. There is no doubt that the special nature of the border areas made them a fertile environment for Byzantine policy to convert and assimilate elements from their population in its society.

Arab and Byzantine literature, especially the epics, reflect a vibrant picture of the border society and its mixed Arab-Byzantine families scattered across the territories of both sides. The Byzantine epic of the 'twyborn' hero Digenis Akritis, relates the story of his father, the Arab emir Mousour, and presents him as a religious oscillator sacrificed his religion, country and people to marry a Byzantine general's daughter named Irene, who later gave birth to the epic hero, Basil. It also includes other stories about the conversion of Panthia, Mousour's Mother, and a Muslim girl called Aisha, who was seduced by a Byzantine man to escape with him to the Byzantine lands. The multiplicity of cases of the border converted Arabs in the epic prompted Oikonomides to suggest that the epic in its entirety expresses the aspirations of these Arabs to get a place in the new society, and to have a new identity within their alternative Christian homeland.

On the Arab side, the epic of Princess Dhāt al-Himma is filled with many stories about mixed persons resulting from mixed marriages between the Arabs of the Byzantines. It relates, for example, the story of Žālim's

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10 HALDON -KENNEDY, Arab-Byzantine Frontier, 105-106. See also CANARD, Relations politiques et sociales, 41-45.
13 Digenes Akrites, ed. MAVROGORDATO, 52-54; Digenis Akritis, ed. JEFFREYS, 59-65.
14 N. OIKONOMIDES, L’ épopée de Digénis et le frontière orientale de Byzance aux Xe et Xie siècles, TM 7(1979), 375-397, esp. 394. [=EADEM., Byzantium from the 9th Century to the Fourth Crusade: Studies, Texts, Monuments (Variorum Collected Studies Series CS 369), Hampshire 1992, XVII].
departure with his son al-Ḥārith, the husband of Dhāt al-Himma, across the border to the Byzantine territories, where they married Byzantine women and gave birth to children carrying Arab-Byzantine blood.\textsuperscript{15} And the story of the \textit{amīr} ‘Abd al-Wahāb, the son of al-Ḥārith and Dhāt al-Himma, who captured a Byzantine girl and gave birth to a child, but the Byzantines succeeded in saving and returning her with the child to Byzantium to be raised according to the Christian Byzantine style.\textsuperscript{16} There is also the story of Maymūnah, the wife of the \textit{amīr} ‘Abd al-Wahāb, who fled to Byzantium and married the Byzantine emperor Romanos (Armānūs) and converted her Arab servants to Christianity.\textsuperscript{17} And the story of Baḥrūn, the king of the Rūms, who was the son of the Arab hero al-Baṭṭāl from a Byzantine girl.\textsuperscript{18} Like the Byzantine epic of Digenis Akritis, the author of the Arabic epic Dhāt al-Himma often shows that these mixed children are oscillators in their faith, such as Sayf al-Naṣrānīyah (the Sword of Christianity), the son of the \textit{amīr} ‘Abd al-Wahāb, who was converted to Islam by his father and named Sayf al-Ḥanīfīyah (the Sword of Islam). Then he returned to the camp of the Byzantines and fought in their ranks against the Muslims.\textsuperscript{19} Also, Baḥrūn, the son of al-Baṭṭāl, who entered into a polemic dialogue with his father, and yet remained reluctant to enter Islam and eventually escaped from captivity with his mother to Byzantium.\textsuperscript{20}

While it is recognized that literature, especially popular epics, have their own language and standards which do not necessarily correspond to actual reality, they at least reflect the popular imagination of the border society and may have connotations consistent with historical reality. If the authors of Digenis Akritis and Dhāt al-Himma indicate that mixed marriages between Arabs and Byzantines produced ethnically mixed and religiously

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ṣīrat al-Amīra Dhāt al-Himma}, al-Maktabah al-Sha‘bīah, Beirut 1981, I, 630-40. The author of the epic narrates later that ‘Abd al-Wahāb, the son of Dhāt al-Himma and al-Ḥārith, captured the Byzantine wives of his father and grandfather: \textit{Each had given birth to a boy named in the name of Christianity. The name of his brother was ‘Abd al-Masīḥ (slave of Christ), and the other was ‘Abd al-Sayyīd (slave of the Lord). Dhāt al-Himma,\textit{ vol.1, p.689.}}

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, II, p.98.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, V, p.256.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, V, p.187.


volatile offspring, and that these marriages were sometimes performed in abnormal conditions and without the desire of Byzantine girls.\textsuperscript{21} Arabic historical sources may have hinted at this in their account of the invasion of Ṭarsūs (354/965) by emperor Nicephoros II Phokas (352-359/963-969), where the reaction of Byzantine women married to Muslims was described as follows: \textit{When the mothers of the sons of the Muslims saw their people, they left their homes and said to their husbands: 'We are free now and we do not need to accompany you'. Some of them left their children to their fathers, while others took them to be brought up according to Christianity. The Muslim fathers came to the Byzantine soldiers to bid farewell to their children with tears and cries. Then they left in the worst case, to the extent that the Byzantine soldiers have been very sympathetic to them.}\textsuperscript{22} The suffering of Muslim fathers from the loss of their children and Byzantine wives seems to have motivated many to join them when they were given freedom of choice. When the General John Courcouas peacefully took over Melitene in 324/935, he erected two tents and placed the cross on one of them, giving its population the freedom to choose between leaving the city or converting to Christianity and retaining their properties and families. According to ibn al-Athīr, \textit{most Muslims turned to the tent of the cross in the hope of keeping their families and money.}\textsuperscript{23}

These two incidents seem to be consistent with an interesting Byzantine text that confirms the existence of the phenomenon of mixed marriages

\textsuperscript{21} The author of Dhāt al-Himma shows many marriages between Muslims and Byzantine girls without the will of the latter. It also refers to the frequent escape incidents of these girls with their children to the Byzantine territories whenever they have the opportunity. The Byzantine woman, Maymūnah, the wife of Prince ʿAbd al-Wahāb, fled with her son to Byzantium to raise him according to the teachings of Christianity. Other similar stories indicate that the Byzantine authorities imposed re-baptism on Byzantine women who had previously been baptized in Muslim lands. For example, when the Byzantine emperor offered Christianization to a Byzantine girl who had been a prisoner of the Muslims, she responded: 'I was only a Christian and one of the people of baptism. I was in the service of one of the most ugliest men. A fat old man with a miserable condition'. The emperor rejoiced in her speech and made her a wife to his son, after he immersed her in the water of baptism and was cleansed by the priest. Then he said to her: 'Now I have purified you from the religion of the people of al-Ḥanīfīyah (Isalm)'. \textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, vol.4, pp.595-6; V, p.232-3.

\textsuperscript{22} Yāqūt AL-ḤAMAWĪ, \textit{Mu'jam al-Buldān}, ed. Ḥasan ĤABĀSHĪ, Beirut 1986, IV, 29.

between Muslims and Byzantines, and the religiously volatile offspring that result from it. In one of his correspondences, Patriarch Photius emphasizes the need to re-baptize children resulting from such marriages. Nicholas Oikonomides interpreted this in the light of what he described as a familiar tradition adopted by Byzantine wives in the Islamic world to baptize their children, a tradition that existed until the twelfth century. However, it seems difficult to accept Oikonomides' assumption that the baptism rites of these children have been carried out against will or under the silence of their Muslim fathers. It is not easy for a Muslim father living under the Islamic control to allow this, especially if it would expose him to a harsh penalty by the official authorities. It is likely that this baptism was carried out secretly and in a limited range within the border areas. Although Arabic evidence has documented some individual cases of mixed marriages, particularly within the ruling class and aristocrats, and has sometimes hinted at what these marriages may have of a potential religious influence on the resulting offspring, it did not provide one case of baptism of a child by his Byzantine mother in the territory under Islamic rule.

There is no doubt that the overlap and interaction of the border society, and the resulting mixed families with their religiously volatile offspring, provided an ideal environment for the Byzantine policy of Christianization and assimilation. This is reflected in the Byzantine attempt to convert large numbers of border inhabitants during the period of Byzantine military expansion in the tenth century. If Judge ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamdhānī has greatly exaggerated the estimate of these numbers by about 2,000,000, attributing their conversion to means of coercion or seduction, there is

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26 OIKONOMIDES, The Turks, 151.
other evidence for the voluntary conversion of many border inhabitants. Arabic sources point out that the approach adopted by John Courcouas when he peacefully took Melitene in 324/935, by granting its people the freedom to choose between leaving the city or converting to Christianity and retaining their property, was a typical Byzantine policy during the military expansion of the tenth century. According to this evidence, when Nicephoros Phokas peacefully conquered Tarsus in 354/965, the terms of reconciliation with its people included the freedom to choose between leaving the city or living there with the payment of tribute or converting to Christianity. As Arabic evidence record, the later would have the privilege and dignity and blessings of his grace. Two banners were erected, one for those who favored Christianity and move to the Byzantine territories and the other for those who wanted to leave. Accordingly, Many Muslims, who chose Christianity or who had the ability to pay tribute, turned to the banner of the Byzantines.29

The choice of the inhabitants of cities that have been peacefully seized between leaving their cities or staying with paying tribute or embracing Christianity as one of the basic terms of reconciliation undoubtedly reflects the status of the Byzantine military superiority in return for the Islamic military breakdown in the tenth century. This situation was explicitly expressed in the Treaty of Ṣafar (359/970) between the Hamdanid Emirate and Byzantium, which guaranteed the freedom and safety of apostates from Islam.30 Of course, the consent of the Islamic authorities to such a term can be interpreted in the light of the necessities of the status quo.31 It can also


31 It seems that such a condition is not in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law regarding apostates from Islam. The Prophet said, 'Kill someone who converts from Islam' and 'Kill the Christian who converts to Islam and then returns to Christianity.'
be regarded as a vital item that the Byzantines sought to include as a new mechanism in their Christianization policy. On the one hand, it guarantees freedom and safety for those who have already apostatized, while at the same time provides motivation or perhaps a justification for those hesitant who wish to abandon Islam and move to Byzantium.\(^\text{32}\)

By contrast, the Arab evidence indicate that the evacuation of the population and the displacement of large numbers of them to the Byzantine territories, especially children and women, are the components of a different approach adopted by the Byzantines in dealing with the cities that were seized by force. It seems that emperor Nicephoros II Phokas was the most prominent in adopting such a policy. According to Arabic sources, when he seized Mopsuestia in 354/965 after a siege, he transferred all its population, who were about 200,000, to the Byzantine territories.\(^\text{33}\) Ibn Kathīr also estimates the number of the transferred people from Tripoli and Hems in 358/969 by about 100,000 boys and girls. He adds that many of them converted to Christianity by the Byzantine hands.\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{32}\) Arabic sources record the stories of people killed because of their conversion from Islam to Christianity within the Islamic territories, as the story of a Christian spice dealer killed and burned because he converted to Islam and then wanted to return to Christianity again. \(\text{Ibn Al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, VII, 81.}\) Bar Hebraeus also narrates the story of a Qurayshi Muslim, named Rwayeḥ, who converted to Christianity and was killed after two years of unsuccessful attempts to persuade him to return to Islam. \(\text{Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 40.}\) Indeed, it is difficult to relate these stories to the Byzantine Christianization policy. The heroes of these stories converted to Christianity within Muslim territories and refused to return to Islam despite the attempts of the Islamic authorities to convince them, even though they knew that the fate awaited them was murder. However, these cases may at least indicate the presence of individuals, especially from former Christians who may have converted to Islam under certain pressures and without conviction, willing to take the first opportunity to convert from Islam to Christianity and move to Byzantine territories.

\(^{33}\) \(\text{Ibn Al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, VII, 278; Ibn Miskawayh, Tajārub al-Umam, II, 211.}\) Bar Hebraeus mentions that Nicephoros captured 200,000 men, women and boys and sent them to the land of the Rūm. \(\text{Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, p.64.}\) While Yahya b. Saʿīd al-Anṭākī mentioned that Nicephoros carried with him all the people of Mopsuestia to the Byzantine lands. \(\text{Yahya Al-Anṭākī, Annales, ed. L. Cheikho, Beirut 1905, 123.}\)

\(^{34}\) \(\text{Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bīdāya, XI, 268-9.}\) He described Nicephoros Phokas as: one of the harshest people on the Muslims. He took from them many cities by force, such as Tarsis and Adana and Mopsuestia and others. He killed a countless number of Muslims whom only God knows, and captured another number whom only God knows. All or most of them converted to Christianity. It should be noted that Ibn al-ʿAdīm records that the number of
Ḥawqal mentions that when Nicephorus II Phokas seized Maʿarat al-Nuʿmān in the same year, he carried with him *35,000 women, boys, and adult men*.\(^35\) Also, when he attacked Antioch in 358/969, *about 20,000 boys, young men and women were moved to territories of the Rūm*.\(^36\) These figures may seem exaggerated, but the Byzantine sources themselves confirm that the Byzantine wars against the Arabs brought large numbers of prisoners to the Byzantine territories.\(^37\)

In light of this, it can be said that Byzantine Christianization policy towards the Muslim Arabs, especially the people of the border regions, reached a peak in the second half of the tenth century. The shift in the balance of military power to its own advantage and the successive victories it has achieved have made the Islamic authorities incapable of dealing with such a policy. This is reflected in the semi-official recognition of the freedom of conversion from Islam to Christianity, as described in the terms of the peace settlements mentioned above, and also in the Arabic poem attributed to Nicephorus II Phokas, in which he explicitly declares his intention to spread Christianity in the land of the Muslims,\(^38\) and in the Muslim prisoners reached 100 thousand before the capture of Antioch. *IBN AL-ʿADĪM*, *Zubdat*, I, 149.

\(^35\) *IBN ḤAWQAL*, *Kitāb Surat al-Ard*, Cairo n.d., 164.


\(^38\) This poem was sent to the Abbasid caliph al-Muṭīʿ (334-363/946-974). Ibn Kathīr points out that it is written by ‘*One of his writers who had abandoned Islam and its people.*’ It includes: ‘*I will open the land of God in east and west, and spread the religion of the Cross*
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poem written by al-Qafāl al-Shāshī to respond to him, in which he implicitly admits that there are many cases of apostasy from Islam among the Muslims.\footnote{39}{If some Arabs lose their sight, or many of them, like cattle, deny their religion.' He said. 
AL-MUNJID, \textit{Qaṣīdat}, 31, 33.}

Finally, it should also be noted that there are indications that the Byzantine armies included Christian clergy for missionary purposes. Judge \textit{ʿAbd al-Jabbār} refers to the presence of the Patriarch himself, in addition to a number of monks, among the ranks of the Byzantine armies, and to the claim of the Byzantines that their success in converting large numbers of inhabitants of the Syrian borderlands (\textit{al-thughūr al-Shāmīyah}) was a result of their miracles.\footnote{40}{Arab sources confirm the keenness of the Byzantine authorities to marry apostates daughters of the Byzantine families. \textit{ʿABD AL-JABBĀR, Tathbīt}, I, 182-3. 'Abd al-Jabbār attacks the Byzantines' claims that the success of their Christianization policy among the Arabs is due to the miracles of the patriarchs and saints: \textit{You claimed that the nations did not respond to Christianity except with the signs and miracles that appeared by Paul, George, Mark, and others. You also claimed that the Patriarch came from the land of the Byzantines, took down his army and raised their dead from the graves and that the Monk Michael came to the people of Mopsuestia, turned water running to oil, and all their sheep to horses, so they all went on their own and headed to the Byzantine territories, as did the people of Samosata and Ḥiṣn Maḥsūr.} 
} The same is confirmed by the Hagiographer of St. Nikon when referring to the saint's departure with the Byzantine armies to attack Crete in 350/961, and tells how he stayed among its inhabitants and was able to miraculously return the Greek population of Crete to Christianity and convert many Muslims to it.\footnote{41}{The \textit{Life of St. Nikon}, ed.& trans. D. SULLIVAN, Massachusetts 1987, 83-87.}

The epic \textit{Dhāt al-Himma} is also filled with many references to the presence of Patriarchs and bishops and monks among the Byzantine armies to the border areas to carry out explicit Christianization activities among their inhabitants.\footnote{42}{\textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, I, 839, 895; II, 100, 521; III, 194, 699; IV, 489; V, 254.}

\textbf{Apostates for personal motives:}

There is evidence that a number of Muslim dignitaries have converted to Christianity and moved to the Byzantine territories for personal reasons,
such as rebellion against the authority of the Caliphate, impunity, or revenge for personal dignity against insults or injustice by a leader or caliph. One of the Prophet companions, the prominent Umayyad Rabī’ah ibn Umayya, is said to have fled to Damascus and then to the king of the Rūm and converted to Christianity, because caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb decided to sign on him the penalty of drinking alcohol, or that he fled after committing adultery with a Muslim woman.43 The Qurayshī noble al-Ṣalt ibn al-ʿĀṣ ibn Wābiṣa, known also as al-Wābiṣī, was said to be disgruntled and fled to the land of the Rūm, converted to Christianity and died there as a Christian. One of the given reasons for his defection is the decision of caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz to punish him for drinking alcohol.44

Most importantly, Arab evidence suggests that the status of the apostate and his leadership of a group or clan can lead to a mass conversion to Christianity and the transition to the Byzantine territory. The alleged personal insult or abuse of the royal status of the last Ghassanid king in Syria (632-638), al-Mundhir ibn al-Ḥārith,45 led him with 30,000 of his people to rebel against caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and flee to Byzantium and convert to Christianity.46 The harsh defeat of Naṣr (Nāsīr/Nuṣayr), a

44 Abū al-Faraj Al-ʾIsfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās et al., Beirut 2008, VI, 86. Ibn Ṭāsākir (d. 571/1175) does not mention the reason for the Caliph's decision to punish him, but he adds that al-Wābiṣī was then governor of Medina. Ibn Ṭāsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, ed. Muḥibaddīn Al-ʾUmruwī, Cairo 1995, VIII, 387. Al-ʾIsfahānī and Ibn Ṭāsākir give another account stating that he was captured and tortured by the Byzantines until entered into their religion. Abū al-Faraj Al-ʾIsfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī, VI, 86-87; Ibn Ṭāsākir, Tārīkh, VIII, 385.
45 Arabic sources usually refer to him after the Islamic conquest as Jiblah ibn al-Ayham ibn al-Ḥārith. He converted from Christianity to Islam after successive Islamic victories over the Byzantines in Syria.
46 One of these accounts indicates that he was angry with caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab because he refused to punish a man from Damascus for slapping him on the face because Jiblah put his foot on his robe. Another story says that he smashed a nose of a man who inadvertently put foot on his robe while circling around the Kaʿba. The caliph then punished him by ordering the man to do the same thing with him. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, VIII, 64-5; Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ al-Buldān, ed. Radwān Muhammad Radwān, Beirut 1982, 142. Al-Balādhurī records a different third account indicating that Jiblah did not enter Islam, so 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb put him between three choices: convert to Islam or pay tribute or go to where he wants. He chose to move to Byzantium with thirty thousand
commander of the Khurramite rebellious religious sect of Babek, by caliph al-Mu’taṣim in late 833 drove him and 14,000 of his men to Byzantium and Christianity.\(^{47}\) Change of political power after the overthrow of caliph al-Muqtadir (295–320/908–932) led his close confidant, Banī ibn al-Nafīs, with many of his people to the same fate.\(^{48}\) Finally, the harshness of the Hamdanids and their arbitrariness in obtaining heavy taxes drove 10,000 knights of the Arab clan of Banū Ḥabīb, with their wives and slaves, to emigrate to the Byzantine territories and adopting Christianity.\(^{49}\) The mass apostasy was also a minor theme in the epic of Dhāt al-Himma, almost identical in content to historical evidence. As in the case of al-Mundhir ibn al-Ḥārith, two of the main characters in the epic, Ṭālîm and his son al-Ḥārith, moved to Byzantium with 12,000 of their clan Banū Kilāb as a result of being subjected to a humiliating punishment by the Caliph.\(^{50}\)

Arabic evidence also presents the physical attractiveness, \textit{fitna}, of Byzantine women as one of the personal reasons that can lead a Muslim to...

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\(^{47}\) Al-Ṭabarī points to the escape of Naṣr with a large group of Khurramites to Byzantium in the context of his talk about the participation of thousands of them in the attack of Theophilos on Sozopetra in 223/837. \textit{Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk}, ed. Muḥammad Abū Al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Beirut 1986, V, 235. Al-Masʿūdī adds that Theophilos was almost killed on the battlefield, but that 'he was saved by a Christianized named Nuṣayr with a number of his companions.' \textit{Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab wa Maʿādin al-Jawhar}, Cairo 1966, II, 276. Bar Hebraeus is more informative when he refers to Nāṣr who, after his defeat by the caliphate army, was forced to resort to the Byzantine territories 'with many of his companions, all of them converted to Christianity.' He also points to the participation of Nāṣr and his men in the imperial wars against the caliphate until his death and many of his followers in one of these wars. \textit{Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia}, 31, 33-34. Michael the Syrian states that the followers of Babek along with the general Naṣr, after suffering a harsh defeat by the Abbasids, went to the Byzantine emperor and converted to Christianity. \textit{Michael THE SYRIAN, Chronique de Michel le Syrien}, trans. J.B. Chabot, Paris 1899-1910, III, 88. Notably, Byzantine sources are ambiguous on their conversion to Christianity. See L. Brubaker - J. F. Haldon, \textit{Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era c. 680-850: A History}, Cambridge 2001, 804.

\(^{48}\) According to these sources Ibn al-Nafīs was one of the closest people to al-Muqtadir. \textit{He rode a horse and fled from Baghdad disguised. He entered Mosul and then Armenia and then moved to Constantinople where he converted to Christianity. Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidāya}, XI, 160; Ibn AL-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, VII, 53.


\(^{50}\) \textit{Dhāt al-Himma}, I, 637.
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It provides stories of male Arab lovers who have been dominated by an irresistible desire for Byzantine girls to the point that they easily sacrificed everything, land, religion, and homeland, to win these girls. Usually, conversion to Christianity and going to live in Byzantium were a recurring requirement of the girls to accept the association with them, to the extent that it can be said that it became a common pattern in all the stories of love relations between the two sides. The Arab side is always represented by the male, while it is very difficult to find in the historical sources one story referring to an Arab girl in love with a Byzantine man. Such stories, which are very rare, can only be found in the popular epics.

The love of Byzantine girls is one of the most frequent personal motivations of apostasy in the epic Dhāt al-Himma, which has always focused on the beauty of these girls as a major reason that has incited many Arabs to apostatize. Among its many stories is the story of the Arab fighter ʿArqūb al-Khayām, who loved the Byzantine princess Nūra, and whose 'soul inclined to disbelief and made him abandon Islam.' And the story of the fighter Ṣabāḥ ibn ʿAmir al-Kilābī, who was fond of a female slave of a Byzantine nobleman. A monk called Shūmudras promised him that he would persuade her master to give her up to him if he converted to Christianity, saying that: I will crown you in the church, and the wedding will be at my expense, and after that both of you will become one spirit and body until one of you dies. This is Christianity.

The author of Dhāt al-Himma also relates the story of Abū Yukhluf al-Maghribī who accompanied al- Baṭṭāl to Constantinople, disguised as the merchants, to liberate Muslim captives. The beauty of one patrikios's daughter seized him.

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51 On the Arab obsession with the beauty and attractiveness of Byzantine women see: N.M EL-CHEIKH, Describing the Other to Get at the Self: Byzantine Women in Arabic Sources (8th-11th Centuries), Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 40/2 (1997), 239-250, esp. 239-240. For more comprehensive discussion, see Eadem, Women, 82-84.

52 The author of Dhāt al-Himma narrates the story of Maymūnah, the wife of Prince ʿAbd al-Wahāb, who fled to Byzantium and converted to Christianity to marry the Byzantine king Armānūs. In the epic of Digenis Akritis, we encounter the case of the Arab girl Aisha, whom one of the Byzantines seduced to convert and escape with him to the Byzantine lands. Dhāt al-Himma, V, 256; Digenes Akrites, ed. MAVROGORDATO, 156.


54 Dhāt al-Himma, II, 344-348.
and eventually led him to baptism.\textsuperscript{55} On the Byzantine side, Epic of Digenis Akritis also presents love as the only motive which incited one of its heroes, \textit{amīr} Mousour, to apostasy.\textsuperscript{56}

Although love as a motive for apostasy appears as an epic treatment, we can frequently find similar stories in Arabic historical sources. Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī (d. 356/976) tells a story of a young Muslim ascetic, \textit{zāhid}, who could not resist the temptation of a Christian slave girl from Amorium and immediately fell in love with her. He gave up his companions and continued to chase her despite severe beatings from her family. The girl finally required him to convert to Christianity in order to marry her, but he refused. However, the man continued his attempt with the girl, which led to his beating severely by the neighbors. This time, the injuries led to his death.\textsuperscript{57}

Another most famous story is attributed to a very devout and faithful man who preserves the Qurʾān in his mind. It relates that when he was fighting in the Byzantine territories, he saw a beautiful girl and fell in love with her, then converted to Christianity to marry her. Many years later, some Muslims, in a prisoner exchange mission, met him in Constantinople and asked what he still remembered from the Qurʾān. He replied that he forgot all of this except the verse: \textit{Those who disbelieve may wish if they were Muslims.} They offered him to return with them to the Muslim lands but he refused. This story was repeated frequently in the Arabic sources in various details and attributed to many people, but it has the following common denominators: 1) All its heroes before apostasy were pious and faithful, memorizer of the Qurʾān, and fighters \textit{mujāhidūn} against Byzantium for a long time. 2) They easily abandoned Islam and homeland

\textsuperscript{55}Dhāt al-Himma, III, 232-234, 383-391. The author of the epic also presents hatred as a motive that could lead to conversion to Christianity and resort to Byzantium, such as the case of a girl who rejected her father's attempts to force her to marry her cousin. She threatened: \textit{If you force me to do so, I will kill myself, or enter the land of the Byzantines and be with them as they want. I will worship the religion of the cross, so you will remain the subject of ridicule people generation after generation.} Dhāt al-Himma, IV, 704.

\textsuperscript{56}Digenes Akrites, ed. MAVROGORDATO, 20-23; Digenis Akritis, ed. JEFFREYS, 3-7, 251-252.

to win their lovers. 3) They refused an offer to return to their homeland. 4) All of them forgot the Qur’an except the same verse.58

However, whether this story is related to one person in different forms and details, or to various people, it reflects the Arabic sources' view of one of the reasons why a Muslim may abandon his religion and prefer to live in the Byzantine territories. It is interesting to note that these sources did not attribute the story to a person who is oscillator in belief. Forgetting the Qur'an, with the exception of a certain verse, despite the obvious exaggeration, seems to reflect the Arab view of the consequences for those who seek to do so. The refusal to return to the land of Islam, the preference for Christianity, and the stay in Byzantium may also reflect the break of the apostates from their former life and their integration into their new society. Al-Wābiṣī has rejected an offer made by ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz's envoy to Constantinople to help him return to the Islamic lands. He said: How can I return to Islam while I have a wife and two boys, and if I enter the city, They will mock me by saying: O Christian, and this will be also said to my children and their mother.59

The assimilation of apostates:

Perhaps the most obvious link between the Arabic popular epics and historical sources regarding the Byzantine policy in absorbing the Arab elements, whether residents of the border areas or apostates for personal reasons, is clear in their consensus on the success of this policy in attracting some of these elements and linking them to the Byzantine territories using means of seduction. Arabic evidence usually present money, power and female beauty, i. e. *fitna*, as basic Temptations. However, some Arabic historical accounts adopt the epic approach and record some exaggerated and unrealistic Byzantine offers of temptation, such as the apostate's share of the emperor's throne and the marriage of his daughter.60 Other accounts

59 Abū al-Faraj Al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī, VI, 86-87; IBN ʿASĀKIR, Tārīkh, VIII, 386.
60 A large number of Arab sources reported that emperor Heraklios tried to seduce the captive ʿAbdullah ibn Ḥudhāyfah al-Sahmī to convert to Christianity by offering to marry his daughter and share the throne. See for example, IBN AL-ATHĪR, Asad al-Ghābah fī
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are more realistic and almost match what was recorded by the Byzantine sources.

The common denominator of all these accounts is the image of prosperity enjoyed by Arab apostates in the Byzantine territories. A comparison is often made between the flourishing and comfortable new life of the apostate in Byzantium and the harsh living conditions in his former homeland. As Skylitzes points out, when Samonas' father came to Constantinople in a diplomatic mission and saw the life his son enjoyed, he would have preferred to stay with his son and forsake his home town, Melitene. The hardships of life are presented as a motive for the apostasy of the Banū Ḥabīb clan and the Khurramite soldiers. Perhaps Genesios meant to compare the previous harsh life of the Khurramites with their new reality in Byzantium when he referred to the Persians who formerly dwelled in tents and wrapped themselves with leather. The contrast between the Arab tenda and the Byzantine oikos, as a symbol of the difference between the nomadism and urbanization, is also a recurring literary theme in the epics of Dhāt al-Himma and Digenis Akritis.
According to Ibn Ḥawqal, the Byzantine emperor honored the clan Banū Ḥabīb, supplied its members with cattle, allocated them the best land and amenities and left them free to choose villages and houses. He adds that the prosperous life of the clan in the Byzantine territories made them correspond with other Arabs, especially the relatives who left behind in the territory of al-Jazīra, to encourage them to catch up with them in Byzantium, describing the extent of care they enjoy. Thus, Many of their relatives and others who did not belong to them joined them.

The Byzantine evidence, though confusing the Khurramites and Persians, provides important details of the extent to which Theophobus/Naṣr and his men received warm hospitality and imperial generosity. According to it, after the defeat of Babek, perhaps in early 834, Theophobus came over to Byzantium and made submission for himself and his 14,000 men to the emperor. For this reason, Theophilos gave him his own sister in marriage and raised him to the rank of a patrikios, along with a large retinue and illustrious honors, and also a luxurious and most adequate life style. As for his men, Theophilos made it legal for any Persian to marry Romans and to be joined and united in

of the amīr Mousour and his relatives, he illustrates the Arabs as people use to live in transit, but when they turn to Christianity and move to Byzantium they become more "civilized." C. GALATARIOTOU, Structural Oppositions in the Grottaferrata Digenes Akrites, BMGS 11 (1987), 29-68, esp.37-38.
66 IBN ḤAWQAL, Ṣūrat al-Ard, 192.
67 Ibn Ḥawqal also states that: 'They sent to those who were left behind and to those who knew to lure them to what they reached and received. They told them how the king generously gave them, supported them, and established them. This made the latter covet what they received.' IBN ḤAWQAL, Ṣūrat al-Ard, 192.
68 For an extensive discussion of the date, see J.S. CODÓNER, The Emperor Theophilos and the East, 829-842: Court and Frontier in Byzantium during the Last Phase of Iconoclasm, New York-London 2014,147
69 THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, Libri I-IV, 163; GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 52. Symeon the Magister points to that he married Empress Theodora's sister. Some scholars tend to adopt this on the grounds that the Byzantine sources did not mention any sisters of Theophilos. Symeon MAGISTER, in: THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, ed. I. BEKKER, CSHB, Bonn, 1838, 625; J.B. BURY, A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I. A.D.802-867, New York 1965, 253 n.3; W. TREADGOLD, The Byzantine Revival A.D.780-842, Stanford 1988, 282.
70 GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 53.
wedlock, causing many of them to be distinguished by imperial dignities,71 He also gave them ‘ranks and strateiai’72, inscribed them in the lists of the army and established a so-called Persian regiment, and commanded that they should be numbered amongst the Romans who went out to war against the Hagarenes.73 As in the case of Banū Ḥabīb, the imperial lavish privileges seems to have spurred other Khurramites to join Theophobos's regiment, whose number has grown in a few years to as many as 30,000.74

Theophilos's arrangement for his new apostate soldiers to marry Byzantine women was certainly seen an essential step in the process of their assimilation. This seems to be associated with an imperial edict mentioned in the life of St. Athanasia of Aegina, who lived in the first half of ninth century,75 which states that 'unmarried women and widows should be given in marriage to foreign men'.76 Arabic sources confirm the keenness of the Byzantine authorities to give apostates the daughters of the Byzantine families as wives. Judge 'Abd al-Jabbār quotes from an Arab apostate that: the emperor gave me generously, and said to his entourage: Look for wealthy women as wives for those converts to improve their conditions.77

71 THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, Libri I-IV, 163. According to al-Ṭabarī, 'the Byzantine emperor provided them generously, arranged for them to marry Byzantine women and enrolled them as soldiers on whom he depend in his most important tasks'. AL-ṬABARĪ, Tārīkh al-Rusul, V, 235.
72 GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 52. A strateia was almost the Byzantine equivalent of a modern military 'commission.' It referred to the obligations imposed upon its holder and the financial arrangements made by the state to support him. See J. F. HALDON, Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army c.550-950: A Study on the Origins of the Stratияtika Ktemata, Wien 1979, 36, 41ff.
73 THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, Libri I-IV, 163; GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 52.
74 THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, Libri I-IV, 181; GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 55. For the growing size of the Khurramite regiment in 838, see CODONER, Emperor Theophilos, 151.
75 Treadgold points to a clear connection between this decree and the imperial desire to encourage the absorption of the Khurramite soldiers. TREADGOLD, Byzantine Revival, 283.
77 'ABD AL-JABBĀR, Tathbīt, I, 171. In one of the stories of the Epic of Dhāt al-Himma, the emperor addressed his patrikoi: Know that these people wanted our religion, and I
Practically, the Byzantine authorities sought to provide privileges and facilities to encourage the Byzantine families to accept the marriage of their daughters with those apostates. A short text in the De ceremoniis of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, entitled “concerning Saracen captives baptized in a theme”, points to tax-free land for three years, money, grains, seeds and oxen given to the new apostate captive, as well as tax exemptions for the family, whether military or civil, which accept to take him as son-in-law. The comparison of the privileges mentioned in this text with those related to the cases of the Khurramites and Banū Ḥabīb suggests that the Byzantine authorities distinguished in their dealings with the apostates between the individual and mass apostasy, the class background from which the apostate came, and more importantly the usefulness of these apostates. However, regardless of the kind or size of the privileges offered to the apostate, it is most likely that the Byzantine authorities were not to present any advantages without expecting a return. Arab and Byzantine sources often emphasize the importance of the role of these apostates in the Imperial service against Muslims, especially as mercenary soldiers. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of 10,000 knights from the clan of Banū Ḥabīb in the Byzantine army was not random or without a goal. Ibn Ḥawqal refers to the Byzantines' exploitation of their knowledge of the Arabic language, pathways of Islamic lands and Muslims' methods of fighting to inflict the most harm to them. The Khurramites regiment of 30,000 participated in the Byzantine attack on the al-Jazīrah in 223/837. Bani ibn al-Nafīs and

have given them the money until they become patrikoi like you. I advise you to share them in your wealth and to give your daughters as wives to them so that you will have the pleasure of Christ. Dhât al-Himma, IV, 282-3. Genesius records a marriage between a poor apostate and a rich Byzantine woman. He was working at her tavern. After a long time of working for her, she fell in love with him and gave birth to a boy, Theophobos. Genesios, On the Reigns, 52.


80 Genesios, On the Reigns, 50; Al-Ṭabarî, Tārīkh al-Rusul, V, 235; Bar Ḥebraeus, Chronographia, 33-34. Most likely, Treadgold is right in his hypothesis: 'Naturally Theophilos was delighted at the prospect of this mass conversion of infidels and of
his people joined a Byzantine campaign led by the Armenian *domestikos* Malīḥ against Samosata and Melitene in 319/931. According to Arabic evidence, Mu’nis al-Khādim, the most influential leader of caliph al-Mu’tadid, resorted to ibn al-Nafis to convince the Byzantines to withdraw from Melitene. Also, it seems that the Byzantine authorities benefited from Arab apostates in the acts of espionage and military intelligence. Emperor Nicephoros Phokas explicitly refers to the Armenian incompetence in the *thema Armeniakōn* to carry out acts of guarding and espionage, and therefore he recommended to use spies from the Arabs and rely on them to obtain information about the movements of Muslims. Judge ‘Abd al-Jabbār also points out that the Byzantines were interested in employing Arab apostates to spy on Muslims because their appearance and language enable them to 'mix with Muslims without being suspicious, so they could convey their news to the Byzantines, as well as reports about their soldiers, leaders, and princes'.

Byzantine evidence provide numerous references to apostates who held important military posts. Theophanes refers to Eumathios, 'An Arab highly skilled in engineering, who had accepted baptism and whom Nikephoros I (186-196/802-811) enrolled in imperial service and established at Adrianople.' Theophanes Continuatus points to Nasar, the *droungarios tou ploimou* under Basil I (867-886), who was sent against Aghlabids since increasing the Byzantine army by almost a sixth with loyal soldiers who hated the Arabs. tendr. *Byzantine Revival*, 282. Like the the Khurramite regiment, Cedrenus points out that emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-1055) recruited a large number of foreign mercenaries, the Franks, the Varangians and the Arabs. He included them in their own *tagmata*, each consisting of the same race and sent them to the northern and eastern borders. It can safely be suggested that the Arab *tagmata* were sent to the eastern border between Byzantium and the Muslims. Georgius Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium*, II, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn, 1839, 602.

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84 ‘ABD AL-JABBĀR, *Tathbīt*, II, 326, 335.
879 and achieved victories that were crucial to the restoration of Byzantine control over southern Italy. Skylitzes mentions Constantine, the komēs tēs hetaireias, who was 'a eunuch of Saracen origin', and who served emperor Constantine IX Monomachos and 'never wavered in his fidelity to him'. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus provides an important reference to an Arab family that has achieved a successful career in military service on the eastern front, acquired leadership positions and, most importantly, received a distinction from emperor Alexander (912-913). One of this family is Chase the son of Ioube (Ayyub) who, although 'remained a true Sarakēnos in thought and manners and religion', was raised to be a protospatharios and had 'great freedom of intercourse with the emperor'. According to other chroniclers, He held a fiscal position in the theme of Hellas thereafter. His brother the protospatharios Niketas, whose Byzantine name implies his conversion to Christianity, was appointed the military governor of the thema of Kibyrrhaioitai. Constantine Porphyrogenitus indicates his strong influence on emperor Alexander who accepted his request to make his son, the spatharocandidat Abercius, a captain-general of the Mardaïtes of Attalia.

Other Byzantine evidence provides many instances of Arab apostates who were able to achieve success and influence in the Byzantine court and

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87 Skylitzes, Synopsis, 412.

88 Chase's father name is recorded by other chroniclers. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, Liber VI, ed. I. Bekker, CSBH, Bonn 1838, 388; Symeon Magister, 723; Georgius Monachus, in: Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn 1838, 880; Leo Grammaticus, Chronographia, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn 1892, 294.


90 Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, Liber VI, 388; Symeon Magister, 723; Georgius Monachus, 880; Leo Grammaticus, Chronographia, 294.

91 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando, 243.
civil administration. Theophanes refers to the *patrikios* Beser who 'was honoured by Leo III', and attributes to him a key role in the outbreak of the Iconoclasm.\(^92\) Perhaps the most famous Arab apostate figure who has attained a prominent position in the Byzantine imperial service is the eunuch Samonas, the *patrikios* and *parakoimômenos* in the reign of Leo VI, who was described by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus as 'a good adviser on economic affairs'.\(^93\) Byzantine sources provide ample information on his career in the imperial palace, and attribute to him a major role in the political scene inside and outside it.\(^94\) He began his career as a servant in the house of Stylianos Zaoutzes, the second man in the empire and the father of Empress Zoe.\(^95\) After he revealed to the emperor the plans of the Zaoutzes family to remove him, he was granted as reward one-third of the property of this family and raised to be a *Koubikoularios*. Samonas soon became the right-hand man of the emperor. Later, he was granted the title of *protospatharios*, and in 906 he was awarded the title of *patrikios* and raised to be a *parakoimômenos*.\(^96\)

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\(^92\) Theophanes, Chronicle, 555. Scholars differ about the historicity of Beser. Ostrogorsky thinks that he is a fictional character fabricated by Theophanes. G. Ostrogorsky, Les débuts de la querelle des images, in: *Mélanges Charles Diehl*, Paris 1930, I, 235. Vasiliev thinks that he is the same Jewish magician Tessarakontapechos whose name was linked with Iconoclasm in other Byzantine sources. A.A. Vasiliev, The Iconoclastic Edict of caliph Yazid II, A.D.721, *DOP* 9 (1956), 23-47, esp.30. Gero believes that he is a real person who is not only mentioned in Theophanes but also in an Arab historical source, still a manuscript preserved in Leiden, where he is presented as the son of a noble Byzantine family, captured by Arabs in his youth and converted to Islam and educated in the court of caliph 'Abd al-Malik. He succeeded in escaping to Byzantium, returned to Christianity, and received a great honor and abundant property from the emperor. S. Gero, Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Leo III. With Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources, Louvain 1973, 59ff; Eadem, Early Contacts between Byzantium and the Arab Empire: A Review and Some Reconsiderations, in: Proceedings of the Second Symposium on the History of Bilad Al-Sham during the early Islamic Period up to 40 A.H./640 A.D., ed. M.A. Bakhit, Amman 1987, I, 129-130.

\(^93\) Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando, 245.


\(^96\) Vita Euthymii, 49; Skylitzes, Synopsis, 174, 180; Leo Grammaticus, Chronographia,
This flourished and splendid career of Samonas led Lennart Rydén to conclude his article dedicated to Samonas by saying: 'To sum up: the Arabs were regarded as enemies, and their religion was repugnant to the Byzantines. But if an Arab became Christian and served the Christian empire loyally, there was no end to his possibilities. In theory, he could even become emperor'. This hypothesis is based on suggesting a relationship between Samonas and two tenth-century apocalyptic texts, one Jewish and the other Byzantine, indicating that at the end of time an Arab would be the Last Roman Emperor. It should be noted, however, that the Byzantine and Arab evidence has already pointed out that some Arab apostates, through their influence and privilege in the empire, sought to take over the throne, or that some emperors actually descended from Arab-Islamic origins. The Byzantine evidence points out the attempt of the Khurramite soldiers to proclaim their leader Theophobos as emperor after the defeat of emperor Theophilus in Amorium in 223/838. There was also a Byzantine tradition that sought to ascribe an Arab, or 'Syrian,' ancestry to emperor Leo V. On the other hand, the Arabic evidence refers to emperor Nicephoros I as the grandson of al-Mundhir ibn al-Ḥārith, and to emperor Nicephoros II Phokas as 'one of the descendants of a Muslim named Ibn al-Faqqās, who was one of the dignitaries of Tarsūs, but he converted to Christianity'. Although this evidence is not based on a tangible historical reality, it at least reflects a common Arab-Byzantine vision that there were

271,279
97 RYDÉN, Portrait of Samonas, 108.
98 RYDÉN, Portrait of Samonas, 107-108
100 GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 11; Symeon Magister, 603. See also D. TURNER, The Origins and Accession of Leo V (813-820), JÖB 40 (1990), 171-203, esp. 172-3.
102 IBN AL-ATHĪR, Al-Kāmil, VII, 320; IBN KATHĪR, Al-Bidāya, XI, 268; IBN AL-JAWZĪ, Al-Muntazam, IV, 56.
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no limits to the power and wealth that the Arab apostate or his descendants could achieve in the Byzantine territory.

Although it is difficult to estimate the extent to which these apostates are integrated into the Byzantine society, it can be said that the Byzantine sources did not provide sufficient evidence that the Apostate family could extend for many generations. The family of Anemas, the son of the amīr of Crete who was captured in 350/961, may be an exception. According to Byzantine sources, he became a loyal Byzantine subject and was appointed an imperial bodyguard and army commander, and subsequently appeared in the narratives fighting prominently against the Rūs. 103 His name appears again after more than a century with his grandsons Michael and Leo, who took part, with two other unnamed brothers, in a conspiracy against Alexios I Komnenos in 1105. 104 Other names of the Anemas descendants appear in Byzantine seals and documents until the late twelfth century. 105

However, Byzantine evidence suggests that much of the history of the Arab apostates in Byzantium was no more than a history of individuals, not families. It seems that some of these apostates did not plan from the outset for a long-term establishment, or that the future of the apostate in the Byzantine territories ended as a result of the authorities' fear of growing influence or a conspiracy to eliminate it. Byzantine sources record cases of desertion of Arab apostates from the Byzantine military service and their joining the camp of enemies. In his narrative about the Arab engineer Eumathios, Theophanes suggests that failing to receive the proper financial appreciation from emperor Nicephoros I was a reason for his defection to the hostile camp of the Bulgarians. 106 The betrayal and defection of many of the Khurramite soldiers to the Abbasid army before the battle of Amorium 107 may be one of the reasons that their leader, Theophobos, was

103 Leo THE DEACON, History, 192; SKYLITZES, Synopsis, 289-290,292.
105 For the references to the Anemas family, see the webpage of Byzantine Nobility-Foundation for Medieval Genealogy.
106 Theophanes attributes to him the most prominent role in the victory of the Bulgarians and their occupation of Mesembria in 812 because that he taught them the whole art of making engines. THEOPHANES, Chronicle, p.682.
107 GENESIOS, On the Reigns, 50,54; THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, Chronographia, Libri I-IV, 185-187; CEDRENUIS, Historiarum Compendium, 134; Leo GRAMMATICUS,
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accused of lèse-majesté the, and later executed by Emperor Theophilos. There is also the case of Samonas' attempt to escape from Byzantium to Syria which, whatever its reason, may suggest that he was not entirely happy to live in Byzantium. According to the Byzantine evidence, four years after this attempt, his father visited Constantinople in a diplomatic mission, and when he expressed his desire to convert to Christianity and stay at Constantinople, Samonas 'would not agree to this, demanding that he go back home, retain his own religion and wait for his return at the first opportunity.' Shauen Tougher suggests that the flight probably occurred in the same year of the Arab advance on Constantinople and the sack of Thessalonike in 904, and Samonas 'might fear the anti-Arab sentiment within Byzantium.'

In fact, anti-Arab sentiment within Byzantium seems to have been a psychological barrier preventing the full integration of Arab apostates. The Byzantine society may accept Arab apostates to the extent that some could be raised to the highest status of Sainthood, but it certainly did not like the idea of the presence of elements occupying a position and influence in

Chronographia, 222.

109 Samonas tried to escape to Syria before 906, but was arrested near Halys River and was brought back to Byzantium. Leo GRAMMATICUS, Chronographia, 277-279; SKYLITZES, Synopsis, 178; ZONARAS, Epitomae Historiarum, ed. M. PINDER, CSHB, Bonn, 1897, 448.
110 JENKINS thinks that it was not a flight at all but a mission in disguise to obtain intelligence of Arab military plans, and “there is no suggestion of motive to induce the cubicularius to desert”. Rydén approves this suggestion considering it an “ingenious theory”. On the other hand, Tougher recommends that “Samonas simply wanted to return to his own people”, and “There seems to be no reason to doubt that this was the real motive”. R.J.H. JENKINS, Flight of Samonas, Speculum 23(1948), 217-235, esp. 218; RYDÉN, Portrait of Samonas, 103; TOUGHER, Reign of Leo VI, 215.
111 Leo GRAMMATICUS, Chronographia, 282-283; ZONARAS, Epitomae Historiarum, 452-453; SKYLITZES, Synopsis, 183-184. The quotation is taken from Skylitzes.
112 TOUGHER, Reign of Leo VI, 215.
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the imperial service. The insistence of Byzantine sources to emphasize the humble origin of apostates suggests a certain discontent with the status and influence they have achieved.\(^{114}\) This seems to have interacted with the Byzantine superiority complex, as opposed to the inferiority of the others in general and produced hostile feelings for which the Arab apostates had a considerable share. In the context of his talk about the privilege enjoyed by the family of Chasi, Constantine Porphyrogenitus criticizes his uncle, emperor Alexander, because he 'superseded all who had been appointed to any commands by the emperor his brother, of blessed memory, being thereto persuaded by malicious and foolish men'.\(^{115}\) Arethas, in his *Epitaphos*, points out that emperor Alexander handed over the imperial matters to the *Barbaroi*. Karlin-Hayter regards this criticism as a kind of defense mechanism from aristocratic families against the policy of favouring Slavs and Arabs in the senior positions.\(^{116}\) A mechanism that appears to be more pronounced in the case of Samonas. The Byzantine sources certainly intend to criticize emperor Leo VI himself when they attribute all evil traits to his right-hand man, Samonas.\(^{117}\) Lennart Rydén convincingly assumes that this attack was not directed against the person of Samonas, but it was an expression of resentment of the aristocratic class of Arab influence in the Byzantine court.\(^{118}\)

Anti-Arab sentiment within Byzantium sometimes exploded in the form of physical violence. Around 915, Chase's financial policies in the theme

\(^{114}\) As well as the *Vita Euthymii* shows Samonas as he began his life as a servant in the aristocratic of Stylianos Zaoutzes, Constantine Porphyrogenitus points to the origin of Chase as *the slave of the patrikios Damian*. *Vita Euthymii*, 49; Constantine PORPHYROGENITUS, *De Administrando*, 243. The negative portrait of Samonas and Chase for their inferior origin can be compared with the positive portrait of Theophobos presented by Genesios, who seems very sympathetic to him and was keen to emphasize his royal origin, to the extent that he criticized emperor Theophilos himself and accused him of treachery for putting Theophobos to death. *GENESIOS, On the Reigns*, p.52.

\(^{115}\) Constantine PORPHYROGENITUS, *De Administrando*, 243.


\(^{117}\) *Vita Euthymii* describes him as *a Satan in disguise*. Skylitzes criticized him as *the emperor's most artful collaborator in all things wicked and illegal*. Zonaras is even more cruel for using a series of ugly qualities as 'treacherous', 'dirty', 'corrupt' and 'evil'. *Vita Euthymii*, 91; SKYLITZES, *Synopsis*, 180; ZONARAS, *Epitomae Historiarum*, 431-454. See also RYDÉN, Portrait of Samonas, 103.

\(^{118}\) RYDÉN, Portrait of Samonas, 105.
of Helas have brought him hatred of the local inhabitants. According to Byzantine evidence, angry Athenians rebelled against him and stoned him to death before the altar of a church. In 1044, the angry inhabitants of Constantinople demonstrated in front of the Imperial Palace to protest the growing influence of foreigners in the city. Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos was forced to issue an order to foreigners who had lived in the city for 30 years to leave within three days or will be blinded. Thus, about 100,000 people were forced to leave, and no more than 12,000 people were allowed to stay because the Byzantines trusted them.

\[119\] Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, Liber VI, 388; Symeon Magister, 723; Georgius Monachus, 880; Leo Grammaticus, Chronographia, p.294.

\[120\] According to Ibn al-Athīr, these foreigners were from Muslims, Christians, and others. Bar Hebraeus records that they were Armenians, Arabs, and Jews. Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, VIII, 262; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 94.
(IV)

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Steps of the Damascene-Crusader Peace-building until the Treaty of (1140AD/534H)
This paper deals with the development of the peaceful relationships between the Seljuk Emirate of Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. Over the course of four decades, starting from 1099 – the year of the first Crusader invasion – both progressively parties opted not only to alter the prevailing spirit of hate into a peaceful one but also to form a mutual alliance. The first decade was characterized by military confrontations, as Damascus tried to face the Crusaders’ expansion, driven by the design to establish a European Christian polity in the Levant at the expense of the scattered Muslim emirates. Such military confrontations intensely harmed both parties alike; thus, they both resorted to peace as an appropriate solution to stop the bloodshed.

However, each party enjoyed external support, which affected their attempts at peacebuilding. In the case of the Seljuks, there were those who called for Jihad, and for the gathering of all available forces to expel the intruding Crusaders from the Kingdom of Jerusalem and from the whole Levant. Meanwhile, European supplies started to flow to back-up the Crusader states against their Muslim neighbours. Damascus’ rulers, who aspired to independence from the Seljuk State, resorted to the Crusaders to help them. The Crusaders seized upon such opportunity to create an independent Damascus that would have isolated them from the mounting powers calling for Islamic awakening. The good relationships between both parties reached their peak when Mu'ín ad-Dīn Unur al-Atabeki, the real ruler of Damascus, visited the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1140 to form an alliance against Imad ad-Dīn Zanki, who aimed at unifying the Muslims of Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, this paper studies this peculiar political relationship, based on common interests and utilitarianism disguised under the semblance of building peaceful relationships.
At the end of the eleventh century AD/the fifth century H, huge numbers of Europeans invaded the Levant, establishing a Crusader Kingdom based on Jerusalem in July 1099 AD/Ramadan 492 H. Such kingdom was surrounded from every side by various Muslim powers. Right away, an existential conflict – not a mere border dispute – broke out between the two major powers in the region; i.e. the Muslim Kingdom at Damascus, and the Crusader Kingdom at Jerusalem. Since the very first day of the establishment of the Crusader Kingdom in the Levant, military skirmishes had been consistently occurring, usually led by Damascus, except during periods of occasional truces and military inactivity.

This paper sheds light on the peaceful relationships between Damascus and Jerusalem; for both sides preferred to renounce the hostility that had long dominated their relationships, and to opt for peaceful coexistence. As a result of a historic political visit, on which this paper focuses, an alliance was formed between the two powers. Such a historical incident was in marked countertendency with the prevailing historical context.

First of all, it is important to give a quick review of the historical events that the region witnessed during this period. When the Crusaders first invaded Palestine, they were under the leadership of Godfrey De Bouillon and Tancred De Houtville. The former became the ruler of Jerusalem in July 1099 AD/Ramadan 492 AH; while the latter, in search for glory and gain, attacked the North of the region, where the cities of Galilee[1], Beisan, Tiberias, Nazareth, Mount Tabor, and Safed are located[2]. Tancred knew that he would not be able to protect his newly established principality and to retain his new title, Ruler of Galilee, unless he expanded eastward and brought under his rule the territories east of Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River until Hawran, known as Iqlim al-Sawâd (i.e. the land of the black.

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soil), as well as Damascus in the North. But his ambitions were not easily achieved, as he faced the stubborn resistance of the inhabitants of these lands who were loyal to the Seljuk Emir of Damascus, Shams al-Molouk Daqaq son of Tutush (1095–1104 AD), though the latter was not always ready to defend them against Tancred’s attacks. Conflicts between Muslims and Crusaders were inevitable in the wake of the conquest of Jerusalem. Repeated clashes between Damascus on the one hand, and Galilee as part of the Crusader Kingdom on the other, erupted since the new kingdom was in need of many resources to be able to live and prosper.

Thus, to secure its borders the Crusaders Kingdom needed to control the territories beyond the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias, which led to a series of existential conflicts. Tancred attacked the Arab tribes several times in order to frustrate any attempt by Damascus to regain control over the region. He used the traditional Arab tactics during his invasion of Eastern Jordan; such tactics consisted of repeated quick raids against the villages he wanted to seize, with the destruction of every standing building or cultivated crop. As a result, Tancred managed to amass piles of loot.

Tancred’s looting raids had some economic outcomes, resulting in a newly found prosperity for Jerusalem, after it had suffered from an acute shortage of resources. This led Godfrey to let him plan another invasion.

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3 The land of the black soil is a fertile land known to the Crusaders Historiographers as “Terre de Sainte”, Ibn al-Qalānisī mentioned it as “the Black lands of Tiberias” as it is located to the East of Lake Tiberias. See Albert D'Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 517; Abū Y’ali Ḥamzah Ibn al-Qalānisī (died 55H/1160AD), Tārīkh Abī Ya’lá Ḥamzah ibn al-Qalānisī (Beirut: Maṭbaʻat al-Ābā' al-Yasū’iy, 1908), 149. This land also known as Fik; see Grousset, des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem, 3 Vols, (Paris, 1948), vol. I, 246. N.2; Burchard of Mount Sion, A Description of the Holy Land, trans. from the original Latin by Aubrey Stewart, (London, 1896); Palestine Pilgrims Text Society (PPTS), vol. XII, 6-7.

4 Raoul de Caen, Gesta Tancredi, 703; Runciman, the Crusades, vol. I., 310.


9 Albert D'Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 517-518.
Iqlīm al-Sawād was not vital only because of the economic importance of its cultivated lands and crops, necessary for both the Muslims in Damascus and the Crusaders in the Kingdom; especially the wheat and the vine, but also the other goods traded through the Mediterranean Sea; it was also vital because of its strategic importance for the security of the Latin Crusaders in the Kingdom of Jerusalem: the natural route to be followed by any attackers coming from Damascus was through the region. In addition, a famous historian shed light upon the question of food security; he explained that Tancred intended his raids not only as a way to extend his control over the region, but also as a measure to prevent the inhabitants from staying loyal to Damascus, given that the Iqlīm al-Sawād was the only food basket in this region.

Thus, war and peace between Damascus and Jerusalem were matters closely related to the Iqlīm al-Sawād and which party was dominating it. The famous historian Albert D’Aix always referred to its ruler as Grossus Rusticus (i.e. the fat peasant) who was loyal to Damascus. However, when Tancred conquered this land, such ruler had to pay for him taxes as a sign of loyalty and obeisance. Yet, this ruler announced his rebellion against Tancred, and his lands returned under the control of Damascus. Once again, Tancred gained the upper hand and control over these territories when Godfrey assisted him, and the Grossus Rusticus had to negotiate with him to buy some time before Daqaq, ruler of Damascus, could arrive with his army to drive the Crusaders out of his lands. This is considered to be the first mention of “negotiations” between the two parties, though it occurred at the level of local rulers.

Tancred asked Godfrey to help him regain control of Iqlīm al-Sawād by preparing a greater raid, larger in numbers and arms. Both leaders

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14 He was known with such name because of his filthy richness; see Albert D’Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 517.
15 Runciman, the Crusades, 310-311.
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headed to this area, and within fifteen days they managed to capture these territories almost without encountering any resistance\(^{[16]}\), as the inhabitants fled. Given the new situation, the Grossus Rusticus had to sign an agreement submitting to Tancred, as he found himself helpless against the Crusaders’ army. In addition, his relationship with Damascus has been shaken, especially given that Daqaq had not sent any troops to defend him this time. This time, taxes had to be given to Godfrey\(^{[17]}\). Consequently, the war between Damascus and Jerusalem has been halted temporarily, and some seeds of peaceful relationships between the two parties began to grow.

During this period, only a few skirmishes over the borders were led by Damascus\(^{[18]}\), while Baldwin De Bouillon acceded to the throne of the Kingdom in December 1100AD/594H. Three months later, Tancred headed to Antioch after assuring himself that **Iqlīm al-Sawād** was firmly under his control. The new king began to set Jerusalem’s policy towards its Muslim neighbours by appointing Hugh of St. Omer (1101–1106AD/494–500H) as the ruler of Galilee. Baldwin wanted to hold a firm grip on the territories located east of the Jordan River and to the south of Yarmouk. He was given a golden opportunity in April 1101AD/494H when he learned that an Arab tribe was crossing the Jordanian valley in a trading caravan from Damascus, heading to Egypt or al-Ḥiğāz (nowadays known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), through the valley of Moses and the valley of Arabah by the Dead Sea. Baldwin and Hugh led an army and attacked the tribe’s encampment at night, leaving only a few numbers of survivors while all men were killed inside their tents; the Crusaders gathered much loot and captives that night\(^{[19]}\).

North of Yarmouk, where **Iqlīm al-Sawād** is located, the political situation remained the same for many years as the Grossus Rusticus stayed loyal to the Crusaders. The Crusaders’ policy changed from launching

\(^{[16]}\) Albert D’Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 517.

\(^{[17]}\) ibid; However, Heinrich Hagenmeyer seriously questioned what Albert D’Aix stated regarding Tancred’s military progress in Iqlim al-Sawad; see Heinrich Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie du Royaume de Jerusalem*, in R.O.L., Vol. VIII, (Paris 1900-1901), 329.

\(^{[18]}\) Ibn al-Qalānī, *Dhīl Tārīkh Dimashq (Appendix to the History of Damascus)* (Beirut: 1908), 138-139.

\(^{[19]}\) William of Tyre, vol. I, 422.
looting raids to settling and occupation\textsuperscript{20}. This did not mean that conflicts between Damascus and Jerusalem had stopped; rather they merely paused for a while until a clear solution over the shared borders was reached.

Rulers of Damascus started to show signs of recovery from the consecutive attacks of the Crusaders; they started to extend their control over the surrounding areas, not just those adjacent to the Crusader Kingdom, perhaps in the attempt to gather more troops to confront the encroaching Crusaders. In addition, they sought to create a balanced relationship with the Seljuk ruler of Aleppo, Fakhr al-Mulk Radwan son of Tutush I son of Al Arslan (1095–113AD/488–506H), in order to focus their attention upon facing the Crusaders\textsuperscript{21}. A shift in the events happened when Daqaq son of Tutush died on the 4\textsuperscript{th} of June 1104AD/the 12\textsuperscript{th} of Ramadan 497H; thus, the Turkic military leader of Aleppo, Zahîr al-Dîn Toghtekîn\textsuperscript{22}, rose to power becoming the custodian of his underage ruler, hence gaining the control of Basra once again. Meanwhile, the Seljuk leaders were preoccupied with their internal conflicts, which gave Toghtekîn a good opportunity to achieve greater independence and put him in a more favourable position, since Damascus did not get involved in such conflicts\textsuperscript{23}.

In 1105AD/499H, Hugh of St. Omer finished the construction of al-Ãāl Citadel\textsuperscript{24} which became one of the most fortified citadels in the region\textsuperscript{25}, strategically located over the top of al-Smakh Mountain in the South-East area of Lake Tiberias to control trade routes extending from Iraq and the Arab Sea to the Mediterranean Sea\textsuperscript{26}. In addition, the Citadel played an

\textsuperscript{23} Ibn al-Qalânisî, \textit{Târîkh Dimashq}, 150.
\textsuperscript{24} For more details about the Citadel, see Ali Ahmed El Sayed, "Emārit al-Jālîl Taḥt Ḥukm al-Latīn wa Durha al-Ṣiāsî fî al-Šīrā’ā al-Ṣalîbî al-Islāmî 1099-1154 / 492-549, (The Principality of Galilee under the Latin Rule and Its Political Role in the Crusader-Islamic Conflict in the Levant)." (Master Thesis, Alexandria University, Faculty of Arts, Egypt, 1988), 127-128.
\textsuperscript{25} Runciman, the Crusades, vol. II, 100.
\textsuperscript{26} Grousset, \textit{des Croisades}, vol. II, 841; Conder, \textit{The Latin Kingdom}, 89.
important military role as well by securing Iqlīm al-Sawād and Hawran for the Crusaders since it became a strong defensive base[27]. An important reference to the military role of the Citadel is found in the writings of Claude Reignier Conder, who stated that this Citadel was considered the farther point in the Jordanian lands controlled by the Crusaders, [28] completing a line of citadels starting from Banias and reaching the Aouf Mountains[29] in the east and al-Rabad Citadel in the south that protects Iqlīm al-Sawād[30]. The ruins of al-Āāl Citadel are still standing to this day[31].

Toghtekīn knew to what extent al-Āāl Citadel represented a real threat to his country since the Kingdom of Jerusalem had built it to strengthen the Crusaders’ power in the lands beyond the Jordan River. Of course, he could not allow such state of affairs: clashes between the two parties would rekindle soon once again. Ibn al-Athīr referred to this fact as he mentioned that skirmishes took place once again between the troops of Damascus and the Crusaders, but the outcome was inconclusive as neither party managed to prevail. Eventually, the Crusaders built al-Āāl Citadel. Toghtekīn was worried about the consequences; accordingly, he led his army and headed to destroy it. This resulted in a great battle between Toghtekīn and Hugh of St. Omer[32]. The priest historian Fulcher of Chartres recorded these events in the late summer of 1106AD/499H and added that Hugh of St.Omer was killed by an arrow while participating to another crusade led by Baldwin on the same region[33]. Albert D’Aix relates that Hugh was killed by some Muslims in an area near Banias as they tracked him and managed to retrieve

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28 Conder, The Latin Kingdom, 89.
30 Conder, The Latin Kingdom, 89.
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all the loot\(^{34}\). Islamic sources agree with the Crusaders’ narratives of the events but disagreed on the exact date. They state that Toghtekīn achieved a great victory, destroying the citadel and taking captive hundreds of his enemies\(^{35}\).

The Latin invasion of **Iqlīm al-Sawād** was contained, so that the Crusaders extended their control over the eastern part of the Jordanian lands, but did not achieve total control over the region. This uneasy equilibrium led both parties to prepare for another military confrontation. Toghtekīn sought the help of the Seljuk Sultan Muhammad son of Malik Shah I (1105–1117AD/498–511H) who sent him many Turk soldiers. Toghtekīn also gave al-Asfahbaz Sabawū the regained lands in the valley of Moses, Muʿāb, al-Sharah Mountains at Ma'an, and al-Balqa'\(^{36}\); in other words, the region in the South-East of the Jordan River. On the other hand, King Baldwin I thought of expanding his borders eastwards once again by force. Thus, he decided to relocate to Tiberias on October 1106/Safar 500H providing it with a new garrison, and appointed a courageous knight as the new ruler of Galilee as the successor of its preceding ruler, Hugh of St.Omer, by choosing Gervase of Bazoches to protect the borders of the kingdom\(^{37}\). It is clear that both Damascus and Jerusalem opted for a ruler with a military background, which was a clear indication that clashes between the two polities were to continue.

When the Crusaders learned that al-Asfahbaz was leading his troops towards them, they set their camp in a nearby area, and waited for a good opportunity to attack. “they launched a sudden raid near Gaza, and al-Asfahbaz lost most of his men, yet he managed to escape!” In Hawran, al-Asfahbaz met Toghtekīn who reinforced him with other troops\(^{38}\). Baldwin

\(^{34}\) Albert D’Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 633.


\(^{36}\) Kurd Ali, *Al-Sham*, vol. I, 288; The Valley of Moses is in the South of Jerusalem; for more details about “Muʿāb”, see Botros Abdelmalik, *Arabic Bible Dictionary* (St. Takla Library, Alexandria-Egypt 1894).


\(^{38}\) Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Tārīkh Dimashq*, 159.
I, who was in Acre after the Christmas of 1107AD/500H, was informed that Toghtekīn was leading an army towards Tiberias to expel the Crusaders and their new ruler Gervase. Consequently, Baldwin I took his knights and made a scouting maneuver and managed to gather intelligence about the Damascene troops and the exact location of their camps, discovering that their numbers reached three thousand men. He could return safely through tortuous paths known to his men.[39]

The maneuver was fruitful as five Turks came to the camp of Baldwin I in the evening to convey a message from their leaders stating their desire to reach peace with the Crusaders. Negotiations were held and the envoys returned to their camp on the 5th of January 1107 AD/ the 9th of Jumada al-Aoula 500 H, spreading the news that the Crusaders were militarily prepared for another fierce battle. Thus, the Turks decided to withdraw to Damascus[40]. Perhaps Toghtekīn was obliged to take such step because he entered into several conflicts with his Muslim neighbours right after his withdrawal[41]. Although late historians did not deal with this incident in detail, they were divided into two groups; the first group linked the peace talks to the truce that took place in the very following year 1108AD/502H[42], whereas, the second group considered such talks as a separate historical incident that had nothing to do with the Peace Treaty[43].

In this regard, the researcher deems that it would have been difficult for seeds of peace to grow within such a hatred-drenched soil; especially since the events that occurred in the following month highlight the bad relationships between Damascus and Jerusalem[44]. On the one hand, Baldwin I led an attack against the Arab tribes in the Eastern Jordan. On the other hand, Toghtekīn camped in Iqīm al-Sawād seeking revenge! He

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[39] Ibid.
[40] Albert D’Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 642-643
led a sudden raid on Galilee right after Easter 1107AD; subsequently, Baldwin I had to leave Tiberias and hurried to Acre[45].

During the first ten days of May 1108AD/Ramadan 501H[46] Toghtekîn went to the mountains near Tiberias, which made its ruler Gervase enter into a battle with him[47]. In the dark, Toghtekîn led four thousand men to enter Tiberias and made sure not to attack with the whole army; rather he sent some knights as a ruse to lure out the Crusaders and defeat them. Gervase and his troops pursued the knights and fell right into the trap set among the mountains [48], and they were showered with arrows. However, they fought back [49], but most of the Crusaders were killed. Only two men managed to flee back to Tiberias and narrated the horrific story of the battle[50], and the news that their leader Gervase had been captured[51]. Toghtekîn then sent some captives as presents to the Seljuk Sultan Muhammad I, and the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir (1094–1118AD/487–512H)[52]; while the fate of the rest of the captives relied on that of their leader Gervase [53].

The researcher believes that this attack is considered the one that affected the Northern parts of the Kingdom of Jerusalem up till that moment the most. The triumph of Damascus over Galilee was a crushing blow for the local Crusaders; since the rest of the Northern area of the

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45 Albert D’Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 645.
46 Sibṭ ibn-al-jūzī, Mi’rāt al-Zamān fi Tārīkh al- Ā’āiyān (The Chronicle of Mirror of Time in the History of Notables), VIII (Ḥīdār Ābād: 1951-1952), 25; Nasser al-Dīn Mohamed ibn al-Forat (d. 907H/1502AD), Tārīkh al-Dowal wal-Molūk (The history of countries and kings) (Beirut 1936), vol. I, picture 2; Albert D’Aix said that it was during the Spring Feasts i.e. the 11th of May 1108. See Albert D’Aix, 645.
48 This battle had taken place either in the East or the North of Lake Tiberias. For more details see Albert D’Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 645; Grousset, des Croisades, vol. II, 845.
49 Albert D’Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 637.
50 Ibid
51 Ibn al-Qalānisī, Tārīkh Dimashq, 161; Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi, 25.
53 Albert D’Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana, 637.
Kingdom laid defenseless in front of the Muslim army that was positioned to assume control of Tiberias, Safed, Nazareth, and Beisan. The well-known historian al-Hariri of Basra, who was a high government official of the Seljuk Empire, regarded holding Gervase as captive to be key for “controlling Tiberias and the near villages”[54]. However, most of the primary sources stated otherwise as Tiberias stayed under the rule of the Crusaders after this battle.

In fact, Toghtekīn used Gervase as a bargaining chip against Baldwin I[55], and requested the handover of Galilee as well as the release of all Muslim captives. Yet, Baldwin I replied: “You should know that we will never hand over these cities in return for one man ... and in case you killed him, we will launch a new war”[56]. The Islamic sources state that Baldwin I offered a thirty thousand-dinars ransom, and the release of 500 Muslim captives[57].

Toghtekīn offered to spare Gervase’s life if he converted to Islam, but Gervase refused. Then Toghtekīn tied him to a trunk and he was showered with arrows[58]. Albert D’Aix stated that a Turk leader hanged the head of Gervase over one of the gates of Damascus[59]. This was the customary way the Turks dealt with their enemies[60] – they used to cut off the heads of the defeated and put them at the top of their lancers as a sign of victory [61].

As a result of the defeat of the Crusaders in this battle, there was a great deal of instability in the Kingdom; this was evident when Baldwin I relocated to Tiberias to defend the boundaries[62]. On the other hand, such victory of Toghtekīn had a great impact upon the scattered Muslim forces in the Levant, which started to regard him as the foremost Muslim leader

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in the struggle against the Crusaders. Since then, the necessity of a powerful Muslim polity to defend the borders became a prevailing notion.

One of the main results of the defeat of Gervase was the truce between Damascus and Jerusalem, which had a drastic effect upon the relationship between both parties. Indeed, the Crusaders stopped their expansion for several years\textsuperscript{63}, in line with the now prevailing desire for peace. A decade full of clashes and conflicts had finally come to an end\textsuperscript{64}, and the fact that many common interests between both parties did exist imposed the truce and the need for an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence\textsuperscript{65}. Reciprocal raids affected the trade dramatically; corps and livestock in Hawran and Iqlim al-Sawād were frequently destroyed. Toghtekīn seized the opportunity to alter his policy; especially given that he got the upper hand after his triumph.

Islamic sources highlighted some details of this truce and stated that it was concluded in 502H\textsuperscript{66}, i.e. between August 1108 and July 1109 AD. The truce called for a halt to war between both parties for four years. Iqlim al-Sawād and the Aouf Mountains were divided into three thirds; one third to be under the control of the Crusaders, and two thirds under Muslim rule\textsuperscript{67}. The people of Damascus and the local farmers were to share the yields\textsuperscript{68}. Some historians see that Crusaders and Muslims disagreed on the exact borders of the lands stated in the truce; Damascus believed that it extended till the southern parts reaching the Red Sea, while Jerusalem claimed that it stopped at the borders of al-Yarmouk River in the South\textsuperscript{69}. This disagreement could be explained by examining each party’s point of view. Logically, Crusaders regarded the region from the city of al-Yarmouk till Ayla at the top of the Gulf of Aqaba to be under their control following

\textsuperscript{63} Grousset, \textit{des Croisades}, vol. I, 253.

\textsuperscript{64} Prawer, \textit{Crusader Institutions}, 474.

\textsuperscript{65} Runciman, \textit{the Crusades}, vol. II, 102.


\textsuperscript{67} Ibn al-Qalānisī, \textit{Tārīkh Dimashq}, 164.


\textsuperscript{69} Prawer, \textit{Crusader Institutions}, 474.
their victory over the Fatimids in al-Ramleh in three raids, the last of which was on 1105AD; however, the Muslim party considered the area as part and parcel of the Eastern region of the Jordan River that is geographically linked to Damascus.

Two years after the signing of truce, its clauses were changed. Muslim historians stated that Baldwin I had intentionally leaked information about his intentions to attack Damascus. He even contacted some of the Crusaders powers in the Levant to join him. Accordingly, Toghtekîn did the same and sought the help of the Seljuk ruler of Aleppo, Fakhr al-Mulk Radwan, in order to face Baldwin I in Hawran. Baldwin I fled “after his trick did not work out” and he found himself forced to conform to the truce; hence a correspondence between both leaders was exchanged once again and the truce was renewed. Although there was no reason for Toghtekîn to offer more, he did just as much; perhaps due to the recurrent threats by the Crusaders. The new truce modified the earlier one, and Baldwin I was given half of the yields of Iqlîm al-Sawād and Aouf Mountains, in addition to some other regions that used to be owned by the Arab locals. After signing the new truce, both leaders went back to their respective cities on the 19th July 1110 AD/the 28th Zulhejjah 503 H.

In fact, comments on this truce varied; some said that both parties had a shared control over Iqlîm al-Sawād and Hawran, a kind of political management known as condominium. That is to say that the truce should have stated the demilitarization of the divided region, i.e. what is nowadays known as a disarmed area. Nevertheless, the Crusaders thus achieved better

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70 After Muslim Armies had entered Al-Sham (i.e. the Levant), it was divided into five main “ajnad” (i.e. regions), see “Lisan al-Arab” Lexicon, (Damascus: Al-Nawader Publishing House, 2006).
73 Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī al-Qalqashandî, (d.1355 or 1356-1418), *Kitāb Ṣubḥ al-a‘shā*, vol. 12 (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Amīrīyah, 1913), 124.
75 Prawer, *The Latin kingdom*, 16-17.
terms, increasing their yields from a third to half; they also extended their control over more land than what was stated in the first truce.

This modified truce represented the foundation upon which the relationship between Damascus and Jerusalem was based for a long time irrespective of the different rulers. The famous historian, Ibn Wassel, did mention more details about this truce when he stated that “Tiberias used to have the half of the yields of Iqlīm al-Sawād, the Aouf Mountains, the Golan Heights, and Hawran... And when Muslims regained Tiberias, everything returned back to them”[76], after the Battle of Hattin in 1187AD/583H.

However, the eminent geographer and traveler, ibn Jobayr, provided an accurate account of the borders between Damascus and The Kingdom of Jerusalem when he crossed these lands on 1183AD/579H. He stated that “Muslims and Crusaders shared the yields of this land evenly”, then added: “we, then, found a great Oak Tree... we were told that this tree is known as the border limit... anyone and anything that happened to be before this tree, even it was a matter of few inches, is considered to belong to the Muslims... likewise, anyone and anything that happened to be after this tree, even it was a matter of few inches, is considered to belong to the Crusaders .. and both sides strictly adhere to this set agreement”[77].

Did both parties, Damascus and Jerusalem, have a true belief in the necessity of peaceful coexistence? To answer this unavoidable question, we should examine certain facts within the historical context of both parties, as each represented a greater power. On the one hand, the Seljuk Sultan, the Abbasid Caliph, and Islamic Scholars had their eyes fixed on the Seljuk cities on the borders with the Crusades; especially Aleppo, Hamah, Hims, and Damascus. On the other hand, the European leaders had kept a close eye on the role of the Crusaders in the Latin East; and especially on their military activities against the Muslims. No to mention the Byzantine Empire that constantly looked to play a greater role in the Levant. Another equally important factor to be taken into consideration is

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the actual attitude of the locals residing in the region within both camps; i.e. whether they did believe in the dire need of reconciliation or not. All such factors, as well as other various ones, significantly affected the shaping of the political paradigm followed by the local leaders in the region, who suffered greatly from the prolonged conflict, and who would touch firsthand the fruitful results of promoting an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence as well.

Within this framework, the truce remained valid for three decades; except for some instances, such as the battle of al-Snobara 1113AD/507H\(^\text{78}\), which was severe enough to put an end for such truce. However, the powerful ruler of Aleppo, Imad ad-Dīn Zanki, opted for unifying the scattered Muslim forces through controlling Damascus; thus, he besieged the city twice in 1139–1140AD/534H, and it was about to fall in the first time. When its king Jamal ad-Dīn Muhammad died on March 1140/Shaaban 534, his son Mujir ad-Dīn Abaq (1140–1154AD/534–549H) took over; hence, Imad ad-Dīn Zanki thought of seizing the opportunity and besieged Damascus for the second time. Nonetheless, its renown leader, Mu'in ad-Dīn Unur al-Atabeki, who got great influence during the rule of Mujir ad-Dīn Abaq since he was the custodian of the underage ruler, decided to confront Imad ad-Dīn Zanki\(^\text{79}\).

When Imad ad-Dīn Zanki could not capture Damascus, he took over Banias because of its strategic importance as the base from which Damascus could be isolated from the Crusaders Kingdom lest the former sought the latter’s assistance in case he attacked it\(^\text{80}\). Since Imad ad-Dīn Zanki did have an enormous power that Damascus could not withstand, Mu'in ad-Dīn Unur al-Atabeki searched for any savior; yet he found no one except for the Crusaders Kingdom, thus he decided to open negotiations. He chose Usamah ibn Munqidh son of Sultan the Emir of Shaizar to be his envoy\(^\text{81}\).

\(^{78}\) Damascus had to ally with the Seljuk leader, Sharaf ad-Dīn Mawdūd, to fight the Crusaders. However, some historiographers believe that Toghtekīn conspired to get him killed lest he intervened in the pre-set plans; see Fulcher of Chartres, *A History*, 208, 2010.


\(^{80}\) Ibn al-Qalānisī , *Tārīkh Dimashq*, 269-270

Whence Usamah ibn Munqidh reached Jerusalem, leaders of the Crusaders Kingdom held a meeting to discuss the suggestions of the Messenger of Damascus, he suggested signing an agreement between Damascus and the Kingdom to be a seed of nurturing long-term peaceful relationships. It seemed that the negotiations had positive results, given that Mu'in ad-Dīn Unur al-Atabeki himself went with Usamah ibn Munqidh to sign a peace treaty with his former enemies!

The Crusaders King Fulk of Anjou (1143–1131) appointed the ruler of Galilee, William of Bour, to receive the Damascene delegation in Tiberias and to accompany them to Acre. During the negotiations, the Crusaders King was cautious not to hasten the process, just as he had been advised by his commanders, advisors, and nobles. However, Unur and ibn Munqidh warned him that “if Imad ad-Dīn Zanki controlled Damascus, he would control Jerusalem as well; in no time, there would be no place left for the Crusaders in the whole coast” Accordingly, their fate became interconnected.

The Crusaders then fully realized that Imad ad-Dīn Zanki had already captured al-Mawṣil, Aleppo, Hamah, Baalbeck, and Banias; this meant that he was just a stone's throw away from unifying the whole Muslim forces in Syria and Iraq, which in turn meant throwing the Crusaders back into the sea!

Consequently, all nobles and leaders of the Kingdom agreed to sign this peace treaty after scrutinizing thorough study. It is worth mentioning that the reception ceremonies of Unur that were held in the court of the Crusaders King indicated the warmth of the relationship between them. The King had given Unur many gifts, among which was a hunting falcon of rare species as ibn Munqidh narrated. William of Bour accompanied the delegation in the return from Acre to Tiberias, and they were his guests for few days. Both parties, then, started to follow the clauses of the peace treaty they had signed.

85 Usāmah ibn Munqidh (d. 584H/1188AD), Kitab al i’tibar, ed. Hartwig Derenbourg,
Sources of both camps agree on the account given by Ibn al-Qalanisi of the stipulations of the peace treaty when he said that: “both parties agreed at facing him – i.e. Imad ad-Dīn Zanki – and prevent him from entering Damascus by all means. The Crusaders asked the Damascenes to pay them for that, and to send some members of the Ruling Family as a guarantee... and they were prepared for the fight”\[86\] William of Tyre also named it a “treaty”, though pointing out that the exact amount of money was twenty golden coin paid monthly in return of forming a strong defense against the powerful army of Imad ad-Dīn Zanki\[87\].

The peace treaty stated that Unur was to hand over Banias for the Crusaders once taken from the ruler appointed by Imad ad-Dīn Zanki, Ibrahim ibn Taghrot; until then, Damascus was to send some members of the Ruling Family to stay at the Crusaders’ camp as hostages to guarantee the agreement\[88\]. It is worth mentioning here that Toghtekīn had made of Banias an independent buffer state located in-between the two camps by handing it to the leader of the Assassins of the Levant, Bahram al-Bāṭini\[89\], who was responsible for defending it\[90\]. However, after the death of Toghtekīn, the Crusaders managed to take it over in 1129AD/523H\[91\]. Three years later, the new ruler of Damascus, Shams al-molūk Būri, regained Banias once again\[92\]; yet, in 1140AD/534H Imad ad-Dīn Zanki controlled it and attempted to drive the Damascenes away from the Crusaders\[93\].

Consequently, the terms and conditions of the peace treaty had to be executed; immediately, orders were given for the troops of the Crusaders Kingdom in Jerusalem to gather in Hawala near Tiberias on April/Ramadan of the same year. Imad ad-Dīn Zanki had to lift the siege of Damascus,

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\[87\] William of Tyre, vol. II, 105.
\[88\] Ibid.
which represented a good opportunity for Unur to lead his army towards Banias to fulfill his earlier promises to the Crusaders.

Unur managed to recapture Banias once again\(^\text{94}\) as Imad ad-Dīn Zanki had to leave it since he was cautious not to confront the armies of the Crusaders and the Damascenes at the same time, taking into consideration the defeat of Ibrahim ibn Taghrot\(^\text{95}\).

In fact, some historians regard the treaty of 1140AD/534H as a turning point in the history of the political relationships between the Muslims and Crusaders\(^\text{96}\) since Imad ad-Dīn Zanki retreated from Damascus, and lost Banias to the Crusaders. Opportunism and common interests played an important role in shaping the political scheme of that period in the region. Furthermore, a friendly spirit prevailed in the relationships between Damascus and Jerusalem\(^\text{97}\).

Such amicable relationships lasted for years, hindering the advance of Imad ad-Dīn Zanki to a great extent\(^\text{98}\). This was the case until major European forces came from overseas aiming to expand the Crusader Kingdom on the expense of Damascus, this event historically known as the Second Crusade (1147–1148AD/534–544H). However, nobles and leaders of Jerusalem were not interested in reigniting the military conflict with their Muslim neighbours. This was evident when they did not offer their full assistance to the European Kings. Some historiographers considered such attitude as high treason, they even accused them of being bribed by the leaders of Damascus in order to misguide the Western Kings, and maybe even prevent them from taking Damascus! This, in turn, led to the failure of the Second Crusade and reinforced the peace treaty.

The alliance between Jerusalem and Damascus was to come to an end when Imad ad-Dīn Zanki controlled Damascus on 1154AD/549H;

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\(^94\) Ibid.  
\(^97\) Grousset, *des Croisades*, vol. II, 143.  
nonetheless, he preferred to keep peaceful relationships with the Crusaders camp. Thus, the truce was renewed on 1156AD/551H. This was apparent when large numbers of Arab and Turk shepherds wandered freely in the Golan Heights right beside Banias after being allowed to do so by the Crusaders King[99]. Yet, Baldwin III (114—1152AD/539–547H) broke the treaty and attacked those peaceful shepherds. Excepting a counter-attack led by Nūr ad-Dīn Mahmūd, Baldwin III appointed the ruler of Tebnīn, Humphry II, to defend the Kingdom. On April 1157AD/Rabia al-Awal 552H, Baldwin III gave half of the yields of Banias to the Hospitallers in return for defending it[100] making it an independent buffer state between the Crusaders and the Damascenes, just as it was while under the protection of the Assassins of the Levant.

Indeed, the truce was shaken when Nūr ad-Dīn Mahmūd besieged Banias on October 1164AD/ Zulhejjah 559 AH, and managed to regain it whilst its ruler Amalric I (1162–1174AD/557–569H) was in Egypt. This meant that Damascus gained the upper hand once again; as Ibn al-ʿAdīm put it “Nūr ad-Dīn Mahmūd had half the yields of the surrounding villages of Tiberias… and the Crusaders paid him yearly tributes over the other villages of which he did not receive half the yields[101]”. This, in turn, meant that Nūr ad-Dīn Mahmūd managed to extend the Muslim control to the lands beyond Banias, which Tancred De Houtville once controlled more than six decades earlier.

Nevertheless, after the death of Nūr ad-Dīn Mahmūd in 1174AD/569H, the Crusaders seized the opportunity and besieged Banias until the truce was renewed once again with the previous terms and conditions; i.e. taking the half of the yields of Banias[102], which remained a clear borderline between both major powers till the Battle of Hattin 1187AD/583H.

Thus, as clarified throughout the past pages, the conflict between Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom was an existential conflict – not a

mere conflict over borders – that dragged for a long time and eventually had to come to an end. Basically, societies tend to live in peaceful coexistence in order to be able to prosper. Indeed, leaders of both camps managed to reach pacification and an agreement of sorts. The process began with the signing of the truce splitting the yields of the lands between Damascus and the Crusaders into thirds, later modified to split them into halves in 1110AD/504H. This later resulted in the signing of the peace treaty of 1140AD/534H that represented a major turning point in the history of the relationships between both camps, until Saladin managed to reshape the political landscape of the whole region.
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Studies in Peace-building History

The Conflict between the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum and the Empire of Trebizond on the southern shores of the Black Sea in the early 13th century AD

Al-Metwally El-Sayed Tamim

Although the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum succeeded at the end of the twelfth century\(^1\) in achieving almost complete control over the Anatolian plateau, it suffered from being a land-locked state. It had no access to the surrounding seaports, the Mediterranean in the south, and the Black Sea in the north, except through the territory of the Byzantine Empire. This represented a significant disadvantage, since, the Byzantine Empire occasionally closed the commercial routes leading to those seas to Muslim merchants, and even committed piracy against them, as a form of political and economic punishment against the Seljuk sultanate of Rum. Therefore, the Seljuk sultanate of Rum strived to reach the shores of those seas and to control ports on both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

This research aims to study the struggle of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum with the Empire of Trebizond in order to reach one of the southern shores of the Black Sea. Such struggle that started at the first quarter of the thirteenth century AD. It resulted in the Seljuks not only succeeding in taking control of the port of Sinop on the Black Sea, but also in bringing the Empire of Trebizond under the influence of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum.

The relations between the Empire of Trebizond and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum were studied, either monographically or within the general history of the region, by many specialists of Byzantine and Seljuk history. In a 1988 article, Michel Kuršanskis tackled the relations between the Empire

\(^{1}\) The defeat of the Byzantines in the Battle of Myriocephalum (late 571 AH / summer 1176) opened the way for the Seljuks to penetrate into Asia Minor, to strengthen their authorities there, and to totally destroy the Byzantine plans, which targets expelling the Seljuks from this area and retrieving it. This battle also resolved the fate of Asia Minor, where it almost completely destroyed Byzantium's plans for recovery, as well as her dreams of attacking Konya and expelling the Turks from Asia Minor, and thus strengthening the influence of Seljuks of the Rum in Asia Minor. For more details on the battle and its results, see: Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century, (London 1971), 123-6. (Afterward, Vryonis, Decline).
of Trebizond and the Turks during the thirteenth century AD.¹ Rustam Shukurov also discussed these relations in the period 1204-1299.² The relations between the two sides were also studied within the general history of the region by a number of researchers such as Vryonis and Claude Cahen.³

The Seljuk Sultanate of Rum began its quest to get the first sea port on the Black Sea at the end of the twelfth century AD, despite the turmoil which the Sultanate suffered on account of the succession dispute between the sons of Sultan Kilij Arslan II (1156-1192)⁴. In 1194, Prince Rukn al-

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³ Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history 1071-1330, (New York, 1968). (Afterward, Cahen, Pre-Ottoman); Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century, (London 1971). (Afterward, Vryonis, Decline).
⁴ Sultan Kilij Arslan II, at the end of his life, especially after his illness, had divided the Sultanate among his eleven sons; but he realized, but, unfortunately, it was too late, the enormity of his mistake. As a result, he decided to reunite the Sultanate again, under the leadership of one man, his minor son, Kaykhusraw I (Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kai-Khusraw I) (1ˢᵗ reign: 1192-1197, 2ⁿᵈ reign: 1205-1211), who was the leader of Konya, providing to him allegiance of princes and dignitaries. Such situation created a power-conflict between brothers. The power-conflict was so strong between Kaykhusraw I. and his brother Qutb al-Dīn Malikshāh, the ruler of Sivas and Akseray, who was died quickly, and Rukn al-Dīn Suleiman Shah, the ruler of Tokat, who succeeded in seizing Sivas and Akseray, and then marched towards the capital Konya and managed to expel Kaykhusraw I. and seize power In 593 AH / 1197 AD. He succeeded in capturing the property of his brothers one by one. For more details on the division of the Sultanate of Kilij Arslan II among his sons and the conflict arisen between him and his sons, see: Ibn al-Athīr, ‘Izz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Jazarī (1160-1233), Al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh, reviewed and corrected, Dr. Mohammad Yousuf, (Beirut, 2002),Vol, 10, 219-222, 275, 292, (Afterward, Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil); Unknown author, Seljuks of the Rum (Saljūq-Nāma) of the 7th Century AH (akhbār salajiqat alrum, Mukhtaşar Seljuknama), translated by Mohammed Al-Saeed Jamal Aldin (2nd edition, Cairo: Supreme Council of Culture, 2007), 2-7 (Afterward, Saljūq-Nāma); Gregorius Ibn al- ‘Ibrī, (Abu-Alfaraj Jamal Al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Ibrī) (d. 1286), Tārīkh al-Zamān, Translated to Arab, P. Ishaq Armaleh (Beirut: Dar Al Mashreq, 1986), 225, (Afterward, Ibn al-‘Ibrī, Tārīkh al-Zamān); Mohammed Suhail Tqoh, The History of the Seljuq Rum in Asia Minor (470-704 H. / 1077-1304 AD.) Introduction to the History of the Ottomans, (Dar Al-Nnafayisi, 2002), 207-209, 213-214, (Afterward, Tqoh, Seljuq Rum).
Dīn Suleiman Shāh, Prince of Tokat, (reigned 1197-1204), succeeded in seizing the port of Samsun (Aminsos or Amisos), on the Black Sea.  

At first, Byzantium tried defusing the situation with the Seljuks. In 1195, Emperor Alexios III Angelos (1195-1203) signed a peace treaty with Sultan Kaykhusraw I (1st reign: 1192-1197, 2nd reign: 1205-1211), but the treaty was revoked in the same year by Byzantine Emperor Alexios III, who arrested the Seljuk merchants of Rum and the Turks who came from Konya to Constantinople, imprisoned them and confiscated their goods. It seems from the succession of events that this was in response to the Seljuk takeover of the port of Samsun. Be it as it may, Sultan Kaykhusraw I was in need of Byzantine support in order to be able to face his more powerful brother Prince Rukn al-Dīn, who was eager to take over the Seljuk throne; therefore, in the spring of the following year (1196) he negotiated a truce with Alexios III, and visited Constantinople to meet with the Byzantine Emperor personally, offering him his friendship. However, the Emperor preferred not to respond to his offer to avoid a clash with Prince Rukn al-Dīn, the actual ruler of the Sultanate. This matter forced Kaykhusraw I to give up all his possessions to his brother Rukn al-Dīn and to leave his capital Konya. He was followed by his sons Izz al-Dīn Kay-kāūs and Alā al-Dīn Kay-Kubādh. Thus, Rukn al-Dīn became the sultan of the Sultanate of Rum (1197-1204).

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5 Nicetas Choniates refers to the sons of Kīlīj Arslan II. and the cities they ruled. It is mentioned that Prince Rukn al-Dīn was the ruler of the cities of Amuseus and Dokeia (a city in the province of, Paphlagonia, west of the city of Aminsus, on the river Halys) and other coastal cities. See Nicetas Choniates, *O city of Byzantium, Annals of Nicetas Choniates*, Translated by Harry J. Magoulias, (Detroit, 1984), 286, 403, n.1399; (Afterward, Choniates); Kuršanskis, *Trébizonde*, 110; D. Korobeinikov, *Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century*, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 117, (Afterward, Korobeinikov, Byzantium); Anthony Bryer and David Winfield, *The Byzantine monuments and topography of the Pontos*, with Maps and Plans by Richard Anderson and Drawings by June Winfield, vol. I (Washington, 1985),71, 93-5, (Afterward, Bryer, Byzantine monuments).

6 Choniates, 253; Korobeinikov, Byzantium, 118.

7 Choniates, 271; Korobeinikov, Byzantium, 118.

8 The translator of Choniates notes that those events took place in 1199 or 1200 AD, see: Choniates, 286.

9 Regarding the first travel of Kaykhusraw I and asking help from the Armenians and Byzantines to recover his throne and his failure, see: Choniates, 286-7; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, *Tārīkh*
Furthermore, Byzantium continued its economic war against the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in the Black Sea region, in order to curb its trade in Samsun. Therefore, the Byzantine emperor sent one of his commanders, Constantine Frangopoulos, in 1200, with more than six ships, to the Black Sea under the pretext of investigating the sinking of a Byzantine ship in the Phasis River near Kerasous while it was in its way to Byzantium. Their real aim, however, was to attack the Muslim merchants who were sailing on their way to Samsun and to loot their goods. When the Muslim merchants complained to Sultan Rukn al-Dīn, he demanded the Byzantine emperor to compensate them for the goods that were looted, and the emperor complied. A peace treaty was concluded between the Seljuks and the Byzantines that year. The treaty stipulated that the Byzantines pay compensation of fifty minas, in addition to the annual tribute. However, this treaty was soon denounced by Byzantium, when the Byzantine emperor conspired against the life of Sultan Rukn al-Dīn by sending someone to kill him. However, the plot was uncovered and the assassin was arrested. The Seljuks responded to the conspiracy by looting Byzantine cities along the Meander River.

The Byzantine Emperor Alexios III attempted to ease the Seljuk pressure on Byzantium and pressure the Sultan. He supported the former Sultan Kaykhusraw I, who had been living in Constantinople in 1200 AD, baptized him as his son, and united him in marriage to the daughter of one of the Byzantine nobleman called Maurozomes. Kaykhusraw I remained in Constantinople until it was conquered by the Crusaders in 1203; when he fled to the castle of Maurozomes in the vicinity of Constantinople and remained there until he returned to the throne again in 1205, after the death of Sultan Rukn al-Dīn in 1204.

al-Zamān, 233-234; Saljūq-Nāma, 7-20; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 118-25; Tqoh, Seljuks of the Rum, 211-213.
10 Choniates, 290; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 125.
11 Choniates, 290; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 125.
12 George Akropolites, The History, Introduction, translation and commentary, Ruth Macrides, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007), 118; (Afterward, Akropolites); Choniates, 343, 286-7; Korobeinikov, Byzantium, 121-4;
13 The successor of Sultan Rukn al-Dīn was his son, the young Ezz al-Dīn Qilij Arslān III. (1204-1205). For more information on this topic, please see: Saljūq-Nāma, 28-30; Ibn al-ʻIbrī, Tārīkh al-Zamān, 243-244; Akropolites, 124.
Byzantine Asia Minor was divided between Alexios III and some local rulers when the Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade took Constantinople on the night of 12th-13th April 1204 AD. Some Byzantine leaders of aristocratic families, who had fled Constantinople, succeeded in establishing kingdoms in Asia Minor. Theodore I Lascaris (1206-1222) succeeded in establishing the Empire of Nicaea in Nicaea, Prousa and other cities. He also succeeded in signing a peace treaty with Sultan Rukn al-Dīn around April 6th, 1204, to secure the eastern front of his territories, agreeing to pay tribute to the Seljuks for five years. This treaty was renewed in 1205, immediately after the death of Rukn al-Dīn, with Sultan Kilij Arslan III (1204-1205).

In April 1204, the brothers David and Alexios I Grand Comnenus (1204-1222 A.D.), the descendants of the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus I, succeeded in conquering the Pontus region and the surrounding areas in the easternmost limits of the Byzantine Empire. They established the Empire of Trebizond, with the help of troops supplied by their aunt, Queen Tamara of Georgia (1184-1213).

The borders of the southern Empire of Trebizond were quite close to the Seljuk domains; therefore, the Grand Comneni, the rulers of the Empire of Trebizond, had to fight with the Seljuks to survive and to maintain their state. The Seljuk strategy towards the Empire of Trebizond during the period 1204-1214 was an extension of the Seljuk policies before 1204. The main strategic objective of the Seljuks was to reach the southern shores of the Black Sea and to obtain a permanent foothold on those coasts, especially after the Seljuks lost the port of Samsun on the Black Sea, which

14 For more details on Asia Minor's division, see: Choniates, 351-1; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 128-9.
15 Choniates, 350; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 129.
16 Saljūq-Nāma, 31; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 129-30.
17 Choniates, 343; 350; Akropolites, 120; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 128; Shukurov, Trebizond, 71. For more details on the establishment of Trebizond Empire, see: A. A. Vasiliev, ‘The foundation of the empire of Trebizond (1204–1222)’, Speculum 11(1936), 3–37, (Afterward Vasiliev, Trebizond); C. Toumanov, ‘On the relationship between the founder of the empire of Trebizond and the Georgian Queen Tamar’, Speculum 15 (1940), 299–312, (Afterward, Toumanov, Tamar); W. Miller, Trebizond, the Last Greek Empire, (London, 1926), 14-19. (Afterward, Miller, Greek Empire).
Alexios I Grand Comnenus, Emperor of Trebizond (1204-1222 AD), succeeded in seizing in 1204.\textsuperscript{18}

Losing Samsun was a very painful economic blow to the Seljuks, so the Seljuk response was swift. In 602 AH / 1205-1206 AD, the Seljuk Sultan Kaykhusraw I, who had just returned to power (1205-1211), undertook a major offensive against the port of Trebizond, the largest port in Asia Minor, where his troops reached the walls of the city and laid siege. Ibn al-Athīr, the only source who spoke about this offensive, pointed out that the reason for this campaign against Trebizond was that its ruler rebelled against the Seljuk Sultan and waylaid the land and sea trade routes coming from the lands of Byzantium (Rum), Rūs (Russia), Qipcāhqs, and other areas. Therefore, merchants from those countries ceased to come to the lands of Kaykhusraw I. the same applied to merchants from Syria, Iraq, Mosul, al-Jazīra and other lands that traded with the aforementioned regions. As a result of such banditry, the traders suffered heavy losses, many failing to recover their capital.\textsuperscript{19} Accordingly, Ibn al-Athīr believes that the only reason for the Seljuk attack on Trebizond is the disruption of the main commercial route from eastern Anatolia, through Sivas to Trebizond, and then to the seaport leading to the lands north of the Black Sea. It seems that the destruction of trade with Trebizond caused enormous business losses in Anatolia and the Levant. On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr did not mention the reason why Alexios Comnenus, Emperor of Trebizond, imposed an economic embargo/blockade on the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. However, this appears to have been a response to the alliance between the Seljuks and Nicaea, and the military assistance provided by the Seljuk

\textsuperscript{18} Cahen, \textit{Pre-Ottoman Turkey}, 117; Shukurov, \textit{Trebizond}, 77; Vasiliev, \textit{Trebizond}, 22.
sultan to Theodore I Lascaris to support his rule in Nicaea,\textsuperscript{20} not to mention his recognition of Theodore I Lascaris' claim to the imperial title.\textsuperscript{21}

Be it as it may, the Seljuk attack on Trebizond appears to have been carried out in cooperation with the Nicaea Empire. Theodore I Lascaris visited Sultan Kaykhusraw I directly after seizing the throne for the second time, and succeeded in concluding a peace treaty with him by the end of March 1205.\textsuperscript{22} Hence, the Seljuk forces, then besieging Trebizond, prevented Alexios Comnenus from helping his brother David, who prevented Theodore I Lascaris from making his way westward to Nicomedia around 1205-1206.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, although contemporary sources make no mention of the outcome of the war, it is clear that the Seljuks failed to seize Trebizond, although they did apparently manage to reopen trade routes.

The Seljuks tried to find another seaport to carry out their trade to the outside world, and in order not to fall prey to the Byzantine economic blockade. They found such an outlet in the port of Antalya\textsuperscript{24} (Attaleia) on the Mediterranean Sea. Since the fall of Constantinople in 1204, Antalya has been under the authority of the Tuscan adventurer Aldebrandinos, who was working for the Byzantines.\textsuperscript{25} In this regard, Ibn Bībī points out that the reason for the Seljuk attack on the port of Antalya is the complaint

\textsuperscript{20} Sultan Kaykhusraw I provided a lot of military aid to Theodore I Lascaris in order to survive the darkest conditions during the period 1204-1208. This was in response to the military assistance that Lascaris gave to the Seljuk Sultan for his return to the Seljuk throne for the second time. See: Korobeinikov, \textit{Byzantium}, 134. In addition to the relationship between the Seljuk sultan and Empress Anna, the wife of Theodore I, where the Byzantine historian Akropolites refers to the baptism of Kaykhusraw I and his adoption by Emperor Alexius III, father of Empress Anna, while he was in Constantinople in 1200 AD. See Akropolites, 124, 128. Finally, their common hostility to the Emperor of Trebizond. For more details on this military aid, see: Korobeinikov, \textit{Byzantium}; 134-7.

\textsuperscript{21} See: Korobeinikov, \textit{Byzantium}; 134-7.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Akropolites}, 118,124; \textit{Choniates}, 350; Shukurov, \textit{Trebizond}, 134-6; Korobeinikov, \textit{Byzantium}; 135-6.

\textsuperscript{23} For more details on the conflict between David Comnenus and Theodore I in Heraclea (1205-1206), see: \textit{Choniates}, 343, 350-2; \textit{Akropolites}, 86,132; Korobeinikov, \textit{Byzantium}; 129; Vasiliev, \textit{Trebizond}, 21-4; Miller, \textit{Greek Empire}, 16-18.

\textsuperscript{24} It was mentioned as Antioch in some Muslim sources, see: Ibn al-Athīr, \textit{al-Kāmil}, Vol 10, 328; Ibn al-ʻIbrī, \textit{Tārīkh al-Zamān}, 245. And it was mentioned as Antalya, the correct version, in Ibn Bībī, see: \textit{Saljūq-Nāma}, 39.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Choniates}, 351; Cahen, \textit{Pre-Ottoman}, 119.
received by Sultan Kaykhusraw I from the Egyptian merchants who were trading with the port of Antalya, whose properties were confiscated by the Franks in the city.  

On the other hand, Choniates suggests that the Seljuk Sultan had coveted the city and advanced to seize it, believing in its weakness and inability to defend itself. In any case, it appears that the Seljuk Sultan coveted the city, which was not under the authority of any of the major political forces in the region. Hence, it would have been easier, from a military point of view, to seize it. The chance presented itself when the Egyptian merchants complained of being ill-treated by the Franks in the city.

The Seljuk forces, led by Kaykhusraw I, marched towards the city and laid siege in 603 AH / 1206 AD, which led the inhabitants of the city to seek the help of the regent of Cyprus, Walter of Montbéliard (1205-1210). He sent them some supporting troops consisting of 200 Latin soldiers, and they occupied the city; however, they could not prevent the Seljuks from destroying the surrounding areas of the city, where the possessions of nobles were located. Contemporary sources differed as to the outcome of the siege; Choniates pointed out that the Latin forces were able to defend the city and force the Seljuk military to withdraw from the city walls after a siege of sixteen days. On the other hand, Ibn Bībī points out that after hearing the complaint of the Egyptian merchants, Sultan Kaykhusraw I ordered the mobilization of all his forces and moved towards Antalya. He did not lift the siege of the city until it fell into his hand. The versions of Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-Abri are the closest to the truth; they are confusing between the narrations of Ibn Bībī and those of the Byzantine sources. In fact, the Seljuk Sultan, at first, besieged the city for almost a year, but was

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26 Saljūq-Nāma, 39; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman, 119-20.
27 Choniates, 351.
28 Edbury, Peter W, the Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 41.(Afterword, Edbury, Cyprus).
29 Choniates, 351; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman, 119; Edbury, Cyprus, 42; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol 10, 328; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, Tārīkh al-Zamān, 245.
30 Choniates, 351.
31 Saljūq-Nāma, 40-41.
32 Ibn al-‘Ibrī points out that Sultan Kaykhusraw I seized Antalya in Shaaban 603 AH, and he had directed his armies towards the city in the previous year. Ibn al-‘Ibrī, Tārīkh al-Zamān, 245.
forced to withdraw with some of his soldiers, and left the rest of the army to besiege the city. The inhabitants of the city suffered from the effects of the siege, a dispute between them and the Latin soldiers took place, forcing them to contact the Seljuk Sultan and to hand the city over to him. Not only that, but they allied with the Seljuks, expelled the Latin soldiers from the city, and took over the castle. Anyway, the Islamic sources agree that Sultan Kaykhusraw I entered the city in Shaaban in 603 AH / the spring of 1207 AD. He appointed Mubāriz al-Dīn Ertöküsh ibn Ṭādūgh as governor. The fall of Antalya in 1207 led to the end of the continental siege on the Seljuks; furthermore, the link between the Empire of Nicea and the Armenians in Cilicia was severed.

After returning from the conquest of the port of Antalya, Sultan Kaykhusraw I attacked the lands of Emperor Theodore I. Both Byzantine and Islamic sources differ on the cause of this sudden change in the Seljuk Sultan's policy towards his ally, Emperor Theodore I. Ibn Bībī points out that the Seljuk sultan attacked the lands of the empire of Nicaea because its ruler was "preventing the Sultan from entering his country or leaving it to go to the land of Islam, furthermore, he was lingering in sending the tribute". On the other hand, the Byzantine sources agree that the reason for the outbreak of war between the Seljuk Sultan and Theodore I was the arrival of Alexios III, the former Byzantine emperor, to Antalya, and his request to Sultan Kaykhusraw I to help him recover the Byzantine throne from Theodore I. It seems that the Seljuk Sultan was taking Alexios III as a pretext to control the Byzantine territories. In any case, the Seljuk Sultan sent a special envoy to Theodore I asking him to abdicate, claiming that he usurped power from the legitimate emperor. The Seljuk sultan led

35 Saljūq-Nāma, 43.
36 Regarding the movements of Emperor Alexios III, since his escape from Constantinople in July 1203 till his arrival to Antalya, see: Akropolites, 79-81, 107, 123-4.
38 Akropolites, 129; Savvides, Akropolites, 95.
39 Akropolites, 129; Gregorae, 17; Savvides, Akropolites, 95, 98; Korobeinikov,
a large army, accompanied by Alexios III, into the Byzantine territories, besieging the city of Antioch on the Maeander.\textsuperscript{40} The request of the Seljuk Sultan was a surprise to Theodore I, who preferred to ignore it and to counter the Seljuk attack, so, he moved with his army, bringing with him the sultan’s envoy, until they reached the city of Philadelphia, and then he released the envoy without replying to the request of the Seljuk sultan. After that he moved to the city of Antioch,\textsuperscript{41} where a battle between the Seljuks and the Nicenes took place on 11 June 1211. The Seljuks were victorious at the beginning of the battle; however, they were forced to flee after their sultan was killed. Nevertheless, Emperor Theodore I did not go after them because of the slim number of his troops.\textsuperscript{42}

Sultan Izz al-Dīn Kay-kāüs (1211-1219), who was the eldest son of Kaykhusraw I, assumed power after the sultan, his father, was killed.\textsuperscript{43} The Byzantine and Islamic sources agree that a long-term peace treaty was concluded between the new sultan and Emperor Theodore I, however, neither source recorded the terms of that treaty. Akropolites points out that this victory gave the Byzantines an opportunity to take a respite because the Muslims concluded a treaty whereby "a long-term peace sanctity is not to be violated". The treaty allowed Theodore I to secure the eastern front and devoted himself to fight the Latins.\textsuperscript{44} Gregoras, however, points out that the Seljuk sultan, as a result of his defeat, sent envoys to Theodore I asking him to conclude a peace treaty. The Emperor of Nicea agreed to his request and, he himself dictated the terms of the treaty in accordance with his interests.\textsuperscript{45} On the other hand, Ibn Bībī points out that the Emperor of

\begin{thebibliography}{100}
\bibitem{Byzantium} Byzantium; 149.
\bibitem{Akropolites} Akropolites, 129; Gregorae, 17-18; Savvides, Akropolites, 95, 98; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 149.
\bibitem{Akropolites2} Akropolites, 129; Gregorae, 18; Savvides, Akropolites, 95-6, 98; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 149. Ibn Bībī pointed out that the Byzantine army had arrived to Elshahr (Philadelphia), but indicated that the final battle had taken place there. Saljūq-Nāma, 44.
\bibitem{Akropolites3} Akropolites, 131; Gregorae, 19-21; Savvides, Akropolites, 96-7, 99-101; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 149; Saljūq-Nāma, 44-47. The former Emperor Alexius III, who was present at the battle, was arrested. Theodore I respected, honored him, and brought him to Nicea, where he was stripped of his Imperial title and forced to stay in the Hyakinthos Monastery, where he died. See: Akropolites, 131, 132 n. 9.
\bibitem{Saljūq-Nāma} Saljūq-Nāma, 48-49.
\bibitem{Akropolites4} Akropolites, 131; Savvides, Akropolites, 97.
\bibitem{Gregorae} Gregorae, 21; Savvides, Akropolites, 101.
\end{thebibliography}
Nicea sent a lot of gifts to the new sultan, carried by one of the great Seljuk princes who had been captured, to mediate a peace treaty between the two parties. He claims that the Seljuk Sultan agreed to conclude the treaty, and that he himself dictated the conditions, and that Theodore I not only signed it, but also sent back with the Seljuk delegation, that he had met at the borders of his country, twenty thousand dinars to be distributed to the poor Muslims as a charity when burying the body of Sultan Kaykhusraw I. Anyway, it seems that a truce was first concluded between the two parties, followed by the signing of the official treaty on June 14th, 1211.

Akropolites related that the agreement only entailed respect of the borders between the two countries, which were located at some point west of the port of Sinop. Such agreement granted Nicaea a truce from the fighting on this side of the border for half a century. Thus, Nicaea was enabled to devote its military efforts to face the Latin kingdom of Constantinople, while being safe on its eastern border, until it succeeded in overthrowing it in 1261. However, it seems that this alliance was directed to the Empire of Trebizond, as it was the only country that had a common border with the two countries, in addition to its common hostility to the two parties.

The Emperor of Nicea could not work jointly with the Seljuk Sultan against the Empire of Trebizond until 1214 because of his struggle with the Latin kingdom of Constantinople. Furthermore, the new Seljuk Sultan Izz al-Din Kay-kāūs was unable to carry out any military action outside the Sultanate until 1214, as a result of the rebellion against him which was led

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46 Saljūq-Nāma, 55-57; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman, 121.
47 Savvides, Akropolites, 101, n.19.
48 Akropolites, 131; Savvides, Akropolites, 97; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman, 121; Vryonis, Decline, 131. Akropolites refers to the renewal of this Treaty in autumn 1243 between the Nicean Emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222-1254) and Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn (Kaykhusraw II) (1237-1245). For further details, see: Akropolites, 220-221, 222, n. 7, n.10, 93.
49 Emperor Theodore I, twice, suffered defeat at the hands of the Latin Emperor Henry I (1206-1216): the first was in Pegai in July 1211, the second was near the Rhindakos River on 15 Oct., of the same year. But Theodore I succeeded in spring 1212 AD in recruiting some soldiers and arresting families of the Latin band near Pegai, forcing Henry I to sign a truce with him in 1212, and signed the final treaty in December 1214. For more details on this period, see: Akropolites, 148-9, 150, 153; Korobeinikov, Byzantium; 150-1.
by his younger brother Prince Alâ al-Dîn Kay-Kubâdh, governor of Tokat (sultan in 1219-1237), and who refused to recognize his rule. He received the support of Leo (Levon) II (1187-1219), the king of Cilician Armenia, parwâna Zahîr al-Dîn Ilî and Mughîth al-Dîn Tughrul shâh of Erzurum (1201 or 1203-1225) and the Turcomans of Kastamonu, nearby Trebizond. It is probable that he received the support of Alexios I Grand Comnenus, the Emperor of Trebizond. The Allies succeeded in besieging Sultan Izz al-Dîn Kay-kâûs in Kayseri.\textsuperscript{50} However, such an alliance did not last long. Leo I withdrew from the alliance after the Seljuk Sultan, through his messenger Jalal al-Dîn Kayser, the ruler of Kayseri, held a peace treaty that brought him many material gains.\textsuperscript{51} He was followed by Mughîth al-Dîn Tughrul shah, who feared that his brother would attack his properties in Erzurum, and doubted Kay-Kubâdh’s ability to face up to his brother.\textsuperscript{52} Eventually, Alâ al-Dîn Kay-Kubâdh had to withdraw from the walls of Kayseri after being abandoned by his allies, and he barricaded himself in the Ankara castle. The internal conflict between the two parties continued until the spring of 1214 AD (610 AH)\textsuperscript{53} when Kay-Kubâdh was besieged in the Ankara castle and was captured; he was imprisoned in Al-Menshar Fortress near Malatya.\textsuperscript{54}

After the surrender of Kay-Kubâdh, Sultan Kay-kâûs I headed to Akseray and from there to Konya where he took over and distributed posts


\textsuperscript{51} The messenger offered him jewels amounted twelve thousand dinars of gold, and he promised to provide him with wheat, if the reign of Kay-kâûs I became stable, and pledged not to invade the Sultan for his country throughout his reign as long as the Armenian king was faithful to his promises. Leo I accepted the Seljuk offer, and a treaty signed by both parties was concluded; see: Saljûq-Nâma, 51-53.

\textsuperscript{52} Saljûq-Nâma, 53.

\textsuperscript{53} The surrender date of Kay-Kubâdh can be found in Abû al-Fidâ; see: Abû al-Fidâ, Al-Mukhtaşar, Vol. 2, 208; Shukurov, Trebizond, 81, n.22.

\textsuperscript{54} See: Saljûq-Nâma, 58-61; Ibn al-‘Ibrî, Târikh al-Zamân, 247; Ibn al-‘Ibrî (d. 1286), Târikh Mukhtaşar al-duwal (Beirut: 1890), 407 (Afterword, Ibn al-‘Ibrî, Mukhtaşar al-duwal); Abû al-Fidâ, Al-Mukhtaşar, Vol2, 208; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman, 121; Shukurov, Trebizond, 81.
to his supporters. Then he suddenly decided to go to Sivas near the port of Sinop, without explaining the reasons for such a move. From the course of events, it seems that Kaykāūs I wanted to punish the Trapezuntine Emperor for his support of Alā al-Dīn Kay-Kubādh during his revolution. It seems that the Trapezuntine Emperor had taken advantage of the previous times of disturbances in the Seljuk Sultanate and attacked the Seljuk domains in Kastamonu. Ibn Bībī mentions that when Sultan Kaykāūs I was in Sivas, "envoys came from the guards of the Sinop border and brought a sealed message, according to which the crime and infringement of kyr Alexius (kīr Aliks), the emperor (takwar) of Janīt, in the lands [of Rūm] surpassed the borders of his realm, and his intrusions into the reaches of the Sultan’s possessions exceeded all the bounds". From the course of previous events, it is likely that Emperor Alexios I tried to take advantage of the internal conflict in the Seljuk Sultanate and invaded Seljuk territory. It is not clear, though, when the Trapezuntine forces invaded the Seljuk territory, and whether it was during the siege of Kayseri by the allied forces, or later during the siege of Alā al-Dīn in Ankara, in order to help the besieged prince and end the siege. Anyway, it is likely that the invasion of the Trapezuntine forces into Seljuk territory took place before the Seljuk sultan arrived in Sivas; where the presence of the sultan's forces in Sivas, near the northern border of the Seljuks with Trebizond and the lands of Tughrul shāh indicates the probability that the Trapezuntine threat was no surprise to the Seljuk Sultan.

In any case, the Seljuk army moved from Sivas towards the port of Sinop, which is located on a narrow isthmus protected by high walls, therefore, it was an impregnable stronghold that the Seljuks could not seize by war; however, it could be seized, as Ibn Bībī says, by besieging it for a

55 Saljūq-Nāma, 65; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 112.
56 Saljūq-Nāma, 65; Shukurov, Trebizond, 81-2; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 112.
57 Shukurov, Trebizond, 82.
58 Sinop is located in the northeast corner of a large peninsula, in a square form, each side length is about 30 km, the whole peninsula consists of low, gently graded hills. Its soil is characterized by its high fertility, which provides the population with the agricultural crops they need. The mountains are located 35 km from the coast, and are about 1,300 meters high, but are approaching the coast in Ayancik in the southwest and in Karousa (Gerze) in the southeast of the peninsula. For more details on the geography and history as well of Sinop, see: Bryer, Byzantine monuments, 69-74.
long period of time and by preventing supplies from reaching it, whether from land or sea "So that its people get bored because of the lack of goods and the unavailability of supplies". Circumstances favored the Seljuks. The news came that Emperor Alexios I was hunting within the vicinity of Sinop with 500 knights of his forces. Immediately, a Seljuk detachment attacked him and succeeded, after a short battle, in capturing him along with some of his courtiers/commanders, and brought him to the sultan’s camp.

Ibn Bībī’s account did not mention the date of the capture of the Trapezuntine Emperor and the imposition of the siege on Sinop by the Seljuks. Yet, the researchers were able to obtain an approximate date from two brief references found in the Byzantine cleric Nicholas Mesarites.

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59 Saljūq-Nāma, 65-66; Shukurov, Trebizond, 82; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 113.
60 Saljūq-Nāma, 65; Shukurov, Trebizond, 82; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 113. Abū al-Fīdā, (Al-Mukhtaṣar, 209) points out that the one who was captured is al-Askari (a title given by the Islamic sources to the Byzantine emperor, and after, was called the Emperor of Nicea), the murderer of Seljuk Sultan Ghiyāṭ al-Dīn Kaykhusraw I. He was brought to Kay-kāūs, son of Kaykhusraw I, who wanted to kill him, but paid for him a huge amount of money, and gave up castles and lands never owned by Muslims (perhaps Sinop intended).
61 Byzantine churchman and writer. He was born ca. 1163/4 AD and died after 1215 AD. In 1200 AD he was skeuophylax of the Church of the Pharos in the Great Palace of Constantinople, and remained in the capital for a period after falling into the hands of the Crusaders in 1204 AD. He moved to Ephesus in early 1207, where he was appointed Metropolitan of Ephesus. As Metropolitan of Ephesus, he headed a mission in 1214/5 to Constantinople for discussions with the new papal envoy, Cardinal Pelagius of Albano. Finally he returned to Ephesus, where he wrote a report on those negotiations. Between 1922-1923 Heisenberg published some works written by Mesarites, entitled "New Sources in the History of the Latin Empire and the Union of the Church" or in its original German title "Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchunion"; Heisenberg gave the third text, the longest and most important, the title "Der Bericht des Nikolaos Mesarites tiber die politischen und kirchlichen Ereignisse des Jahres 1214." The text deals with ecclesiastical affairs in that period, namely, the project of unity between the churches of Nicea and Rome, for him Mesarites, as Bishop of Ephesus, to Constantinople. Heisenberg believes that Mesarites wrote his report in 1215, and that the events he deals with fall back to the winter of 1214/1215. Although the report elaborates on the problems of the Church at that time, it deals in two brief references to the war between Theodore I, the Emperor of Nicea, and his political rivals, Emperor Alexios I, Emperor of Trebizond, and his brother David.

Mesarites refers in two brief paragraphs to the war between Emperor Theodore I and his political rivals in Trebizond. He states in the first paragraph that while Emperor Theodore I was near the gates of Nicaea, a man from the north came unexpectedly, like a "divine messenger" to proclaim that the arrogant Alexios Comnenus, who is planning many evils against the Roman Emperor (Nicaea)". Although the following lines are missing from the text, Heisenberg, its publisher, assumes that describing the messenger as "divine" suggests that Alexios Comnenus suffered a severe defeat. In the second paragraph, he points out that as a result of this failure "the northern regions are now under the leadership of our Emperor".

Vasiliev notes that since the events referred to in the text occurred, according to Heisenberg, in the autumn and winter of 1214/1215, it is likely that the good news received by Emperor Theodore I near the gates is the surrender of Sinop to the Seljuk Sultan on 1 November 1214, after the murder of David and the capture of Alexios I, who was later released. On the other hand, Shukurov sees that the good news is the capture of Alexios I by the Seljuk army, and that this event occurred shortly before the death of Patriarch Michael IV Autorianus (the Patriarch of Constantinople 1208-1214) on August 26, 1214. Accordingly, the correct date of the Seljuk attack on Sinop as well as the capture of Alexios I was at the end of August 1214. However, it is probable that both the capture of the Trapezuntine Emperor and the beginning of the attack on the port of Sinop took place at the end of the summer of 1214. The Islamic sources indicate that the surrender of Prince Kay-Kubâdh occurred in the spring of 1214, and that the sultan then went directly to the city of Sivas near Sinop, apparently, to punish the rulers for their support of Prince Kay-Kubâdh during his revolution.

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63 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 66; Shukurov, Trebizond, 83; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 181.
64 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 18; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 181.
65 Vasiliev, Mesarites, 182.
66 Shukurov, Trebizond, 83.
In any event, the Seljuk army continued to besiege the port of Sinop during the months of September and October 1214. The Seljuk army destroyed the Trapezuntine fleet in the port of Sinop and reduced it to ashes, thus, they completely cut off the city's links with the outside world. Sultan Kay-kāūs I ordered Alexios I to ask the inhabitants to hand over the city of Sinop; accordingly, the emperor sent one of the princes who were captured with him with a letter written in Greek, demanding that people surrender. The people defending Sinop refused to surrender. They said, "If Emperor Alex was captured, he has decent offspring, we will appoint one of them as a king. We will not hand over this country to the Muslims. The sultan ordered the messenger to go again, however, in vain". 67

Finally, Sultan Kay-kāūs I resorted to harsh methods, where he ordered the torture of Alexios I within the sight of the defenders of Sinop, who, after witnessing the suffering of their Emperor, decided to surrender, provided that the Seljuk Sultan pledged not to kill Emperor Alexios Comnenus, and to allow him to safely return to his reign, and to grant the people of Sinop safety for their lives, their parents, their money and their children, and to let them go where they want. The Seljuk Sultan agreed to these terms. The city surrendered, as the Islamic sources point out, on 26 Jumādā II in 611 AH (November 1, 1214). 68 This is supported by the commemorative Arabic and Greek inscriptions on a tower in Sinop built the following year (1215 AD). 69

67 Saljūq-Nāma, 67-68. Shukurov, Trebizond, 84; Vasiliev, Trebizond, 27; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 113.
68 Saljūq-Nāma, 68; Ibn al-ʻIbrī, Tārīkh al-Zamān, 251; Abū al-Fidā, Al-Mukhtaşar, 209; Shukurov, Trebizond, 84; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 182; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 113. Vasiliev, according to Islamic sources, reports that Sinop fell into the hands of the Seljuks twice: the first time was in the summer or early autumn of 1214, when the Seljuk Sultan took over Sinop and then killed his ruler David, the brother of Alexius Comnenus. In such case Vasiliev depended on the text of Ibn al-ʻIbrī, who says: "In 611 AH (May 13, 1214-1 May 1215 AD), Sultan Izz al-Dīn Kay-kāūs I took over Sinop on the Black Sea and killed its ruler, see: (Tārīkh al-Zamān, 251). Vasiliev says, that Ibn al-ʻIbrī has mistakenly said that Alexius was the one who was killed, and not David, because Alexius, ruler of Trebizond, was the most famous in that time, see: Vasiliev, Trebizond, 26. The second time was reported in details by Ibn Bībī: the Seljuk Sultan took over the city on 1 November 1214, see: Vasiliev, Trebizond, 27-9.
69 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 69-72; Shukurov, Trebizond, 84; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 182.
Sultan Kay-kāūs I and Emperor Alexios Comnenus held a peace treaty in Sinop, which was written by the Guards of the Seljuk Sultan's Court (notaran).⁷⁰ The Emperor read it aloud as an oath before the Seljuk sultan as follows, "if the sultan grants me, kyr Alexius, life and turns over to me and my scions Janīt outside the Fortress of Sinop and its vicinities, I will give annually [to the sultan] ten thousand dinars, five hundred horses, two thousand cattle, ten thousand sheep, fifty pack-loads of diverse goods, and also if the sultan asks for aid, I will help with all my army, as many [soldiers] as will be [at my disposal]".⁷¹ After that, Alexius I and his entourage set off aboard ship to Janīt, by which Ibn Bībī appears to mean the Byzantine province of Chaldia or the city of Trebizond itself.⁷²

The following day, the Seljuk Sultan entered the city of Sinop. The church was converted into a mosque, a large Seljuk garrison was established in the city to defend it, and an illustrious commander was appointed to command it. The breaches in the wall got repaired. The Muslim merchants were able to set foot in the city. Finally, Kay-kāūs I returned to Sivas where he announced the great victory in the whole Orient.⁷³ Thus, the Empire of Trebizond became subject to the influence of the Seljuk Sultan in accordance with the treaty concluded between the parties.

The Seljuk campaign against Sinop seems to have been carried out in coordination with Emperor Theodore I, who, in conjunction with the siege of Sinop, sent his forces to attack the province of Paphlagonia. These forces succeeded in taking over some areas in Paphlagonia, where Mesarites points out, "Then good news came to the Emperor (Theodore I), and he left Nicaea

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⁷⁰ According to the translator of Ibn Bībī, the author of the document is "the guardians of the Court". In footnote No. 3, he mentioned that the word in the original text is "Notaran", which means guardians, and its originality is related to the Arabic Word "الطور", see: Saljūq-Nāma, 69, footnote 3. Meanwhile, Vryonis suggests that Ibn Bībī may be referring to the "Greek bureau" in the sultan’s chancellery as it probable, that there was a Greek bureau in the sultan’s chancellery, given the importance of the relations between the Seljuks and Greek-speaking elements. The staff of this secretariat knew the Byzantine title "Notaran". This group that set the terms of the treaty between the Seljuk Sultan and the ruler of Trebizond, when the Seljuk Sultan Sinop conquered in 1214. See Vryonis, Decline, 233.

⁷¹ Saljūq-Nāma, 69; Shukurov, Trebizond, 85-6; Kuršanskis, Trébizonde, 113; Vasiliev, Trebizond, 28.

⁷² Shukurov, Trebizond, 86; Vasiliev, Trebizond, 28.

⁷³ Saljūq-Nāma, 70-71; Shukurov, Trebizond, 86; Vasiliev, Trebizond, 28.
and headed to Paphlagonia.”

Shukurov sees that the Emperor of Nicea was unable to head his forces, himself, in the first phase of his campaign against Paphlagonia as a result of the death of Patriarch Michael IV Autorianus and the need to choose a new patriarch. On September 28, 1214, the new Patriarch Theodore II Irenikos (Theodore Kopas or Koupas) (1214-1216) was elected. So, sometime in October 1214, Theodore I led the army of Nicea to Paphlagonia, where he succeeded in taking over Heraclea and Amastris (Amasra) without meeting any significant resistance, and returned to Nicaea at the end of October. In another reference, Mesarites points out “Now the northern regions (Paphlagonia) are under the leadership of Our Emperor (Theodore I).”

In the middle of October 1214, Mesarites wrote to the Latin cardinal Pelagius of Albano that the army of Nicea, in 1214, and under the leadership of Theodore I Lascaris, had succeeded, with the help of God, to seize the entire land of Paphlagonia and its fortified cities. The Seljuk-Nicene attack on the Trebizond territory in Paphlagonia seems to have been in the implementation of the peace treaty concluded by the two parties in 1214.

Thus, Theodore I of Lascaris and the Seljuk Sultan shared the entire lands of Comnenus in Paphlagonia. The greater part of Paphlagonia was added to the Empire of Nicaea, while Sinop, perhaps the most important part of the northern coast of Anatolia, was granted to the Seljuks, who probably also recovered Samsun.

The fall of Sinop on November 1, 1214, led to a radical change in the strategic balance in the north of Anatolia in favor of the Seljuks. In addition, with the fall of Antalya in 1207, the continental siege of the Seljuks has ended; they had achieved regional hegemony in Anatolian politics, and completely cut off the route of the Empire of Trebizond leading to Constantinople. They also cut off, with the fall of Antalya, the bridge that connected Nicaea with Cilician Armenia. The fall of Sinop, ultimately, also allowed the Seljuks to expand in Crimea and the southern Russian plain, an expansion.

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74 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 18, 66; Shukurov, Trebizond, 83; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 181.
75 Trebizond, 83.
76 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 18, 66; Shukurov, Trebizond, 83; Vasiliev, Mesarites, 181.
77 Heisenberg, Nikolaos Mesarites, 25, 26; Shukurov, Trebizond, 84.
78 Kursanski, Trébizonde, 113.
(VI)

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WHY VENICE, NOT GENOA? HOW VENICE EMERGED AS THE MAMLUKS’ FAVOURITE EUROPEAN TRADING PARTNER AFTER 1365
Why Venice, not Genoa? How Venice Emerged as the Mamluks’ Favourite European Trading Partner After 1365
Albrecht Fuess

Abstract
The present contribution deals with the relationship of the Mamluk Empire with the Italian seafaring city-states of Venice and Genoa. Their approach towards the Mamluk Empire differed considerably after the year 1365 which marked the attack of Alexandria by the Cypriot king Peter I of Lusignan. Although Venetian and Genoese ships participated in this expedition, the considerations of Venice and Genoa how to deal with the Mamluks from that time onwards led to different results. In the aftermath of the sack of Alexandria the Venetians cooperated as a stable and reliable trading partner with the Mamluk Empire through the help of their centralized trading system. Genoa in contrast had a decentralized trading system where Genoese individual merchants were more flexible but harder to control. This lead to a series of cases where Genoese merchants turned into pirates when approaching Mamluk shores. Sometimes it was more lucrative to loot than to trade. Venice did not accept pirate activities of its subjects. In the short run both systems seemed to be profitable but in the long run the Venetians could outplay the Italian rival in the Mamluk Empire. Another disadvantage for the Genoese lied in the fact that their black sea strongholds came under increasing pressure of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The different approach of Genoese and Venetians towards the Mamluk Empire had as well cultural consequences as will be explained in the latter parts of this contribution where it will be shown that the aggressive stance of the Genoese earned them the status as Mamluk arch villain in popular Mamluk folk literature whereas the friendly Mamluk-Venetian relations led to the increasing appearance of Mamluk motives in Venetian paintings.

I. Introduction
It is always difficult trying to rewrite history and to speculate what the possible outcome would be if the historical actors involved had been taken some different twists and turns. This contribution will therefore not argue that Genoa could have become the main trading partner of the Mamluks
instead of Venice if it would have acted in a different way after the Cypriot attack on Alexandria in 1365. The aim is rather to show, how the far more aggressive Genoese stance against the Mamluk Empire did have on the one hand some short and middle term positive effects for Genoa like the conquest of Famagusta but proved to be counterproductive in the long run and even earned Genoa, as will be shown at the end of this paper, the role of the eternal arch villain in the pre-Modern Egyptian and Syrian mind, whereas the mutual Mamluk-Venetian perspective was less belligerent.

However, in order to introduce the topic, a brief sketch will describe the two great Italian rivals and their Levantine policies in the mid-fourteenth century at a time when the end of the papal ban concerning trade with the Mamluks reopened direct trade routes from Europe towards the Mamluk Empire. This ban had been issued and renewed several times after the final expulsion of the crusaders by the Mamluks from the Holy Land in 1291.

II. Venice

Venice was keen to resume trading with the Mamluk Empire after the end of the papal prohibition which had hindered official trade to a large extent. When in 1345 Venice and the Mamluks reached a new trade agreement, the Venetian envoys noted that no Venetian had set foot on Mamluk soil for twenty-three years.¹

Figure 1: St. Mark saves the ship transporting his dead body from Alexandria to Venice

After 1345 the Venetians sent a state convoy every year to Alexandria in order to trade Oriental spices, which were to become, besides Syrian cotton, the main backbone of the Venetian Levant business. In the other direction Venetians sold metals like copper and iron, which were scarce in the Mamluk Empire. Trade was mainly carried out by official state convoys called *mudas* (from Arabic mudda = time period (of trade)). The *muda* to Alexandria was complemented since 1375 by the so-called *muda al trafego* which headed every year towards Beirut and in later years to Tripoli as well. The convoys had the advantage that the merchandise was well surveyed and that trade could be organized in a quick and efficient manner in Venice and in the ports of destination. The trading period for the state convoy in Beirut was decreed for example in 1500 not to exceed 30 days during which one of the trading galleys was sent to Tripoli to carry out business there. Galleys were financed by rich Venetian businessmen. At

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the head of the convoys stood the capitano who should be a patrician and older than 30 years. Although private investors fitted the state galleys for muda journeys the cost of construction of the galleys was born by the state. The Venetian complemented their trading network by sending Venetian merchants into Mamluk cities who coordinated locally the trade with Mamluk authorities and helped to organize the mudas. The Venetians thereby outnumbered other European merchants in the Mamluk Empire by far. This kind of trading system needed stable relations with the Mamluk Sultanate as large enterprises were more vulnerable to possible reprisals from the side of the Mamluk state than the individual trading system of the Genoese. On the emotional side, there was another clear link between Venice and Alexandria as the bones of St Mark had been brought under legendary circumstances at the beginning of the 9th century from Alexandria to Venice. This theft had at the time contributed ideologically to the emancipation process of Venice from the Byzantine Empire.

III. Genoa

In the mid-fourteenth century, Genoa as well was firmly established in the Eastern Mediterranean. It had helped the Byzantine Palaiologan dynasty to regain Constantinople in 1261 thereby ending the Latin Empire which had been under heavy Venetian influence. Genoa as ally of the renewed Byzantine Empire was therefore granted trade privileges and encouraged to establish trading bases in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Caffa became an important Genoese port on the Crimean peninsula and the Island of Chios in the Aegean became Genoese in 1304. The civil war between the factions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines in the years from 1314 and 1331 then proved to be challenging for Genoa but

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did not stop the expansion of Genoese trading routes.\(^1\) Genoese traded through Caffa especially slaves. Female slaves were destined for the domestic market and male slaves went usually as military slave to the Mamluk Empire despite the papal ban.\(^2\) According to Dols it is even highly probable that it was a Genoese slave ship that brought the Black Death to Egypt in 1347 as the Genoese were the main maritime slave traders at that time, and according to the classic account of al-Maqrīzī, the plague entered Alexandria on a slave ship.\(^3\) This unfortunate event did not bring the slave trade to an end. According to the Venetian-Cretan Merchant Emanuel Piloti, who lived in the Mamluk Empire, around the year 1420 2000 slaves reached Alexandria each year, mostly purchased by agents of the Sultan in Genoese Caffa.\(^4\)

Genoa was active as well in the spice trade but had a serious geographical disadvantage in this respect compared to Venice, as Venice had the monopoly for the important German market, whereas Genoa had to cope with the challenge of neighbouring Mediterranean cities like Aigues-Mortes or Marseille regarding the French market. Still, the overall volume of trade of the Genoese with the Mamluk Empire in the fourteenth century did not fall very much behind Venice’s trade.\(^5\) Melis, using Florentine documents, has counted 278 Venetian ships trading in the harbour of Beirut in the years 1394-1408 compared to 262 Genoese, although this was a time of increased tension between Genoa and the Mamluk Empire.\(^6\)

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6 Frederigo Melis, “Note sur le mouvement du port de Beyrouth d’après la documentation florentine aux environs de 1400” In *Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l’océan Indien. Actes du huitième colloque international d’histoire maritime*, Beirut 5-10
Another decisive difference was the organisation of the trade in Genoa. In contrast to Venice Genoa equipped no stately convoys towards the Eastern Mediterranean. Trade was done by individual merchants and could bypass the hometown. Private credit associations called maona (from Arabic maÝÜna = help, assistance) could equip large trading fleets and obtained important concessions. Overall this meant that Genoese trade in the Mediterranean functioned more on the individual level compared to Venice. It was, therefore, more flexible on one hand but on the other it could not be controlled as efficiently as in Venice. As a result Genoese merchants and sailors resorted quite often to acts of piracy at the Mamluk shores if these acts seemed to be more lucrative than pure trading. From the Mamluk viewpoint, the Genoese were the less reliable trading partner because individual Genoese merchants did not always felt to be bound by mutual trading agreements.

IV. The Cypriot crusade of Peter I of Lusignan against Alexandria in 1365 and its aftermath

Crucial for the development of the relationship between the Mamluk Empire and the Italian seafaring nations was the role of the Kingdom of Cyprus under the Crusading dynasty of the Lusignans. In the years of the trade boycott, Cyprus had profited from its strategic location near the Syro-Palestinian coast. The historian of Beirut Şāliḥ ibn Yahyā (d. after 1435) reports that “(after the Mamluk conquest of Beirut) the traders of the Franks came back to Beirut little by little with their goods. The ships of the Venetians brought them to Cyprus. The lord of Cyprus then sent them over on smaller boats to Beirut. The Cypriots had their own churches in Beirut and a number of merchants lived there, where they had their own taverns. Then this kind of trade stopped and the number of ships of other Frankish nations increased which came directly to Beirut”. Until then Frankish

7 Feldbauer/ Morrissey, Weltmacht, p. 41; Fuess, Verbranntes Ufer, p. 407.
8 For a discussion on the connection between trade, privateering and piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth and fifteenth century with a special stress on the Catalan situation, see: Damien Coulon, Barcelone et le grand commerce d’orient au moyen âge. Un siècle de relations avec l’égypte et la syrie-palestine (ca. 1330-1430), Madrid-Barcelone : Casa de Velázquez 2004, pp. 201-213.
9 Şāliḥ ibn Yahyā, Tārīkh Bayrūt. Akhbār al-Salaf min Dhurrīyat BuÎtur ibn ’Alī Amīr al-
pirates had attacked Cypriot ships heading for Syria under the pretext to observe the papal order. For example in the height of the papal ban on trade in 1317 Arab travellers reported in Tripoli that they had been on board of a ship, when the Genoese captured it and beheaded all Cypriots on board under the accusation that they had allegedly circumvented the prohibition of the pope, “the caliph of the franks”, to trade with the Mamluk infidels.\textsuperscript{10}

In the light of the aforementioned story of Ṣāliḥ ibn Yaḥyā it becomes quite evident why the Genoese ship would attack a Cypriote vessel near Beirut. It was presumably full of Venetian goods.

However, once the Venetians, Genoese and other Europeans resumed trading directly with the Mamluk Empire by the mid-fourteenth century, the Cypriots lost their lucrative position as intermediaries of the Levant trade. Their response was twofold. First of all, they intensified pirate raids against Mamluks shores and ships. The remnants of the Mamluk harbours at the Syro-Palestinian coast were constantly attacked after the fall of Acre by Cypriot corsairs or by other Frankish pirates operating from Cyprus. Sometimes Muslims were even kidnapped in the vicinity of the shore and taken away or freed for ransom after direct negotiations near the shore.\textsuperscript{11}

The second way of coping with the financial loss was undertaken by the Cypriot King Peter I of Lusignan (1358-1369). He gathered help in European countries from 1362 to 1365 in order to gain support for the liberation of the Holy Land. According to Edbury, the crusader argumentation was only rhetorical, the real aim being commercial. The king wanted to revert the trade from Alexandria back to Famagusta.\textsuperscript{12}

Finally, Peter I set sail from Rhodes with his mixed European fleet in the autumn of 1365 and headed towards the Mamluk Empire, revealing only in the last minute that the target of the expedition was in fact Alexandria. Labib argues that Peter revealed the target so very late, because he did not

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\textsuperscript{10} Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī l-Faḍā’il (d. mid 14th century), \textit{Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 and 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaḍḍal b. Abī l-Faḍā’il}, ed. and transl. by Samira Kortantamer, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz 1973, p. 51 (German Text), pp. 2-3 (Arabic Text)
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 156.
\end{flushleft}
want to give the Genoese or the Venetians the possibility to warn the Mamluks in order to profit from a Mamluk goodwill for possible further trade arrangements. The real target of the attack turned out a complete surprise for Venetians and Genoese. Peter and his international troops landed in October of 1365 and remained there ravaging the city for several days until the main Mamluk army approached from Cairo.

In this context, it is interesting to look shortly at how the composition of this fleet is perceived by local Arab chroniclers. The Alexandrian eyewitness al-Nuwayrī (d. 1372) reports that at first the population of Alexandria assumed that the fleet arriving at their shore was composed completely out of 70 Venetian tradeships (tuğğār al-Banādiqa), but this soon turned out to be not the case. Later in his account he specifies that the fleet contained besides around 40 Cypriot vessels, fourteen Venetian ships, 10 ships from Rhodes and five French vessels, only two ships belonging to the Genoese. Al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442) tells a quite similar story, but he raises the number of Venetian ships which took part in the Attack to 24 while the Genoese contribution stays at two vessels.

According to al-Nuwayrī’s many Muslim inhabitants of Alexandria trusted at first the fortifications. Curious to see what was happening they went out on the peninsula to watch the Frankish ships. During their outing food was sold among them. However, the happy atmosphere was soon to end as spies and incompetence would provide the Franks with the necessary assistance through which they would conquer Alexandria.

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European sources differ in the numbers and composition of the fleet. According to the Cypriot chronicler Leontios Makhairas (d. after 1432), the Cypriot ships alone comprised 108 ships, 34 of them suited for horses, three Genoese galleys and four galleys from the Knights from Rhodes. He speaks of the initial help of the Venetians for the undertaking but does not provide exact numbers of their ships.\(^\text{19}\) The French poet and musician (d. 1377) Guillaume de Machaut writes in his poem on the sack of Alexandria that the Venetians were so impressed by Peters personality when he passed through the city that they offered ships and material support.\(^\text{20}\) George Hill in his classic book on the history of Cyprus adds to the 108 Cypriot ships given by Makhairas thirty-one ships which had come with the king from Venice, so we can assume that the bulk of the non-Cypriot ships talking part in the expedition were, in fact, Venetian ships.\(^\text{21}\)

It is remarkable though, that although the Venetians equipped far more ships for this devastating expedition, the Genoese should get the literary blame for it as will be shown later. It can be assumed that the Venetians hoped to cash in on the gains had Peter succeeded to manage a long-lasting victory in the East.\(^\text{22}\) Still, they had mixed feelings towards the expedition and therefore they sent three Venetian ships into the Eastern Mediterranean to follow King Peter’s fleet in order to find out where it was heading at and to inform the Serenissima about the success of the expedition.\(^\text{23}\)

After the negative outcome, their viewpoint apparently changed and they were sending several embassies to the Mamluk Empire in order to end the conflict. However, while Venetian and Genoese emissaries to the Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf ShaÝbÁn (r. 1363-1377) tried to cool down the general tension in 1368, Peter I continued his aggressive tactics against the Mamluks and attacked several other coastal towns in Syria in the next


\(^{22}\) Hill argues similarly saying that Venetian diplomacy in that case is “difficult to disentangle”. In his opinion the whole expedition was bound to hurt Venetian trade interests. “One can only conjecture that they banked on Peter’s winning, in which case they would be in a favourable position to secure still greater privileges”; see: Hill, *The History of Cyprus*, vol. II, p. 336.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.
years. A peace treaty between the Mamluks and the Kingdom of Cyprus could only be signed in 1370 after Peter had been murdered by unhappy nobles because his war expenses presented a heavy burden for them.\textsuperscript{24}

In 1372 fights then broke out between Genoese and Venetian merchants in Famagusta at the coronation ceremony of King Peter II of Lusignan (r. 1369-1382) which resulted in many casualties and financial losses for the Genoese. Genoa reacted by equipping a fleet, financed by a \textit{manoa}, an association of private creditors. The expedition force took Famagusta from the weakened Cypriots in October of 1373.\textsuperscript{25} The main trade emporium of the Levant trade now being in Genoese hands, the Venetians were swift to respond. From 1375 onwards they sent a yearly state convoy to the Levantine coast, \textit{the muda de trafego}, to trade directly in Beirut thereby circumventing Genoese Famagusta.\textsuperscript{26}

The Venetian Genoese rivalry in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean was soon to culminate in the war of Chioggia 1379-1381, which was won by Venice and ended officially by the peace of Turin in 1381.\textsuperscript{27} The result was not as decisive as it is often presented in the secondary literature. Genoa was not driven out of the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, it could stabilize its grip over Famagusta, which could from then on serve as a safe haven for Genoese merchants and Pirates alike and could be used as a point of departure for military expeditions against the Mamluk Empire. The Venetians did not have such a local base and therefore they preferred now the option of stable and reliable relations to the Mamluk sultanate. No large or even small scale military aggression of the Venetians against the Mamluk Empire can be reported for the period after 1365. The memory of the Venetians taking part in the assault on Alexandria, therefore, faded away in the Mamluk Empire.

\textbf{V. The years 1382 – 1467: Genoese Aggression and Venetian Cooperation}

At the beginning of 1382 rumours spread in Venice and Genoa that Italian merchants were imprisoned in the Mamluk Empire and their goods

\textsuperscript{25} Epstein, \textit{Genoa & the Genoese}, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{26} Archivio di Stato Venice, Senato-Misti, Copia 1375-77, Nr. 35, 3 r f.
\textsuperscript{27} Feldbauer/ Morrissey, \textit{Weltmacht}, p. 86.
sequestered. Venice opted for negotiations while Genoa equipped a fleet which attacked Beirut and Sidon in the summer and boarded two Venetian vessels in the port of Beirut. In Beirut, they even planted the Genoese flag in the ruins of the old crusader citadel before being driven out by local forces.\textsuperscript{28} Just twenty years later in 1403, a Genoese fleet under the French Governor of the Genoa Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut, “Mareschal de France” started a new expedition against the Mamluk coast taking Famagusta as starting point. The Genoese aim was certainly to increase their economic influence at the coast, and to damage Venetian interests.

Besides, Boucicaut did present himself as well as a crusader knight and he might have really been dreaming of a re-conquest of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{29} However, he was surprised to find the coastal towns prepared for battle. He discovered the explanation for this when he captured a Venetian ship near Beirut, whose captain confessed to having the order to warn the Mamluks.\textsuperscript{30} Boucicaut was very upset about this Venetian directive. “De ceste tres grant mauvaisté. Laquelle jamais ne cuidast, fu moult esmerveillié le mareschal”, we read in the \emph{Livre de fais} of Boucicaut.\textsuperscript{31}

As had been the case 20 years before, the Genoese troops could not hold the city but had enough time to loot the Venetian spice depository and steal spices whose price amounted to 10,000 \textit{dīnār}.\textsuperscript{32} The Venetians were quite upset and Venetian ships engaged the fleet of Boucicaut in battle on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of October 1403 near Modon. While Boucicaut managed to escape, his French-Genoese fleet suffered a defeat and considerable losses.\textsuperscript{33} Genoa had to pay an indemnity to the Venetians in order to settle the dispute. A first agreement was signed in 1406 and after a resumption of tensions, a new treaty was signed in Florence in the year 1408.\textsuperscript{34} This expedition presented the last large scale aggressions of a Genoese fleet against the

\textsuperscript{28} Fuess, \textit{Verbranntes Ufer}, pp. 189-190; Şāliḥ ibn Yahyā, \textit{Tārīkh Bayrūt}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{29} See to the attack of Boucicaut on Beirut: Albrecht Fuess “Prelude to a Stronger Involvement in the Middle East: French Attacks on Beirut in the Years 1403 and 1520”, \textit{In Al-Masaq: Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean}, 17/2 (2005), pp. 171-192.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Livre des fais}, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{32} Şāliḥ ibn Yahyā, \textit{Tārīkh Bayrūt}, pp. 32-34.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Livre des fais}, pp. 260-267; Lalande, \textit{Jean II le Meingre}, pp. 119-121.
\textsuperscript{34} Fuess, \textit{Verbranntes Ufer}, pp. 214.
Mamluk Empire, but Genoese corsairs, Catalan privateers and Cypriot pirates continued to harass Mamluk shores in large numbers and on several occasions.

As many of these buccaneers operated from Cyprus, Sultan Barsbāy (1422-1438) equipped three fleets in the summers of 1424, 1425, 1426 to get rid of the nuisance. During these Mamluk expeditions, the Genoese had apparently opted for helpful neutrality. The Genoese governor of Famagusta treated the Mamluk emirs with great hospitality in the summers of 1424 and 1425. In 1426 King Janus (r. 1398-1432) was finally captured by Mamluk forces and his palace burned down. After having officially recognized the overlordship of the Mamluk sultan and agreed to pay a yearly tribute, the sultan allowed Janus to depart from Cairo for Cyprus in May of 1427.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Kitāb al-Sulūk}, vol. 4, part 2, p. 722; Śāliḥ ibn Yahyā, \textit{Tārīkh Bayrūt}, 250-51, Makhairias, \textit{Recital}, § 672-696.} The Genoese might have feared that Famagusta could become another target of the Mamluks, so they considered it wise to stay out of the conflict. Still, in 1431 they managed to upset Sultan Barsbāy by introducing an extra tax on the Genoese – Mamluk slave trade via Caffa. Apparently, Barsbāy sequestered 16,000 ducats from Genoese merchants in Alexandria to compensate for the costs of the tax.\footnote{Subhi Y. Labib, \textit{Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171-1517)}, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1965, p. 329.}

Thereafter the Genoese Black Sea strongholds came under increasing pressure by the emerging Ottomans after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The Ottomans pushed hard on the Genoese until Caffa fell in 1475. Famagusta’s loss preceded in the year 1464 when it had to surrender to a combined army of Cypriot-Mamluk troops. The Mamluks took their overlordship over the island quite serious and had intervened for the Cypriot pretender James the Bastard in favour of his half-sister Charlotte. During the war against his sister, the Mamluks then helped James to besiege and conquer Famagusta. After James’ death, his Venetian wife Katharina Cornaro abdicated in favour of the Serrenissima in 1489.\footnote{See for the Mamluks and Cyprus: Albrecht Fuess, “Was Cyprus a Mamluk Protectorate? Mamluk Influence on Cyprus between 1426 and 1517”, In \textit{Journal of Cyprus Studies}, 11 (2005), [28/29], p. 19; Hans Eberhard Mayer, \textit{Geschichte der Kreuzzüge}, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1989, p. 217. Still the best work on the general outline of the history of Cyprus in the fifteenth century is: George Hill, \textit{A History of Cyprus}, 4 vols, Cambridge: CUP 1940-1948.}
Venice continued to pay the annual tribute and promised to defend Mamluk shores against pirates.38 Genoa’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean had almost vanished at the time, while Venice’s position was stronger than ever.

How did Venice achieve this? What had Venice done in the years from 1365 to 1489? She mainly relied on regular and discrete business relations with the Mamluks. Sometimes trade relations were strained, sometimes there was sequestration, but overall, trade relations stayed intact until the end of the Mamluk Empire. In the fifteenth century, there was even open political cooperation. The Mamluk naval expeditions against Cyprus would not have been possible without Venetian benevolent neutrality. After Cyprus became at the end of the fifteenth century Venetian bonds were even closer and written down officially in mutual contracts. The Venetian network of traders did increase considerably as well.

Other European nations still traded in the Mamluk Empire, even trade by Genoese subjects never really ceased in the Levant, but with the Venetians, it was different for the Mamluks. They had a sort of special relationship as has been shown lately by Francisco Javier Appellániz in his “Pouvoir et Finance en Méditerranée pré-Moderne.”39 According to him even the negative view of Modern European historians on the so called “forced sale” of spices by Mamluk authorities is not justified any more. From the 1450s onwards Mamluk sultans installed a so-called “stock system” where Venetian merchants had to buy a certain stock of spices of the sultan each year before they could buy on the free market. However, the sultans sold this fixed stock in the second half of the fifteenth century usually below the price of the free market. The sultans were interested to have a fixed amount of steady revenue which they could rely on in advance for their budget previsions each year, instead of negotiating new prices. The advantage for the Venetians for this kind of arrangement is obvious as well. They knew prices in advance, there were a steady supply and prices were usually cheaper than on the free market.40 Therefore Appelanz talks

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38 Fuess, “Was Cyprus a Mamluk Protectorate”, 19-21.
40 Ibid., Chapter IV and especially: pp. 142-143; These arrangements were the final result.
about “une alliance politique (des Mamlouks) conclue avec Venise pour subvenir aux besoins financiers.” (“a political alliance of (the Mamluks) concluded with Venice to satisfy mutual financial needs”)41

It seems therefore that the approach of the Venetians after 1365, i.e. to provide the utmost level of reliability, did fit the Mamluk Empire far better than the unstable approach of the Genoese, where the merchants apparently did decide if they want to trade or loot according to the occasion. Still, Genoa did generate income through its policy as well. Large portions of the wealth generated in the Levant went through its hub of Famagusta. However, in a hostile environment of Cypriots, Venetians and Mamluks, just securing Famagusta proved not sufficient in the long term. The pressure of the Ottomans in the black sea made matters worse, but this might have been foreseen by the Genoese as the Ottoman expansion in Anatolia and the Balkans had started already very powerfully in the fourteenth century.

For the Venetians, their trade policy apparently paid off as can be illustrated by the following story. When in 1433 Frankish pirates attacked the harbour of Tripoli and took with them a ship with many Muslims, the belongings of the usual suspects, that means the Catalan and the Genoese merchants were confiscated by the Mamluk authorities but the Venetian merchants were explicitly exempted from this decree.42

VI. Genoa as the arch villain in Mamluk literature

Despite the fact that it had been far more Venetians that had taken part in the attack of Alexandria in 1365 than Genoese, Genoas policy afterwards did lead to it becoming the leading arch villain in the eyes of the Mamluk population. One striking example for this is to be found in the Sirat Baibars, (life of Baibars) a work of popular Mamluk literature, which was written down in numerous manuscripts and versions between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. The hero of the novel is the historic Mamluk sultan Baibars (r. 1260-1277), who ruled in the second half of the thirteenth century.

of ongoing trading conflicts between Mamluk authorities and Venetian merchants about forced sales and a forced royal monopoly of pepper in the first half of the fifteenth century which had hampered the mutual trade, see for example on conflicts on this issue in Alexandria: Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 229-249.
41 Appellániz, Pouvoir et Finance, p. 239.
42 Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulāk, Vol. 4, part 2, p. 882
century, but Thomas Herzog has lately very convincingly shown that the historicity of described events places the storyline between the attack of Peter I. of Lusignan on Alexandria in 1365 and the capture of the Cypriote King Janus in 1426.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, many inhabitants of the Mamluk Empire would have perceived the attack on Cyprus as a revenge of the attack of the Cypriot attack on Alexandria in 1365.

However in the popular \textit{sira} the main villain is not Cyprus, but Genoa. The \textit{sira} contains as a central element the so called “Genoa episode”, which shows clearly how the Christian Franks trick and deceive the Muslim Mamluks even inside the Mamluk Empire. Alexandria, for example, has an underground level constituted of tunnels and caves where Baibars once is taken captive in an underground church by his main enemy the mighty JawÁn, who is a magician and crypto Christian in disguise of a Muslim QÁDI. JawÁn kidnaps Baibars and brings him to Genoa as a prisoner of ÞannÁ, king of the Genoese. In Genoa, the noble Baibars is tortured, but the Mamluk-Muslim troops under King al-ŠÁlih, who had adopted Baibars as his son, go on a rescue mission. They sail to Genoa, liberate Baibars, conquer the city and return home in a triumph.\textsuperscript{44} One can easily imagine that such heroic stories were as well part of popular contemporary shadow plays, from whom some pieces have survived, like the following boat which might have been used to illustrate the transport of the legendary warriors to Genoa.\textsuperscript{45}

Figure 2: Mamluk Ship from a Shadowplay, Egypt 14th century

\textsuperscript{43} Thomas Herzog, \textit{Geschichte und IMAGINAIRE: Entstehung, Überlieferung und Bedeutung der Sírat Baibars in ihrem sozio-politischen Kontext}, (Diskurse der Arabistik 8), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 2006.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., pp. 60, 72-118.
This story line, however, clearly makes allusion to the successful attack on Cyprus in 1426 and the capture of its king. It is striking though that it was not Cyprus or Barcelona which represents the evil empire in this epic tale between good and bad, but Genoa. We cannot really comprehend why this choice was done by the anonymous authors of the *sira* but the very fact that the Ligurian city was chosen, demonstrates how Genoa had managed to obtain a very bad image as leading Frankish villain in the Muslim East from 1365 onwards right to the 20th century.

VII. The Venetian-Mamluk relationship in the Fine Arts

In contrast to the negative image of the Genoese, mutual Venetian – Mamluk perceptions seemed rather positive. Maria Pedani has even speculated that the winged lion representing St. Mark, which made its first appearance on a ducal seal in 1261, was influenced by the lion which represented the aforementioned Mamluk sultan Baibars in his heraldry. She argues that it is remarkable that the Venetians would have chosen the lion as a heraldic animal at a time when they had to leave Constantinople in 1261 after the downfall of the Latin Empire. Maybe, so she remarks, Venetian officials tried to get a foot into the market of the Mamluk Empire.
by choosing the lion of St Mark with its Alexandrine connection in order to befriend the Mamluks as Baybars used a lion as well in his heraldry.\textsuperscript{46}

However, when talking about the aspect of an artistic relationship between the Mamluks and the Venetians one has to bear in mind that it is mainly an artistic representation of Mamluks or Mamluk stylistic components which can be found in Venetian art or carpets.\textsuperscript{47} The Influence of European arts on Mamluk art is more difficult to observe. At the beginning of the Mamluk Empire the Gothic style of crusader churches was still copied in Mamluk architecture but for later periods a clear European is not exactly traceable. Doris Behrens-Abouseif notes in this respect that while European techniques and European craftsmanship were increasingly used from the end of the fifteenth century onwards, the same cannot be said about European artistic motives.\textsuperscript{48}

But this holds not true for the other way round. The topic of St Marc of Alexandria had always been popular in Venetian art (see for example above figure 1), but with an increasing number of Venetian visitors, the depiction of St Mark receives a clear Mamluk touch.

Especially towards the end of Mamluk rule when the Mamluk-Venetian relationship had grown almost into a mutual alliance, images of the Mamluk Empire and its rulers became very popular in Venice. Julian Raby has shown how the image of the Mamluk governor of Damascus with so called \textit{nāʿūra} (waterwheel) on his head has influenced very much Venetian art at the beginning of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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The *nāʾūra* was a large turban worn by high-ranking Mamluk dignitaries in the late Mamluk period whereby ram horns were enwrapped into the turban. This was done in order to resemble Alexander the great, i.e. Iskander in the Muslim tradition, often identified with the Dhu al-Qarnayn, the one with the two horns, mentioned in the Quran.\(^{50}\)

The *nāʾūra* was apparently so peculiar that it became a popular theme in Venetian paintings for example in the paintings of Giovanni Mansueti (d. after 1526). In the painting “The Arrest and Trial of St. Mark” the governor of Alexandria wears the *nāʾūra*. Here we remark again the link which St. Mark constitutes between Alexandria and Venice.

But even more astonishing is Mansuetis painting “nativity” where the nā‘ūra of the Mamluk sultan can be found on the head of one of the three kings from the East looking for the newborn Christ.

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VIII. Conclusion

As stated in the introduction history cannot be rewritten, but lessons can be drawn. The Genoese and the Venetians came to different conclusions after the failure of the attack on Alexandria in 1365. These conclusions, however, were as well influenced by the formal frame in which their trading activities were organized. As shown, the Venetians opted for stable relations and refrained from aggressive acts. The Genoese did not follow this path, they conquered Famagusta and traded from there, moreover they allowed their subjects acts of piracy against the Mamluks. However, the Mamluks were not able to stop the Genoese piracy nor were they willing to forbid Genoa to trade at all in the Mamluk Empire. Too precious, so it seems, were the Military slaves imported via Genoese Caffa.

Both approaches were apparently lucrative and worked side by side for almost a century. After the mid-fifteenth century however the Genoese influence and part in the Levant trade went considerably downwards. This might have to do with the special trade arrangements the Mamluks concluded with their Venetian ally or this was the consequence of the Ottoman pressure which drove the Genoese out of the Black sea and deprived them of the important slave trade. Presumably, it was a mixture of both.

But being nice to your trading partner apparently paid off for the Venetians. In the context of the Mamluk mental mind, it even helped to extinguish the fact that the Venetians took so actively part in Peter’s crusade. Through their aggressive policy afterwards the Genoese got the blame and the lions of St Mark and Baibars became mutual friends.
Between Peace and War: The Peaceful Memory of the Crusades between the Middle Ages and the Modern Arabic-Egyptian writings

Ahmed Mohmed Sheir

I. Abstract:
Starting from the current approaches regarding the memory of the crusades in modern and present time, this short article seeks to examine the memory of the crusades reflected in some writing-models of modern Arab works and to discover the developments in crusade historiography between the past and present. Therefore, this paper studies some selected models of the peaceful correspondences between the Latin crusader Kings and Muslim Ayyubid rulers to measure the memory and perception of the crusades in the modern time. It is important to memorize, rethink and re-receive the memory of the peaceful relations that took place during the crusades' time as this can contribute to reinforcing the peacebuilding between the East and West in the contemporary time. The second part of the paper aims to give an overview of the memory of the crusades and its perception through selected writings and cultural materials of the 19th and 20th centuries, to measure the crusades’ memory and its role in shaping peace and war between West and East.

II. Introduction:
The term “crusade” was unknown when the Latin-Christian forces invaded the Levant at the late of the eleventh century. The Pope Urban II (c. 1035 – 1099) who first called for such an expedition, did not use or create the term crusade during his speech at Clermont in 1095. Indeed, the crusade initially was defined as a military pilgrimage and most of the contemporaries referred to it as expeditio, passagium, peregrination (pilgrimage). ¹ The idea of the crusade was used and described starting from

the twelfth century to refer to the Crusaders who took the cross and vowed to fight the Muslims in the Levant. “Crusade” was first used by Pope Innocent III in the fourth Lateran in 1215, who preached for the Fifth Crusade and used the term "crucesignatus."\(^2\) Since that time the terminology of the Crusade was adopted by the Latin Christians. As an alternative term for the crusades in the Arab-Muslim world, the term of “Hurub al-Ifranj” or “al-Firanj” was used, which means the wars of the Franks who came from Europe to fight the Muslims.\(^3\) Apparently, this means that the crusades directly meant the warfare which took place in the late eleventh century and afterwards between the Latin West and Muslim East. The crusades has “systematically sown the seeds of Islamophobia up to today,”\(^4\) Such a perception or image transmitted and adapted from the past is presented as disrupting the peacebuilding conception.

Jonathan Phillips said: “there is also the historical legacy of the crusades – a legacy of brutality and fanaticism that has cast a deep shadow across relations between Christianity and Islam, Christianity and Judaism, and among Christians themselves.”\(^5\) The historical memory of the crusades thus conveyed the war and hostility aspects more than the peace-diplomatic appearances. Consequently, in this paper, I will first attempt to restore intellectually, conceptually and historically, some of the peaceful-diplomatic aspects that took place during the crusades. I will then consider whether the crusades' memory transmitted such aspects to the modern period, or only transmitted images of war and conflict.

### III. Models of Peaceful Correspondences and their Memory:

In 1174, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (d. 589AH/1193AD) sent a diplomatic letter to King Baldwin IV (d.579AH/.1183AD), who was crowned as the new king of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the time. This message was preserved in the Egyptian Ayyubid archive by the Egyptian chronicler al-Qalqashandi (d.1418),\(^6\) who was fortunate to be working in the administration in the 14th century.

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\(^3\) Othman, “Islamophobia, the First Crusade, 89.

\(^4\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Shihab al-Din abu 'l-Abbas Ahmed ibn Ali ben Ahmad Abd Allah al-Qalqashandi (1355 or 1356 – 1418) was a medieval Egyptian chronicler and mathematician. He wrote a well-known encyclopedia Subh al-a' sha. He was educated in law and literature and became a
and early 15th century. In this letter, Ṣalāh al-Dīn sent his best wishes to King Baldwin IV (Bardwil برديويل) as written by al-Qalqashandi) saying; “God bless to the great king, the protector of Bait al-Maqdis, (Jerusalem) with all best wishes, luck and happiness." He sent his sincere congratulations for crowning Baldwin as a King of Jerusalem and expressed his earnest condolences for the death of his father, the previous king Amalric I (d.569 AH / 1074 AD). Then, Ṣalāh al-Dīn said that he held nothing but a friendship, loyalty and friendly intentions and ties to his realm, as he did before with the late kingdom due to the common interest, regardless of their different religions. Therefore, King Baldwin IV can trust him and consider him as a son relying on his father. At the end of the message, Ṣalāh al-Dīn told the King of Jerusalem to contact and consult him any time, asking Allah to bless, protect his rule and kingdom, and guide him to trust in such a friendly letter.

Such correspondences reflect a neglected side of the peaceful coexistence between Muslim rulers, especially Ṣalāh al-Dīn, and the Latin Kings, which was often avoided by the historians and writers of the past, modern and present time. Media, education and other cultural materials concentrate only on the military aspects of the crusades and they are accustomed to disregard such friendly, diplomatic and peaceful cohabitation, particularly at the time of Ṣalāh al-Dīn who succeeded to


8 Amalric, I (1136- 1174), king of Jerusalem and son of King Fulk of Jerusalem. He had been the count of Jaffa and Ascalon before crowing his elder brother Baldwin III on the throne of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1163. He sought to control Egypt and crush the attempts of the Muslim unification by Nur-al-Din Mahmoud. Therefore, he invaded Egypt several times commencing from 1163, the year in which he ascended the throne of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. After Amalric’s death, his son Baldwin was crowned king of Jerusalem as Baldwin IV. See: William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea, ed. trans. E. A.Bacock and A.C.Krey, vol. 2 (New York, 1943), 295-343; Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Vol. 2 (USA: Cambridge University Press, 15th ed, 1995), 267-75.

9 al-Qalqashandī، Ṣubḥ Al-A’shá Fī Sinā’at Al-Inschā’، Vol. 7.
restore Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 583 AH/1187 AD. Most of the works, especially drama and schools, focus on the third crusade and the relations between Şalâh al-Dîn and King Richard I,\(^\text{10}\) Richard the Lionheart, King of England from 1189 to his death in 1199.\(^\text{11}\) Indeed, this illustrates that the two centuries of the crusades have been considered and perceived as an ideological and religious-political conflict.\(^\text{12}\)

The significance of Şalâh al-Dîn’s letter is that Baldwin IV was a son of Amalric I, who attacked Egypt several times and besieged Ássad al-Dîn Shirkûh, Saladin’s uncle, in the Egyptian town Belbeis for three months and Şalâh al-Dîn himself in Alexandria for four months.\(^\text{13}\) However, once Şalâh al-Dîn was learned about his death, he proved his intention of peacebuilding sending the above-mentioned message. Such message presents several diplomatic lessons to the contemporary world, by which we might manage and drive our present world to peace. It could be said

\(^\text{10}\) al-Qalqashandī, Šubḥ Al-A‘shà Fī Sinā‘at Al-Inshā’, Vol. 7.
that peacebuilding talks of our present time in need to be reproduced by shaping a peaceful memory of the past.

On the other hand, both Fredrick II (d. 648 AH/1250 AD), Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Sultan al-Kāmil of Egypt (d.635AH/1238 AD) presented a unique type of mutual diplomatic peaceful cohabitation during the crusades. Fredrick II was crowned as a King of Germany in 1215 and then as the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1220 and he promised to go on a crusade to capture Jerusalem.\(^{14}\) However, such a crusade was delayed numerous times. The Papacy, thus, issued an excommunication against him in 1227 and 1228,\(^{15}\) despite the fact of his close involvement in the affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem through his marriage to Isabella II, the heiress to the throne of Jerusalem.\(^{16}\)

Consequently, Frederick launched his crusade to avoid further enmity with the papacy and to protect his authority and his positions. In June 1228, the Emperor sailed to the Levant with a small force. He relied on his friendly relations with al-Kāmil to hold peaceful negotiations around the city of Jerusalem, by which he could gain it without bloodshed.\(^{17}\) There were numerous diplomatic interrelations between Frederick II and al-Kāmil that were not widely accepted by the majority of religious scholars in East and West at this time.\(^{18}\) The mutual missions and embassies were concluded to hold the treaty of Jaffa 626 AH/ 1229 AD, by which a ten-


\(^{16}\) Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Oxford History of the Crusades, Book (Oxford University Press, 1999), 133.


year truce was held and al-Kāmil agreed to deliver the City of Jerusalem to Fredrick II. 19

The essence of the intimate and diplomatic relations between the Emperor and the Sultan could be clarified by looking at a message sent by al-Jawad ibn-Younes (Nephew of Ṣalāh al-Dīn) in 1232 AD/ 630 AH. This letter was al-Jawad's response to a previous letter received from Frederick II. Al-Jawad started his message with a glorification of Frederick II

19 Jaffā stated on holding peace between the Crusaders and Muslims for ten years. Both sides had the freedom to worship, the Mosque of Amr ibn-Al Khattab remained under the Muslims’ hand. Fredrick II had agreed to punish anyone from the crusade sides beak this peaceful agreement, not only but he promised al-Kāmil to not support any crusader army against the Muslims. For more information see: Gamal al-Dīn Mohamed Ibn-Wāṣil (d. 1298-678AH), Mufarrīj Al-Kurūb Fi Ākhir Bānī Āyyūb, Vol.4, ed. jamal al-Dīn al-Shaiyal (Cario, 1960), 241-42; Huillard-Bréholles, Historia Diplomatica Frederici Secundi, 3/6, 86-88; Eleryan, “The Diblūmāsīat Fī Al-‘ilāqāt Bayna Alembraṭūr Frederick Althany Wa Al-Āyyūbiyin,” 95-98.

20 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ Al-A’shā, Vol. 7, 117; Ms. Nr.18880 P.115,118, in the Egyptian Archive in Cairo.

mentioning that al-Malik al-Kāmil did not make a distinction between the "two Kingdoms," i.e. Kingdom of Fredrick II and the Ayyubid State. He concluded the message by confirming the reliability of the relations between them.22 These relations between Frederick II and Ayyubid Sultans of Egypt enhanced their position to stand strong in the face of their opponents on both sides; especially the Latin nobles, Templars and Hospitallers who opposed Frederick II and al-Ṣālih Ismā‘īl of Damascus who sought to ally with those nobles against al-Ṣālih Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb of Egypt between 1239-1241.23

Mathew Paris has mentioned a discussion that took place in 1146 between Sultan Najm al-Dīn and the Templars and Hospitallers who asked to release their captives by paying a ransom. The sultan demanded from them a large sum of money in fine gold and silver coins. They accepted and asked the sultan’s nobles to intercede for them. When the Sultan heard that, he rebuked these intercessors, and reproached Templars and Hospitalers saying, according to Matthew Paris;" what wretches are those Christians called Templars and Hospitalers, transgressors as they are their law and their order; for in the first place, a few years back, they wished traitorously to betray their emperor Frederick when he was a pilgrim in the service of Christ, but, owing to our regard to justice protecting him, they did not succeed in their attempts (…) Again, these people, who are mutually bound to love their brothers as themselves, and to assist them in their necessities, have now, for years, carried on war amongst themselves, and cherished feelings of inexorable hatred one against another(...) And now, adding evil to evils, and heaping transgressions on transgressions of the rules of their order, they are endeavoring to procure the release of their masters and brethren who are captives, by paying a large sum of money, when we know that, according to the rules of their order, they can only be ransomed by a certain belt or cape. Owing to their manifold deserts, therefore, the Lord has delivered them as prisoners into the hands of those who hate them."24

22 al-Qalqashandī, Šubḥ Al-Aʿshá Fī Sināʿat Al-Inshā', Vol. 7, 117.
As an indication of the extent to which the relations between the Egyptian Sultan and the emperor were, the former informed the Hospitallers and Templars that he would free their captives only if Fredrick II asked him to do so. Such an answer was diplomatic support to the emperor who was in a struggle with those knights, the Papacy and others crusader nobles in the Levant at the time. Another example of the friendly relations could be observed in the message of Frederick II in 646/1248 to Sultan al-Ṣālih Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb; informing him that he tried to obstruct the crusade of Louis IX (624-668 AH/ 1226-1270), known as the seventh crusade, against Egypt.

Later, the emperor ordered his messenger; the emperor’s son Manfred, disguised in the dress of a merchant, to inform the Sultan of Egypt about the movements of King Louis IX. Ibn-Wāsil reports that the emperor’s messenger said: “the emperor secretly sent me to al-Mālik al- al-Ṣālih Najm al-Dīn to notify him about the intention of the Ray de Frans (Louis IX King of France) to attack al-Dīyār al-Masriyah (Egypt), prompting him to prepare his troops. No one else knows about such a meeting between me, [Manfred] and al-Mālik al- al-Ṣālih, lest the Franks learn something about such information transferred to the Muslims.” Though the crusades included at times amicable, diplomatic and peaceful relations, the influence of the crusades and its memory was often understood and almost always associated with the conflicts between West and East, Islam and Christianity. In the rest of this article, thus, we aim to briefly present the memory of the crusades; by examining some of the modern Arabic studies of the crusades. We will not provide a comprehensive investigation but rather a brief overview which can serve as a stepping stone to further works on such a theme in near future.

26 “أرسلني الإمبراطور في السر إلى الملك الصالح نجم الدين لأعرفه عزم قصد ريدافرانس على الدير المصرية وأحزنه منه، وأشير عليه بالاستعداد، فاستعد له الملك الصالح، ورجعت إلى الإمبراطور، وكان ذهابي إلى مصر ورجوعي في زي تاجر. ولم يشعر أحد باجتماعي بالملك الصالح خوفاً من الفرنج أن يعلموا مشاراً الإمبراطور للمسلمين عليه.”
IV. The Memory of the Crusades through Selected-Writings in the late 18th and during the 19th centuries.

In July 1798, the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) landed in Egypt, defeated the Egyptian army, which was, in reality, a Mamluk army under the Ottoman leadership, at the Battle of the Pyramids and attacked Cairo. Bonaparte claimed that he came to Egypt to create modern political and economic structures in the country.28 Such a French invasion of Egypt was sufficient to revive the memory of the crusades in the collective mind of Egyptian thinkers, represented by intellectuals, clerics or imams and even historians. It should not be forgotten that the First Crusade (1095–1099), called for by the French Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont in 1095, known as the Princes' crusade, was primarily led by Frankish nobles.29 Napoleon’s expedition was the first foreign invasion of Egypt in modern history. It was an extension of the enduring conflict between France and Britain at the time. France sought to control the commercial roads between Britain and its colonies in the East through this expedition.30

ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī (1753–1825), who was an eyewitness of the Napoleonic French invasion of Egypt (1798-1801) and the most prominent Egyptian historian at the time, coined the term “al-Firansāwīah: الفرنساوية" to refer to the French forces. Moreover, he also used the term Franks "alfrinjah: الفرنسة" as a reference to the European forces, especially the French and British. He made use of modern terms, such as occupation, and colonization, in his account while also describing the French as infidels.31 Such terms were linked with the terms that had been used during

the crusades such as the Franks, by which the Arabs and Muslims called the Latin Christian armies that invaded the Levant during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. However, al-Jabartī was an objective historian and he recorded and praised the civilizational and scientific efforts of the scholars who came with Napoleon.\textsuperscript{32}

The French contributed much to the crusades and they were the first to represent their modern imperialism projects in crusading terms. France created a legendary national crusading history to be associated with its modern imperialist program but it was not the only European country which invented such propaganda.\textsuperscript{33} In spite of such a crusading national glory, it is interesting enough to find that the memory of the crusade was brought back by Napoleon in July 1798, at the beginning of his campaign against Egypt. He wrote an exceptional letter in Arabic to emotionally convince the Egyptians to trust in him saying: “The French are also faithful Muslims and they have diminished the Apostolic See or the Papal See, in Rome, which was always preaching for the wars on the Muslims. After that we, the French, also fought the knights of St. John in Malta who exhorted the war against the Muslims claiming that the Lord has required them to conduct such warfare against the Muslims.”\textsuperscript{34}

Consequently, we can observe how both al-Jabartī and Napoleon recalled the crusades’ memory; however, both of them did not use explicitly the term crusades. Al-Jabartī sought to alert the Egyptians about the hazards of such Franks and to raise awareness among the Egyptians to defend Egypt. Napoleon manipulated the same memory to invite the Egyptians to peace; claiming that he came with peaceful intentions, to develop Egypt and to free the Egyptians from oppression. This was a short-image of the early memory of the crusades in the late eighteenth century and least nineteenth century.

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\textsuperscript{32} al-Jabartī, vol.3, 179.  \\
\textsuperscript{33} Riley-smith, “Islam and the Crusades in History and Imagination,” 155-56.  \\
\textsuperscript{34} Jabartī, vo.3, 5. Here is a part of Napoleno message in Arabic: إن الفرنسا هي أيضاً مسلمون مخلصون، وإثبات ذلك أنهم نزلوا في رومية الكبري وخردوا فيها كرسي البابا الذي كان دائماً يحب النصارى علي محاربة الإسلام، ثم قصدوا جزيرة مالطة وطردوا منها الكوالالري (فرسان)...
\end{flushright}
In the 19th century, Rifā‘a al-Ṭahṭāwī (d. 1873) used the term crusades along with the term Frankish wars in his account al-‘Amāl al-Kāmilā. He employed the term crusades in the frame of his writing about modern civilization in Europe as an example of Europe’s past and as a warning about what could become of Islamic civilization which had broken down. Expressing his view saying: "when the crusades and the Franks’ attack commenced in the eastern Islamic countries, the leaders of the armies themselves travelled to fight Islam. (…) They waged a long war to control Jerusalem, lived among and with the Muslims and learned from Islam what could develop their countries. (…) Those leaders wasted much money and they had to sell their properties to the people. (…) Since that time, they obtained the benefits of civilian and economic rights, they became civilized and free and the European countries enjoyed actual civilization and freedom.ṭahṭāwī, thus, was the first among the Arab-Muslims scholars of the Modern era who embraced and included the term crusades (al-ḥurūb al-Salibīyah: الحروب الصليبية) in his works. This represented a transformation in the use of the term crusades in subsequent works. Ṭahṭāwī created an association between the situation of Europe during the crusades and its condition during his time, influenced by his residence in Paris as the head of the Egyptian student mission sent to Paris by Mohammed Ali Pasha, the ruler of Egypt, in 1826. This means that Ṭahṭāwī adapted the word crusades during his life in France influenced by the French books that commonly used this term.

Thus the use of the term crusades in modern Arabic literary and historical works was one of the outcomes of the French-Arabic translation movement encouraged by Ṭahṭāwī. The French culture had influenced his

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background and his writings. He is considered the founder of the School of Languages or Translation in 1835 which later became the Faculty of Languages in Ain Shams University in 1973. Tahtawi’s works contributed to the flourishing of intellectual life in Egypt and the Arabic renaissance (Nahḍa) that blossomed in the years between 1860-1940. 39

Consequently, Ṭaḥṭāwī used the crusades' memory to stimulate the Egyptians and the Egyptian state to imitate the European Renaissance and to resist fanaticism and political-economic backwardness as France and other European countries had done. It could be argued, therefore, that Ṭaḥṭāwī used the memory of the crusades to encourage peace, self-determination and national development, and not to encourage war or hostility.

V. The Crusades, Colonialism, Jerusalem and Israeli-Arab Conflict:

At the start of the twentieth century, an extraordinary volume of studies and editions of primary sources on the crusades were published, as a natural reaction to the extension of the imperial powers in much of the non-western world, especially the Arab World. As Jonathan Phillips noted: “The Arab world began to try to shake off the shackles of western imperialism, the struggles of their predecessors against the Crusaders seemed highly relevant and this is a perception that has continued.” The increase of publications on the crusades and the occupation of Arab lands contributed to reviving the crusading memory, but it was a “much sharper and more vivid presence, in large part because the outline of events in the medieval period has a number of pertinent parallels to the present.”40

The European overseas movement in the 19th and 20th centuries; especially the British and French occupation of Arab countries have been described in some sense as a new crusade. Moreover, the conflict between the Ottoman state and Europe, the Issue of Jerusalem and the Zionist movement contributed to reviving the memory of the crusades.

The first modern Arabic book about the history of the crusades was printed in 1899 by the Egyptian Sayed ‘Alī al-Ḥarīrī entitled; “al-Akhbār al-Sanīyah fī al-Ḥurūb al-Ṣalībīyah.”41 Al-Ḥarīrī identified the reason for writing such a book saying: “As we, the Arabic readers, do not find in our language a book about the history of the crusades to know its truth, justifications and its consequences, I, thus, wrote this book titled “al-akhbār al-sanīyah fī al-ḥurūb al-Ṣalībīyah.”42 In Al-Ḥariri’s introduction, it was stated that Sultan Abd-Al-Ḥamīd II remarked that “Europe is now fighting a new crusading war in a political frame.”43

The author’s presentation of the Ottoman Sultan Abd-al-Ḥamīd II as the protector of the Muslims illustrates how political-religious passion influenced the interpretation of the crusades in modern times, just as religious enthusiasm charged the crusades in the middle ages. Thus, the struggle between Europe and the Ottoman Empire was associated with the crusades between Europe and Islam in the Middle Ages. This clearly reflects that the crusades were used as a political propaganda tool in the conflict between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. However, Al-Hariri believed that the Christian religion was completely innocent of the wars which launched in its name.

In the autumn of 1898, the year before al-Ḥarīrī’s work appeared, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany visited Syria and then Šalāh al-Dīn’s tomb in Damascus; describing him as “one of the most chivalrous rulers in history and a knight without fear or blame.”44 This visit brought back the memory of the crusades in the minds of Arabs who had never forgot the idealistic leader Šalāh al-Dīn. Jonathan-Riley-Smith’s claim that “Kaiser Wilhelm II reintroduced Saladin to the Muslims in the Levant, who had been almost forgotten by them,” is unfounded.45 One might argue that the Arab

42 Ibid, 15.
43 Ibid. 15.
44 Riley-smith, “Islam and the Crusades in History and Imagination, 151-52.
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collective memory had omitted some aspects of the crusades, but Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was never forgotten.

The idea of the crusade was employed as an instrument of nationalism against the colonial powers in the Arab world, especially with the beginning of the 20th century, to demand democracy, liberty and independence within a modernized political-religious frame. Muṣṭafā Kāmil (d. 1908), an Egyptian lawyer, journalist, nationalist activist and the originator of the idea of establishing the Egyptian University,46 revived the crusade-war’s memory through his writing about the Ottoman-British struggle over Jerusalem and Palestine. He said: “the British ambition is to subject Jerusalem under the Protestant authority and we do not know how the Catholic and Orthodox through the entire world would perceive such consequence.” Then he added, “Assuming that Pope and Kaiser agreed on such concern, then what shall the Muslims, who defended Jerusalem during the crusades, would say.”47

Kāmil sought to reinforce his idea of liberation and resistance by making a connection between the past and future to excite the Egyptian movement against British colonialism. He also claimed that "Jerusalem is an Islamic city" saying: "The crusades provided us with the greatest evidence that the city of Jerusalem could not be owned by a country other than the Islamic state, in which the balance between all sects and religions would have existed." He stated that “wresting Jerusalem from the Ottoman State means the collapse of the Ottoman state itself, which would cause an awful disaster for civilization, causing dreadful wars between all nations of different beliefs. There is no other nation that can own and protect al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf (Al-Aqsa Mosque or Jerusalem).”48

The Balfour Declaration in 1917 caused many to compare the crusades with Zionism and British imperialism. During World War I, the British

47 ʻAlī Fahmī Kāmil, Sīrat Muṣṭafā Kāmil Fī Arabʻah Wa-Thalāthīn Rabīʻan, vol.3 (Cairo: Maṭbaʻat al-Difāʻ al-Waṭanī, 1926), 179.
48 Ibid, 181.
issued the D-Notice (Defence Notice) in 1917, which forbade publishing any article or pictures describing the military operations against Turkey as a holy war or a modern Crusade, or as having anything whatsoever to do with religious questions. In contrast, there were several painting and cartoons about the crusades in British newspapers or magazines.49 The modern Israeli occupation of Jerusalem was recognized as a parallel to the crusader conquest of Jerusalem in the middle ages.50 Jonathan Phillips says; “there is a perception that the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem was a forerunner of the modern Israeli state.” 51

Since that time, the crusades were often associated with the Palestinian-Israel conflict and the issue of Jerusalem. During the time of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (d. 1970), the crusades were often brought to mind as a result of the wars that took place around Jerusalem and Palestine, along with the Syrian - Egyptian unification. These events recalled the unification of Egypt and Syria under Nur Al-Din and Šalāh al-Dīn and the reconquest of Jerusalem in 583 AH/ 1187 AD.

During the speech of March, 2nd, 1958, Gamal Abd al-Nāṣir described the French-British attack on Egypt, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as a new crusade.52 He said: “the union between Egypt and Syria was the only approach to conquer such Crusade campaigns. The Egyptian and Syrian forces were able to defeat the Crusaders in Syria, to free Jerusalem and to defend Egypt against the Crusaders' attacks.” 53 The memory of the crusades was completely revived at this time, exemplified in the use of the word crusades by the pioneer of Arab nationalism, president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Moreover, Mūflih Ali in his book, “Ábtal al-Wahda al-Sūriyah wa-al-Miṣriyah fī al-Hūrūb,” says “there is no doubt that the conflict around Jerusalem between the Zionist Israeli state and

Arab nation is the same issue faced by the Arabs and the Franks during the crusades. This image reflects the contemporary memory of the crusades, in parallel with the union between Egypt and Syria and the Arab-Israeli conflict around Jerusalem that still exist.

VI. The Idea of the Crusades through some Egyptian Academic-University Writings:

By the mid-twentieth century, numerous academic works on the history of the crusades had been published, as a response to the idea of shaking off colonial rule in the Arab world, promoting the idea of Arab nationalism by Abd al-Nāṣir and striving for the liberation of Jerusalem from the Zionist movement. ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mājid (d.1999) wrote a book entitled "al-Nasir Šalāb al-Dīn, published in Cairo in 1958, reprinted in Beirut in 1967. The same book was published under the title “Ṣalāb Al-Dīn Al-Ayyūbī “in 1987. This book was the first Arabic book dedicated to Saladin. Majid describes the rule of Saladin who was very eager to call himself “khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfīn,” i.e. the servant of the holy sanctuaries, as an “idealistic regime.” He saw such the idealism of Saladin in the personality of the president of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abd al-Nāṣir, especially after the attacks of France, Britain, and Israel on Egypt in 1956.

Sa‘īd ‘Āshūr (d.2009) wrote his two-volumes “Al-Ḥarakah Al-Ṣalībīa: Šafḥah mushriqah min al- Jihād al-Islāmī fī al-‘uṣūr al-wusṭā, (The Crusading Movement: a bright page in the history of Islamic Jihad in the middle Ages),” first published in 1963. ‘Ashur's book is considered to be one of the basic academic reference works on the crusades in Arabic and it is also a common university textbook. One can argue that ‘Āshūr’s position in Arabic crusades studies was similar to that of his contemporary, the English historian Steven Runciman (d. 2000), in the same field in the English-speaking world.

‘Ashūr says in his introduction: “the crusades form an important event in Arab and Islamic history. They were a great occurrence, with dangerous

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54 Ali, Ābtal Al-Wihda Al-Sūrīyah, 15.
effects, deep influences, and many lessons for the present." ʻĀshūr aimed to revive the crusades' memory academically and scientifically to be taught from an Arabic perspective in the universities and schools. He also tried to show links between lessons learned from the crusades and the condition of the Arab World and the Middle East world in the twentieth-century.

In 1990, Qāsim Abduh Qāsim (b. 1942) wrote a book entitled “Māhīyat al-Ḥarakah al-Ṣalībīah,” applying a new methodology to the crusades. He used the term Arab world instead of the Muslim world to refer to the Middle East and the lands captured by the Crusaders. In contrast to Sayyid al-Ḥarīrī, who considered, in his book published in 1899, that the Ottoman Empire was facing a crusade and the Sultan Abdulhamid II was the protector of the Arab World, Qāsim believes that “the crusade movement disrupted the creativity and prosperity in Arab-Islamic civilization, which, in turn, caused the weakness of the Arabian region and led to its fall under the Ottomans who were unable to revive Arab-Islamic civilization.”

Qāsim changed the approach to dealing with crusades as a militant movement. He sought to rethink and study the term crusades with its different concepts that necessarily led to chaos and confusion. Besides the military memory of the crusades which was transmitted via media to serve European imperialist purposes, Qāsim believed that the crusades have left us a sort of cultural heritage, folklore which needs to be discovered and studied. According to him, “no one can deny the relation between what occurred several centuries ago and what governs our present relationship with Western Europe and America.” He also identifies the crusade movement as “the first European colonialist wave to the Arab world before the modern one, which was an inspiration to the Zionist movement that has settlement objectives.” Consequently, it is important to examine such a

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57 ʻĀshūr, Al-Ḥarakah Al-Ṣalībīah, vol.1, 7.
60 See above
61 Qāsim, Māhīyat Al-Ḥarakah Al-Ṣalībīah, 9.
phenomenon to interpret its ideology, motives and reasons and its effects on the Arab world.\(^{62}\)

The above-mentioned works are a few examples of how modern Arab historians deal with the crusades and their memory. Before concluding, we will look at the image of the crusades in the works of two other contemporary Egyptian historians. Mohammed Mu’nis ‘Awaḍ (b. 1956), an Egyptian professor currently working at Sharjah University in the United Arab Emirates, wrote dozens of books about Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in addition to general works on the crusades, travellers’ accounts from the crusading period and a bibliography of the crusades in the West and East.\(^{63}\) According to him, “the modern Arab academic historians only became involved in the study of the crusades a half-century ago, while the western historians wrote about 5660 works about the crusades by 1965. This means that we, as Eastern scholars, have fallen behind the western historians in the investigation of this topic. However, we have to take the initiative to delve deeply into crusading studies in order to protect ourselves and our countries from a similar movement.”\(^{64}\)

As a reaction to the Israeli settlement policy in Jerusalem, some Arab and Egyptian scholars studied the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese cities during the age of the crusades examining the political, social and even cultural conditions of such cities, to show that the Arabic-Islamic character of these cities. Awareness of the history of the Palestinian cities, for example, might help to defend them against the present settlement campaign by Israel. Aly Ahmad al-Sayyid (b. 1955), emeritus professor at Damanhour University in Egypt, is one of the historians who wrote about the Palestinian cities during the crusades. His first work, a master’s thesis,

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\(^{62}\) Qāsim, Māhīyat Al-Ḥarakah Al-Ṣalībīah, 5, 9-10.


discusses the history of the principality of Galilee during the crusades, and his second deals with the city of “Al-Khalīl” Hebron.

To conclude, this article has dealt only with a few examples of the legacy of the crusades in Arabic-Egyptian historical scholarship of the 19th and 20th centuries. Much more work is needed and it is my hope to explore this topic in greater depth in future articles and works. The peaceful episodes of the crusades did not influence modern attitudes as much as the military aspects. The crusades were described as a holy war by the contemporary writers and compared to the Western colonialism of modern times. Consequently, the memory of the crusades and its re-perception is still connected with the events of the conflicts that take place in East and West, in which the collective mind, the public, intellectuals and historians in the East accuse the West and the USA and vice versa.

The memory of the crusades still transmits the influence of warfare and conflicts more than the determination of peacebuilding. We, as historians and scholars, have to use the memory of the crusades to build peace and to avoid wars. To doing so, we should intensively concentrate on the hidden peaceful and diplomatic aspects found during the age of the crusades, along with imagining destruction and devastation caused by that war.

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(VIII)

Aly Afify Aly Ghazy

An Independent Egyptian researcher in the modern and contemporary history

Peaceful Coexistence between Muslims and Copts in Egypt (1882-1952)
“It is not permissible for any person to insult the other people’s doctrines, otherwise all beliefs will be humiliated, and no religion will be valid for any person” (Youssef Zidan: ‘Azazyl, p.120)

This research investigates the history of sectarian problems and to show what it meant in the Egyptian case, 1882-1952. The imperialist west commonly resorted to the pretext of quelling sectarian violence or political impasse to justify its interference. Sectarianism among the minorities of Egypt, whether in the ethnic or religious sense has, in the main, been an unknown phenomenon. Rather, sectarianism has been and is now a favorite allegation by the imperialist powers when they take certain actions which they claim are meant to protect the minorities which are alleged to face persecution. Under the pretext of protection, formulated in terms of “human rights” and “spreading democracy,” they create the premises or invoke what is known as “the intervention thesis.”

The sectarianism narrative may have succeeded in other countries which experienced the obscenities of colonialism, but it failed in the Egyptian case because Egyptian society was more reflective and deeply experienced in facing societal diversity. For example, the strategy of colonial sectarianism succeeded in India, leading to its division into two states: Islamic Pakistan and India with its Hindu majority and various non-Islamic religions. Yet the colonial occupation proceeded in the same manner in Egypt and India in its theory and practice. But Egyptians proved to be more aware of the necessity to preserve the two elements of the Egyptian nation as they have long been parts of a single national fabric.

The current presentation expands on this thesis to grasp the reality of the Copts’ status in Egypt and their relations with the larger society and its authorities. Are they a minority? The Catholics are in America are, for instance. But is there a sectarian problem? And is there a Coptic Question in Egypt?
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Muslims and Copts before the British occupation

Before the Arab conquest of Egypt, “Copts” referred to the all people of Egypt without any sense of the word connoting a person or group’s religious beliefs.1 “They were the original inhabitants of Egypt who still retained their national language in its different dialects. They were called by this name to be distinguished from the estrange elements who settled in the country and used the Greek language.”2 But the predominance of Christianity among the Egyptians when the Arab Muslims invaded Egypt made this word acquire a religious dimension. Then its use came to be limited to referring to the Egyptians who remained Christians3 after the majority had converted to Islam.4

The use of Copts in the administration of financial affairs and collection of taxes began under Mamluk rule (922-1517), and the growing Coptic intellectual elite became necessary for the administration and the financial business in the country because of their qualifications and experience. Consequently, their life of luxury in Cairo and Egypt thrived and they mastered horseback riding and trading in the most wonderful mules and luxury jewelry. They wore rich clothes and “have taken over the great works.”5 In return, they were exposed to popular outrage and occasionally to the Sultan’s abandonment. Sometimes the ruling authority kept them away from their positions when they showed intolerance to their Dhimmi brethren or actually tried to harm Muslims.6

After the Mamluks, Ottoman rule began in 1517 and the administration of Egypt was devolved to an Ottoman Pasha who was often isolated. The

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1 Mai Sa´ed :”Al-tamiyyz Alqibty wa Esteb´ad al-Diwla”(Coptic Discrimination and the Exclusion of the State), Omran magazine, no. 1, (summer 2012), Pp.189,190.
2The Jesuit Father Ferdinand tuttle: Al-munjid fy Al-A´lam (Upholstered in Characters), (Beirut: Dar Al mashreq, 1978), Pp. 554, 555.
5Qasem Abdo Qasem: Āhl al-dhma fy disr mn alfath al-Islamy hta nhayat al-mamalyk (The Dhimmis in Egypt from the Islamic conquest until the end of the mamluks), (Cairo: Eein for publishing and distribution, 2003), p 71.
6 Farouq Osman Abaza: Dirasat fy Tārīkh misr al-hadith wa al-mu´asir (Studies in Modern and contemporary history of Egypt), (Alexandria: The University Knowledge House, 2001), p 178.
local administration remained in the hands of the Mamluks. The Copts continued practicing the functions of the administration’s collections, their clerks enjoying certain security and freedom more than when under the rule of the Mamluks. Some of them were enabled to collect wealth such as the two brothers Johari. The Ottoman Sultan gave them full freedom in religious matters, belief, and organizing sects. They had to pay tribute or to the communities but he exempted women, children, elders, monks and some sick people such as lepers.

During the Ottoman era, Copts practiced special formal modes of dress and traditions, such as wearing a uniform or taking a certain color for the turban. Regardless of these modes that were dictated by “Ottoman considerations of the doctrines’ system,” Muslim and Copt lived in harmony and in one cohesive fabric. They shared together feasts, celebrations, joys, and sadness in complete freedom and with a deep sense of affiliation to a common heritage. The Copts enjoyed religious freedom and all political rights. They were committed to all the duties of Egyptian citizenship, regardless of their doctrinal affiliation, and they had a positive role in Egyptian society. They found tolerance and equitable responses to their grievances in the Islamic system justice. They were subject to the Islamic judiciary in issues of personal conditions and inheritance.

In the Ottoman era the Al-Qesma Al-Arabiya court was commissioned to look into the issues of divorce and the Dhimmis’ contracts according to the Islamic Sharia because the Christian woman “Mariam” asked her husband “Mikhail bin Youssef Al-Nasrani” to divorce her in front of the Hambali judge in Masr Al-Qadima court. The scholars and the muftis of...
the four doctrines agreed to relieve the Copt woman, the mufti of Al-
Malikiyah saying that whoever has the guardianship of the other has to be
the one to withdraw from their covenant in the parish of jurisdiction, even
though they are Christians. The mufti of Shaf‘i said that whoever tolerates
injustice is faithless and has departed from Islam and the provisions of the
apostates applied to him.13

One of the first intrigues in sectarianism between Muslims and Copts,
emerged with the advent of the French campaign against Egypt in 1798, as
the Copts received Napoleon Bonaparte enthusiastically, hoping that the
French would apply the freedom and equality principles of the great French
revolution. But the French, to find a justification for their continuous
occupation of Egypt, preferred to play the Islamic majority card and
Napoleon declared himself the protector of Islam and thought about
dispensing with the services of the Copts in collecting taxes.14

Napoleon’s successors sought to industrialize sectarianism with the
encouragement of the teacher Jacob to join them. Jacob was assigned by
Kléber to organize finance in the country and, in Al Gebrti’s phrase,
General Kléber delegated the teacher Jacob “[t]o do with Muslims what he
wants. And the Christians from the Copts and the Christians of Al-Sham
insulted the Muslims by hitting and cursing and showed their hatred and
there was no place for reconciliation. They declared the end of the Muslims
and the Unitarian God.”15 La Scares encouraged him to form a corps from
the Coptic soldiers that would be a part of the French army and help them
in their war against the Turks and Mamluks. With this band, he could rule
Egypt with the support of France. Jacob actually established such a band
such that Abdullah Jacques Menou promoted him to the rank of general.
But very few Copts joined him. So he completed his formation from the

The Cultural House for Publishing and Distribution, 1983), p 17,125.
14 Samira Bahr: Al-āqbat fy al-ḥiāyat al-siāsiyah al-masriyat (The Copts in Egyptian
Political Life), (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Library, 1979), p 17, 18.
15 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, ‘Ajāʾib al-āthār fī al-tarājim wa- al-akhbār (Wonders of
Antiquities in the Translations and News), 4 vols, (Cairo: Dar El kotob Al-masriya
Maltese, Armenians, Cypriots, and Romans. He called himself ‘Sari Askar Al Qabta’\(^{16}\) and proclaimed himself their supreme commander.

But the Copts disowned him and the Patriarch and the senior churchmen cursed him. When the French had to evacuate from Egypt, he went with them at the head of a Coptic team to demand Egypt’s independence from the Ottoman Empire or come back with troops to invade Egypt at a time when conditions permitted. But he died of fever on the ship that was traveling to France and serenity returned among the people of Egypt to that of the former era.\(^{17}\) This was the first seed of sectarianism in Egypt and the ruling authorities in Egypt worked towards making them permanent. Al-Gebrti said: “No one harms a Christian or a Jew, whether he is a Copt, a Roman or a Shawam. They are nationals of the sultan and the past shall not be repeated,” and “decrees were read and mentioned the dignitaries of the Coptic clerks and not to expose to them, and maintenance of their symptoms and money and the commandment to them.”\(^{18}\)

In his book *Agaeb al-asar fi al-tragem wa al-akhbar* Al-Gebtri mentions Yaqoub al-Qubti in more than one passage accompanied by words that show him as dedicated in the service of the French occupation. He is described as one who reads for Al-Gebrti and imagines that he is one of the renegades who appear in the foreign rule era, and through it they are waging war against their nations. But the reader will not find in Al-Gebrti and in the others the fact that when the French occupation ended, Jacob emigrated with the French army to achieve the dangerous project of “Obtaining the Independence of Egypt.” Jacob’s support for the western foreign intervention represented to him the liberation of his homeland (Egypt) from a rule which was not Ottoman or Mamluk, but a combination of their


disadvantages of chaos, violence, and waste. Jacob saw that any type of the rule would be no worse than what Egypt had been subjected to before Bonaparte came.

The presence of Coptic group was the first main condition which was made for a man of the Egyptian nation, followed by farmers and industrialists, to be effective on the conditions of this nation, if the French occupation left, and the Ottomans and Mamluks returned to fight for Egypt and propagate corruption. The signs referred to that, as the French leader (Kléber), who authorized the establishment of the Coptic force did not believe that he would stay in Egypt. That’s why Jacob and the French were interested in the future of the new military force more than its present. They would have preferred to see it in the best state of readiness possible so as to make it the probable element in the future of Egypt after the departure of the French. This makes us offer another view that considers the attitude of the teacher Jacob as the first attempt at the independence of Egypt, and the recruitment of Egyptians for it, before the emergence of Muhammad Ali Pasha.

Muhammad Ali Pasha ascended to power in Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This event was a starting point for continuous improvement in the Copts’ status. He worked to create a modern state that imitated the European model. Benefiting from the scientific missions he sent to France for orientation on modernizing state institutions, we read in his correspondence that “all the Egyptian territories are considered and covered by the emotions of his honorable view as his own department, its inhabitants are raised in his bounty whether big or small, high or low.”

The effects of the building process of the Egyptian state had its impacts on the conditions of Copts in Egypt. The emergence of the state as a political entity led to the birth of Egyptian citizenship. In this sense, the era of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the ruler of Egypt (1805-1848), was a turning point in the treatment by the state and society as regards the Copts. He followed a tolerant policy aimed at asserting the equality between all

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Egyptians, Muslims and Copts, in rights and duties. He appointed Copts as officers for the centers of Bardis and Al-Fashn in Upper Egypt and Deir Mawas, Bahjoura, and Sharqiya in the Delta. A large number of Coptic friars were appointed in important positions in the state. Muhammad Ali terminated the use of their uniform and all the restrictions imposed on them as a concerned practice of their religious rites. He did not reject any request to build or repair the churches and provided them with assistance from the state treasury. Abdeen Palace provided a large number of orders for the churches, whether for its reconstruction or helping them in doing this, or expediting their implementation.

Muhammad Ali was the first ruler that granted the rank of Bakawi to Coptic employees and took them as consultants. The policies of Muhammad Ali matured and the spirit of equality between all Egyptians spread between Muslims and Copts, and they sincerely cooperated for the glory of the nation. The Copts in the era of Muhammad Ali formed an element in the Egyptian nation which promoted and experienced peace.

The international powers that dreamed of dominating Egypt tried to generate a second period of mistrust between Muslims and Copts to create the sectarianism that would justify intervention. Russia feared the quick conquests of Muhammad Ali, which came close to the elimination of Russia’s aspirations in the East. It sent an envoy to Peter VII, the Coptic Patriarch (1809-1852), to offer protection of the Copts by the Czar of Russia. The Pope asked the envoy, “Will your king live forever?” The

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20 Zkharbas Al Antony: *Al-qidís al-bābā Kírlis Al-Rāb Abou Al-Islah* (St. Pope Cyril IV the Father of Reform), Anba Mat Awes (revision and introduction), (Cairo: The national printing house in Fagala, 1995), p. 19,


22 Dār Al-ūthāiq al-qaūmíah fy Al-qāhirah (National Archives in Cairo), *Dfatr Dywan Al-Khedwy*, (The Books of the Office of the Khedive), notebook 728, *mn al,tab ela al-ma,ya sanya*, date: 7 Moharam 1235h/ 27 October 1819 A.D. Examined in a picture on microfilm in the research room.

envoy answered, “No, sir he will die as all people die.” Then the pope said, “Then you live under the care of a king that will die, but we live under the care of a king that will not die, and he is God”. When Muhammad Ali heard of that he was very happy and went to the patriarchal house to give thanks to the pope.24

Muhammad Ali’s successors completed his reform program and Said Pasha, the governor of Egypt (1854-1863) issued a decree in December 1855 to abolish the taxes imposed on the Copts25 and he allowed them to enter the army and apply the law of military service to them as Egyptian citizens. Said Pasha encouraged literary development and materially supported Coptic education, and the Copts traveled in the scientific missions that were sent to Europe26 where they played a significant role in the educational renaissance. He appointed a Christian governor in Massawa in Sudan27. The relations between Copts and Muslims improved markedly and principles of political and social equality had become a familiar thing. Thus the Copts again enjoyed full and equal citizenship with their Muslim brethren28.

In the era of Khedive Ismail (1863-1879), the law of establishing offices to teach the people reading and writing was presented to the council of representatives. The Muslim representatives demanded that these offices must be opened for all “(whether they were Muslims or Copts) because the

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26 Omar Toson: al-Ba´athāt al-misríat fi ´ahad Mohamed Ali fi ´Ahdyy Abbas al-´uwal was Saa`ed, (Scientific Missions during the Era of Muhammad Ali and during the Era of Abbas I and Said) (Cairo: Salah Al- Din printer, un. date), p 495, 518.


Copts are sons of the homeland, The Copts were active in establishing schools to teach their children religion, morals, reading, and writing in both Arabic and Coptic. This renaissance was due to the efforts of the Patriarch Anba Cyril IV (1853-1861), who established the first regular school for the Copts next to Al-Battarkhana which was inaugurated in 1855. The Khedive gave the Copts’ schools 1500 acres of the finest lands of the Egyptian state. Many senior statesmen had graduated from Copts schools such as prime ministers, ministers, deputy ministers, consultants, senior lawyers, and employees.

When Khedive Tawfiq (1879-1892) ascended to power, he declared the principle of equality among all Egyptians, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. The Khedive Abbas Helmy II (1892-1914) agreed to issue a decree on 21 July 1913 that supported the Copts’ demands to which they agreed at an Assiut conference in 1911. The decree dealt with equality in assigning administrative functions, the specification of financial resources, and increasing Coptic representation in the elected councils.

**The British occupation and the relationship between Muslims and Copts**

England exploited results of an ordinary quarrel about the fare for a donkey cart ride which broke out in Alexandria in 11 June 1882 between

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29 Soliman Naseem: *Al-Āqibāt wa al-t´alím fy misr al-ḥaditha* (Copts and Education in Modern Egypt), Anba Gregarious (introduction), (Cairo: Publications of the Episcopal Theological Seminary, and Coptic culture and scientific research, 1983), p 73.

30 Gerges Salama: *Tāríkh al-t´alím alājnaby fy misr* (History of Foreign Education in Egypt), (Cairo: The Supreme Council for the Care of the Arts and Literature, 1962), p 32.


an Egyptian cart driver and a foreign national, a Maltese man who stabbed the Egyptian to death. Muslims revolted by the thousands, considering it an assault not only on their lives but also their religion. The quarrel spread into all neighborhoods of the city. Dozens of foreigners and Egyptians were killed.\textsuperscript{35} England took this quarrel, known as the “Alexandria Massacre,” as an opportunity to attack the city under the pretext of protecting the Christian minorities and the situation evolved into the British occupation of Egypt. There was widespread Egyptian opinion that the incident was planned by the British or others to manufacture sectarianism and provide Britain justification for intervention, though the possibility remains that it was entirely spontaneous and that the British occupation thereafter was simply swift and opportunistic.\textsuperscript{36}

The first decades from the beginning of the British colonial era were associated with the diminution of the Copts’ status and tension between Copts and Muslims.\textsuperscript{37} Contrary to what many had expected, the British occupation saw discriminatory policies emerge against Copts in terms of public functions. The view adopted by Lord Cromer, the British High Commissioner (1882-1906) was one of caution about dealing with the Copts in order to avoid provoking the Muslim majority, especially since the Copts did not show much willingness to cooperate with the occupation forces.\textsuperscript{38} Rather the new British administration developed a reliance mainly on Christians from the Levant.\textsuperscript{39} This is in contrast to Hopwood’s assertion that “[t]he Copts took a large number of government positions, and they


\textsuperscript{36} Monsieur Theodore Roedstein: \textit{Tāríkh misr qabl al-iḥtilal al-birthāny wa b´aduh} (History of Egypt before and after the British occupation), Ali Ahmed Shokri (Translation), (Cairo: \textit{AL-Helal} library, 1927), p 320, 321, The preparation for the massacre seems to have taken place in May. As Sir Edward Mallet wrote to Lord Granville on May 31 says: “The feud between Muslims and Coptic may occur in any moment”. Ibid., p 318.


\textsuperscript{39} Yahia :Op.Cit, p 413.
were more prosperous than Muslims, and they gradually accepted the national movement, although their inclination towards the British was remarkable. the Copts’ status. A natural transformation took place in  

The revolutions of the nineteenth century led to the formation of a wealthy and educated elite that sought to present the Coptic issue in Egyptian political life.

In 1908 Boutros-Ghali constituted the government, commissioned by Khedive Abbas Helmi II (1892-1914) with the consent and blessing of the British Commissioner, but he was murdered by a member in the National Party, Ibrahim Al-Wardani, on 20 February 1910. The British newspapers exploited this incident to enflame sectarian differences, although Al-Wardani acknowledged that the reason for this was Peter’s betrayal of the nation by signing the bilateral government convention for Sudan in 1899, and his presidency of Denshawai court 1906, and the revival of the publications law 1909, and urging acceptance of the agreement to extend the concession of the Suez Canal. All these reasons were the result of political belief and there was no religious reason among them, as Heikal said.

It seems that the bitterness of the experience that the Egyptians lived with during the sectarian strife of 1910 and 1911 was an eloquent lesson. They realized the value of national unity afterwards and the damage of the strife to all parties. Muslims and Copts were entwined in the wake of the incident. Many Egyptians considered Al-Wardani as a “national hero” and talked about his “legendary heroism.” The National Party and others made many attempts aimed at amnesty, releasing him, and not prosecuting him.

\[\begin{align*}
40 & \text{Hopwood: Op. Cit., p. 19.} \\
42 & \text{Mohamed Hussien Heikal: } Mudhkirat fy al-síāsat al-masriya (Memoirs in Egyptian Politics), 3 Vols., (Cairo: Dar Al- Maaref, 1990), Vol. 1, p 37. \\
\end{align*}\]
The British exploited this incident when strengthening sectarianism, benefiting from the meeting of the Coptic conference which was held at the invitation of the Bishop of Assiut and was presided over by Bishri Hanna Bey, the Russian under-secretary consul of Assiut from 5-8 March 1911. Certain colonial newspapers were invited which were gathered in the conference to promote the example of Muslims in India, who united and formed the Indian Islamic party so that the British government would make a kind of balance between Muslims and Copts.⁴⁵ In response to the Coptic conference, Mustafa Riyadh Pasha, the former Prime Minister of Egypt, called for a conference for 29 April to 4 May of the same year that considered the affairs of all Egyptians: Copt and Muslim. It was called “The Egyptian Conference” to confirm the unity of Ummah. Ignoring the sectarian basis which the conference was based upon, its interlocutors asserted that the entire Egyptian nation was one. As the Coptic deputies in the legislative councils were few and the system of employment in the government was corrupt, the gathering was to be held to affirm that the rights and facilities in Egypt must be held in common by all.

They recommended that efficiency should be taken as the basis for appointment and there should be work towards rejection of the amendment of the election law which would have each sect’s representatives in the parliamentary councils.⁴⁶ The two conferences were contrivances of the colonial sectarian industry about which Al-Rafei said, “The hand of Mr. Eldon Gorst, the British Commissioner (1907-1911), was not far from inviting to them.”⁴⁷

The sectarian tension that prevailed during that period, and which was expressed by the Coptic and then the Egyptian conference, represented a turning point in relation to the Coptic issue, as it was the first time that the issue of the Copts’ rights was discussed. This ordeal was not all evil.

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wise people of the two communities rose to ease the intensity Britain was promoting, and to establish evidence that sedition only benefited the British occupation authorities which spilled Egyptian blood without distinction between Muslim and Copt. They attacked any persistence of schisms and warned against them. The British call for Cairo University, “which has no disputes between its two elements,” to be more restrained was held to be meaningless. And everyone realized that Egyptians had no interest moderating the division and separation based on religion that which Britain imagined.

Egyptians had lived for hundreds of years in peace and harmony. When they were subjected to injustice from a ruler or tyrant, Muslims and Copts drank from the same cup, suffering the same suffering, and feeling the bitterness of life together. The oppressors never differentiated between Muslims and Copts; they always oppressed all. This incident gave birth to Egyptian nationalism whose manifestations culminated in the 1919 revolution. The promotion of the rivalry alarmed the two groups, creating a sincere desire for more conspicuous unity. With the end of the conference, the uproar ended, and the nation returned to its previous serenity. The English attempt to generate a sectarianism industry had failed.

**The Copts and the 1919 Revolution**

In the events of the 1919 Revolution, national unity prevailed and Egyptians went onto the streets in a great revolution that spread all over the country and chanting, “Long live Saad, the crescent lives with the cross.” The demonstrations spread in the streets and the political meetings in mosques and churches which were led by the clerics, converting the mosques and churches into centers of revolution with the slogan: “The crescent embraces the cross.” Everyone realized that the cross and the crescent were two arms of the one body: Egypt. The journalist Amin Al Rafei (1886-1927) attributed the success of the revolution to the unity of the Egyptian nation. He said, “We have shown to the world many examples of advancement of our political nationalism, and we have proved that the Egyptian nationalism is not less rational than any other civilized people so
that the name of Egypt is only mentioned with glorification and compassion.”

The 1919 revolution was the beginning that assured the European countries and the British occupation that Egypt was united in sacred national unity. No state would find a religious pretext to interfere in Egypt under the claim of protecting the Christian’s rights, maintaining their places of worship or giving the Copts their religious freedom. With the Copts accustomed to and comfortable with national unity, Egypt was one nation seeking one thing: saving Egypt for the Egyptians. Thus the opening to seek national unity in Egypt was facilitated by the British occupation rather than frustrated by what seeds of the discord might have been planted through British action and posturing. In this regard, Al-Lewaa newspaper wrote on 22 April 1911:

There is no doubt that the Egyptian nation in the politician’s view is composed of one element and one gender, not two elements, as some newspapers have speculated. If the jurist or the priest divided it into two parts, Muslims and Copts, the politician would not follow this division so as not to generate an excuse for discord, because in this way he is fighting for his country and his personal interests which cannot be separated from the interests of the country.

In this healthy environment, the depth of national unity was confirmed by the mutual trust between Muslims and Copts. The personal memories of the contemporaries of this period are filled with the memories of the brotherhood and the national protectiveness. Ahmed Amin (1866-1954) wrote, “I indulged in politics and participated in demonstrations that aimed at the convergence between Christians and Muslims. I was scouting the demonstration, riding a cart with my turban and escorted priest with his priestly clothes, carrying a flag of the cross and the crescent. Fakhri 50” Abd- Al-Nour (1881-1942) noted:

From the first moment in which Saad established the national movement, a union of the two elements (Muslims and Copts)

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48 William Soliman Kelada: *El-masihiya wa al-islam fy misr wa dirāsat ukhra* (Christianity and Islam in Egypt and other studies), (Cairo: Sina for publishing, 1993), p 207.
emerged and covered all appearances. In the demonstrations, Al-Azhar scholars and the Coptic priests were marching in the front side by side, and the flags were flapping over their heads embracing the crescent and the cross. In Al-Azhar and the major mosques in Cairo and the cities and villages, the most prominent speakers were the scholars and priests. The priests themselves had presided over some of the meetings that were held in the mosques. And the Muslim scholars also had presided over some of the meetings in the churches. The preachers in the churches on the Coptic holidays were Muslims. The preachers in the mosques on the Islamic holidays were Copts. This appearance was the most prominent gain for the Egyptian national movement which has not yet missed stepped.\footnote{Fakhry Abd- Al-Nour: Modhakirat Fakhri Abd Al-Nour, 1919 Revolution, (Memoirs of Fakhri Abdel Nour, 1919 Revolution), Yonan Labib Rezq (Investigation), (Cairo: Dar Al-Shrouq, 1992), p 58,59, for furthering the role of Fakhri Abd Al-Nour in 1919 revolution and the Egyptian Wafd in the view of Abd Al-Naser Mohamed Ali Abd Al-Rahim: Fakhri Abd Al-Nour wa dawroh fy al-ḥaīah Al-siāseya fy misr1907-1942 (Fakhri Abdel Nour and his role in political life in Egypt 1907-1942), Master thesis, (Suhag: College of Literature in Suhag, South Al- Wadi University, 2002).}

The priest Sergius (1882-1964), one of the revolution’s leaders and its preachers said a few famous words on the Al-Azhar platform: “If the English insist on their presence in Egypt under the pretext of protecting Copts, I say: ‘Let the Copts die and the Muslims live in freedom.”\footnote{Al Beshry: Al-muslimon wa al-āqbat, (Muslims and Copts), p 130.} “And his phrase expresses the general rejection of the English façade of protection of the minority, and its failure in the sectarianism industry; it is an indication of the Egyptians’ coherence. And starts from the fact that Islam according to the Muslim is a doctrine, a culture, and a civilization, and for the non-Muslim, it is a culture and a civilization. Makram Ebeid Pasha (1889- 1961) said, “We are Muslims in the homeland. And Christians in religion. Oh, Allah, make us Muslims for you, and supporters for the homeland. Oh, Allah, make us Christians for you and Muslims for the homeland.”\footnote{Mohamed Emara: Fi al-masālat al-āqbtihā ḥaqaeq wa āwhām,(On the Coptic Question: Facts and illusions), (Cairo: Al Shroq library, 2001), p13.}

Efforts were made for Al-Wafd to be an agent of the Egyptian nation and travel to Paris to articulate the Egyptian cause in the peace conference
in the wake of the World War One. Copts quickly joined it. Fakhri Abd Al-Nour wrote in his memoirs that “the Copts and their intellectuals and thinkers noticed that the names of the members of Al-Wafd which were mentioned in the petitions of authorizations and were distributed throughout the country did not include any names of Copts. They think that it should not be, and this failure must be eliminated.” They decided to assign Fakhri Abd Al-Nour (one of the top dignitaries of Gerga), Wissa Wassef (the member of the National Party) and Tawfiq Andraus (one of the top dignitaries of Luxor), to go to the house of the nation and to present the subject to Saad Pasha, who “expressed his pleasure with the idea.” He explained the objectives of Al-Wafd party. Tawfiq Andraus commented, “Nationalism is not exclusive to Muslims.” Saad Pasha rejoiced and kissed him because of his words. Tawfiq continued saying that the two elements that form the nation, Muslims and Copts, were working with one thought and one opinion which achieves their interest in obtaining independence.  

It was agreed that Wasef Ghali Pasha, who was then in Paris, would be elected to the membership of Al-Wafd party and Saad Zaghloul welcomed this. Then Al-Wafd added Senut Hanna, a member of the Legislative Assembly, and George Al-Khayat (1862-1923) one of the top dignitaries of Assiut. They swore right on 2 December 1918. George Al-Khayat asked Saad Zaghloul, what was the status of the Copts and their fate after joining their representatives to Al-Wafd? Zaghloul answered him saying Copts have the same rights and they are committed to all duties on an equal footing.


55 Botros Pasha’s son who was murdered in 1910, He was elected as an unofficial representative of the Egyptian policy in Paris 1919 until he joined Al-Wafd party, He took over the first foreign ministry for Saad Zaghloul 1924, and Al-Nahas ministry 1928, and he was one of the negotiations’ delegation in London from March to May 1930, he was re-elected as the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Al-Nahas ministry in 10 may 1936. Lamei Al-Metiei: Mawsuʿat nisāʾ wa rijal min Masr, (Encyclopedia of Women and Men from Egypt), (Cairo: Dar Al-Shrouq, 2003), p 276,277.


Successively, the Copts joined Al-Wafd party, not in their sectarian activities, but on the basis of the degree of nationalism and efficiency. The sectarian characterization was necessary when Al-Wafd party was formed only to respond to the colonizer’s allegation that Al-Wafd did not represent the Egyptians with their different sects. When Al-Wafd proved that it represented all Egyptians, the sectarian characterization disappeared and was replaced by the considerations of nationalism, experience, and efficiency. Abd Al-Rahman Fahmi (1870-1945) comments on the Copts’ accession to the Egyptian Wafd by saying “joining of Sinot Hanna Bey and George Bek Khayat to Al-Wafd had a great impact that gave it strength over strength and showed that it represents the Egyptian nation in all its sects.”

The national movement developed and the leaders of Al-Wafd were arrested and exiled to Malta on 8 March 1919. Fakhri Abd Al-Nour commented on these events by saying, “Egypt was writing its wonderful slogan of national unity in its historical pages.” Mustafa Amin said, “The Coptic members of Al-Wafd party remained steadfast with Saad Zaghlol more than the Muslim members.” When the English exiled Saad Zaghlol and his comrades to Seychelles, the statement issued by Al-Wafd to protest their exile was signed by five members, including one Muslim, Mustafa al-Nahas, and four Copts: Wasef Ghali, Sinot Hanna, Wissa Wassef, and Makram Ebaid. This statement declared the insistence of Al-Wafd party to continue the struggle. And when most of them were arrested, only Wasef Ghali and Wissa Wassef remained to issue statements until the formation of the new Al-Wafd entity. They issued the only statement in the history of the Egyptian party of Al-Wafd which was signed by only two of its members. The crowds in Egypt were led by their confidence in Al-Wafd and its members regarding these statements. The state organs were operating according to what these statements specified, regardless of the

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60 Mustafa Amin: *Min wahid le asharah*, (From One to Ten), (Cairo: Akhbar al youm printing house, 1990), p 127.

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sectarian affiliation of those who issued them, and compliance with the decisions of Al-Wafd became a necessarily optional obedience that was based on faith and trust, as long as Al-Wafd was not in power and did not have any of its material means.62

It shows that sectarian affiliation was not an element of choice except in two cases. In the first case, Wassef Ghali entered Al-Wafd at first as a Copt according to what Fakhri Abdel Nour wrote. This characterization left him after he had joined Al-Wafd, and others joined after him without regard of this side, and when Saad Zaghlol confirmed to George Khayat that the Copts would have the same rights and duties which the others have. And by this confirmation, he removes the Coptic and Islamic characterization, as a political characterization, from all the members. At the same time, it confirmed that there would not be Muslims and Copts in the political action of Al-Wafd.

The second case represents in the appointment of Mark Hanna63 as the agent of the central committee of Al-Wafd. This choice was because Hanna was a Copt and it occurred in response to the entrance of Youssef Wahba into the ministry on 20 November 1919.64 As a step attempted by the British occupation authorities in Egypt towards encouraging sectarian divisions before the advent of Milner committee, 65 the British

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63 He was born in 1872, his friends chose him as the president of the Bar in 1914, and he was re-elected again, he was a prominent member in Al-Wafd, in 25 July 1922, he was arrested by the occupation authorities with six other members of Al-Wafd Party in the barracks of the Nile palace and sentenced to death, but under the popular pressure, They were released, He was appointed as a minister of Works in 1924, a minister of Finance in 1926, and a minister of Foreign Affairs in 1927 and was died in 1934, Samaan Alseryani: Mashahir al-āqḥāt fi al-qarn al-’ishreen, (The Famous Copts in the twentieth century), his Holiness Anba Matawes (forward and revision), 5 vols., (Cairo: Creative Press for Publishing, 2002), vol. 5, p 42.
65 It is a committee that Britain sent to Egypt under the chairmanship of Lord Milner the minister of colonies in 7 December 1919 to discuss the system which fits Egypt under the protection and to study the possibility of establishing autonomy with the survival of Egypt as a part of the British Empire. The Committee has stayed in Egypt for three months without any contact, and departed it in 6 March 1920 and it does not believe the attitude
Commissioner Edmond Allenby (1919-1925) wanted to hit the national movement as deeply as possible and a Coptic national youth, Arian Youssef Saad, volunteered to assassinate Youssef Wahba. Thereafter the historical documents show that he was a member of the secret organization of Al-Wafd led by Abdel Rahman Fahmi, and that he indeed volunteered to assassinate Youssef Wahba. In spite of the failure of this assassination attempt, it had results on 19th May 1920 when Youssef Wahba submitted his resignation to the Sultan Fouad I (1917-1936), justifying it by saying, “I need a rest.”

The religious sectarianism industry had emerged clearly in the declaration of 28th February 1922 in which Britain gave Egypt nominal independence but restricted Egyptian independence by four “reservations” that were subject to negotiations between the two sides, including Britain’s right to protect minorities and foreigners through Article III. This article faced fierce opposition from the Copts as they insisted that they are not a minority and that any division between the Copts and Muslims was an artificial division which would lead to the destruction of national unity and serves as a means and justification for British intervention in the affairs of Egyptian.

of full boycott which was unanimously agreed by all entities of the country except the palace and the ministry of Youssef Wahba Pasha. Hussien Moanes Deräsat fy Thaïurat 1919, (Studies in the 1919 Revolution), series of eqraa, 418,(Cairo: Dar Al-Maaref, 1973), p 79, 80.

Qelada: Op. Cit., p 216, Arian Youssef Saad, his father is Youssef Saad Beck, the headmaster of the Coptic moratorium in Mitt Ghamr, He was born in 25 may 1899 in Mitt Mohsen, his place is sixth among his twelve brothers. He was raised in their manor near Mit Ghamr. He then moved to Cairo to complete his secondary education at Al-Tawfiqiya school, And as a result of his excellence he joined the faculty of Medicine, when the events of the revolution broke out he was in the second year in the faculty of medicine and his first steps in the path of politics was signing a petition to delegate Al-wafd. Mohamed Afifi: Al-roḥ al-waṭaniya al-masriya fy Thaïrut 1919, (The Egyptian National Spirit in the Revolution of 1919), (Cairo: The National Council for Youth, 2010), p 64.


Rafiq Habib & Mohamed Afifi: Tārīkh al-kinsyah al-maṣriyah (History of the Egyptian Church), Refaat Alsaeed (forward), (Cairo: Arab House for Printing and Publishing,
The work of the liberal front bench in 1923 was launched and contributed in the constitution’s formulation of Egyptian national unity which enabled Saad and his comrades to rule with a great majority as a result of fair elections.\textsuperscript{70} The committee of thirty which formulated the constitution had witnessed very frank discussions on the meaning of citizenship as it is one of the inevitable components for a civil state’s existence, especially with regard to the issue of the relationship between Muslims and Copts.\textsuperscript{71} In the discussions of the constitution committee, Tawfiq Dos Pasha called for including text that would guarantee Copts’ rights in representation in the parliamentary assemblies. This was to be accomplished by elections or by appointing them if the number elected representing them was not sufficient representation.\textsuperscript{72} Salama Moussa and people of his kind in the intellectual forefront of the Christian youth protested and considered the constitution as a guarantee for the presence of the civil state which confirms that citizenship law does not discriminate between classes of citizens. The protest failed because of the awareness of the Egyptian Christians elite who rejected the principle, but this attempt did not occur in isolation from the unity of the sons of Egypt in the 1919 revolution against the English.\textsuperscript{73}

In the next year (1924), Saad Zaghlol Pasha formed the first ministry for the people. This event was considered the straw that broke the camel’s back in the context of discrimination and differentiation. It had broken the rule of appointing only one Copt as a minister and opened the way for Copts to participate in the successive governments. Since that date, no government has been devoid of two Coptic ministers but for a very few, and the Copts benefited from the Egyptian national climate in nominating themselves on the lists of Al-Wafd Party, and succeeded due to Muslims’ votes. Their high proportion in the Egyptian parliament with its two assemblies was linked

\textsuperscript{71} Tager: Op.Cit, p 262.
\textsuperscript{72} The records of the constitution committee (unpublished printed records which are saved in the hall of prints in the house of books and national documents in Cairo): the record of the 27th session held on Friday in 25 Augusts 1922, p 108.
\textsuperscript{73} Assem Al desoqi:“\textit{Al-dīn wa al-tā’ifiat wa al-waṭan}”, \textit{(Religion, sectarianism and homeland)}, Sotor magazine, no 3-4, (February/March 1997), p 15.
to the fair and free elections which were conducted under the supervision of the government of Al-Wafd Party. Copts improved their positions in the official departments and the governments of Al-Wafd. The Coptic family of Ghali is an example of the acceptance by the Muslims of the Copts. They occupied ministerial centers before the year 1919 revolution and after it. The Copt Wissa Wassef also served as a speaker of the parliament, the second position below the king.

The Copts participated in the successive committees of negotiations that were formed to obtain the independence of Egypt, culminated in the signing of the 1936 treaty between Egypt and Great Britain that gave Egypt complete independence except the “four reservations.” The Copts considered that the treaty was in the interest of Egypt and defended it, explaining the advantages that Egypt would harvest. This treaty gave Britain the right to protect minorities and it included cancellation of all the conventions and documents contrary to its provisions, including the February 28 statement and its four reservations.

The British role in the sectarianism industry in Egypt continued to exist in the 1940s, exploiting the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Egyptian political scene, such that Campbell, the British Commissioner in Egypt, in one of his weekly evaluations of 1946, said that “some Coptic elements seek to reach an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. This attempt appears to be similar to a successful one in 1919 made by the Copts to reach an alliance with Al-Wafd Party. The Coptic religion seems to be the religion of a minority trying to reach an understanding with any nationalist movement to avoid persecution. The suggestion made by some Coptic elements was an attempt to change the title of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian Brotherhood, but Hassan Al-Banna was intelligent enough to realize that the strength of its resumption was in its religious side rather than the political. Nevertheless, he rejected this suggestion, but in the end he expressed himself in favor of tolerance.

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74 In the era of the second ministry of Mostafa Al Nahas Pasha from 1 January to 19 June 1930, Lamei Al Metiei: Mawsīʿat hadha al-rajul min Misr, (The Encyclopedia of the Man from Egypt ),(Cairo: Dar Al-shrouq, 1997), p 659.
75 Hopwood: op. cit., p. 12, 13.
towards Christianity and Judaism. It is not clear whether the Coptic attempt is successful or unsuccessful.”

The British Commissioner in Cairo wrote to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs and said, “according to the usual Coptic reading, the conference of prominent Copts will be held shortly after Christmas, to decide what action would be taken about the current persecution of the Copts. There is no doubt that this suggestion reflects the increasing fears of Copts because of the activity of Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations. In another letter, he said, “It is usual in the Egyptian political scene that whenever there were imminent crises in the Egyptian affairs, the Copts fear and most of the educated and wealthy people always feel that they may become the first victims of the Islamic fanaticism. There were many reasons for taking these fears seriously, including the apparent progress of the Muslim Brotherhood and the religious persecution against the Copts, which illustrated in the failure of Makram Ebeid Pasha to retain any important ministerial positions in the Egyptian government, as he was probably one of the most efficient politicians, and one of the results of this persecution was the emergence of a small and steady trend that aimed at turning the Copts into Muslims. This turning is due to the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the truth remains that there are many open ways to Muslims and closed to the Copts, which significantly appears in the middle class or the poor class of Copts who earn their livelihood in competition with Muslims.”

Copts and 1952 revolution

On 23 July 1952, the army movement depended on a secret organization of the free officers, in which there was only one Copt from the second

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76 F. O. 371/53331, No. 667, From Sir R. I. Campbell (Cairo) to Mr. Bevin (F. o.), 13 April 1946. A letter from Campbell “The British Commissioner” in Cairo to Anthony Bevin, the British Foreign minister in London on 13 April 1946 which is taken from documents kept in the library hall of the house of the books and the national documents that include a graphic documents from the British foreign minister in London, These portfolios are historically ranked, This is why the reference to it by the number of its file in London as shown, where the symbol 571 documents of Egypt in the archives of the British Foreign Office, and the number followed by the file, and then the document number.

77 F. O. 371/53332, No. 1595, From Mr. Bowker (Cairo) to Mr. Bevin (F. o.), 25 October 1946.

78 F. O. 371/53292, No. J2253, From M. L. Fitzgerald (Cairo) to General Pollock (F. o.), 4 June 1946.
grade. Copts had exited the political game in Egypt to some extent at this point in time. Although, Copts had representatives in the committee of constitution preparation of 1952, and with the absence of parties from the Egyptian political scene starting in January 1953, it was no longer possible for any Copt that nominated himself in the elections to succeed, as long as there were no parties to support him or her. So President Gamal Abd-Al Nasser (1954-1970) developed a new method to ensure the Copts’ presence in his Parliament. He decided to administratively limit the nomination of Copts to only ten departments that were carefully selected as the presence of Copts was tangible and noticeable. This principle remained until 1979, where a new constitutional principle was issued and granted the president of the republic the authority to appoint ten members in the Parliament which have later taken into account that the appointed members would be all or mostly be Copts\textsuperscript{79}.

Finally, after this panoramic presentation of the Copts’ relationship with the society and power, we find that the Copts in Egypt do not really form a sectarian issue or besieged minority. History proves that. The Copts have played important and vital roles in Egyptian society in its many historical periods that were full of events and important political developments. And they contributed positively in the historical movement in historical periods that witnessed symbols of Egyptian patriotism and they had important roles in the political, parliamentary, cultural, and educational life of Egyptian society. As the Copts are members of the Egyptian national group, they are not an “independent group” or a “closed block.” Copts are not monolithic in terms of social and political affiliation. They are spread throughout Egyptian society including workers, farmers, professionals, businessmen, and traders who are connected by affiliation to Egypt firstly and religious affiliation secondly. Citizenship is an expression of the person’s enjoyment of rights and duties practiced it in one’s homeland,\textsuperscript{80} and thus it has a higher standing than the concept of sect and doctrine.


\textsuperscript{80}Sameh Fawzi: \textit{al-mwatanah}, (citizenship), (Cairo :The Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, 2007), p 7.
(XI)

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ANTALL GOVERNMENT’S FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST (1990–1993)
The aim of our study is to review the directions of the new foreign policy in Hungary between 1990 and 1993, based on the available archives and document repositories already published, and, in the same context to provide – within the confines of the paper – mosaics about certain efforts and concrete steps of the Hungarian diplomacy, including their background when necessary.¹

József Antall, on May 22, 1990 as a prime ministerial candidate in the Parliament, then, two months later, on July 25 as a Prime Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the so-called „Ambassadors’ meeting” presented the Hungarian government’s external policy objectives,² and the responsibilities of the diplomatic service. “Our purpose is to be able to secure the restoration of Hungary’s sovereignty, enabling the Hungarian politics to make free and independent decisions concerning all issues, so that no external influence can prevail, no foreign troops can be stationed in the country without our consent, and to be able to draw the political consequences of this condition. This also means, at the same time, that we wish to establish a policy which secures the country’s determinative capability and its independence in this regard. It is clear that our foreign policy objectives are, on the one hand, global foreign policy objectives


resulting from our own national interests, on the other hand, the observance
of realities resulting from the country’s geopolitical realities. Moreover,
they are the continuation of a foreign policy that promotes and secures the
solution of the economic and social issues of Hungary, as a small country.
[...] We are unable to maintain good relations with a neighbouring country
which does not treat the Hungarian national minorities fairly from the
human and minority rights perspective.”

At the beginning of the 1990s, we can observe several parallel processes
in Europe. On the one hand, the pulling down of the old structures (the
Warsaw Pact, Comecon), the horizontal enlargement (Pentagonale,
Hexagonale) and the vertical reinforcement (the European Communities,
the European Union) of the already existent integration structures, and the
creation of new organisations (the Visegrád Group). On the other hand,
disintegration processes such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union
(1991), and the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991) and of the Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic (1993). While Central Europe depreciated
from a military and security policy aspect with the termination of the Cold
War – when the centre of gravity shifted in the direction of the Baltic Sea
and the North Sea – the Central European and the East-Central European
regions became significant factors from a political point of view. Certain
European processes took place along the contours of the Treaties of Paris
terminating the First World War, and the uniting Germany was interested
in upkeeping a system of small states. The Antall government, enriched
with international and political experience, too, had to change the course of
foreign policy of the democratic Hungary and enforce its interests within
an environment of opposing processes happening in Europe.

We consider necessary to overview the particular situation which is
closely related to the restoration of sovereignty. We aim to examine the
priorities of the Hungarian foreign policy: the Euro-Atlantic integration,
the European regional cooperation, the improvement of the conditions of
the Hungarians living across the borders and its accentuation in the national

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policy, the good neighbourly relations, and the further intensification of the existing relations.\textsuperscript{4}

József Antall’s first official journey in Western Europe led to the Federal Republic of Germany and France. All these reflected the importance of Bonn and Paris in the objectives of the Hungarian foreign policy, and in the realisation of the Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{5} Besides, Moscow and Washington’s standpoint was of paramount importance for the Hungarian foreign policy.

**The restoration of sovereignty and the existing relations**

In 1990 the Warsaw Pact reached a stage when it could be pronounced that Hungary did not wish to be a member of the union, and the long-term goal of the NATO membership set the change of direction. However, there were efforts in some member states of the Warsaw Pact to reorganize the system but they failed due to the agreement among the foreign policy leaders of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland stating that they would leave the Pact together.\textsuperscript{6}

The basis of the cooperation on security policy in the Warsaw Pact was the Soviet-dominated common identity shared by the members of the regime. Its only content was the military alliance but the Comecon could

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\textsuperscript{4} From the 1990s to the beginning of the 2010s Antall’s key points were the strategic goals of the Hungarian foreign policy. However, it should be added that the relation between the nodes and their emphasis changed according to the national interests of Hungary, adapting to the international challenges. Furthermore, a large proportion of the elite establishing the left-wing foreign policy included politicians socialized in the Kádár regime, which meant a compulsion to conform to the power politics, while also striving to avoid conflicts. The sense of the cohesion of the Hungarian nation was and still is more deeply inherent in civic mentality, that is, in the right-wing political forces. A polgári mentalitás vagy másképpen a jobboldali politikai erők mélyebben éltek, élő meg a magyar nemzet összetartozásának tudatát. Cf. BÁBA Iván: \textit{Irányváltás a magyar külpolitikában 1990–1994.} Windsor Klub Füzetek 2. Budapest. 1994., MARINOVICH Endre: \textit{1315 nap – Antall József naplója.} Éghajlat Kiadó. Budapest. 2003., Oszkó Judit: \textit{Antall József – Késői memoár.} Corvina Kiadó Kft., 2013, and \textit{Iratok a magyar Külügyminisztérium történetéhez 1985–1993…}


\textsuperscript{6} See BÁBA Iván: i. m. 4–5.
neither fortify this cooperation, nor place it on other, economic grounds. Moreover, it could not establish an economic structure based on mutual benefits. By 1990 the cohesion of cooperation on security policy within the Warsaw Pact terminated. The member states, outbidding each other, strived to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate with Western countries in order to obtain economic advantages and a favourable position. By then the Soviet Union was left alone to face NATO as well as its former allies. At the same time, the occurring changes becoming uncontrolled in Central and Eastern Europe was by no means in the interest of the West. The leaders of the Western democracies were seeking the opportunities that would accelerate the process of disarmament negotiations if the Warsaw Pact dissolved, however, they did not wish the Soviet Union to become completely isolated, and excluded from Europe. At the time NATO believed that for the member states willing to leave the Warsaw Pact the right thing to do would be to endeavour to develop in their own regional areas based on regional cooperation. In parallel with all these processes the military importance of Central Europe decreased, while the position of the Baltic and the North Sea grew considerably.

The new leaders of the Hungarian diplomacy saw the essence of their foreign policy in the signing of bilateral treaties, which served a double purpose. On the one hand, they were intended to guarantee Hungary’s security in the long run by forming a many-layered “net”. The good neighbourly relations based on the bilateral treaties were an essential element of the “net”, and its creation was of particular interest for Hungary’s security policy, too. On the other hand, it also intended to help the reform-minded Soviet leadership, in line with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, while taking into account the legitimate Soviet security interests. The so-called negative security assurances – i.e. no threat against Moscow should be initiated from the territory of Hungary – were supported by Budapest, which, at the same time, wanted to reduce the weight of Soviet conservative forces within and without the Soviet Union. It was because in the most conservative part of the military command, due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the arguments supporting the statement “we are alone against Europe” were still becoming more powerful, along with strong imperialistic attitudes.
One of the Antall government’s foreign policy objectives was to restore the sovereignty of Hungary, so that the Hungarian policy could make free and independent decisions concerning all issues, and no foreign troops could be stationed on the territory of our country. The Political Consultative Commission of the Warsaw Pact met in Moscow on June 7, 1990. According to the rotation system the presidency of the session was held by József Antall, who proposed the pact’s dissolution as a military alliance.

During the visit the Hungarian Prime Minister held discussions with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov. The Soviet leaders considered the meeting as an opportunity to become acquainted with their partners, to state their purpose of maintaining the Soviet-Hungarian relations, and their intentions concerning further cooperation.

Gorbachev accepted the change of regime, the result of the Hungarian elections, which he regarded it as an internal issue. He confirmed that the Soviet Union aims at maintaining good neighbourly and friendly relations with Hungary in the future, too.

Ryzhkov wished to exchange opinions on the problems of the Hungarian-Soviet economic relations and cooperation, the world market prices and the transition to a convertible payment method. The discussion between József Antall and Nikolai Ryzhkov took place in the Soviet Prime Minister’s office. József Antall explained that the aim of the Hungarian economy is the extensive and quick opening up, and the transforming Comecon. Moreover, he considered the tightening bilateral and trilateral cooperations to be part of the European economic relations because the Soviet Union continued to be one of the most important economic partners for Hungary. Ryzhkov said that the Soviet external economic strategy had a similar purpose, and it aimed at the world market. They did not intend to constrict the Soviet-Hungarian economic relations but they also found the current trend to be unfavourable. József Antall found it important to claim that Budapest insisted on dollar-based accounting in economic relations from January 1, 1991. In his reply Ryzhkov unfolded Moscow’s plan to set up Soviet–Japanese–Hungarian joint ventures in Hungary, where they would assign an essential role to the buildings abandoned by the withdrawn Soviet troops. During the negotiation the question of small border traffic

7 ANTALL József: i. m. 321–323.
was also touched upon, as well as the transport of gas and petroleum derivatives to Hungary. Ryzhkov initiated the discussion of military issues. In his opinion, the Soviet Union was leaving behind 2-2.5 billion roubles worth Soviet properties in Hungary. He stated his principled position which assured the Soviet troops’ withdrawal; however, the Soviet properties could not be given away as a gift. As a solution, he recommended again the establishing of joint ventures. In contrast, József Antall argued that the restoration of the initial situation, as well as the environmental damages should be taken into consideration. Thus, against the Soviet claims there are Hungarian claims, too, which – being of the same proportion – lead to break even. Ryzhkov did not react to the Hungarian suggestion regarding the transforming of Comecon.\(^9\) It should be added that in June, 1990 Moscow’s opinion on Comecon was that for the Soviet Union it would be more favourable to trade with the other Comecon states under global market conditions. Still, a lot depended on the pace of realising the economic reforms in the states of former Soviet bloc. In case of positive outcome, the creation of a new, market-based integration could be conceivable in the future. At that time Moscow took into consideration the formation of subregional alliances, the evolving Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish cooperation, and the Pentagonale.

Another essential stage of the Eastern policy of the new, freely elected Hungarian government and the Soviet–Hungarian relations was the meeting of József Antall and Mikhail Gorbachev on November 21, 1990, in Paris, taking place five months after the discussion in Moscow. All these steps indicate, at the same time, the activity and dynamism of the Hungarian diplomacy. The talks between the two leaders were held at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, two days after the opening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Beside Gorbachev the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze and the Soviet Defence Minister, Dmitry Yazov were present on the Soviet side. József Antall was accompanied by Géza Jeszenszky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gyula Kodolányi, Secretary of State, István Forrai, Head of Cabinet, and Emőke Sillár, Head of the Minister of Foreign Affair’s Cabinet.

Currently two sources of the talks are available\textsuperscript{10}. If we compare them, the proceedings could be reconstructed as follows.

The conversation was initiated by Gorbachev, who stated that there had been too much talk about the problems. The question is whether these concerns could be solved in a democratic way in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people want order, and the announced programme to stabilise the country is available in the Kremlin. There is a power struggle going on, which must be kept within the confines of democracy. József Antall declared that it is important to settle the bilateral relations. He understands the problems of the Soviet Union, but the transition is a slow process. After having congratulated Gorbachev on his Nobel Peace Prize, Antall proceeded to the question of the Warsaw Pact. He suggested that the best solution would be if the Soviet Union initiated the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and if new foundations were laid for the treaty. He also suggested the signing of bilateral agreements and treaties, because Hungary would welcome a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union, too.

Regarding the member republics, József Antall stated that regular requests arrived to Budapest, and the case of the Baltic was particular. Hungary does not encourage the Baltic states, but the Hungarian government recognises the right of people to self-determination. Gorbachev believed that the cooperation with the Eastern European countries needed to be reconsidered, and legal reforms reflecting the new processes were necessary. Nevertheless, Moscow does not think that it is right that there are some countries which turn completely towards the West, and completely abandon their Eastern relations. Earlier the formations were deformed, still, they were wide-ranging. Gorbachev declared that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact had to be considered and prepared. The Hungarian Prime Minister inquired whether the Ministers of Foreign Affairs could start the talks in this respect. Gorbachev gave an immediate positive answer, adding that it should be announced, since the current events are in accordance with Moscow’s strategic concepts; however, it should not be a unilateral process but a joint initiative. The nature of the Warsaw Pact must be defined explicitly until the new European security structure comes into existence.

\textsuperscript{10} SÁRINGER 2015. 164–169.
József Antall said that there was a conceptual difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. One is a community of sovereign states, the other is not. Gorbachev added that there was a state belonging to the former Soviet bloc which defended NATO more than Hungary did, but the establishment of the collective security system had to be advanced by all means. Antall responded that the Hungarian government is committed to the Atlantic idea, but not only within NATO, since the United States of America has a crucial role in the new situation. He stated that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary were proceeding in order, however, further negotiations would be needed. Gorbachev’s reaction was that the Germans would pay 30-40 billions, and the question of joint ventures would have to be examined. The two leaders touched upon energy and economy issues, too, and at the end of the meeting Gorbachev emphasised that “we did not become estranged. Everybody should think over these matters, and make a sovereign decision.” József Antall claimed: “They think the same about us. The Western relations mean equalisation, it is certainly not a case of neglect. Our Eastern relations affect our whole industry, the largest workforce, so it would be illogical to assume that we did not want to maintain good neighbourly relations.”

On February 11, 1991, in his letter addressed to József Antall Mikhail Gorbachev indicated that “we should take steps to dissolve the military structure of the Warsaw Pact at the earliest possible, in order to conclude this process by April 1, 1991. […] As far as the further development of the relations between the states of the Warsaw Pact, according to our views, they should be transferred energetically to bilateral grounds – taking into consideration the new and international circumstances in each case.” József Antall responded to the Soviet leader on the same day: “I can assure you that I fully agree with the ideas inherent in your letter. […] The promising first round of the negotiations about the Hungarian–Soviet bilateral treaty proves that this approach is in accordance with our mutual interests concerning the constructive and friendly relations between our countries and people, and it also meets the requirements of the new European conditions.”

Two weeks later, on February 25, at the meeting of the Political Consultative Commission of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest the

12 SÁRINGER 2018., 131.
representatives of the participating member states announced in a joint communication the dissolution of the military organisation and structure of the Warsaw Pact by March 31, 1991.

On March 10, 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze and Gyula Horn signed the bilateral agreement containing the full withdrawal of the Soviet troops by June 30, 1991. However, the questions concerning property and financial issues were still open. The negotiations were carried on by the Antall government after the free elections, but the military questions of the withdrawal were coordinated by Antal Annus, who had been commissioned by Miklós Németh as an authorised representative of the government. Ferenc Somogyi, who had been appointed earlier, consulted on the political front as the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian government wished to reach the so-called “break even” solution, meaning that both sides would renounce their mutual financial claims. With this move the Hungarian party detached the schedule of the troop withdrawals from the problematic matters. In September 1990 there was an unsuccessful specialist discussion between the Soviet and the Hungarian party, followed in a few days by the talks between the Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations. The last Soviet soldier, General Victor Silov left the territory of Hungary on June 19, 1991. With this our country became sovereign again from July 1, 1991 in a legal and conceptual sense. On the other hand, the property- and finance-related issues of the troop withdrawal were still pending.

On August 19, 1991 some members of the Soviet government, the army and the leaders of the KGB attempted a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament considered the partial takeover unconstitutional. He called on the soldiers not to turn against the people whom he called for a strike. After having consulted on phone with George Bush, the Hungarian government provided a statement on the situation. Budapest supported the Russian reform processes, and condemned the coup. Next day, on August 20 the Hungarian Prime Minister managed to speak to Boris Yeltsin on phone, whom he assured of his government’s support.

During these days József Antall was continually in contact with François Mitterand, Helmuth Kohl, Vaclav Havel and Lech Wałęsa. Géza Jeszenszky consulted about the situation in the Soviet Union with Henning Wegener, the Deputy Secretary-General responsible for political matters of
NATO. Yeltsin did not forget József Antall that he was amongst the first to called him. The first meeting between József Antall and Boris Yeltsin took place in Moscow on December 6, 1991, which brought forth a breakthrough concerning the financial accounts following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Yeltsin agreed to the so-called “break even” solution stating that the buildings established by the Soviet army, remaining in Hungary compensate for the damages caused in the environment.

In addition, the Russian–Hungarian treaty was signed at that time. Yeltsin visited Budapest between November 10 and 11, 1992, where an agreement was finally concluded: the treaty on the withdrawal of troops still contained the “break even” solution, and another document included Hungary’s humanitarian aid to Russia. The treaty, signed by Boris Yeltsin and József Antall, dealt with the property-, finance- and other, economy-related issues regarding the temporary stationing and the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union troops in Hungary.\(^\text{13}\) Besides, an agreement was made on the cooperation concerning the rights of the national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, which further strengthened Hungary’s safety net.

The Euro-Atlantic integration

Apart from Moscow, Washington, too, came into the focus of the leaders of Hungarian diplomacy. Thus, József Antall accepted with pleasure George Bush’s invitation to Washington. The official visit was scheduled between October 14 and 20, 1990. Since 1947 he was the first Hungarian Prime Minister who visited the United States of America and the White House. One of the visit’s first preparatory steps was that the Foreign Office’s Deputy State Secretary, Tádé Alföldy travelled to Washington at the beginning of October to present the Hungarian government’s memorandum to the American party.\(^\text{14}\)

The aim of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s visit was to confirm that Hungary wished to improve the friendly relations between the two democratic countries. The Hungarian government sought to make the


American party eradicate the discriminatory rules and regulations which placed Hungary among “non-market economy” states that are “under communist control”. Earlier the relations between the secret services of the two governments were characterised by mutual mistrust and suspicion, but now the Hungarian government proposed mutually acceptable cooperation between the services. The government required the United States to abolish the twenty-five-mile movement restriction against Hungary’s UN representation in New York. Hungary was ready to provide visa-free access for the American citizens. In return, it required the American party to consider Hungary among the Western countries enjoying complete visa waiver in case the so-called “pilot visa-free” program is extended to September 30, 1991, and to facilitate the application and use of the US visa. There were successful preparatory negotiations between the two countries about the cooperation of customs services, which were signed during the Hungarian Prime Minister’s visit to Washington.

A few days after the presentation of the memorandum the Prime Minister’s advisor, Ottó Hieronymi took further steps to prepare József Antall’s visit to the United States. “According to the American government JA’s visit has to be a successful one. JA’s visit will be the first visit made by a truly independent, pro-Western East-Central European Prime Minister. According to the American government the Hungarian Prime Minister understands the most clearly the situation of the East-Central European countries and role of the United States. The success of this visit is important for the American government in terms of domestic and foreign policy.”  

Ottó Hieronymi wrote in his record that the American government was convinced that the Hungarian government was pursuing right internal and external policies. Both the US President and the US Secretary of State will express their confidence regarding Hungary’s foreign policy. The confidence statement was important for other reasons, too, since on the lower level of the US Treasury some impatience was felt against Hungary.

As the record indicates, the weight of the Hungarian problems regarding the economic questions had to be stated clearly: the difficulties resulting from the collapse of the Comecon, the effects of drought on exports and

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16 It should be added that the relations between the officials of the State Department and the US Treasury are traditionally far from being the best.
imports, the impact of the Iraq crisis on commerce, the claims that could not be recovered, and the significant increase in the price of oil. The essence of the Hungarian oil price policy had to be seen clearly by the Washington government: the Hungarian government did not intend to keep the internal market price of the oil on an artificially low level. The State Department understood that Hungary needed short- and medium-term assistance. The first one is a “safety net” and an exceptional aid, in which 150 million USD worth feed would arrive in the country, and, in an emergency situation, the securing of the oil supply via the International Energy Agency in Paris, or the twenty-four. The medium-term assistance is a financial guarantee for the success of the transformation, but without aggravating the country’s debt burdens. Within this framework, an IMF loan with acceptable conditions for Hungary, and an economic aid package not in the form of credit should arrive in the country. The American party supported Hungary’s OECD membership, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The American government circles saw that the success of Hungary was also an important political interest of the United States. “During the preparatory voyage the American senior officials explained that in the eyes of the American government Hungary plays an exceptional role in the transformation of Eastern Europe. The success of this transformation is an important interest for the United States and the entire Western world.” 17 The members of the American government, during their talks with Ottó Hieronymi, emphasised that despite the Iraq crisis they would not neglect the importance of the development of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, they explained even to their allies that they would not neglect the problems of the three states despite the crisis in the Middle East. At the end of the record its author added that „JA’s analysis of world policy will be of interest especially to the President. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is likely to discuss more concrete issues.” 18

József Antall and his escort 19 went to New York via London on October 15, 1990 at 10 o’clock in the morning. He met George Bush on 18 October

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18 Ibid.
19 The members of the Prime Minister’s escort were: Géza Jeszenszky, Béla Kádár, Péter Boross, Ferenc Mádl, György Matolcsy, Gyula Kodolányi, István Forrai, Balázs László, Kálmán Kocsis. In New York Pál Tar, György Surányi and Péter Zwack joined the delegation.
in the White House, where the American President talked with appreciation about the Hungarian democracy, which had a great impact on the Central European events. József Antall mentioned the role of Mikhail Gorbachev, who was awarded the Nobel Prize, in the process of transformation. The Hungarian Prime Minister asked President Bush not to lose sight of the Eastern European region, despite of the Gulf crisis, which was promised by the American President. The discussion in the White House was followed by ministerial and leaders meetings. President Bush announced the new era of the American–Hungarian relations, which was based on complete confidence. Hungary abolished visa requirements, while the United States facilitated the conditions of obtaining a visa.

The SEED-II bill,\(^{20}\) which secured the American financial support for the year 1991, was extended not only to Poland and Hungary, but to the other Central European countries, too. The bill was accepted by the House of Representatives in 1990, but the Senate made an amended version, which was debated in 1991. The US Congress, however, accepted the so-called “Foreign Affairs Offering” bill, which allowed the government to use US $ 500 million to support Central European states. In the absence of the SEED-II law providing for itemized use, the State Department disposed freely of the envelope.

In order to make the relations between the two countries more effective, a Consulate-General in Los Angeles was authorized at Hungarian request. József Antall, feeling himself as the Prime Minister of fifteen million Hungarians, declared in the Hungarian House of New York that “I consider myself to be the representative and the Prime Minister of all Hungarians”.

The dynamism of the Hungarian diplomacy was indicated by the fact that the negotiations of the association agreement with the European Community, which was an important step for Budapest in the process of European integration, proceed at a rapid pace. The Hungarian government was orientated towards NATO, the European Union and the Western

\(^{20}\) The US Congress adopted the SEED-I Act in 1989, which provided a total of 938 million USD financial support for Poland and Hungary. Poland’s share of this amount was 841 million USD, while Hungary’s share was 97 million USD. The largest Hungarian item in the SEED-I was an entrepreneurship fund of 60 million USD which started its operation in 1990. Cf. SÁRINGER 2015., 189–246.
European Union.\textsuperscript{21} On October 17, 1990, during József Antall’s visit in the United States, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited the Republic of Hungary to be the twenty-fourth full member state of the organisation.

In the spring of 1991 József Antall commissioned György Granasztói, the Hungarian Liaison Officer in Brussels,\textsuperscript{22} to make inquiries and arguments concerning the Western European Union’s role in the Central European security policy. According to the Hungarian Prime Minister the second stage of NATO could be the strengthening and reorganisation of the WEU. Accordingly, on March 25, 1991 György Granasztó presented the Hungarian vision to the Ambassadors of Brussels to NATO. The French and the Soviet parties are interested in the strengthening of the Western European Union in case it means, at the same time, the exclusion of the Americans from Central Europe. This, however, was not in the interest of the other NATO member states, or the Central and Eastern European states. In György Granasztói’s opinion the three Visegrád states can secure themselves against the Soviet Union by signing bilateral agreements, which can be further supplemented by treaties with each other or with the neighbouring countries. These can also provide the basis of the new security net. For all these, guarantees may be obtained from the two-stage NATO, the second stage of which is provided by the WEU.\textsuperscript{23}

Shortly before the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Hungary, a meeting of NATO member states took place in Copenhagen. The declaration of \textit{Partnership with Central and Eastern European States} issued on June 6, 1991 stated that NATO’s security was inseparable from the security of all European countries. For that purpose, it was suggested that a network of closely-related institutions and relations should be established, which would form a global architecture. In this system NATO,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} The Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1948 by five Western European states (Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) under the Brussels Treaty. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany were invited to the organisation in 1954, Spain and Portugal joined in 1988. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 described the WEU as an integral part of the European Union. In 1993 the seat of the WEU was moved from London to Brussels, to improve cooperation with NATO.
\item \textsuperscript{22} György Granasztói was the European security policy Special Envoy of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.
\end{itemize}
the European integration process and the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) are the key elements. The regional
cooperations were also given an important role. On December 16, three
states, namely Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the
Association Agreement with the European Community.

Regional cooperation

Regarding regional cooperation, József Antall and Géza Jeszenszky
participated in the Venice Summit of the Pentagonale in late July and
early August, 1990. The Hungarian position was that the cross-border
cooperations and the consultations between government bodies should be
further strengthened in the economic field. The plans concerning the
construction of the Budapest–Zagreb and Budapest–Belgrade motorways,
and the Budapest–Belgrade high-speed rail line were given priority
treatment. The Hungarian government wanted to sign bilateral cultural
agreements with Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, besides, it supported the
mutual establishment of cultural centres. They wanted to establish mutual
guarantees to ensure minority rights, and to improve the situation of
minority education.

In September, 1990 the union of the centre-right wing parties held its
meeting in Helsinki, where József Antall outlined his plan for the East-
Central European Union. The basic concept was that the Union should
negotiate with the Western European Union, the defence organisation of
the European Community as an equal partner, thus it would serve as an
intermediate institution until Hungary joins NATO. The member states of
the Union would be Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which would

25 See NYUSZTAY László: Regionális, szubregionális kezdeményezések szerepe az európai politikai együttműködésben. Esettanulmány: Visegrádi Négyek első két
26 In 1990 Czechoslovakia joined the Adria–Danube program (Quadragonale), the regional
cooperation of 1989 including four countries, namely Italy, Austria, Hungary and
Yugoslavia, thus the Pentagonale was formed. In 1991, with the admission of Poland, the
cooperation was formed into Hexagonale.
leave the Warsaw Pact, and form an independent politico-military alliance. Its structure would be similar to the Western European Union. The plan attracted much attention among NATO’s politico-military circles, too, however, it was not materialised. Nevertheless, the idea of the East-Central European Union and the joint exit of the three countries from the Warsaw Pact involved the cooperation of the Visegrad Three (then Visegrad Four).

The Hungarian foreign policy prioritised the relations with the European Community, and considered the undisturbed functioning and development of the various forms of regional, subregional and cross-border cooperation as important. This was provided by the Central European Initiative, and the Czech–Slovak–Polish–Hungarian multilateral cooperation. On February 15, 1991, at the Visegrad meeting, the Heads of State and Government of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary signed a cooperation agreement, thus the cooperation of the Visegrad Three was born. The summit of the Visegrad Three was held in October, 1991, in Krakow – where, among others, they decided to set up CEFTA – then in May, 1992, in Prague.

In Krakow the Foreign Ministers of the three states announced in a joint statement that: “We are jointly of the opinion that the present system of diplomatic relations (diplomatic liaison) should be broadened considerably, with the aim of directly linking Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic and Poland into the activity of the Alliance. […] The ministers of the three countries would appreciate it if these proposals would

28 The Hungarian Republic was represented by President Árpád Göncz and Prime Minister József Antall, as well as Géza Jeszenszky, Foreign Minister and Béla Kádár, Minister of International Economic Relations. The Czech and Slovak Republic was represented by President Václav Havel, Prime Minister Marián Čalfa and Jiří Dienstbier, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The Republic of Poland was represented by President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Krzysztof Bielecki, and the Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski.
29 Central European Free Trade Agreement. The establishment of CEFTA was signed by the states of the Visegrad Three on December 21, 1992, in Krakow. The purpose of CEFTA was to accelerate and deepen the integration of member states with Western European institutions, which would strengthen the democratic system of their states as well as their free-market economy. With the accession to the European Union the CEFTA membership terminates.
be reflected in the regulations of the forthcoming NATO summit in Rome, and they express the readiness of their countries to begin the negotiations on the practical implementation of these proposals as soon as possible.”

Within the Hexagonale the three countries participated in bilateral cooperations according to their own, independent interests, there was no need to harmonise them. It was not advisable to demonstrate the trilateral cooperation because it would have caused the unnecessary suspicion of any member state, which would have weakened considerably the cooperation of the Six.

The Prague summit was preceded by the meeting of the Visegrad Three foreign policy leaders on February 13 and 14, in Warsaw, where they agreed to strengthen the international significance of the tripartite cooperation, and the coordination component of their activities at the CSCE and the Council of Europe. The parties sought to develop relations with the Western European Union, the European Community and NATO. The representatives of the three states acknowledged the need for closer cooperation in order to regulate the rights of the national and ethnic minorities, which is the element of stability and security. “In this regard, they are engaged in substantive consultation during the elaboration of pan-European regulation.” Besides, “the parties consider it to be an essential part of the cooperation, serving the idea of European integration, to adapt their legal system to the requirements that oblige the member states of the Council of Europe.”

In the spring of 1992 the relations between the Visegrad Three and the European Community were characterised by a strong unifying tendency, and these efforts were clearly appreciated by the Community. Therefore, the leaders of the Hungarian diplomacy considered that the practice of coordination among the Visegrad Three member countries should be further improved. The cooperations – as well as the association agreement – should be extended on almost all areas of economic, political and social life, because the deepening integration among the states strengthens pan-European integration, too. The Hungarian government believed that in major relationships all levels should be institutionalised, thus in Brussels

and in the countries of the presidency, as well as in the headquarters of major international organisations (New York, Geneva, Vienna), too. The exchange of views and cooperation among the European Community member states and the Visegrad Three ambassadors should be made regular.

The meeting of the foreign affairs leaders, which – as already mentioned – took place in Warsaw in February, 1992, was a higher level of contact, similarly to the foreign ministers’ meeting, which was held for the first time on May 5, 1992 in Prague. The latter was organised one day before the summit of the Visegrad Three in Prague. The leaders of the Hungarian diplomacy considered that at the Prague Summit of May 6 the following should be initiated: the three states and the heads of their government should write a letter to the European Community asking to discuss the EC’s enlargement strategy at the Lisbon Summit (June 26–27), because the common goal of the V3 countries is to achieve membership of the EC. In all three countries priority was given to the implementation of the Association Agreement. In these states the social, political, legal, institutional, economic and financial adaptation was continuous, since they were essential to achieving full membership. The efficiency and success of this process was further enhanced by the cooperation of the three states.

By 1992 supporting the democratic states of the Central and Eastern European region became an emphatic element in the policy of the Council of Europe, in which the Visegrad Three played a prominent role. Besides, however, the relationship between the member states of the Three was not without problems. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic became a full member of the Council of Europe on February 21, 1991 in Madrid, and Poland on November 26, 1991 in Strasbourg. According to the reports of the Hungarian Head of Mission accredited in Strasbourg, the characteristic of the period until May, 1992 was that due to Czechoslovakia’s conduct there were neither meaningful consultations, nor conciliations among the three regarding major issues. Prague ordered the Czechoslovak party to avoid the negotiations regularly and deliberately. In Strasbourg, at non-public events, the Czechoslovak Ambassador acted on behalf of the Three, however, he enforced solely the Czechoslovak interests. In many cases, the
Czechoslovak delegation voted differently in spite of explicit Hungarian and Polish conciliation attempts.\(^3^2\)

**Good neighbourly relations and the situation of Hungarians across the borders**

By 1991 the former Yugoslavia broke up.\(^3^3\) Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent in 1991, Macedonia in January, 1992 and Bosnia–Herzegovina in April. By then the armed conflicts transformed into a three-sided civil war. The Yugoslav wars seriously affected Hungary’s security, and not only in military terms, since the Hungarian minorities living in Vojvodina were heavily affected by the war, and a large number of refugees arrived in Hungary. On June 5, 1992, at the foreign ministers’ meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Oslo, a separate discussion between the leaders of the Hungarian and US delegations was initiated by the Americans. Géza Jeszenszky and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, negotiated for forty-five minutes about the South Slavic crisis and the expected effects of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Lawrence Eagleburger stated that the use of political and economic punitive measures became indispensable. He also emphasised that the international embargo could lead to even more determined and aggressive Serb behaviour, and there was a possibility that the Serb leadership would also engage in an adventure in Kosovo. For the United States the violent change of borders is not acceptable, and the outbreak of fights in Kosovo poses serious problems to Albania.

The American Deputy Secretary of State informed the Hungarian Foreign Minister about his visit in Bucharest, too, confirming that the leaders of the US diplomacy made it clear to the Romanian leadership that the United States paid special attention to the situation of Hungarian minority in Romania. Concerning the Yugoslav wars, Géza Jeszenszky stressed the importance of peacekeeping forces, and the necessity of their intervention in order to prevent fights on the territory of Vojvodina. In


\(^3^3\) Regarding the relations between Hungary and the neighbouring countries see JESZENSZKY Géza: Kísérlet a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltás éveiben. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2016.
addition, the Hungarian leader provided information about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The meeting fitted into the system of high-level American–Hungarian consultations, which promoted the familiarisation of the Hungarian standpoint regarding the South Slavic crisis, too.34

József Antall called the attention of the leaders of great powers to the events in Central Europe in a letter written in mid-June, 1992. In the diplomatic action the Hungarian Prime Minister addressed his first message of June 10 to George Bush. He sent a letter with the same content to Helmut Kohl, Francois Mitterand and John Major.35 In the first half of his letter József Antall stated that the changes happening in Central Europe in 1989/90 were a real historical turning point, but they primarily provided an opportunity for the people living in the region. However, this is only an opportunity which does not necessarily mean success. In the former communist countries the former communist nomenclature is a major source of danger, taking advantage of problems in the states of the region, and striving to a leading position.

József Antall was concerned about the current situation in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, where the influence of legally and politically uncontrolled armed forces increased. The economic, social and national problems intensified the destabilisation of the Soviet Union and the region, and their signs can be felt from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. “I believe that it is extremely important to increase the American and Western European economic presence, to further develop security systems and to consolidate NATO. There is a greater need for NATO and the US presence than ever. The most serious situation is in the north, in Poland, in the economic and political sense, while in the Czech and Slovak Republic the situation is critical regarding the whole state. I do not intend to talk in detail about the internal problem of Romania, but the “Greater Romania plan” with the formerly Soviet Moldavia can become reality, which could be a threatening and destabilising factor with a military takeover.”36

With regard to the South Slavic crisis József Antall stressed to the leaders of the great powers that it was becoming more serious, therefore

36 Ibid.
everything must be done to bring the civil war to an end. One option is the embargo, the other to help the security of independent republics with sanctions. The Belgrade leadership directs the regular and irregular Serbian troops for which, however, does not assume responsibility. “It is indispensable to ensure the presence of peacekeeping forces in areas that are not battle zones yet, including Vojvodina, where, of course, the fate of the Hungarian minority is a special responsibility for us.” He concluded his letter by saying that in that hot region Hungary seems to be a stable island, but its government could not escape the sense of threat and the consequences of social tensions inherent in the process of transformation. “I wished to impart these concerns and serious problems, and draw the attention of the leaders of the United States and Western Europe to the fact that the process in our region has not yet been completed, but it has only begun, its outcome is still uncertain, which could involve the danger of failure, too, unless we have a well-thought-out political strategy.”

NATO membership

In the autumn of 1993, the Hungarian diplomacy took further active steps towards the NATO membership of our country, in which several factors contributed: on the one hand, the South Slavic crisis, which was becoming acute, on the one hand, the conflict between Boris Yeltsin and the Duma with its communist majority, thirdly the NATO summit in January 1994. József Antall wrote a letter to the President of the United States, William J. Clinton, and to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, in which he presented the position of the Hungarian government.

The essence of the concept was that the preparation of the NATO membership of the Visegrád Group – according to a previously specified plan – should be completed as soon as possible. Accordingly, it is necessary to define the political, the security and the military grades, because an adequate guarantee is required for the security of the area. The right legal

37 Ibid.
38 As it is well known, the origins of the conflict between Russia’s President, Boris Yeltsin and the Duma, dominated by communists was Russia’s constitutional issue. While Yeltsin supported the presidential system, and intended to rule by decree until the next elections, the Duma wanted limited presidential power and the slowing the reforms. On September 23, 1993 the Duma deprived Yeltsin of his presidential power, and, as a response, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency, domestic and military units besieged the building of Russian legislature, the White House. Finally, by early October, Yeltsin won a victory.
form, like in the case of the European Community, would be an association followed by regular membership. This long-term, strategic goal could be introduced at the NATO summit in January, and the specific program could be implemented. In his letter József Antall stated that “today the army in the Commonwealth of Independent States is ‘a state within the state’, which was loyal to President Boris Yeltsin in a serious situation. […] Still, there is a danger that in the future the army leaders will not disown their imperial ideas about restoring all or a large part of the former Soviet Union.”

If NATO and the Western European Union do not integrate thoughtfully and in a planned manner the area between NATO and Russia, but leave it as a backup vacuum without guarantees, a pessimistic scenario may arise. József Antall also warned President Clinton that an extremely dangerous situation would arise if UN units were withdrawn from the Balkans, moreover, it would be expedient if NATO troops took over peacekeeping.

In parallel with the letters from the Hungarian Prime Minister, a personal diplomatic action was held in Washington, which was intended to allow members of the delegation to present the government’s position on the NATO summit in January. Gyula Kodolányi, the Head of the Advisory Board, Enikő Bollobás, the Head of Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Péter Zwack, the Hungarian Ambassador in Washington, and Pál Tar made a working visit to the leading personalities of the United States of America. Nearly thirty meetings were held with David Gergent, General Counselor of Clinton, Jenonne Walker, General Director of National Security Council, Frank Witzner, Secretary of State for Political Affairs at Pentagon, or Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and several heads of State Department. The Hungarian theses, based on the conceptions of József Antall, were elaborated by János Martonyi, Iván Bába, György Granasztói, Gyula Kodolányi, István Gyarmati.

The starting point of the Hungarian argument was to express the NATO Partnership for peace, which contained three distinct categories in the Hungarian concept: firstly, the special relationship between NATO and Moscow, but not within the framework of NATO. Secondly, the establishment of a fast connection “track” for the members of the Visegrad

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Group to enable them to join as soon as possible the development of NATO, on account of their strong democracy, their military willingness to cooperate and their geopolitical position. Thirdly, a slower “track” for the other European states applying for membership. The second point of the government’s thesis is that the approach between the Russian and the Central European states is not a mutually exclusive policy strategy, but one that should be treated in a parallel way. This was also underlined by the Hungarian delegation, because at the second level of the US security policy a misconception emerged concerning this approach. The third point was that Yeltsin was a realpolitik whose strategic priority is domestic politics, and the Eastern and Southern directions. According to the fourth thesis, the situation gives the US administration and President Clinton a chance for the historic initiative to make a spectacular gesture to the members of the Visegrad Group at the NATO summit in January.

In addition to the formal negotiations, further discussions were held behind the scenes. During all this, it became obvious that nothing had been decided in Washington. US governmental circles and the Pentagon’s “second tier” decision-makers opposed the differentiated treatment of Central European states regarding NATO membership. Among the NATO member states, France and Greece did not support the “fast track” concept of the Visegrad states. NATO’s Partnership for peace declaration was signed on January 10, 1994 at the Brussels Summit, in order to establish closer political and military cooperation with the states of the former Soviet bloc.

NATO considered its main task to prevent possible armed conflicts in Europe. The document envisaged the establishment of cooperation between NATO member states and other states. The Partnership Program did not set a deadline for full NATO membership, it was an alternative to NATO enlargement. Hungary participated in the Peace Partnership program between 1994 and 1999.

On the whole, we can conclude that the government led by József Antall, in accordance with it objectives, changed the course of Hungarian foreign policy. In the autumn of 1990, Hungary was first in the Central European region to be admitted to the Council of Europe. The Hungarian foreign

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40 With regard to France, Ambassador János Szávai started the preparatory work with Pál Tar for their joint diplomatic actions.
policy took an important role in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe. The concept of human rights and collective human
rights, and the closely related problem area of minorities were given an
emphatic role in the Hungarian diplomacy. The system of international
relations of Budapest expanded considerably, which was utilised in an
active way by the leaders of Hungarian foreign policy and diplomacy.
Along with the established foreign policy priority, the foreign affairs
administration has achieved significant results. The government led by
József Antall gave equal attention to Eastern and Western relations, and at
the same time, successfully created a balance between them. Antall’s
foreign policy concept renewed the foreign policy components of the
Hungarian nationhood, and also defined the place of Hungarians between
East and West, in the world, and in Europe.